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Dissertation

**COMPETITION OR COOPERATION? A  
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND  
SELECTED MEMBER STATES**

by

**ALICE SRUGIES**

born on February 8, 1986 in Dresden

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Prof. Dr. Martin Löffelholz (doctoral supervisor)

Prof. Dr. Nicholas J. Cull

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## **Abstract**

This study conducts a comparative, empirically grounded analysis of European public diplomacy at national, regional, and transnational level. It centers on France and Sweden as two selected EU member states. The study explores the questions of how EU and member state organizations conduct public diplomacy and to what extent public diplomacy efforts on the regional and national level complement or contradict each other. It enriches theory development in public diplomacy research by integrating theoretical approaches and insights from public diplomacy research, communication studies, sociology, and organization theory. Moreover, it enriches the small body of empirical knowledge on the public diplomacy understanding and practice of EU as well as French and Swedish organizations.

Based on a combination of a qualitative document analysis and guided expert interviews with public diplomacy practitioners, this study suggests that both France and Sweden pursue a rather centralized public diplomacy approach, whereas EU public diplomacy is much more decentralized with separate strategies and structures for communicating to internal and external publics. The two member states show a preference for persuasive public diplomacy goals that facilitate the assertion of national interests. While France perceives the EU as a channel to promote competitively oriented goals, Sweden does neither explicitly refer to the EU in its public diplomacy goals or messages. Interorganizational cooperation between the EU as a multi-issue organization and its member states depends on the political will of the single members and may stretch from ad-hoc cooperation on single issues and activities to the development of joint communication plans. The findings hint at predominantly pragmatic, often project-based cooperations that resonate with the ideas of a 'Europe of Projects' and 'Europe à la Carte' rather than endorsing strategic cooperation on an overarching EU public diplomacy strategy. Moreover, the study has disclosed that France as a founding member that has adopted the Euro currency and maintains a comparably high degree of influence on EU decision-making pursues a slightly more cooperative strategy with regard to EU public diplomacy than Sweden.



*In loving memory of  
Hans-Georg Nagel*



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## List of Abbreviations

AD	Anno Domini
AEFE	Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger
AFD	Agence française de développement
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Euro Meetings
BC	Before Christ
CESE	Conseil Économique, Social et Environnemental
CFI	Canal France International
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CICID	Comité Interministériel <i>de la</i> Coopération Internationale et du Développement
CIMEE	Comité Interministériel des Moyens de l'État à l'Étranger
CNCD	Commission Nationale de la Coopération Décentralisée
CNFPT	Centre National de la Fonction Publique Territoriale
CoR	Committee of the Regions
CORINTE	Comité Interministériel des Réseaux Internationaux de l'État
CROUS	Centre national des œuvres universitaires et scolaires
DAECT	Délégation pour l'Action Extérieure des Collectivités Territoriales
DGM	Direction Générale de la Mondialisation, du Développement et des Partenariats
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EEC	European Economic Community
e.g.	for example ( <i>exempli gratia</i> )
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUNIC	European Union National Institutes of Culture
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments

GII	Gender Inequality Index
HDI	Human Development Index
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IT	Information technology
MAEDI	Ministère <i>des Affaires Étrangères et du Développement International</i>
MENESR	Ministère de l'Education Nationale, de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Cono Sur
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSU	Council for the Promotion of Sweden
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIF	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
PI	Partnership Instrument
SEK	Swedish Krona
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UD-FIM	Enheten för främjande och EU:s inre marknad
UD-KOM	Kommunikationsenheten
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization



# 1. Introduction

Public diplomacy operates in a “‘polylateral’ world” (Melissen, 2011a, p. 3). This world is characterized by different kinds of actors that are economically, ecologically, and socially interdependent<sup>1</sup>. Challenges such as climate change, the protection of human rights, and the prevention and treatment of epidemics not only demand transnational cooperation, but the expertise of both state and non-state organizations (cf. Busch-Janser & Florian, 2007, p. 217; Melissen, 2005, p. 12). As a consequence, non-state organizations increasingly influence processes of governance on the transnational, national, and sub-national level (cf. Sørensen, 2004, p. 64).

Regionalization is an important development within this transformation of the international environment. It refers to the process of moving from a lack of cooperation and heterogeneity to cooperation, complementarity, and common identity in a given geographical area (cf. Schulz, Söderbaum, & Öjendal, 2001). Within the broader notion of regionalization, Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal (2001) define regionalism as “the urge by any set of actors to reorganize along a particular regional space”, with the aim of “creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security and wealth, peace and development within a region” (p. 10). Regionalism is not a new phenomenon, but it has grown in scope and diversity within the last decades<sup>2</sup>. The European Union (EU) was established almost 60 years ago to foster peace, stability and economic prosperity among European nations and “has developed into the most ambitious and far-reaching example” (Sørensen, 2004, p. 65) of regionalism. It is based on the idea of the region as acting subject, which encompasses “a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making” (Sørensen, 2004, p. 64, see also Hettne, 1997, p. 228).

As an international actor at regional level, the EU engages in public diplomacy towards strategic publics within and outside of the EU. EU public diplomacy towards strategic publics in member states contributes to fostering the legitimacy and support for the EU as an international actor, as well as EU policies and actions. Outside of the EU, public diplomacy constitutes a tool for strengthening the EU’s international role, as well as its visibility. This study explores public diplomacy as a tool for European public diplomacy actors on the regional and national level in greater detail.

## 1.1 Problem definition: European public diplomacy between competition and cooperation

Public diplomacy efforts of the EU are increasingly becoming a subject of academic debate. Scholars have explored EU public diplomacy from an instrumental perspective, focusing on approaches, tools, and messages (see for instance Cross, 2011; Rasmussen, 2010, 2009; Szondi, 2010; Valentini, 2008a, b), as well as an institutional perspective, centering on organizational structures and resources (see for instance Duke & Courtier, 2011; Lynch, 2005). They widely agree that there is a gap between the EU as a normative or civilian power (see for instance Manners & Whitman, 2013; Telò, 2006), which plays a significant role in areas like humanitarian aid, as well as development, and the international

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<sup>1</sup> Keohane and Nye (2000) assume that there are “multiple channels between societies, with multiple actors, not just states; multiple issues, not arranged in any clear hierarchy; and the irrelevance of the threat or use of force among states linked by complex interdependence” (p. 115). This notion is based on the concept of complex interdependence. Complex interdependence “refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane & Nye, 2000, p. 105). Realists focus on interdependence in a military sense, whereas the approach of complex interdependence by Keohane and Nye (1977) also includes economic, ecological and social aspects of interdependence.

<sup>2</sup> Protectionist politics in the 1930s as well as ‘hegemonic regionalism’ during the Cold War can be regarded as early forms of regionalization, that were imposed on countries from outside (cf. Schulz et al., 2001).

visibility of EU policies and actions. Scholars trace this gap back to structural obstacles (cf. Lynch, 2005; Szondi, 2010) and conceptual shortcomings (cf. Cross, 2011; Szondi, 2010) at the level of the regional organizational. Moreover, Cross (2012) argues that public diplomacy strategies of single EU member states can impede the visibility and the success of EU public diplomacy.

The EU is an international actor *sui generis*, which combines supranational and intergovernmental characteristics. Although EU member states pool their national sovereignty in a number of policy fields, they “do *remain* special players with exceptional powers and prerogatives” (Sørensen, 2004, p. 71, italics in original). This observation corresponds to the notion of regionalism as “an instrument to supplement, enhance or protect the role of the state and the power of the government in an interdependent world” rather than presenting “a distinct alternative to national interest and nationalism” (Schulz et al., 2001, p. 8). The ongoing European refugee crisis exemplifies the strong position of member states: Even though the crisis affects the EU as a whole and can only be mitigated on the basis of cooperation, EU member states are deeply divided on the measures suggested by the EU and partly refuse to commit to a joint solution. As a consequence, the impact of both EU policies and EU public diplomacy efforts is dependent on the political will of the member states

Public diplomacy organizations within EU member states are confronted with a strategic challenge between “competitive identity” and “multilateral cooperation” (Fisher 2010: 1). EU member states pursue competitive public diplomacy strategies in order to “compete with others for access to markets, for investment, for political influence, for tourism, for immigration talent, and for a host of other things which will bring direct benefit to them alone” (p. 22, see also Hocking, 2008). In this approach, public diplomacy is understood as a zero-sum game: Organizations perceive it as crucial that public diplomacy efforts are (only) associated with the international actor they communicate on behalf of (cf. Leonard et al., 2002, p. 22). In contrast, member states organizations that adopt cooperative public diplomacy strategies seek to “promot[e] stability, economic development, human rights and good government” (Leonard et al., 2002, p. 22) jointly with other public diplomacy organizations. Cooperative public diplomacy activities do not (only) serve the interest of a single political entity, but address common interests of several international actors. Even though Leonard et al. (2002) conceptualize cooperative public diplomacy as a positive-sum game, they point out that “the natural interest of any [organization] is to compete for power and influence wherever it can, and to expand the scope of its activities as much as resources allow” (p. 23). The question of the extent to which organizations pursue a competitive rather than a cooperative public diplomacy strategy guides this thesis. The following section describes the study’s purpose in greater detail.

## **1.2 Objectives and relevance of the study**

As outlined by Cross (2012), member states can either complement EU public diplomacy efforts or pursue competitively oriented public diplomacy strategies, which neglect or even contradict EU public diplomacy strategies. The state of research discloses little information on the extent to which these claims can be empirically substantiated. This study addresses this research gap by conducting a comparative, empirically grounded analysis of EU and France and Sweden as selected member states. It seeks to explore European public diplomacy at national, regional, and transnational level, as well as the interrelations between these levels on the basis of the following research questions:

- 1) How do EU organizations conduct public diplomacy?
- 2) How do organizations from the EU member states France and Sweden conduct public diplomacy?

- 3) To what extent do the public diplomacy efforts of EU and member state organizations complement or contradict each other?

The first two research questions center on the analysis of public diplomacy conducted by EU and member state organizations respectively. The study fathoms the understanding, and the practice of public diplomacy on the strategic level (public diplomacy goals, strategic publics, approaches) and the tactical level (public diplomacy messages and instruments), as well as cooperation among public diplomacy organizations as sub-aspects of each research question.

The third research question compares the public diplomacy understanding and practice by EU and member state organizations, focusing on the question to what extent regional public diplomacy efforts of the EU and national public diplomacy efforts of member states complement or rather contradict each other. It is assumed that synergies between national and regional public diplomacy efforts can only be achieved if national public diplomacy organizations pursue a cooperative public diplomacy strategy or include at least cooperative elements in their public diplomacy practice.

To answer these research questions, the study conceptualizes public diplomacy from the perspective of the single public diplomacy organizations that communicate on behalf of the EU as well as its member states. This organizational perspective constitutes a framework for integrating theoretical approaches and insights from public diplomacy research, communication studies, sociology, and organization theory. The methodological approach of this study draws on a combination of a qualitative analysis of strategy documents and guided expert interviews with representatives of EU and member state public diplomacy organizations. A qualitative approach to empirical research focuses on understanding social phenomena, which have not been extensively researched yet. It allows for in-depth, holistic analysis of public diplomacy organizations in which context factors are a vital part of both data collection and data analysis. The combination of research methods enables the researcher to level out the weaknesses of one specific method with the strengths of other methods. The document analysis focuses on strategy documents, which disclose information on formal communication structures and processes, as well as the question of how public diplomacy should be conducted. It is complemented by guided expert interviews, which document the perspective of single public diplomacy organizations and its representatives on how public diplomacy is actually conducted and how informal communication structures and processes influence public diplomacy. By analyzing, how EU as well as French and Swedish organizations conduct public diplomacy, this study applies a comparative research design. Comparative research does not only look at similarities and differences between particular objects of investigation, but also provides insights into the infrastructure, as well as the political, cultural and media environments, which surround the objects of study (cf. Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004).

It goes beyond the scope of this study to compare EU public diplomacy with the public diplomacy efforts of all 28 EU member states. Therefore, the study focuses on a qualitative analysis of France and Sweden as two selected member states. These two countries are chosen on the basis of four criteria that describe the relationship between member states and the EU. It is assumed that these criteria influence the public diplomacy practice of the respective member state organizations and their motivation to cooperate with EU organizations on public diplomacy. These criteria include 1) the year of accession to the EU, 2) the adoption of the Euro currency, 3) the influence on the decisions of the EU, and 4) the monetary contributions to the EU. France is included as a founding member of the EU, which has adopted the Euro currency, exercises a comparably high degree of influence on EU decision-making, and contributes a comparably large share of money to the regional organization. Moreover, Sweden represents a less influential EU member state, which has joined the EU after the inception of the Maastricht Treaty, kept its own currency, and contributes a comparatively small share of money to the EU. The study does not define the EU, France and Sweden as single cases, but

conducts an in-depth analysis of the most relevant public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of the three international actors. This approach to case selection enables the researcher to draw a differentiated picture of the public diplomacy conduct of the EU and its member states, which also reveals similarities and differences between the organizations that communicate on behalf of an international actor.

As qualitative studies only allow for the analysis of a limited number of cases, this thesis concentrates on governmental organizations such as the foreign ministry or foreign representations, and government agencies. Governmental organizations may conduct public diplomacy themselves or act in the role of a public diplomacy “sponsor”, which coordinates and finances activities of government agencies such as the Institut Français and the Swedish Institute. Both governmental organizations and government agencies represent and communicate on behalf of an international actor. Even though media and civil society organizations, as well as businesses can be public diplomacy organizations in their own right, the scope of this study does not permit a detailed analysis of the public diplomacy understanding and practice of these non-state organizations. The role of media and civil society organizations, as well as businesses in EU and member state public diplomacy is only addressed in the analysis of interorganizational cooperation.

This study advances public diplomacy research from a theoretical and methodological perspective. Moreover, it contributes to the internationalization of the state of research. This study adds to theory development by introducing an interdisciplinary research model that draws on findings and concepts from public diplomacy research, communication science, particularly public relations research, sociology, organization theory as well as social network research to fathom the public diplomacy practice of different international actors. Moreover, this study enriches the small body of empirical knows on public diplomacy in Sweden and France and deepens the knowledge on EU public diplomacy practice. In contrast to most public diplomacy research, it addresses both the domestic/internal and foreign/external dimension of the concept.

Until now, there are only very few comparative public diplomacy studies (see for instance Pamment, 2013b; Valentini, 2010; Wang & Sun, 2012; White & Radic, 2014). The current debate on public diplomacy research shows that scholars stress the demand for (more) comparative public diplomacy research to “prepare the ground for generalizations needed to construct theories” (Gilboa, 2015) and to understand the “often very different cultural and political understandings of why and how states need to communicate to foreign publics” (Hayden, 2015). This study contributes to enriching comparative public diplomacy research by analyzing similarities and differences of the public diplomacy approaches of the EU as well as its member states. It...

- ... encourages the development of empirically grounded public diplomacy theories,
- ... enables scholars to identify patterns of public diplomacy practice that specifically apply to single cultures, countries, regions and types of organizations or may even be generally valid,
- ... examines the influence of context factors on the understanding and practice of public diplomacy, and
- ... empowers practitioners by learning from the public diplomacy practice of others and including scientific findings in their own work (cf. Srugies, 2013a, pp. 232-233).

The following section outlines theory development, internationalization of public diplomacy research, and comparative public diplomacy scholarship as central research areas, which are addressed in this study.

### 1.3 Relevant areas of research

#### *Theory development*

Auer (2015) organizes contributions to public diplomacy research in four groups, which vary with regard to their theoretical scope and complexity. These groups include 1) normative ‘everyday theories’, case studies and historical accounts, 2) models, taxonomies, demarcations of public diplomacy from related concepts, 3) theory proliferation and, 4) theory integration:

1. **Normative ‘everyday theories’, case studies and historical accounts:** Publications in this group include accounts on the historical evolution of public diplomacy as a practice as well as the historical contexts and precedents that shape the public diplomacy practice of different political entities today (see for instance Dizard, 2004). Moreover, the state of research encompasses a large number of reflections on the current state of public diplomacy as a professional practice as well as ways of improving it - either from a general perspective or on the basis of case studies on single public diplomacy actors, campaigns or instruments.
2. **Models, taxonomies, demarcation from related concepts:** There are many different approaches to describing public diplomacy, but no internationally consented and empirically grounded definition on the meaning of the concept. In order to refine the understanding of public diplomacy, scholars have explored similarities and differences of public diplomacy and related concepts, including
  - diplomacy (see for instance Bolewski, 2008; Melissen, 2005; Gregory, 2008),
  - propaganda (see for instance Taylor, 2002; Snow, 2004; Zaharna, 2004; Plaisance, 2005; Snow & Taylor, 2006),
  - public relations (see for instance Fitzpatrick, Kendrick & Fullerton, 2013; Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005; Lee, 2007; Petersone, 2008; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Signitzer, 1993, 1995, 2008; Yun, 2006, 2008),
  - strategic communication (see for instance Deutsch, 2010; Gregory, 2005; Hayden, 2010, Leonard et al., 2002; Nye, 2004, Pamment, 2009; Taylor, 2009; van Dyke & Verçîc, 2009),
  - marketing (see for instance Kotler & Gertner, 2002; Benoit & Zhang, 2003; Kendrick & Fullerton, 2004; Sun, 2008), and
  - nation branding (see for instance Anholt, 2006; Copeland, 2006; Kaneva, 2011; Olins, 2002; Szondi, 2008).

Demarcating public diplomacy from related concepts contributes to defining the boundaries of public diplomacy as a field of research and practice. Both models and taxonomies of public diplomacy constitute intermediate steps towards theory building by identifying important analytical categories and describing the relations between them (cf. Gilboa, 2008, p. 59). Models can be understood as “simplified symbolic representations of reality”<sup>3</sup> (Bonfadelli, 2010, p. 121, translation by the author) that depict structures and processes of reality.

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<sup>3</sup> “Ein Modell kann a.s vereinfachte symbolische Repräsentation der Wirklichkeit definiert werden“ (Bonfadelli, 2010, p. 121).

Bonfadelli (2010, p. 121) stresses that models always display reality from a specific perspective that highlights selected structures and processes, while other aspects may either be treated with less importance or completely left out. With regard to public diplomacy, models serve four different purposes: 1) They organize and systematize knowledge on public diplomacy, 2) they explain processes and structures of public diplomacy, 3) they guide empirical analyses of public diplomacy in the context of a broader theoretical framework, and 4) they predict how public diplomacy is practiced under certain circumstances. Scholars have developed models that focus on...

- ... public diplomacy actors (see for instance Gilboa, 2008),
- ...public diplomacy functions and goals (see for instance Brown, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2010b; Signitzer, 1993; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992),
- ... approaches to public diplomacy (see for instance Cowan & Arsenault 2008; Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008; Leonard et al. 2002, Nye 2004), and
- ... public diplomacy instruments (see for instance Löffelholz et al. 2011)

Cull applies the term ‘taxonomy’ to describe his systematization of core approaches to public diplomacy as well as their “conceptual timeframe, the direction of flow of information, the type of infrastructure required and the source of their credibility” (Cull, 2009c, p. 24). Taxonomies present classifications of terms or concepts (cf. Kepplinger, 2004, p. 92). Both models and taxonomies make public diplomacy as an object of research more tangible by reducing complexity. However, this strength can also turn into a major weakness: They simplify the concept of public diplomacy and cannot take all important context factors into consideration.

3. **Theory proliferation:** The term proliferation refers to the “[application of] a theory to a new explanatory domain” (Berger, Wagner & Zelditch, 1985, p. 29). This group of studies concentrates on “theories that help scholars and practitioners make sense of the “field” of public diplomacy” (Hayden, 2009). Publications that can be allocated to the group ‘theory proliferation’ include contributions by scholars and (former) practitioners: “As it has been neglected in academic circles in the past”, Cowan and Cull (2008) argue that “scholarship around public diplomacy has until recently been dominated by practitioners, frequently with an institutional axe to grind” (p. 7). Even though practitioners’ contributions to public diplomacy research may be biased, they provide “firsthand experience” and “a nuanced understanding of events and organizational cultures that scholars often find difficult to match” (Gregory 2008: 279). Joseph Nye’s (2004) work on soft power as well as Caitlin Byrne’s (2012) reflections on applying constructivism to public diplomacy scholarship illustrate that publications from (former) practitioners are not limited to atheoretical ‘everyday theories’ and case studies, but also include pieces that apply theoretical knowledge from disciplines like international relations to public diplomacy scholarship.
4. **Theory Integration:** Theory “*integration* involves uniting two or more theoretical arguments covering at least partially different domains into a single that covers both domains” Berger et al., 1985, p. 30, italics in original). Auer (2016) is among the first scholars that combine different sociological theories to develop an integrated public diplomacy theory.

This study focuses on theory proliferation. It fathoms the potential of applying approaches from communication studies, sociology, organization theory as well as social network research to public diplomacy in an interdisciplinary research framework developed in chapter two of this thesis.

Over the past five decades, public diplomacy scholarship has gradually widened in scope. Public diplomacy research from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War has been dominated by the USA as object of analysis as well as U.S. scholars. Studies from this period particularly focused on the United States Information Agency as public diplomacy actor, cultural diplomacy as well as international broadcasting (cf. Cull, 2009d).

The period after the Cold War is characterized by an internationalization of public diplomacy as a field of research: While the majority of the institutions and authors dealing with public diplomacy were still situated in the United States (cf. USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2009) and the U.S. remained the main object of analysis (see for instance Schatz & Levine, 2010; Cull, 2009d; Höse, 2008; von Eschen 2005; Snow, 2004; Hoffman, 2002; Ross, 2002; Ohmsted, 1993), European researchers started engaging in public diplomacy (see for instance Signitzer, 1993) and looking at single European countries such as Great Britain (see for example Leonard, Small, & Rose, 2005). To Melissen (2006), many European countries draw on a long public diplomacy tradition:

*“The ‘European school of public diplomacy’ does in fact draw on a much longer and more varied experience with public diplomacy than any other region in the world. For some of the nations of Europe, public diplomacy was a top priority from the first days of their existence. This was true for some of the new nations on the Balkans in the 1990s, but it was also the case for Germany’s Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit from the very start of the Federal Republic in 1949.” (Melissen 2006: 2)*

Research on public diplomacy in European countries discloses three research focuses on three geographical areas (see sub-chapter): 1) public diplomacy in West European countries, especially Great Britain, France and Germany (see for instance Auer & Srugies, 2013; Brown, 2012; Fisher, 2009; Ostrowski 2008; Pamment, 2013a; Rivera, 2015), 2) public diplomacy in North European countries (see for instance Bátorá, 2005; Olsson, 2013; Pamment, 2013b; White & Radic, 2014), and 3) public diplomacy in Central and East European countries (see for instance Ociepka, 2013; Ociepka & Riniejska, 2005; Szondi, 2009). The review on the state of research on the selected EU member states France and Sweden (see sub-chapter 4.2) shows that there is little empirically grounded knowledge that goes beyond case studies on single organizations and initiatives.

Public diplomacy in Asia has been one of the most discussed issues in public diplomacy in the last years. Scholars have conducted studies on single Asian countries China (see for example D’Hooge, 2005, 2007; Rawnsley, 2009; Wang, 2008, 2011) or Japan (see for example Ogawa, 2009). Moreover, Lee and Melissen (2011) provide a comprehensive introduction to public diplomacy and soft power in East Asia. The body of public diplomacy research is still significantly characterized by U.S. scholars and studies on the U.S., but complemented by a growing number of studies on European and Asian countries. Scholars have only begun to explore Australian see for instance Byrne, 2011, 2009; Chitty, 2009), Latin American (see for instance Villanueva Rivas, 2011) and African (see for instance Ndhlovu, 2009) perspectives that will further enrich and broaden the field of the research in the future.

Public diplomacy research does not stop at national borders, but increasingly turns its eyes to the communication strategies and activities of multilateral organizations like NATO (see for instance Babst, 2009), the EU (see for instance Rasmussen, 2010; Szondi, 2010) or ASEAN (see for instance Bui, 2011; Chachavalpongpun, 2011; Smith, 2014). However, “the question of how multilateral

organizations conduct public diplomacy is not yet sufficiently explored” (Pagovski, 2015, p. 5). Cross and Melissen (2013) have made a significant contribution to theoretical development of EU public diplomacy scholarship. Only a small group of researchers has conducted empirical research on the public diplomacy practice of the EU (see for instance Michalski, 2005; Rasmussen, 2009, 2010; Azpiroz, 2015). Valentini (2008a, 2008b) is one of the first scholars to empirically examine EU public diplomacy efforts from the perspective of the multilateral organizations and its member states.

The interdisciplinary research framework developed in chapter two guides the review of the state of research on the EU as well as France and Sweden as selected member states in chapter three and four. The literature review systematizes and compares theoretical reflections and empirical studies on the most important public diplomacy organizations, their external environments, and, building on that, their public diplomacy understanding and practice.

### *Comparative public diplomacy research*

So far, public diplomacy research has focused on the analysis of ...

- ... single actors (see for instance Kelley, 2011; van Noort, 2011; Zöllner, 2006, 2009),
- ... single events (see for instance Cull, 2008b; Horton, 2008; Xu, 2006)
- ... single initiatives, programs and tools (see for instance Metzgar, 2012; Pamment, 2015), and
- ... single countries (see section ‘Internationalization of public diplomacy research’).

The first group of scholars concentrates on the public diplomacy practice of different public diplomacy state and non-state organizations: Zöllner (2006, 2009) for instances looks at the conceptual convergences between public diplomacy and public relations taking the example of the international broadcaster Deutsche Welle. Van Noort (2011) dedicates her research efforts to the analysis of digital public diplomacy by examining the online activities of the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands. Kelley (2011), on the other hand, analyzes the U.S. government’s public diplomacy strategy and tactics. In addition to a growing interest in the Chinese public diplomacy practice, scholars have also studied single events within the public diplomacy strategy of China. The Olympic Games, held in Beijing in 2008, have been subject of an intense discussion of the Chinese approach to public diplomacy on the one hand and sports as public diplomacy on the other hand (Cull, 2008b; Horton, 2008; Xu, 2006). Studies that concentrate on single campaigns, programs and initiatives encompass Pamment’s (2015) analysis of the promotional campaign ‘GREAT Britain’ as well as Metzgar’s (2012) assessment of the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program.

Even though these studies represent different foci of public diplomacy research, they can all be classified as case studies. Case studies constitute the prevailing methodological approach to public diplomacy research. They fulfill a number of core functions for the theoretical, empirical and practical advancement of public diplomacy:

- Case studies enable scholars to empirically ground and test theoretically developed typologies.
- Case studies allow for a detailed analysis of context factors that influence the understanding and practice of the concept of public diplomacy (cf. Lauth, Pickel, & Jahn, 2009, p. 67).

Despite these benefits of case studies, it needs to be taken into consideration that their external validity is limited (cf. Muno, 2009). So far, the body of research on public diplomacy does only include a



small number of internationally or cross-culturally comparative studies: Kampschulte (2008) conducted a comparative analysis of the public diplomacy approaches of Germany and the USA from 1990 to 2005 based on a qualitative document analysis and guided interviews with state actors. A comparative analysis of the public diplomacy approaches, evaluation methods and selected campaigns in the USA, Great Britain and Sweden is the focus of Pamment's (2011) doctoral thesis. Pamment (2011) applied a multi-methodological research design that encompassed qualitative interviews with public diplomacy actors, a document analysis and the reconstruction of selected public diplomacy campaigns. These comparative studies all apply a case-oriented approach: They conduct in-depth analyses of a small number of countries (cf. Esser, 2010, pp. 4-5) and consider context factors and dynamic developments essential to the analysis of the public diplomacy understanding and practice in the respective countries. Based on the number of countries compared, Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge (2005) present the most comprehensive study on public diplomacy strategies and instruments to-date. Their publication "European Infopolitik" reviews the public diplomacy activities of all states that were a member of the EU as of 2005. Plumridge (2005) states that the analysis is based on a "brief survey" (p. 29), but does not provide a detailed description of the methodological foundation of the research project.

This review of methodological approaches to studying public diplomacy reveals a dominance of case studies or case-oriented approaches that focus on the perspective of the communicator. Transnationally or cross-culturally comparative public diplomacy analyses constitute only a small share of public diplomacy research and lacks both systematization and continuity. To contribute to filling this research gap, this study develops a research design that allows for a systematic comparative assessment of national and regional public diplomacy efforts. Chapter five specifies the research design and describes the single steps of the empirical research process, including the sampling procedure, the development of research instruments, the data collection, as well as the conceptualization of a data analysis strategy. This chapter paves the way for the presentation and discussion of findings on chapter six. Chapter six presents, interprets and contextualizes the empirical results of the study. In the closing chapter seven, the researcher summarizes the thesis as a whole. Moreover, this concluding chapter describes this study's contribution to theory building in public diplomacy and outlines future avenues of empirical research. Not least, it derives a set of recommendations for advancing public diplomacy practice.

## **2. Theorizing national and regional public diplomacy**

This chapter aims at developing a theoretical framework for studying European public diplomacy. This framework will guide the analysis of the state of research in chapters three and four as well as the conceptualization, realization, analysis, and interpretation of the empirical study in chapters five and six. The framework as well as the research model elaborated in this chapter is not limited to the analysis of the EU and its member states, but can also be adapted to the study of the public diplomacy understanding and practice in other national and regional contexts.

This chapter begins by developing a definition of public diplomacy in sub-chapter 2.1 that serves as a basis for the theoretical conceptualization of public diplomacy. This chapter continues by giving an overview of major theoretical perspectives on public diplomacy (sub-chapter 2.2.1) and providing a rationale for adopting an organizational perspective on public diplomacy research (2.2.2). The following sub-chapters 2.3 to 2.7 detail the single aspects of conceptualizing public diplomacy from an organizational perspective. Building on the assumption that the internal and external environments of public diplomacy organizations influence their public diplomacy understanding and practice, sub-chapter 2.3 takes a closer look at the different types of organizations that communicate on behalf of an international actor as well as the internal and external factors that shape, enable and constrain their public diplomacy efforts. Sub-chapter 2.4 expands on the question of how public diplomacy organizations define public diplomacy and to what extent they apply this term to refer to their work. This study conceptualizes the public diplomacy practice of organizations on two levels: on the strategic level (sub-chapter 2.5) it explores models and approaches to the analysis of communication frameworks, public diplomacy goals as well as strategy publics, the a tactical level (sub-chapter 2.6) it discusses approaches to investigating public diplomacy messages, tools and communication channels. The organizational approach to public diplomacy approach does not only focus on single organizations, but also on cooperation between them. Sub-chapter 2.7 introduces theoretical approaches different academic disciplines to describe and compare aspects of interorganizational cooperation among public diplomacy organizations.

Based on the theoretical approaches introduced to analyze public diplomacy from an organizational perspective, sub-chapters 2.3 to 2.7 develop the analytical dimensions that guide the empirical study (see sub-chapter 5.2). This approach enables the researcher to establish a direct link between the theoretical concepts discussed in each sub-chapter and the operationalization of these theoretical concepts in the empirical study<sup>4</sup>. The analytical dimensions developed in single sub-chapters constitute the building blocks of a research model for the analysis of European public diplomacy (sub-chapter 2.8).

### **2.1 Academic understanding of public diplomacy**

This sub-chapter focuses on the question of how scholars define public diplomacy. It depicts the historical evolution of the term and reflects on debates on defining the scope of the concept<sup>5</sup>. It

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<sup>4</sup> Chapter five will summarize these analytical dimensions and explain in greater detail how they are translated into coding frame and interview guidelines as research instruments.

<sup>5</sup> There is an entire sub-area of public diplomacy research, which deals with demarcating public diplomacy from related concepts such as diplomacy, branding or propaganda (see sub-chapter 1.3). However, it goes beyond the scope of this study to discuss demarcations of public diplomacy from related concepts in greater detail. Similarities and differences of public diplomacy and related concepts are only taken up, if this study applies theories and approaches from other fields such as public relations.

concludes by developing a public diplomacy definition, which constitutes the basis for theorizing public diplomacy in the following sub-chapters.

Public diplomacy scholars universally agree that the term ‘public diplomacy’, in its modern sense, was coined in 1965 by Edmund Asbury Gullion, former Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at the Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, USA and long-standing diplomat. However, the actual practice of public diplomacy has a long history, comprising several thousand years. The ancient Olympic Games (held from 776 BC to 393 AD) serve as an example for early public diplomacy practice: The political and cultural dimension of the ancient Olympic Games “extended well beyond the sporting competition” (Auer & Srugies, 2013, p. 18) itself. The event did not only bring political representatives of different city states together, but also provided a political forum, in which citizens of the different city states could be reached (Das Olympische Museum 2007: 2f.).

Cull (2009b) traces the earliest use of the term ‘public diplomacy’ back to an opinion piece in the London Times published in 1856, in which public diplomacy was used as a synonym for ‘civility’. In the decades to come, ‘public diplomacy’ was primarily used in the sense of an ‘open diplomacy’ opposed to secretive forms of diplomacy behind closed doors (ibid.). Gullion (1965) defined public diplomacy as “the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions” (The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, n.d.). This definition emphasizes persuasion as the primary objective of public diplomacy. Against the background of the Cold War, the term public diplomacy served as an important means to delineate the USA from the Soviet Union: “[...] Americans would do public diplomacy and the communists were left peddling propaganda“ (Cull, 2008b, p. 18)<sup>6</sup>. Like Gullion, the former United States Information Agency Associate Director Gifford D. Malone considers public diplomacy to be “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” (Malone, 1985, p. 199). Malone reinforces this understanding of public diplomacy in 1988 by describing it as a way “to influence the behaviour of a foreign government by influencing the attitudes of its citizens” (Malone, 1988, p.3). Similarly, Delaney (1968, pp. 3-4) and Adelman (1981, p. 913) advance an understanding of public diplomacy that focuses on persuasion.

While a number of definitions published in the 1990s still highlight public diplomacy as a means of influencing foreign governments and citizens (see for instance Frederick, 1993, p. 229; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992, p. 138), the end of the Cold War marks the beginning of a gradual shift towards the generation of understanding as the main focus of public diplomacy. The concept was now understood as „a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, as well as its national goals and current policies” (Tuch, 1990, pp. 3-4). This definition by Hans Tuch, one of the most influential and cited ones to date, exemplifies the shift in the understanding of public diplomacy. The notion that “only governments use public diplomacy” (Gilboa, 2008, p. 57), however, was still present.

A second shift in the understanding of public diplomacy was triggered by the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. Scholars and practitioners alike have verbalized the need of rethinking public diplomacy: “Our new thinking in public diplomacy must involve a motto-shift from USIA’s ‘telling

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<sup>6</sup> Interestingly, Jarol B. Manheim, emeritus professor of media and public affairs and political science, makes an explicit comparison of public diplomacy with propaganda and argues that “[s]trategic public diplomacy [...] is, within the limits of available knowledge, the practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behaviour.” (Manheim, 1994, p. 7).

America's story to the world' to 'sharing values, hopes, dreams, and common respect' with the world. We need a shift from the Clinton doctrine of economic engagement and enlarging markets and the Bush doctrine of preemptive security and the long war to a new doctrine of global partnership and engagement" (Snow, 2009, p. 5). This new understanding of the concept is characterized as relational or "dialogue-based public diplomacy" by Riordan (2004, see also Fitzpatrick, 2011; Zaharna, 2010) and further elaborated by Leonard, Stead and Smewing (2002): "In fact public diplomacy is about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause" (p. 8).

The review of public diplomacy definitions has outlined that real world events influence the scholarly conceptualization of public diplomacy. Important historical turning points, namely the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, have reframed the understanding of the concept from public diplomacy as persuasion (Cold War period) to accentuating the generation of understanding (Post-Cold War period) and, eventually, centering on mutual understanding (Post-9/11 period) (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013, pp. 9-10). Auer and Srugies (2013) remark that this shift in the understanding of public diplomacy is also visible with regard to the role that is attributed to (foreign) citizens: "During the Cold War it was seen as a target to be persuaded and thus again an actor to persuade other governments, at the end of the Cold War it was mainly a target group whose understanding was sought and since 9/11 it has been an actor seeking mutual understanding" (Auer & Srugies, 2013, p. 10). In order to delineate the dialogue- and relationship-based understanding of the concept from the way how public diplomacy was grasped in the Cold War-era, Melissen (2005) suggested to differentiate between public diplomacy and the new public diplomacy: "The new public diplomacy moves away from – to put it crudely – peddling information to foreigners and keeping the foreign press at bay, towards engaging with foreign audiences" (Melissen, 2005, p. 13)<sup>7</sup>.

Despite this shift in the understanding of public diplomacy after 9/11, persuasive, asymmetric communication activities remain an integral part of public diplomacy. Sharp (2005), for example, comprehends public diplomacy as "the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented" (p. 106). Thus, public diplomacy goals can be located on a continuum ranging from persuasion to mutual understanding<sup>8</sup>.

Processes of transnationalization have encouraged the development of a multi-actor structure of public diplomacy comprising both state and non-state actors, including governments, NGOs, and multinational corporations (see for instance Busch-Janser & Florian, 2007, p. 217; Melissen, 2005, p.

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<sup>7</sup> Even though many scholars agree with the re-definition and re-conceptualization of public diplomacy, the majority neglects the adoption of a new terminology and stays with the established term public diplomacy (cf. Gilboa 2008a: 58). This study applies the term public diplomacy while acknowledging the changing international environment that the concept operates in as well as the changes in the understanding and practice of public diplomacy.

<sup>8</sup> This observation corresponds to the typology of public diplomacy functions introduced by Fitzpatrick (2010). Based on a review of 150 public diplomacy definitions, Fitzpatrick (2010, pp. 89-90) identifies six different functions of public diplomacy: Public diplomacy can serve the function of 1) influencing the attitudes and behaviors of publics (influence/advocacy function, see for instance Mor, 2006), 2) inform and educate publics about an international actors, its goals, policies, values and actions (communication/informational function, see for instance Tuch, 1990), 3) sell or promote specific aspects of an international actor (promotional function, see for instance Snow, 2007), as well as 4) establish and maintain mutually beneficial relationships between an international actors and/or between an international actors and its publics (relational function, see for instance Leonard, 2002). Moreover, scholars have also described public diplomacy as "an instrument of national security used to support and/or complement military efforts" (Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 90, see for instance Oglesby, 2005).

12). While public diplomacy definitions in the Cold War- and post-Cold War-period regard governments as sole or main public diplomacy actors, definitions published after 9/11 stress the multitude of actors in the international environment. Although the nation state remains the dominant frame of reference in many public diplomacy definitions in the post-9/11-period (see for instance McClellan, 2004, pp. 23-24; Pamment, 2011, p. 1), public diplomacy is not limited to the national level, but conducted on both sub- and regional or transnational level. Increasingly, scholars turn to the analysis of the public diplomacy of cities, federal entities like Quebec in Canada or Catalonia in Spain (see for instance Melissen, 2011a; Huijgh, 2011, 2013), but also international organizations (see for instance Babst, 2009; Cross & Melissen, 2013; Pagovski, 2015; Rasmussen, 2009, 2010; Szondi, 2010). Following Cull (2009c)<sup>9</sup>, this study broadly defines public diplomacy actors as “international actors”, including the different types of public diplomacy actors (state/non-state, public/private) on sub-national, national and regional or transnational level.

Public diplomacy primarily, but not exclusively addresses foreign target groups<sup>10</sup>. However, public diplomacy also has a ‘domestic dimension’ that involves communication with immigrants, but also with citizens in general<sup>11</sup>. Public diplomacy towards domestic citizens aims at legitimizing foreign policy programs and generating public support for these external actions (see for instance Huijgh, 2013; Potter, 2009). Individuals that travel abroad or engage in exchange programs are often perceived as representatives of their home country who, consciously or unconsciously, “play a role in promoting the message or image which the public diplomat is seeking to project to the world” (Cull, 2008a, p. 24) and influence the relationships their home country maintains with other international actors. In this sense, public diplomacy also fulfils the function of sensitizing citizens for their role as ambassadors of their home country abroad. “[T]he support of ‘at home’ citizens for international policy choices is [considered] a precondition for effective public diplomacy abroad” (Melissen, 2011a, p. 20, see also Cull, 2009a, Fitzpatrick, 2010b; Huijgh, 2013; Michalski, 2005). The ‘domestic dimension of public diplomacy’ also reflects the interconnection of the national and the international sphere that is fostered by the cooperation on transnational challenges like climate change or terrorism (see for instance Cull, 2009a; Gonesh & Melissen, 2005). Similarly, EU public diplomacy comprises an external dimension focusing on third states and international organizations outside of the EU as well as an internal dimension within the EU, including France and Sweden as member states.

Based on a review of the different approaches to conceptualizing public diplomacy, this study defines public diplomacy as follows:

*Public diplomacy encompasses communication activities of international actors that aim at managing the international environment. Public diplomacy can be understood as an instrument of an international actor to improve its international relations and facilitate the assertion of its interests. Public diplomacy can be targeted at both foreign/internal and domestic/external audiences (cf. Auer, Srugies, Löffelholz, 2015, p. 40; Cull, 2009a, p. 12).*

<sup>9</sup> Cull (2009c) defines public diplomacy as an „international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public” (p. 12)

<sup>10</sup> While the majority of Western democracies concentrate on public diplomacy towards foreign target groups, domestic and foreign target groups are of equal importance to Chinese public diplomacy practitioners (cf. Auer, Srugies & Löffelholz, 2015, see also d’Hooghe, 2011).

<sup>11</sup> The domestic dimension of public diplomacy overlaps with governmental public relations. Both concepts aim at explaining and legitimizing policies to domestic /internal constituencies, and aim at generating support for an international actor’s external actions. While Signitzer and Wamser (2006) refer to public diplomacy as a “specific governmental public relations function” (p. 382), this thesis argues that the domestic dimension of public diplomacy can also go beyond governmental public relations. Governmental public relations is limited to the government as communicator. In contrast, state and non-state organizations can engage in the domestic dimension of public relations.

Drawing on the different approaches to defining public diplomacy, three roles of public diplomacy actors can be identified. These different roles are not mutually exclusive, but may overlap:

- Public diplomacy actors seek to influence the attitudes and decisions of primarily foreign publics and governments and manage perceptions (role of the persuader),
- Public diplomacy actors seek to evoke understanding for political programs, ideas, ideals and values (role of the generator of understanding), and
- Public diplomacy actors seek to establish and maintain relations and partnerships (role of the facilitator) (cf. Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015)

Despite the growing internationalization of public diplomacy research, it needs to be taken into account that the majority of definitions presented above have been developed by Western scholars in Western contexts. Future contributions from African, Asian or for instance Latin American researchers can expand and greatly enhance the academic understanding of public diplomacy<sup>12</sup>. In addition to that, comparative public diplomacy research enriches our knowledge on how different political, cultural and/or media environments shape practitioners' public diplomacy understanding (see for instance Rawnsley, 2014, p. 164). Sub-chapters 2.2 to 2.8 introduce a theoretical framework for analyzing and interpreting similarities and differences in the public diplomacy understanding and practice in different national and regional contexts.

## **2.2 Theoretical perspectives on public diplomacy**

This sub-chapter provides an overview of the major theoretical approaches to studying European public diplomacy (2.2.1). It outlines benefits and limitations of applying these single approaches to the study at hand. Based on these considerations, this study pursues an organization centered approach to analyzing public diplomacy. Sub-chapter 2.2.2 describes the fundamentals and foci of theorizing public diplomacy from an organizational perspective.

### **2.2.1 Overview of major theoretical perspectives on public diplomacy**

The introductory chapter has identified four groups of scholarly contributions to public diplomacy research, which vary with regard to their theoretical scope and complexity (cf. Auer, 2015). This study fathoms the potential of employing existing public diplomacy models and taxonomies in empirical research. Furthermore, it draws on theory proliferation as the “[application of] a theory to a new explanatory domain” (Berger, Wagner & Zelditch, 1985, p. 29). It adapts existing models and taxonomies in public diplomacy research as well as approaches from related disciplines to theorize European public diplomacy. To Gilboa (2008), public diplomacy is “one of the most multidisciplinary areas in modern scholarship” (p. 56). Disciplines that have particularly contributed to enhancing the theoretical and empirical knowledge of public diplomacy include communication studies, international relations, and sociology.

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<sup>12</sup> See Waisbord and Mellado (2014) for an overview on the current debate on de-Westernization in communication studies

This sub-chapter provides an overview of theoretical approaches that have already been applied to advance theory development and empirical research in public diplomacy. It focuses on communication studies, international relations, and sociology as disciplines that have particularly contributed to enhancing theoretical and empirical public diplomacy knowledge. Moreover, this section identifies approaches that have received little to no attention in public diplomacy scholarship yet, but that are useful concepts for the analysis of European public diplomacy. It discusses the benefits, but also the limitations of applying the respective concepts and approaches to public diplomacy scholarship.

Within communication studies, scholars have explored the potential of applying middle-range theories in media content analysis and public relations to public diplomacy. Both Entman (2008) as well as Sheaffer and Gabay (2009) draw on framing as an analytical framework for the study of public diplomacy messages. The strength of the framing approach is its integrative nature (cf. Dahinden, 2006): It allows for the analysis of all phases of the communication process and is, thus, applicable to different fields of research, ranging from public diplomacy and public relations to journalism and media effects (cf. Matthes, 2012, p. 248; Srugies, 2013b, p. 9). A range of scholars have pointed to conceptual convergences between public relations and public diplomacy, stating that they have similar functions (see for instance L'Etang, 1996) and *modus operandi* (see for instance Melissen, 2005), that they face similar problems (see for instance Signitzer & Wamser, 2006) and demand similar skills and knowledge (see for instance Fitzpatrick, Kendrick & Fullerton, 2013). As a consequence, public diplomacy scholars and practitioners benefit from applying and integrating models and theories of public relations research (see for instance Fitzpatrick, 2007; Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005; Snow, 2009). Both Lee and Jun (2013) and Seo (2013) use organization-public relationships as a theoretical basis for studying the relationship between U.S.-American public diplomacy organizations and South Korean publics. Yun (2006, 2008), on the contrary, empirically tests the applicability of the excellence theory (cf. L. A. Grunig, J. E. Grunig & Dozier, 2002) as a “general theory of public relations” (Grunig, 2008, p. 1660) to public diplomacy. This study adapts assumptions of the organization-public relationships approach to investigate interorganizational cooperation in public diplomacy. The approach is suited for the analysis of cooperation between EU and member state organizations, as it centers on „patterns of interaction, transaction, exchange, and linkage” (Broom, Casey, Ritchey, 2000, p.18) between organizations rather than attributes of individual organizations. Furthermore, it discusses the potential of incorporating public relations approaches to analyze strategic publics and communication tools (see sub-chapter 2.2 below). Despite these important contributions to advancing theory development from a communication studies perspective, it is fair to say that the community of communication scholars has only started to engage in public diplomacy research. By 2015, the International Communication Association as the biggest association of communication scholars worldwide held its first pre-conference on public diplomacy research (cf. International Communication Association, n.d.)). In January 2016, it approved a Public Diplomacy Interest Group.

International relations theories constitute a valuable basis for identifying public diplomacy actors and their dispositions, as well as the general conditions of the political environment they are operating in. Moreover, this theoretical foundation helps to analyze the processes that determine the dynamics in international relations, which have a direct or indirect impact on the public diplomacy efforts of international actors. Up to now, only few public diplomacy scholars have employed theories of international relations to public diplomacy. So far, public diplomacy scholars employing international relations theory have mainly focused on constructivist approaches (see for instance Byrne, 2012; Cross, 2013; Manners & Whitman, 2013; van Ham, 2013). Constructivism emphasizes the importance of (collective) identity, culture, norms, narratives and social interaction in international relations (cf. Wendt 1999; Villanueva Rivas 2010). From a constructivist perspective, the perceptions of foreign publics are seen as crucial in determining the behavior of state and non-state actors, as the external

image of an actor embraces a set of norms that reflect an actor's identity, values and policies (cf. Cross 2012: 4). Similar to constructivism, discursive approaches view "international politics as increasingly being a struggle over ideas and values", in which the "meaning of phenomena is socially constructed through language" (Rasmussen, 2009, pp. 1, 3). Rasmussen (2009) applies discourse theory in his analysis of EU public diplomacy messages and activities, conceptualizing EU public diplomacy as a means of "influencing foreign perceptions of the EU, [...] establishing an identity for the EU as an actor, and [...] influencing foreign conceptions of other discursive elements, such as democracy, human rights, climate change" (p. 2). Similar to constructivism, discursive approaches view "international politics as increasingly being a struggle over ideas and values", in which the "meaning of phenomena is socially constructed through language" (Rasmussen, 2009, pp. 1, 3). Rasmussen (2009) applies discourse theory in his analysis of EU public diplomacy messages and activities, conceptualizing EU public diplomacy as a means of "influencing foreign perceptions of the EU, [...] establishing an identity for the EU as an actor, and [...] influencing foreign conceptions of other discursive elements, such as democracy, human rights, climate change" (p. 2).

The analytical potential of other international relations theories remains largely unexplored. Transnationalism serves as an example: Transnationalism posits that states do not act autonomously, but are part of transnational networks that consist of pluralistic organizations that command different amounts and different kinds of resources – ranging from financial resources (governments) to specialist knowledge and moral authority (for example civil society organizations) (cf. Schimmelfennig 2010: 116ff.) This approach can make valuable contributions to understanding and investigating cooperation between public diplomacy organizations on a transnational level. Moreover, approaches of European integration theory propose a theoretical framework for the analysis of European public diplomacy. Diez and Wiener (2009) define European integration theory as "the field of systematic reflection on the process of intensifying political cooperation in Europe and the development of common political institutions, [...] its outcomes [as well as the] changing constructions of identities and interests of social actors in the context of this process" (p. 4). International relations and European integration theories provide important frameworks for advancing the understanding of public diplomacy on a macro level. However, they are less suited to guide empirical analyses and explore public diplomacy understanding and practice on micro and meso level. Similarly, soft power as a central concept in international relations scholarship constitutes a useful framework for describing and explaining actions of international actors (see for instance Hayden, 2012; Nye, 2008), but is of limited suitability for empirical analysis of public diplomacy. Therefore, these approaches have not been selected to guide the empirical analysis of European public diplomacy.

Brown (2014) argues that there "is a divide between the macro world of International Relations and the micro world of Communications" (p. 3). He connects this statement with the assumption that many scholars neglect that public diplomacy "involves the flow of money, people, information, meaning through specific organized networks" (p. 8) By that, Brown (2014) points to the need of investigating the "organizational dimension of public diplomacy" (p. 7) and approaching public diplomacy research from multiple levels of analysis. He suggests for example the application of actor-network theory<sup>13</sup> to comparative public diplomacy research (see for instance Latour, 1993, 2007). In addition to that, social-integrative approaches in sociology enable scholars to analyze public diplomacy on micro, meso and macro level. They go beyond systems theory that focuses on the macro level of analysis and action theory that concentrates on the micro level of analysis by establishing micro-meso-macro links. They enable scholars to analyze structures and actions of public diplomacy organizations in the

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<sup>13</sup> Actor-network theory originates from science studies and postulates that humans and non-human objects can both be part of a network of social networks.



context of their external environments (meso-macro link) as well as interactions between public diplomacy organizations and the individuals that constitute the organization (micro-meso link).

There are three important social-integrative approaches that could be applied to the study of social of public diplomacy: 1) Giddens' structuration theory, 2) Bourdieu's theory of social fields, and 3) Schimank's social-integrative approach. Giddens' (1984, 1995) structuration theory combines social and economic scientific reasoning (cf. Altmeppen, 2007, p. 289). According to Giddens (1995), structure as a combination of rules and resources enables and constrains actions. Actions, in return, produce and reproduce structures (cf. Altmeppen, 2006, p. 18). While structuration theory has not been applied to public diplomacy yet, Jarren and Röttger (2004) as well as Zühlsdorf (2002) discuss Giddens' approach as a theoretical framework for public relations research. From the perspective of structuration theory, public relations is analyzed as part of an organization at the meso level as well as set of (inter)actions at micro level. Structuration theory does, however, not analyze how conditions of the external environment influence organizational department and actions of individuals. In addition to that, Schwarz (2010) criticizes that structuration theory inspired public relations research assigns an organization legitimization function to public relations. The reduction of public relations to legitimizing organizations falls short of theoretically describing communication campaigns on behalf on a country or to inform about a health pandemic. The same applies to the application of structuration theory to public diplomacy scholarship.

Bourdieu's (1984) theory of social fields also bridges structure and agency. Fields can be defined as settings of individual agents and their social positions. Social positions result from rules of a specific field, habitus as agents' structure of the mind and emotions as well as agents' social, economic and cultural capital. Hilgers and Mangez (2014) contend that the theory of social fields is primarily suited to analyze "social organization of a domain or activity" (p. 22) such as culture or education. This study does not further elaborate on the theory of social fields, as it does not look at public diplomacy activities within a specific domain, but explores public diplomacy organizations that act on behalf of an international actor and operate in different social sub-systems and core areas (see sub-chapter 2.3). Instead, it considers Schimank's (1996, 2002a) social-integrative approach to analyze and explain the selection of courses of organizational action as most suitable framework for analyzing European public diplomacy. Schimank's social-integrative approach allows for capturing public diplomacy by single practitioners (micro level) that constitute public diplomacy organizations (meso level) that, again, communicate on behalf of an international actor like a country or a region (macro level) (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013, p. 13). Schimank (1996) assumes that individual action at the micro level is directed by three types of social structures: 1) the sub-systemic orientation horizon (macro level) of the sub-system(s) a public diplomacy organization operates in, 2) institutional structures within an organization (meso level) that guide individuals through formal and informal regulations, and 3) constellations of organizations and single public diplomacy practitioners. These structural dimensions do not only offer a heuristic framework for explaining how structures and actions mutually depend on each other (cf. Schwarz, 2010, p. 46), but also to grasp cooperation between public diplomacy practitioners within and between organizations. Löffelholz et al. (2011a, see also Auer et al., 2010; Auer & Srugies, 2013) provide one of the first empirically grounded studies on public diplomacy in Germany that builds on Schimank's social-integrative approach. Building on an empirical reconstruction of this analysis on German public diplomacy, Auer (2016) has developed a theory of public diplomacy. She combines Schimank's social integrative approach with considerations of Max Weber's interpretive sociology, Luhmann's conceptualization of systems theory, as well as contributions by Schütz and Luckmann as representatives of the phenomenologically oriented school of sociology.

In addition to these basic theories in sociology, scholars have turned to ‘The ‘Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ (1991[1962]) and ‘The Theory of Communicative Action’ (1984, 1987) by German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas as a framework for theoretical and empirical analyses of public diplomacy (see for instance Brüggemann, 2008, 2010; Dutta-Bergman, 2006; Mor, 2014). ‘The Theory of Communicative Action’ serves as a heuristic tool for examining the role of dialogue in public diplomacy strategies and activities. Moreover, this study draws on Habermas’ conception of the public sphere to describe the external environment public diplomacy organizations operate in.

Zaharna (2012) is among the first scholars to introduce concepts and approaches of cultural studies and intercultural communication to public diplomacy scholarship. Drawing on Hall’s (1976) concept of “in-awareness”, Zaharna (2012) seeks to “spark a cultural awakening in public diplomacy” (p. 52). While Zaharna (2012) elaborates on the relevance of cultural considerations in both public diplomacy research and practice, she does not develop a framework for analyzing public diplomacy from a cultural studies perspective. This study includes cultural considerations in the analysis of the external environments of public diplomacy organizations, as well as the adaptation of the organization’s public diplomacy practice to types of strategic publics and target countries or regions.

Social network theory centers on the question how social structures of relationships influence attitudes, beliefs and behavior of individuals (as representatives of organizations) (see for instance Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1992). Its analytical focus is on relationships instead of attributes of actors. Both Fisher (2013) and Zaharna (2013) work with concepts of social network theory in order to explain and assess collaborative public diplomacy as well as interorganizational cooperation. In this study, social network theory contributes to understanding cooperation between public diplomacy organization on the national, regional, and transnational level (see sub-chapter 2.7).

Up to now, public diplomacy scholars have widely neglected approaches from organization theory. This section introduces resource dependency theory as a possible approach for studying European public diplomacy. It draws on the assumption that individual actors pool resources in a collective actor (organization) to realize common goals and interests. Moreover, resource dependency theory postulates that organizations either provide or pool resources in order solve problems through synergies and improved efficiency (cf. Biermann, 2008, p. 160). Resource provision and resource pooling does not only refer to tangible resources such as financial capital, but also intangible resources, including organizational reputation (see for instance Eisenegger & Imhof, 2009), the relative position in a network (see for instance Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007), organizational culture (see for instance Ortega, 2005) and social capital (see for instance van Ham, 2013). This study fathoms the potential of resource dependency theory to understand interorganizational cooperation among public diplomacy organizations.

### **2.2.2 Public diplomacy from an organizational perspective**

Sub-chapter 2.1 has defined public diplomacy as communication activities of international actors that aim at managing the international environment. This study comparatively analyzes how the EU as well as France and Sweden seek to manage the international environment. By that, it focuses on public diplomacy research from a communicator perspective. International actors like the EU or France are not capable of acting themselves. The public diplomacy of an international actor can be understood as an aggregation of the public diplomacy efforts of single public diplomacy organizations that communicate on behalf of an international actor (see sub-chapter 2.3). Thus, this study concentrates on

public diplomacy as a form of organizational communication (cf. Löffelholz et al., 2011a). It theorizes the concept from an organizational perspective.

Organizations constitute a central building block of modern, functionally differentiated societies and both enable and constrain human action (cf. Preisendörfer, 2008, p. 15; Schimank, 2002b, p. 52). Similar to public relations (cf. Schwarz, 2010, p. 49), public diplomacy does not operate autonomously, but is integrated in an organizational context. The public diplomacy understanding and the public diplomacy practice of individuals is guided by the institutional structures or structural conditions within an organization, including resources, regulations, decision-making structures (*internal environment*), as well as the relationship between an organization and its *external environment*, including sub-systemic orientation horizons and constellations of organizations (cf. Preisendörfer, 2008, p. Schimank, 1996, 2002a). Analyzing public diplomacy from an organizational perspective enables the researcher to understanding social actions of public diplomacy practitioners within an organizational context. This analytical focus centers on the perspective of the communicator rather than the perspective of strategic publics and the reception of public diplomacy activities.

While this study concentrates on the organizational or meso level, investigating how organizations conduct public diplomacy, it also takes reflections of public diplomacy on the micro level such as the perception of single public diplomacy practitioners within organizations and on the macro level such as social expectations, norms and values into consideration. Uwe Schimank's social-integrative approach provides an overarching framework in which these three levels of analysis as well as the links between them can be systematized. Moreover, the strength of this approach lies within its ability to structure and integrate public diplomacy models and middle-range theories on single aspects of public diplomacy research (see for instance Kunczik, 2002, p. 74; Schwarz, 2010, p. 37). Models, taxonomies and middle-range theories serve as a basis for developing and operationalizing single analytical dimensions that guide the empirical study. The following paragraphs introduce the single theoretical concepts that are integrated in this overarching framework.

The assumption that the public diplomacy understanding and practice of organizations is influenced by factors within the public diplomacy organization (internal environment) as well as external factors (external environment) serves as a starting point of the theoretical and empirical analysis. The public diplomacy understanding and practice of an organization is an aggregation of the actions of single public diplomacy practitioners that belong to an organization. Knowledge on the organizational understanding and practice of the concept is reconstructed on the basis of guided expert interviews with representatives of an organizations as well as strategy documents written by individuals on behalf of an organization (see sub-chapter 5.2). Schimank (1996) defines internal factors that influence the public diplomacy understanding and practice of individuals as 'institutional structures' "that provide a frame of reference for the individual through informal regulations (e.g. rites or ways of behaving) or formal rules of procedure that the organization has established (e.g. diplomatic protocols)" (Auer & Srugies, 2013, p. 13). 'Institutional structures' correspond to the structural level of organizational research identified by sociologist Peter Preisendörfer (2008). Drawing on insights from organizational sociology, organizational culture as well as public relations research, sub-chapter 2.3.1 identifies factors of the internal organizational environment that may influence the understanding and practice of public diplomacy. Following Preisendörfer (2008), the external environment encompasses all relations between an organization and its environment. This includes, but is not restricted to the sub-systemic orientation horizon identified by Schimank (1996). To theoretically describe and analyze the external environment in an international context, this study combines a framework for comparative communication research proposed by Sriramesh & Verçiç (2009) with Schimank's social-integrative approach (see sub-chapter 2.3.2). The state of research on the definition of public diplomacy, as well

as publications discussing similarities and differences between public diplomacy and related concepts guides the analysis of the organizations' public diplomacy understanding in chapter 2.4.

This study examines public diplomacy practice on the strategic and the tactical level. This differentiation draws on Smith's (2005) conceptualization of public relations as a four-phase process<sup>14</sup>. Phase one, 'formative research', covers the analysis of the internal and external organizational environment (see sub-chapter 2.3). 'Strategy' as the second phase includes the definition of goals and the way of communication with strategic publics (see sub-chapter 2.5). 'Strategy' "concerns the organization's direction and positioning in relation to its environment for a longer period of time" (Cornelissen, 2008, p.98). It is followed by the third phase 'tactics', in which organizations choose communication tools and channels and implement their strategy or specific communication plans (see sub-chapter 2.6). 'Evaluative research' as fourth phase of the public relations process does only play a subordinate role in this study<sup>15</sup>. On the strategic level (sub-chapter 2.5), this study develops an understanding of information and relational communication frameworks to public diplomacy and critically assesses existing systematizations of public diplomacy goals. Moreover, it discusses the potential of applying public relations approaches like the Situational Theory of Publics (see for instance J. E. Grunig, 1997; J. E. Grunig & Repper, 1992; J. E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984) or the Linkage Model (cf. Grunig & Hunt, 1984) to the (empirical) analysis of strategic publics of public diplomacy organizations. The theoretical conception of public diplomacy practice on the tactical level (sub-chapter 2.6) also draws on approaches from public relations research and adapts the 'Integrated Public Relations Media Model' by Hallahan (2001) to the study of European public diplomacy. Moreover, strategic framing as "the process by which political actors [...] select and establish priorities when interpreting and explaining reality" (Azpiroz, 2013, p. 181, see also Entman, 2008) provides a basis for examining messages public diplomacy organizations communicate to attain their goals.

Following Schimank (1996), the public diplomacy understanding and practice of organizations are not only influenced by institutional structures and sub-systemic orientation horizons, but also by constellations between actors. "Although Schimank relates the constellations of actors only to individual actors, we can assume and empirically observe that organizations also unite with others to pursue their goals" (Auer & Srugies, 2013, p. 13, see also Auer et al., 2010; Löffelholz et al., 2011a). Public diplomacy organizations form constellations with other organizations, in which they observe and influence one another as well as negotiate with each other (cf. Schimank, 2002a). Interorganizational cooperation constitutes an interdisciplinary field of study that includes contributions from management research, sociology, communication science, computer science, international relations or business studies. Sub-chapter 2.7 provides an overview of the state of research on interorganizational cooperation to identify factors that enable and/or constrain interorganizational cooperation of European public diplomacy organizations. It investigates approaches from organization theory and social network theory in a more detailed way to develop a framework for analyzing motivational, structural and operational characteristics of interorganizational cooperation. In addition to that, sub-chapter 2.7 explores the potential of applying organization-public relationships to the analysis of perceived relationships between organizations.

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<sup>14</sup> This conceptualization of public relations resembles Zerfaß's (2010) conceptualization of the management of public relations.

<sup>15</sup> Public diplomacy evaluation does not constitute a focus of this study. Nonetheless, the analysis of strategy documents and guided expert interviews captures statements on the evaluation of entire public diplomacy strategies and single programs and tools.

## 2.3 Public diplomacy organizations

This sub-chapter sets out to define public diplomacy organizations, systematize types of public diplomacy organizations and identify the roles public diplomacy organizations assume in international communicative spaces. In addition to that, it details factors in the organizations' internal and external environments, which influence their public diplomacy understanding and practice.

### 2.3.1 National and regional public diplomacy organizations

Organizations “are formed by a fusion of individual actors, but [their] constitutive factor [...] is their *collective* capacity to act: all individual acting is based on coordination in order to intentionally reach a *common* aim (organizational intent)” (Auer & Srugies, 2013, p. 12, italics in original; see also Donges, 2008, p. 52). Similarly, L’Etang (2008) describes organizations as “collectivities of people with a shared mission or interest” (p. 190). Despite their “goal-directed” nature (Aldrich, 1999, p. 2), organizations remain “socially constructed systems of human activity” (ibid., p. 2) whose individual members do not always act in a rational way (cf. Preisendörfer, 2008; Scott, 2003). Public diplomacy organizations are a specific type of organization, which purposefully contributes to the management of the international environment of an international actor (cf. Auer, 2015, p. 159).

Sub-chapter 2.1 has shown that the nation state remains the dominant frame of reference in the eyes of many public diplomacy scholars in the post-9/11-period (see for instance McClellan, 2004, pp. 23-24; Pamment, 2011a, p. 1). This observation is substantiated by a large number of studies that focus on single public diplomacy organizations within particular countries or single countries (see sub-chapter 1.3). Public diplomacy is, however, not limited to state and non-state actors of one particular country, but is increasingly applied by organizations operating beyond national borders as well as sub-national entities (cf. Ram, 2005: 102; Smith, 2013; van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007). This section focuses on public diplomacy organizations on national as well regional level, as they are the foci of the empirical analysis<sup>16</sup>.

As official representatives of a country, governmental organizations public diplomacy organizations in a traditional sense. The notion that “only governments use public diplomacy” (Gilboa, 2008, p.57) is present in many definitions of the concept prior to 9/11 (see sub-chapter 2.1). Governmental organizations comprise the foreign ministry of a country or region, other ministries that conduct public diplomacy in specific core areas like culture or economy as well as embassies as representations of a country abroad. Foreign ministries often assume the role of a boundary spanner that coordinates the work of other ministries whose work also includes an international dimension (cf. Hocking, 2002). Embassies promote the goals and programs of the state they represent and support the bilateral relationships between sending and receiving state. On a multilateral level, permanent representations advocate the positions and priorities of a specific country or sub-national entity. Within the EU, the EC corresponds to a national government, while the EEAS combines features of a Foreign Ministry and a diplomatic service: “[T]he EEAS is not only an organization for the diplomatic representation of the EU, but also a forum for the analysis, planning, and formulation of EU foreign policy, drafting Council Conclusions, policy papers and negotiating mandates to be decided upon” (Rasmussen, 2014, p. 786; see also EEAS Review, 2013). Both EC Representations in EU member states and EU

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<sup>16</sup> The empirical analysis encompasses guided expert interviews with EU, French and Swedish public diplomacy practitioners as well as an analysis of EU, French and Swedish strategy documents. However, statements on sub-national public diplomacy organizations in interviews or documents are taken into consideration in the data analysis.

Delegations in third countries and to multilateral organizations fulfill similar functions like embassies. Heads of states in EU member states or the president of the EC, for example, exercise a lot of influence on the public diplomacy understanding and practice of governmental organizations, as they define political priorities (see sub-chapter 2.3.2). Moreover, they can be regarded as ‘public faces’ of an international actor and play a major role in its public and external representation. As a case study on the visit of U.S. president Barack Obama to Brazil in 2011 illustrates (cf. Fisher & Montez, 2011), a government’s public diplomacy activities are designed around public appearances of heads of state or heads of EU institutions<sup>17</sup>.

Governmental organizations may conduct public diplomacy themselves or act in the role of a public diplomacy “sponsor” (Zaharna, 2013, p. 175), coordinating and financing public diplomacy activities of other organizations. As strategic publics may be more sceptical of public diplomacy initiatives that are directly associated with governmental organizations (cf. Busch-Janser & Florian, 2007, p. 226), governmental organizations often commission government agencies to carry out public diplomacy strategies. Government agencies may be organized as an association (for example the German Academic Exchange Service, cf. German Academic Exchange Service n. d.) or (partly) owned by the government (for example Business Sweden, cf. Business Sweden, n. d.). The cooperation between governmental organizations and government agencies varies with regard to the scope and the duration as well as the level of autonomy enjoyed by government agencies. The Federal Foreign Office has for instances entrusted the Goethe-Institute with the task of promoting the German language abroad. In this case, the Goethe-Institute as governmental agency engages in a long-term commitment to the Federal Foreign Office and covers an entire area of public diplomacy (cf. *Rahmenvertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Goethe-Institut e.V.*, 2004). Similarly, the mission of the German Academic Exchange Service is comparably wide in scope and comprises the international exchange of students and researchers (cf. German Academic Exchange Service, n. d.). In contrast to the long-term partnership between governmental offices and the Goethe-Institute or the German Academic Exchange Service, implementing agencies may be commissioned to realize a single public diplomacy campaign or activity in a clearly defined, mostly short time frame.

The Goethe-Institute serves as an example of a governmental agency with a comparably high level of autonomy. Based on a framework contract signed in 2004 (*Rahmenvertrag*), the Federal Foreign Office entrusts the Goethe-Institute with the tasks of promoting the German language abroad, fostering international cultural cooperation and conveying a diverse, up-to-date image of Germany abroad. While the work of Goethe-Institute is coordinated and to a large share financed by the Federal Foreign Office, the cultural institute stresses its independence in carrying out public diplomacy activities. Implementing organizations, or contractors, that realize single projects or campaigns on behalf of governmental organizations enjoy less autonomy.

As outlined at the beginning of this sub-chapter, public diplomacy can be understood as an instrument of an international actor to improve its international relations and facilitate the assertion of its interests. Drawing on Luhmann’s systems theory, Auer (2016, chapter 9.3.1) argues that public diplomacy by government organizations contributes to the political sub-system of a society. Government agencies like the Institut Français, the Swedish Institute or Goethe-Institute, in turn, constitute inter-systemic organizations that do not only contribute to the political sub-system, but at least one more societal sub-system like research or economy (cf. Auer, 2016, chapter 9.3.2; see also Bode & Brose, 2001). In 2002, Leonard, Stead and Smewing have identified ‘politics/military’, ‘economy’ as well as

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<sup>17</sup> This study does not focus on the analysis of heads of states and heads of EU institutions. Rather it centers on the analysis of entire public diplomacy organizations like a national government. Interviews are only conducted with representatives of an organization, who are responsible or involved in developing public diplomacy strategies, and have expert knowledge on the formal and informal communication structures and processes within an organization.

‘society/culture’. The typology of spheres of public diplomacy was extended by Löffelholz et al. (2011a), identifying ‘education/research’ as a fourth sphere. Whereas the sphere ‘politics/military’ corresponds to the political sub-system of a society, this study adapts ‘society/culture’, ‘economy’ and ‘education/research’ as core areas government agencies operate in.

Processes of regionalization and globalization expand and intensify economic, political, social and cultural relations across borders” (Sørensen, 2004, p. 45). They broaden the spectrum of organizations that conduct and/or influence public diplomacy. Castells (2008) defines globalization as “the process that constitutes a social system with the capacity to work as a unit on a planetary scale in real or chosen time” (Castells, 2008, p. 81)<sup>18</sup>. Many issues that concern people in their everyday lives move beyond the area of control of sovereign states. As a consequence, there is a growing gap between “the space where the issues arise (global) and the space where the issues are managed (the nation-state)” (Castells 2008: 82). Governments are neither capable of addressing global problems on their own nor do they possess a specific mandate for making decisions on a global scale (cf. Castells, 2008, p. 82). To Kelley (2010), non-state organizations like NGOs have an important function in addressing these cross-border issues, as they are able to navigate between official and non-official coalitions, develop transnational coalitions and “act, when governments fail to act” (Pagovski, 2015, p. 7). Businesses, media as well as civil society organizations play a crucial role in public diplomacy today – as public diplomacy organizations in their own right<sup>19</sup>, cooperation partners of governmental and government agencies as well as strategic publics of public diplomacy activities. This section explores the specific roles of businesses, media organizations and civil society in greater detail.

Multinational corporations like Coca Cola or Mercedes Benz influence the image of a country abroad. At the same time, the country of origin can add value to a product or service, as “Made In...” labels (cf. Anholt, 2007, p. 9) or the integration of Swedish culture in the IKEA brand (cf. Wästberg, 2009) illustrate. Businesses strive for achieving favorable political conditions in the countries they invest or export in. “Especially firms selling directly to consumers realize that their credibility and likeability are essential elements of their brand. This implies that NGOs and the wider public of consumers may steer business actors to comply with a wide range of social and environmental goals” (van Ham, 2013, p. 26). Multinational corporations maintain important communication networks abroad and often have more human resources in a specific country than the representation of a country or international organizations. Moreover, multinational corporations are mostly coined by flat hierarchies as well as more flexible decision-making processes and hold expertise in local contexts and on specific issues (cf. Bolewski, 2007). In addition to these resources, their reputation as well as their expertise in communication practices like marketing, public relations or branding can make businesses desirable cooperation partners for state organizations. (cf. Fitzpatrick, 2009; Melissen, 2011a) Even though public-private partnerships have become more common in the last years, as for instance the Germany Years in the BRICS countries illustrate (see for instance Hampel, 2015), Wang (2006) and Fitzpatrick (2009) point to two limitations and potential drawbacks: 1) Businesses try to remain as neutral as possible and may not wish to be associated with a specific (foreign) policy (cf. Wang, 2006, p. 45). 2)

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<sup>18</sup> Castells (2008) identifies three types of capacity: The term ‘capacity’ encompasses the “ability to use networking as the flexible, interactive, borderless form of structuration” (Castells, 2008, p. 81) (*organizational capacity*), “deregulation, liberalization, and privatization of the rules and procedures used by a nation-state to keep control over the activities within its territory” (Castells, 2008, p. 81) (*institutional capacity*), as well as the emergence and growing application of the new information and communication technologies (*technological capacity*) (cf. Castells, 2008, p. 81).

<sup>19</sup> Cull (2009a) stresses that businesses or civil society organizations are not “unpaid auxiliaries” of the public diplomacy “of the state to which they have been historically connected” (p. 15). In contrast, they are “international actors in their own right” (Cull, 2009a, p. 15).

There may be conflicting interests of public and private organizations. Fitzpatrick (2009, pp. 168-169) therefore questions if businesses may always uphold the public mission of a joint public diplomacy initiative.

The media can play a double role in public diplomacy. On the one hand, the media is a communication channel through which messages are communicated and, on the other hand, media organizations are intermediaries that select specific issues (agenda setting), highlight specific aspects of an issue (framing) as well as influence the criteria by which recipients assess public diplomacy organizations (priming) (see Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Srugies, 2013b). The example of the BBC World Service illustrates that the media can also influence the national public diplomacy strategy of a country. As part of the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, the BBC World Service has consulted both the Foreign Commonwealth Office and the British Council on the guidelines and the orientation of British public diplomacy<sup>20</sup> (cf. Lord Carter of Coles, 2005). Gilboa (2002) defines four different types of media organizations that reflect different relationships between the media and the government: 1) Controlling media organizations determine the conduct of (foreign) policy as exemplified by the CNN effect (cf. Volkmer, 2015), 2) constraining media organizations can also influence foreign policy behavior to a certain extent, but do not necessarily alter foreign policy decision-making. The power of constraining media organizations is situational. 3) Intervening media organizations take on the role of mediators in conflicts (media-broker diplomacy). 4) Finally, media diplomacy refers to the use of media organizations as communication channels and, thus, public diplomacy instruments. (cf. Gilboa, 2002) In this sense, international broadcasting is considered as a public diplomacy tool.

Civil society organizations can be understood as an “organized expression of the values and interests of society” (Castells, 2008, p. 78)<sup>21</sup>. To the UN, civil society constitutes “the “third sector” of society, along with government and business” (United Nations, n.d. – Civil Society). Civil society organizations select and aggregate public interests and integrate them into the political system. By that, they play an “important role in agenda setting, opinion building, and drafting of plans and policy proposals” (van Ham, 2013, p. 19). Furthermore, they may also be involved in the implementation of political decisions as well as in the evaluation of political outcomes (cf. Avant, Finnemore & Sell, 2010). Civil society organizations can either directly address decision-makers and citizens in target countries or support other civil society organizations in the respective target countries (cf. Hellmann, 2006, p. 162). Civil society organizations enjoy a high level of trust as well as moral authority and hold expertise in specific issue areas (cf. Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 122)<sup>22</sup>. La Porte (2012) argues that

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<sup>20</sup> Due to its editorial independence, the BBC World Service has been given observer status on the Public Diplomacy Board (cf. Fisher, 2009, p. 254). Based on the recommendations of the Carter review (Lord Carter of Coles, 2005), the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board was turned into the Public Diplomacy Board in 2006. The First Evidence Session of the ‘Inquiry on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence’ by the Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence has finally announced that the Public Diplomacy Board has been lapsed to give way to new communication structures in the wake of the Olympic Games 2002 hosted by Great Britain (cf. Pamment, 2015).

<sup>21</sup> Castells (2008) sub-divides civil society actors into four groups: 1) Local civil society actors that “defend local or sectoral interests, as well as specific values against or beyond the formal political process” (Castells, 2008, p. 83), 2) NGOs “with a global or international frame of reference in their actions and goals” (Castells, 2008, p. 84), 3) social movements that constitute “global network of opposition to the values and interests that are currently dominant in the globalization process” (Castells, 2008, p. 85), and 4) movements of public opinion. These movements emerge on the basis of “spontaneous, ad hoc mobilizations using horizontal, autonomous networks of communication” (Castells, 2008, p. 86).

<sup>22</sup> NGOs increasingly take the role of “the advocates of the needs, interests, and values of people at large” (Castells, 2008, p. 83, see also La Porte, 2012). This claim is substantiated by the findings of the Edelman Trust Barometer: The Edelman Trust Barometer analyzes trust in governmental actors, NGOs, business and media. In 2014, 33.000 people in 27 different countries were surveyed. The findings of the Edelman Trust Barometer 2014 indicate that NGOs are the most trusted actors (64% of the survey participants express trust in NGOs), followed



their legitimacy largely stems from their efficacy in advocating issues that are central to citizens and/or advancing political regulations (cf. La Porte, 2012, p. 6). Moreover, civil society organizations often have better access to the public in target countries than (foreign) governments (cf. Bolewski, 2007, p. 57). These resources make cooperations with civil society organizations desirable for governmental organizations. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) serves as an example of a successful cooperation between governmental and civil society organizations: The initiative brought more than 1.000 civil society organizations from about 60 countries together, which promoted and decisively contributed to passing the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention or Ottawa Treaty. ICBL's efforts were acknowledged by awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to the initiative in 1997. Despite examples of successful cooperation, civil society organizations may be reluctant towards being associated too closely with governments: "The credibility of [...] non-governmental agents will be enhanced by the extent to which they are perceived to be independent of, and even critical of [...] governments" (Riordan 2004: 3).

While collective actors like governmental organizations, civil society organizations or media organizations primarily act as decision-makers and/or multipliers, there are also single individuals, labelled as 'public figures', who may assume these roles. Public figures include celebrities like Bob Geldorf, U2 singer Bono, George Clooney and Angelina Jolie that do not only seek to uphold their celebrity status, but also pursue a political and/or social agenda (cf. Bentele & Nothhaft, 2015; Cooper, 2008) and intellectuals like the philosopher Jürgen Habermas or the Chinese contemporary artist and activist Ai Wei Wei. Cooper states that "[c]elebrities provide a convenient surrogate for, and a conduit in response to, the traditional bonds that hold society together, performing mobilizing, interpreting, and most importantly, mediating functions that have been eroded within traditional institutions" (Cooper, 2008, p. 113). Due to criteria of newsworthiness such as the reference to elite people (cf. Galtung & Ruge, 1965), celebrities are more likely to be heard than civil society organizations in many cases (cf. Cooper, 2008, p. 114; Wessler & Brüggemann, 2012, pp. 133-134).

In summary, the different types of public diplomacy actors command different types and amounts of resources: Governmental actors possess the legitimate authority to define rules and financial resources, businesses have both financial resources and expert knowledge in specific fields. Civil society organizations possess expertise and networks in specific areas that extend well beyond the realm of governmental actors (see for instance La Porte, 2012; Langhorne, 2005). Additionally, they are characterized by moral authority and a high level of trust in many regions in the world. The supply and demand of these different types of resources define the power relations between the different types of public diplomacy organizations (cf. Schimmelfennig, 2010, pp. 120-122). Furthermore, the different types of resources can also complement each other in joint public diplomacy initiatives. Even though non-state organizations may perceive cooperations with state organizations in a hesitant and at times reserved manner, complex transnational issues increasingly demand the combined effort of different types of public diplomacy organizations (see for instance Hudson, 2009 for the case of Great Britain).

The scope of this study does not allow for a detailed empirical analysis of the public diplomacy efforts of businesses, civil society actors and media in the selected member states France and Sweden. Thus, this study focuses on the analysis of governments and government agencies as representatives of the

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by business (58%), media (52%) and governmental actors (44%). While trust in both NGOs and business remained stable, there is a decline in trust in the media (from 57% to 52%) and governmental actors (from 48% to 44%) from 2013 to 2014. (cf. Edelman, 2014) It needs to be taken into consideration that these figures represent global findings. The trust in governments, businesses, NGOs and media may of course vary between respondents from different countries and cultural backgrounds.

selected countries. The goals, roles and responsibilities of businesses, media and civil society organizations are captured in the analysis of interorganizational cooperation between state and non-state organizations (see sub-chapter 2.7). Cull (2008a) rightfully states that “to compartmentalise public diplomacy as the exclusive preserve of those who draw salary cheques for working in the field [would mean] to ignore both the contribution of ‘citizen diplomats’ and the ‘people-to-people’ public diplomacy carried out through work like town twinning” (p. 24).

Based on a review of conceptions of diplomacy and the public sphere, Auer (2015) defines public diplomacy one a first level as the” management of the public sphere in the framework of a collective strategy of a political entity in order to represent the interests of this political entity towards estranged actors” (p. 159, translation by author)<sup>23</sup>. Within the framework of the collective strategy of the respective political entity, single public diplomacy organizations contribute to shaping the public sphere. The Institut Français serves as an example of a public diplomacy organization that operates within the scope an overarching French public diplomacy strategy: Under the supervision of the French Foreign Ministry, the Institut Français promotes French culture abroad (cf. Institut Français, 2014). Citizen diplomats constitute a second, informal level of public diplomacy that can positively or negatively influence collective public diplomacy strategies of political entities (cf. Auer, 2015, p. 160). While acknowledging the individual contributions made by citizen diplomats on a second, informal level, this study concentrates on public diplomacy organizations that purposefully conduct public diplomacy.

Within the public sphere, public diplomacy organizations and their representatives may resume the roles of communicators<sup>24</sup>, intermediaries as well as audience members (cf. Neidhardt, 1994). The role of the communicator can be subdivided into the role of the speaker and the role of the architect: As speakers, public diplomacy organizations carry out communication activities themselves, including talks or speeches. As architects, public diplomacy organizations set up and design communicative spaces in which other individuals and organizations interact with each other, for instance in the context of a workshop or an exchange program (cf. Auer, 2015, p. 157). The example of the Finnish Embassy in Washington, D.C. illustrates that the communicative space can embody a communicative message itself: The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned the creation of a green, energy efficient embassy to display its commitment to environmental sustainability (cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2010). In the role of the intermediary, public diplomacy practitioners can reinforce, contest or simply ignore public diplomacy efforts by other organizations. Not least, public diplomacy involves an important listening component (see sub-chapter 2.5): The EU assumes the role of the audience, listening to its strategic publics, by conducting a public opinion poll among citizens in EU member states or providing on- and offline tools, such as the discussion platform ‘Debate Europe’, that encourage EU citizens to voice their concerns regarding EU-related matters.

### *Internal environments of national and regional public diplomacy organizations*

After having developed a first understanding of national and regional public diplomacy organizations above, this section details the inner life of these organizations and identifies factors that may influence their public diplomacy understanding and practice. Preisendörfer (2008) defines goals, structure as well as the external environment (see section ‘External environments of national and regional public

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<sup>23</sup> Public Diplomacy ist das Öffentlichkeitsmanagement im Rahmen einer Kollektivstrategie einer politischen Entität zur Interessenvertretung in Beziehungen zwischen entfremdeten Akteuren“ (Auer, 2015, p. 159).

<sup>24</sup> Donges & Imhof (2001) label communicators as speakers. This study, however, draws on Auer (2015) who differentiates between speakers and architects who both act in the role of the communicator within a public sphere.

diplomacy organizations' below) as basic elements of an organization. The mission and the overarching goals of an organization determine the public diplomacy goals, strategic publics and specific public diplomacy tools applied to reach public diplomacy goals (cf. Löffelholz, Auer, & Schleicher, 2013, p. 181). In the context of a strategy, organizations define "the organizational purpose in terms of its long-term objectives, action programs, and resource allocation priorities" (Chaffee, 1985, p. 90), but also reflect on the influence internal and external conditions as well as the role of strategic publics on the organization's action (cf. Chaffee, 1985, pp. 91–94; Hax & Majluf, 1996, pp. 4–14). Steyn (2003) differentiates between strategies that refer to the organization as a whole and functional strategies that focus on a single functional area of an organization. The public diplomacy strategy of an organization may be understood as a subordinated functional strategy of its overall mission and organizational strategy (cf. Raupp & Hoffjahn, 2012, p. 152).

The structure of an organization corresponds to the dimension 'institutional structures' introduced by Schimank (1996) in his social-integrative approach. The term structure refers to the constitution and composition of an organization as well as organizational processes. Both Schimank (1996) and Preisendörfer (2008) differentiate between formal and informal structures. The formal structure describes an organization from a normative point of view (How should the organization be structured?), whereas the informal structure reflects actual structures and processes on a day-to-day basis (How is the organization structured?) (cf. Preisendörfer, 2008, p. 66). The formal structure of public diplomacy organizations refer to the structural embeddedness of public diplomacy within an organization, decision-making processes as well as the coordination, steering and control of work processes<sup>25</sup>. Structural embeddedness addresses two questions: 1) Has an organization set up a public diplomacy department or integrated public diplomacy is integrated in other, already existing departments?, and 2) Where is/are the department(s) responsible for public diplomacy located within the organization? The analysis of the structural embeddedness provides useful insights into the relevance attributed to public diplomacy within an organization.

The decision-making power of the departments in charge of public diplomacy is central to the analysis of formal communication processes. As Raupp and Hoffjahn (2012) argue, „[t]he strategic capability of collective actors, such as corporations, depends on how the division of labor is internally organized and on which opportunities for strategy development are given to individual actors or departments within the organization" (p. 152). Both the "scope of action and the self-responsibility [constitute] prerequisites for strategy formation" (Raupp & Hoffjann, 2010, p. 152). According to Botan (2006), organizations can either pursue a cooperative/integrative grand strategy in which the communication management (or the departments concerned with public diplomacy respectively) influence the development of organizational goals and strategies or pursue an intransigent/resistant grand strategy in which the role of the communication department (or the departments concerned with public diplomacy respectively) is limited to the implementation of an organizational strategy. The empirically grounded excellence theory of public relations stresses that organizations need to recognize the public relations function as a critical management function in order to be successful (cf. L. A. Grunig, J. E. Grunig & Dozier, 2002). Yun (2006, 2008) has shown that these findings can also be applied to public diplomacy. These normative considerations are contrasted with observations that, in practice, policy decisions are often made without the communication aspect in mind and public diplomacy is confronted with the task of managing unpopular decisions: "The communications issue is the second-order set of consequences that follow from this initial choice" (Brown, 2013, p. 47). In addition to the decision-making power, the human and financial resources allocated to public diplomacy also determine the scope of action of public diplomacy practitioners within an organization.

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<sup>25</sup> The identification of formal and informal structures within public diplomacy organizations draws on the work by Löffelholz, Auer and Schleicher (2013, pp. 179-180) on organizational communication.

Informal organizational structure comprises power relations between single departments and their employees, patterns of interaction within an organization and the organizational culture. Organizational culture is defined as the “basic, taken-for-granted assumptions that an organization makes about itself, its customers, employees, and surrounding environment” (Pauchant & Mitroff, 2006, p. 136). L’Etang (2008) differentiates between an instrumental and an interpretative view on organizational culture. In the instrumental view or corporate culture approach, “managers seek to align culture with the strategic direction (vision and mission) of the organization through articulating managerial definitions of corporate identity” (L’Etang, 2008, p. 193). In the interpretative view or critical management paradigm, “culture emerges from all practices, values, assumptions, behaviours, struggles, dreams, successes, failures, emotions, and relationships that take place within the organization, and not just from the sanitized idealistic version that managers wish to impose” (ibid., p. 193). This study adopts an interpretative view on culture, as it integrates the perspectives of public diplomacy practitioners on all organizational levels.

#### *Analytical dimension 1a: Public Diplomacy Organization – internal environment*

Public diplomacy organizations are the first analytical dimension of the empirical study. To understand the internal environments national and regional public diplomacy organizations operate in, this study examines the following sub-dimensions within the analytical dimension ‘Public Diplomacy Organization’:

- **Overarching goals and mission:** As outlined above, the overall mission and organizational strategy sets a framework in which public diplomacy goals, strategic publics as well as approaches and tools to realize public diplomacy goals are defined (cf. Raupp & Hoffjahn, 2010, p. 152). This sub-dimension captures the overarching mission and vision an organization pursues as well as its overall goals to analyze their impact on the organization’s public diplomacy practice.
- **Structural embeddedness of public diplomacy:** This sub-dimension addresses the public diplomacy architecture within an organization. It covers the organizational unit(s) entrusted with public diplomacy-related tasks as well as the responsibilities and the position of this/these organizational unit(s) within the organization.
- **Public diplomacy resources:** This sub-dimension analyzes the types and the amount of resources available to an organization to realize its public diplomacy goals. Resources are subdivided into human resources (including the educational and professional background of staff members as well as training to enhance public diplomacy-related skills), financial resources and other resources (for instance technology or software solutions to implement a specific public diplomacy activity).
- **Decision-making power:** This sub-dimension examines the power and the influence single organizational units or employees within these organizational units have regarding decisions on the public diplomacy goals, their realization as well as the allocation of resources to public diplomacy efforts.

Whereas strategy documents issued by public diplomacy organization primarily depict formal structures, guided interviews also disclose informal structures and working routines (see chapter 5.2). As a latent construct, organizational culture is not measured on the basis of a single analytical sub-dimension. Sub-dimensions like structural embeddedness or decision-making power allow the researcher to draw conclusions on the organizational culture.

### **2.3.2 External environments of public diplomacy organizations**

In addition to factors within the organization, the public diplomacy understanding and practice of national and regional organizations is influenced by the external environments they are operating in. To systematically describe external environments of national and regional organizations, this study adapts Sriramesh and Verçiç's (2009) 'theoretical framework for global public relations research and practice'. It pursues a deductive and an inductive approach to grasp the external environment of public diplomacy organizations: It draws on academic literature as well as a secondary data analysis of the Eurobarometer survey and the European Social Survey to describe the infrastructure, the political, the cultural and the media environment (see sub-chapters 3.2 and 4.2). Moreover, it develops analytical categories to gain additional information on the external environments of public diplomacy organizations on the basis of the document analysis and guided expert interviews (see section 'Analytical dimension 1b: Public Diplomacy Organization – external environment' below).

#### *Infrastructure and political environment*

Sriramesh and Verçiç (2009) aim at "identifying [how] the impact of environmental variables on public relations practice helps increase our ability to predict which strategies and techniques are better suited to a particular organizational environment" (p. 3). They define infrastructure, culture and media as groups of environmental variables. The infrastructure of a country comprises its political system, its level of economic development, its legal system as well as activism. This study concentrates on the political system as well as the level of economic development of both France and Sweden as components of the national infrastructure. The analysis of the infrastructure of regional public diplomacy centers on the EU as a polity as well as its system of multilevel governance. Legal considerations are only discussed if they touch on aspects that are directly related to the practice of national and regional public diplomacy. This study does not consider activism, which is exemplified by activities of social movements and labour unions, but not further defined by Sriramesh and Verçiç (2009), as part of an international actor's infrastructure. Rather, this study assumes that activism is part of the political culture and political participation within a country or region (see section 'Cultural environment' below).

Robin Brown (2013) argues that there is a "politics of public diplomacy" (p. 44), which is often neglected by scholars. He emphasizes the strong influence of the political and diplomatic environment: "Relationships built or facilitated by public diplomacy programs are a subset of all governmental relations with that country, which in turn, are a subset of all relationships between two countries" (Brown, 2013, p. 46). This political and diplomatic environment goes beyond the structural conditions of a political system. It encompasses policy priorities as well as external relations of international actors. In the case of France and Sweden, this study also looks at the EU policy the two member states pursue.

#### *Cultural environment*

The analysis of external cultural factors assesses the role of culture in determining the mission, the values and the ideas of organizations, their social practices and the communication outputs (Brüggemann, 2011, Hanitzsch, 2007; Hepp, 2006). Sriramesh and Verçiç (2009) differentiate between societal and corporate culture. This study concentrates on societal culture, as it takes all groups within a given society into consideration. Aspects of corporate culture are only addressed in the context of inter-organizational cooperation between public diplomacy organizations (sub-chapter 2.7).

To explore the societal culture in the EU member states France and Sweden, this study investigates 1) the basic cultural value orientations of French and Swedish citizens, 2) political culture and the political participation in France and Sweden, and 3) the public perception of the EU among French and Swedish citizens. All three aspects of societal culture have an impact on the relationship between public diplomacy organizations and their domestic publics.

Culture encompasses a system of value orientations that are shared by actors and that guides the interpretation of the world around them (cf. Gerhards & Hölscher, 2005, p. 19). According to Singh & Parashar (2005), culture draws on “both historical and present shared realities in a given society or group” (p. 4). The authors define five sets of factors that shape culture over time: 1) social identity (for example language and religion), 2) historical context (for example myths and colonialization), 3) economic parameters (for instance the economic and technological development), 4) institutional factors (for instance the political and the legal system), and 5) geography (for example climate and topography) (cf. Singh & Parashar, 2005, p. 5, see also Schwartz, 2006, p. 139). This analysis concentrates on the cultural value orientations of French and Swedish citizens. Cultural value orientations constitute “preference[s] which [are] felt and/or considered to be justified” (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961, p. 396, see also Schwartz, 2006, p. 143). They shape the beliefs, actions and goals of both individuals and groups. Moreover, they also find expressions the political system, specific policies, but also everyday practices in a private, occupational or organizational setting. (cf. Schwartz, 2006, p. 139) Like cultures, cultural value orientations may gradually change over time, but are relatively stable (cf. Gerhards & Hölscher, 2005, p. 19; Schwartz, 2006, p. 139). Cultural value orientations at the national level have been examined on the basis of studies focusing on single dimensions like high and low context cultures (see for instance Hall 1976), high and low trust (see for instance Fukuyama, 1995) or monochronic and polychronic societies (see for instance Lewis, 1992). In addition to that, a number of scholars<sup>26</sup> apply multiple dimensions to identify national cultural value orientations. The works of Hofstede (1980), House et al. (2004), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) as well as Schwarz (2006) have received most scholarly attention. Both Hofstede (1980) and House et al. (2004) draw on business and management research and derive findings on national cultural value orientations from specific segments of society<sup>27</sup> and are therefore not explored in greater detail. Instead, this section relies on the empirical findings by Schwartz (2006) and Inglehart & Welzel (n.d.) as well as a secondary data analysis of the 6<sup>th</sup> round of the European Social Survey, conducted in 2012.

Drawing on theoretical concepts in social psychology, Schwartz (2006) derived three basic value dimensions<sup>28</sup> that he connects to three societal problems. The boundaries between the person and the group constitute the first societal problem. The relationship between individuals and the group are located on a continuum from autonomy, stressing individual preferences, ideas, and abilities, and embeddedness, highlighting shared goals and social relationships. The second societal problem addresses the responsible behavior of citizens. Responsible behavior can either be ensured through egalitarianism or hierarchy. Egalitarianism encompasses the idea that all members of a society are equal and are inclined to cooperate and express concern for everyone’s welfare. Hierarchy, on the contrary, acknowledges “the unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources as legitimate” (p.

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<sup>26</sup> see for instance Burrell & Morgan (1979), Hofstede (1980), Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1997), House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta (2004), Inglehart & Welzel, (2005), Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961, 1994), Newman, Summer & Warren (1997), and Schwartz (2006)

<sup>27</sup> Hofstede (1980) has concentrated on employees of the multinational technology corporation IBM. House et al. (2004) focused on managers in organizations to develop different leadership styles on the basis of cultural value orientations in 62 societies.

<sup>28</sup> Schwartz (2006) applies the term “basic values” (p. 143). These values do not refer to specific events, domains or circumstances, but relate to all situations.

141). The third value dimension introduced by Schwartz looks at the relationship between members of a society and their social and natural environment. Cultural value orientations are located on a continuum ranging from harmony, involving the acceptance and appreciation of the world at it is, and mastery, incorporating the idea of changing and exploiting the social and natural environment to reach own goals (cf. Schwartz, 2006, p. 141).

The World Values Survey has tracked changes in beliefs, cultural value orientations and motivations since 1981 (cf. World Values Survey, n.d.a). The longitudinal study includes representative national samples of almost 100 countries (cf. World Values Survey, n.d.b) and constitutes the empirical basis for Inglehart's comparative analysis of cultural value orientations. Inglehart has introduced 'traditional/secular-rational' and 'survival/self-expression' as two value dimensions (cf. Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, n.d.). The dimension 'tradition/secular-rational' explores orientations towards authority and fathoms the role religion, family, moral standards and the nation play for the members of a society (cf. Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 25). The dimension 'survival/self-expression' differentiates between a survival pole, at which economic and physical security are at the core of citizens' concerns, and a self-expression pole, at which a high level of security is guaranteed. Members of a society that tend to the survival pole are afraid of and/or less likely to tolerate cultural diversity and change. In contrast to that, citizens at the self-expression-end of the continuum endorse tolerance, equality, environmental protection as well as innovation and have a growing demand for participating in the economic and political decision-making process. (cf. Inglehart & Welzel, n.d.; Schwartz, 2006, p. 151).

The European Social Survey, conducted every two years by the European Research Infrastructure Consortium, focuses on the attitudes, beliefs and behavioral patterns of individuals. It seeks to "chart stability and change in social structure, conditions and attitudes in Europe and to interpret how Europe's social, political and moral fabric is changing" (European Social Survey, n.d.a) on the basis of representative national samples in around 30 European countries (cf. European Social Survey, n.d.b). It measures value orientations on the basis of a 21-item Basic Human Values Scale, developed by Schwartz. This study draws on a secondary data analysis of the sixth round of the European Social Survey in 2014, carried out with the software Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 19<sup>29</sup>.

Schwartz (2006) argues that a society's cultural value orientation influences the political participation of citizens. To explore political participation and political culture, defined as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation" (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 14f.), this study conducts a secondary data analysis of the European Social Survey. Both the European Social Survey and the Eurobarometer<sup>30</sup> provide empirically grounded information on the public perception of the EU among French and Swedish citizens. Citizens' support for the EU and European integration as well as their identification with Europe provides important cues for the domestic support of cooperative public diplomacy efforts with the EU.

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<sup>29</sup> Country files for Sweden and France were retrieved from the website of the European Social Survey <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>.

<sup>30</sup> The Standard Eurobarometer, started in 1973, is the most important source of data on public opinion within the EU. The longitudinal study enables researchers to track developments in public opinion over the course of four decades. It is coordinated by the EC (Directorate-General for Communication) and carried out by TNS opinion & social twice a year. It is based on approximately 1.000 quantitative face-to-face interviews with citizens in each EU member state and candidate country. In addition to the Standard Eurobarometer, the EC also commission Special Eurobarometer and Flash Eurobarometer surveys. While the Standard Eurobarometer measures the public perception of the EU as a whole on the basis of a recurring set of topics, the Special Eurobarometer (in-depth surveys) and the Flash Eurobarometer (ad-hoc telephone surveys) address specific issues and EU policies like cybersecurity or gender equality. In addition to these quantitative research tools, qualitative group discussions and guided interviews fathom the thoughts and feelings of selected publics on issues like the economic crisis. (cf. European Commission, n.d.d)

Concepts like basic cultural value orientations focus on nation states and are therefore not suited to analyze the cultural environment of EU public diplomacy organizations. Instead, this thesis centers on the development of European identity as well as public opinion on the EU as important indicators of the cultural environment EU public diplomacy organizations operate in. It introduces the public sphere at European level as a heuristic framework to integrate studies on the development of a collective European identity as well as the public perception of the EU. Moreover, the concept of the public sphere also provides a framework for analyzing the media environment of EU public diplomacy organizations and exploring links between cultural and media environments (see section 'Media environment' below).

Based on Wessler (2011), "[t]he 'public sphere' is generally conceived as the social space in which different opinions are expressed, problems of general concern are discussed, and collective solutions are developed communicatively. Thus, the public sphere is the central arena for societal communication" (Wessler, 2011; see also Trenz & de Wilde, 2009, p. 10). The public sphere can be distinguished from areas of private communication. Private communication targets a limited and clearly defined number of addressees, whereas public communication is coined by an open-endedness of the addressees of communicated messages (cf. Maletzke, 1972, p. 24). The term public sphere embodies three notions of 'public': 1) A space in which the public is generated (cf. Liebert, 1999, p. 93), 2) 'the public' as "the collective of speakers and listeners present in the public sphere" (Wessler, 2011), and 3) 'publicness' as "the state of being publicly visible and subject to scrutiny by the public" (Wessler, 2011). The European public sphere is the arena in "which public debates and collective action mediate between European citizens and EU policies and institutions" (Koopmans, Neidhardt & Pfetsch, 2000, p. 2). It is "constructed through social and discursive practices creating a common horizon of reference and, at the same time, a transnational community of communication over issues that concern <us as Europeans> rather than British, French, Germans, or Dutch" (Risse, 2003, p. 3).

The state of research discloses both empirical-analytical and normative approaches to conceptualizing the public sphere (cf. Donges & Imhof, 2001). Empirical-analytical contributions focus on the communication structures and processes in the public sphere as well the roles that individuals and organizations resume in the public sphere (see for instance Jarren & Donges 2006; Neidhardt, 1994). Normative approaches, on the other hand, "specify ideal characteristics of public communication, as well as conditions conducive to their realization, and help to evaluate critically existing communication" (Wessler, 2011, see for instance Adolf & Wallner, 2005; Neidhardt, 1994). Empirical-analytical approaches guide the analysis of the roles public diplomacy organizations, decision-makers, multipliers, and citizens can assume in the public sphere. Normative approaches, on the other hand, provide the basis for developing criteria that enable or constrain the development of a vital public sphere at the European level.

European identity is a form of collective identity. The term goes back to social psychologist Alberto Melucci (1985) and has predominantly been analyzed in the context of social movements. In this study, collective identity is defined as "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution" (Polleta & Jasper, 2001, p. 285). Subsequently, the term 'European identity' refers to the cognitive, moral and emotional connection of citizens living in EU member states as well as their support of the common values and goals of the EU. Sub-chapter 3.3 reviews theoretical reflections and empirically grounded studies on the development of a collective European identity. The public perception of the EU is closely linked to the level of identification with Europe. Studies on the perception of the EU among citizens in member states serve as an indicator of their support for EU public diplomacy initiatives.



### *Media environment*

As intermediaries, media organizations can either reinforce, contradict or not take up messages by public diplomacy organizations. They serve as important multipliers of national public diplomacy organizations to reach strategic publics at a domestic level and diaspora groups as well as multipliers of regional public diplomacy organizations in order to address internal and external strategic publics.

Sriramesh & Verčič (2009, pp. 14-19) specify three factors that allow scholars to develop a sound understanding of the media in countries: media control, media access, and media diffusion (cf. Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009, pp. 14-19). This framework provides an alternative to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) comparative analysis of media systems. Hallin and Mancini's (2004) analysis of the media systems as well as the relationship between the media and the press in 18 Western democracies constitutes one of the most influential studies in comparative media research. The authors fathom similarities and differences between media systems on the basis of four criteria: Hallin and Mancini (2004) explore 1) the structure of the media market, including the development of the mass press, orientation towards the readership as well as the regional and/or linguistic segmentation of the media market (cf. Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 22-26). 2) Moreover, the dimension 'political parallelism' investigates to what extent the media have distinct political orientations and connections to political groups (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 26-33). 3) The dimension 'professionalization of journalism' summarizes the degree of journalistic autonomy, professional norms and rules as well as the service orientation of the media (public service orientation vs. service orientation towards specific groups in society). (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 33-41). Not least, Hallin and Mancini (2004, pp. 41-44) examine 4) the influence of the state on the media, which may include economic subsidies, media ownership, but also censorship. Drawing on these four dimensions, the authors develop three ideal models of media systems: a Polarized Pluralist Model, a Democratic Corporatist Model, and a Liberal Model (see sub-chapters 3.3 and 4.2.2). A number of scholars provide a critical reflection of Hallin and Mancini (2004)'s comparative analysis of media systems: Jackubowicz (2010) considers the study's "methodological nationalism" (p. 9) as a weakness. The analytical focus on national media systems does neither take processes on the micro and meso level into consideration nor does it capture transnational media developments (see also Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 66-73). Moreover, Hallin and Mancini's (2004) analysis concentrates on news coverage in the press and broadcast media, neglecting online journalism (cf. Jackubowicz, 2010, p. 10) and entertainment media (cf. Hardy, 2008, p. 20). Not least, both Jackubowicz (2010) and Sriramesh and Verčič (2009) argue that the media systems concept does not adequately reflect the media environment around the world as well as the dynamic processes that occur within it.

Sriramesh & Verčič (2009) propose media control, media access, and media diffusion as building blocks of an alternative model to analyze the media environment. Media control, the first factor for accessing the media environment identified by Sriramesh and Verčič (2009), encompasses all categories of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) comparative analysis of media systems. It looks for instance at structures of the media market, legal structures and institutions to protect journalism, the influence of the political system on the media content, the political alignment of journalists as well as journalists' professional standards. Media access describes the level of access organizations, but also individuals have to the mass media to voice specific ideas, interests, and concerns. Finally, media diffusion captures the potential and actual reach of mass media, also taking the degree of human development with regard to aspects like poverty or illiteracy into consideration. (cf. Sriramesh and Verčič, 2009, p. 18)

This study adapts the typology suggested by Sriramesh and Verčič (2009) to the analysis of national public diplomacy organizations. It analysis the media environment of France and Sweden on the basis of the 1) media market and the level of media control, 2) the self-conception of French and Swedish journalists, and 3) the media use patterns of French and Swedish citizens. The analysis of the media

market concentrates on the structure of the media market in the respective country, the degree of editorial freedom as well as the influence of economic and political forces on journalism. The self-conception of French and Swedish journalists explores the role and self-conception of journalists in both France and Sweden including the journalists' tasks, working conditions, norms and professional standards. It provides important cues for the exploration of the relationship between national public diplomacy organizations and journalists. The analysis of media use patterns of French and Swedish citizens corresponds to Sriramesh and Verčič's (2009) conception of media diffusion. It draws on data from the Eurobarometer survey and sheds light on the question through which communication channels national and regional public diplomacy organizations can reach domestic/internal publics. The analysis of the media environment French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations operate in, focuses on national, regional and local print, broadcast and online media. Transnational media are addressed separately in the analysis of the EU's media environment below (see also sub-chapter 3.3).

The conceptualization of the media environment by Sriramesh and Verčič (2009) centers on nation states. Even though there are several European frameworks on media freedom or the protection of minors, there is no EU media system. Therefore, this study does not depict the media market and the level of media control of the EU, but concentrates on the state of research on the mediated Europeanization of national public spheres. It reviews scholarly publications on the coverage of European issues by national media as well as the development of transnational media outlets. Furthermore, this study applies the concept of media access to the EU by examining the state of research on the relationship between journalists and EU organizations. Not least, it addresses the aspect of media diffusion by exploring media use patterns of EU citizens on the basis of the Eurobarometer survey. The dimensions for examining the external environments of both EU and member state organizations are summarized in the table below:

**Table 1: Dimensions of the external environments of EU and member state organizations**

<b>Dimensions of external environment</b>	<b>EU member states organizations</b>	<b>EU organizations</b>
<b>Infrastructure</b>	political system level of economic development	EU as a polity system of multilevel governance
<b>Political environment</b>	policy priorities/external relations EU policy	policy priorities/external relations
<b>Cultural environment</b>	cultural value orientations political culture and participation public opinion on the EU	European public sphere European identity public opinion on the EU
<b>Media environment</b>	media market and the level of media control self-conception of journalists media use patterns citizens	coverage of European issues by (sub-national) media development of transnational media relationship between journalists and EU organizations media use patterns of EU citizens

(source: own depiction, dimensions based on Sriramesh & Verčič, 2009)

#### *Analytical dimension 1b: Public Diplomacy Organization – external environment*

The review of the state of research on the external environments of national and regional public diplomacy organizations in chapters 3.3 and 4.3 provide a general assessment of external influence factors. Additionally, this study captures how the single EU, French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations that are analyzed empirically perceive the external environments they engage in. The study focuses on the following sub-dimensions within the analytical dimension ‘Public Diplomacy Organization’:

- **Political environment:** This sub-dimension analyzes the influence of the political and diplomatic environment (cf. Brown, 2013) on the organization’s public diplomacy understanding and practice.
- **Social sub-system and core areas of public diplomacy:** The political and diplomatic environments of an international actor are part of the sub-systemic orientation horizon (cf. Schimank, 1996). As outlined in sub-chapter 2.3.1, the public diplomacy of governmental organizations at national level as well as EU public diplomacy organizations contributes to the political sub-system of an international actor. Government agencies as inter-systemic organizations, on the other hand, do not only belong to the political sub-system, but to at least one more social sub-system like research or economy (Auer, 2016) and operate in different core areas of public diplomacy. In an empirical analysis of German public diplomacy, Löffelholz and colleagues (2011a) have shown that these core areas have a decisive impact on the public diplomacy understanding and practice of organizations and practitioners (see also Auer et al., 2013; Auer & Srugies, 2013). This sub-dimension addresses the social sub-system(s) and the core area(s), in which public diplomacy organizations operate. It addresses the question of how the social expectations, norms and values within these sub-systems and influence the public diplomacy understanding and practice of an organization.
- **Media coverage:** While the media environment of the selected member states as well as the EU are examined in closer detail in the sub-chapters 3.3 and 4.2.2, this sub-dimension covers all statements that disclose how the transnational, national and sub-national media coverage influences the public diplomacy understanding and practice of the organization included in the empirical analysis.
- **Public opinion:** Social expectations, norms and values as external influences on the understanding and practice of public diplomacy are not only generated by public diplomacy sub-systems and core areas, but also by EU citizens. While basic cultural value orientations and as part of the culturalistic dimension are discussed in the sub-chapters 3.3. and 4.2.2, this sub-dimension captures all expressions of public opinion that influence the public diplomacy understanding and practice of the single organizations analyzed included in the empirical analysis.

## **2.4 Public diplomacy understanding**

This sub-chapter develops the assumption that the internal as well as external environments of public diplomacy organizations have an impact on their public diplomacy understanding. It identifies the application of the term public diplomacy, the conceptualization of the term ‘public diplomacy’ as well as the exploration of alternative concepts used to describe public diplomacy-related activities as important analytical sub-dimensions of the public diplomacy understanding.

Gregory (2010) rightfully stresses that public diplomacy scholars and practitioners “approach what they do in different ways” (p. 6). Lee (2011) even argues that “two camps [...] often tend to march forward on parallel tracks, with minimal intersection, save the occasional conference panel, jointly-drafted article, or when an individual leaves one camp to work in another” (p. 47). Differences in the public diplomacy understanding can, however, not only be found between scholars and practitioners, but also among practitioners themselves.

The definition of public diplomacy developed in sub-chapter 2.1 guides the sampling of EU, French and Swedish organizations for the empirical analysis of European analysis. Even though the selected organizations conduct public diplomacy from a scholarly point of view, they may not refer to their own activities as ‘public diplomacy’, but work with alternative concepts instead. The use of alternative terminology may be traced back to the unfamiliarity of practitioners with the concept of public diplomacy (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013). Moreover, public diplomacy practitioners opt for concepts that are directly related to the core area they are working in. Practitioners that engage in the internationalization of higher education and student mobility will possibly refer to their public diplomacy efforts as scientific or science diplomacy (see for instance Schütte, 2015). Not least, Melissen (2013) emphasizes the political dimension in the selection of terms to describe public diplomacy activities. To Melissen (2013), West European organizations did deliberately not use the term ‘public diplomacy’ to dissociate their own public diplomacy practice from “the more politicized American approach that was more closely linked to short-term foreign policy objectives” (p. 206). Furthermore, a historical analysis of public diplomacy in Germany shows<sup>31</sup>, that German public diplomacy organizations have developed their public diplomacy understanding and practice rather independently of the U.S. that has been the center of research and main object of investigation in the past five decades. The public diplomacy of these international actors is informed by historical experiences as well as conditions of the external environment. (cf. Auer et al. 2010; Auer & Srugies, 2013)

These theoretical and empirically grounded reflections lead to three questions: 1) To what extent do public diplomacy practitioners apply the term ‘public diplomacy’ to describe their own work?, 2) If practitioners apply the term ‘public diplomacy’, how do they define it?, and 3) If practitioners do not work with the term ‘public diplomacy’, what other concepts do they use to describe their work? These three questions guide the analysis of the state of research on European public diplomacy understanding (see sub-chapters 3.4, 4.1 and 4.2.3) as well as ‘Public diplomacy understanding’ as the second dimension of the empirical analysis.

### *Analytical dimension 2: Public diplomacy understanding*

The second dimension of the empirical analysis focuses on the understanding and conceptualization of public diplomacy by EU and member state public diplomacy organizations. It explores both communication activities that are explicitly referred to as public diplomacy and communication activities that are not labeled as public diplomacy, but contribute to public diplomacy in the scholarly understanding of the concept. The guiding questions on the public diplomacy understanding of practitioners outlined above are addressed in the following analytical sub-dimensions:

- **Application of public diplomacy:** This sub-dimension seeks to answer two questions: First, to what extent are public diplomacy practitioners as representatives of organizations familiar

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<sup>31</sup> A number of scholars have outlined that the practice of public diplomacy had begun long before scholars have turned to the concept (see for instance Cull, 2009a; Gregory, 2008; Melissen, 2006).

with the term and concept public diplomacy? Secondly, to what extent the interviewees apply this concept in their everyday work to describe their own communication activities?

- **Conceptualization of public diplomacy:** This sub-dimension captures all definitions provided in strategy documents or by public diplomacy practitioners that are familiar with the concept. It contributes to analyzing the practice-based public diplomacy understanding of EU and member state organizations.
- **Terms and concepts used to describe communication activities:** This sub-dimension fathoms which terms and concepts EU and member state organizations use to describe their communication activities, if they do not apply ‘public diplomacy’.

The public diplomacy understanding of the single public diplomacy organizations provide first indications of the goals, strategic publics and the competitive or cooperative focus of their public diplomacy practice. These aspects of public diplomacy practice are addressed in greater detail in sub-chapters 2.5 to 2.7.

## 2.5 Public diplomacy practice on the strategic level

Public diplomacy practice on the strategic level includes the definition of goals and strategic publics as well as the way of communication with strategic publics (cf. Cornelissen, 2008; Smith, 2005). When regarding public diplomacy as strategic communication management, public diplomacy practitioners are confronted with the challenge of making deliberate decisions on the basis of evaluating several alternatives of action (cf. Raupp & Hoffjahn, 2012, p. 157). This sub-chapter outlines the alternatives of defining goals and strategic publics of public diplomacy as well as the approach to public diplomacy on the basis of public diplomacy models. The public diplomacy approach refers the mode of communication as well as the role attributed to strategic publics.

### 2.5.1 Goals of public diplomacy organizations

A public diplomacy goal steers and provides a direction for the conceptualization, implementation and evaluation of public diplomacy activities (cf. Hallahan, 2015, p. 244). It is a desired status that should be reached on the basis of the public diplomacy activities. (cf. Endruweit, 2004). This sub-chapter introduces a systematization of public diplomacy goals and discusses the intermediate steps necessary to reach these overarching goals.

Cowan and Cull (2008) define public diplomacy as “an international actor’s attempt to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics” (p. 6). Improving international relations and facilitating the assertion of an international actor’s (foreign) political interests can be regarded as an overarching purpose of public diplomacy that can be broken down into more specific goals of public diplomacy. Facilitating the assertion of political interests corresponds to achieving ‘milieu goals’ (see for instance Nye, 2004; Smith, 2014). Wolfers (1962) differentiates between direct ‘possession goals’ and ‘milieu goals’ that pertain “to the shape of the environment in which the nation [or the international actor] operates in” (p. 73):

*In directing its foreign policy toward the attainment of its possession goals, a nation is aiming at the enhancement or the preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value. The aim may apply to such values as a stretch of territory, membership in the Security Council of the United Nations, or tariff preferences. Here a nation finds itself competing with others for a share in values of limited supply [...] Milieu goals are of a*

*different character. Nations pursuing them are out not to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries". If it were not for the existence of such goals, peace could never become an objective of national policy [...] Similarly, efforts to promote international law or to establish international organizations, undertaken consistently by many nations, are addressed to the milieu in which nations operate and indeed such efforts make sense only if nations have reason to concern themselves with things other than their own possessions. (Wolfers, 1962, p. 73)*

This quotation shows that ‘milieu goals’ do not only refer to achieving national, competitive goals, but may also embody a cooperative dimension (cf. Wolfers, 1962, p. 73).

While public diplomacy practitioners may classify their activities as political or non-political, Zaharna (2013, p. 176, see also La Porte, 2012, p. 3) argues that all public diplomacy activities imply an explicit or implicit political motivation: The author differentiates between public diplomacy initiatives with “an explicitly articulated and advanced political goal, such as political advocacy, policy formation, or agenda setting” and ‘non-political’ initiatives concentrating on aspects like education or the environment that “may have a strong, underlying political motivations for these apolitical initiatives” (Zaharna, 2013, p. 176, see also Brown, 2013, p. 48). The inherent political dimension of public diplomacy goals is also stressed by Brown (2013, pp. 49-53) who refers to public diplomacy as a tool to either reinforce or enhance diplomatic relationships, influence policies, initiate regime change or contribute to the improvement of governance.

Deibel and Roberts (1976) suggest a differentiation between public diplomacy as government-to-people communication focusing on political information and public diplomacy as people-to-people communication concentrating on cultural communication. Similarly, Signitzer (1993, p. 201) distinguishes between persuasion and cultural communication as two basic functions of public diplomacy. Political information corresponds to persuasion whereas cultural communication is more focused on relationship building as well as the generation of mutual understanding. The differentiation between political information and cultural communication as two poles of a continuum serves as a starting point for examining public diplomacy goals in greater detail. It corresponds to the distinction between an information and relational communication framework to public diplomacy suggested by Zaharna (2009): The information framework to public diplomacy emphasizes the “design and dissemination of messages to advance political objectives” (Zaharna, 2009, p. 86) and, by that, persuasion. In contrast to that, the relational communication framework to public diplomacy stresses the goals “relationship-building and the construction of social structures to advance political objectives” (Zaharna, 2009, p.86).

Both Fitzpatrick (2010b) and Brown (2012) have developed typologies to systematize the goals of public diplomacy. Drawing on a review of public diplomacy definitions, Fitzpatrick (2010b, pp. 93-94) identifies six different purposes of public diplomacy:

- facilitating the assertion of national interests and the promotion of national values (see for instance Glassman, 2008),
- exerting influence on foreign governments as well as their policies and actions (see for instance Malone, 1988; U.S. Advisory Commission on U. S. Public Diplomacy, 2005),
- exerting influence on the knowledge, the attitudes and the behaviour of foreign publics (see for instance Ross, 2003; Fiske de Gouveia, 2006),
- influencing public opinion on an international level (see for instance Dizard Jr., 2004),

- shaping the national image (or the image of an international actor) (see for instance Noya, 2006), and
- achieving understanding and enhance relationship building and maintenance (see for instance Tuch, 1990).

While the first five purposes of public diplomacy identified by Fitzpatrick (2010b) can be assigned to political information/persuasion, relationship building can be assigned to the umbrella term cultural communication. The purpose of generating understanding occupies an intermediate position between political information and cultural communication.

Robin Brown (2012) has introduced a framework for comparative public diplomacy research that differentiates between public diplomacy activities on the basis of their purpose. Based on a historical analysis of public diplomacy practice across different nations and organizations, Brown (2012) identifies “four recurring sets of ideas about the nature and the purpose of [public diplomacy]” (p. 2): 1) public diplomacy as an ‘extension of diplomacy’, 2) public diplomacy as a ‘mode of national projection’, 3) public diplomacy as cultural relations, and 4) public diplomacy as political warfare:

1. Brown (2012) defines diplomacy as “a system of continuing relationships between states and international organizations and groups that seek to influence these relationships” (p. 4). Increasingly, these relationships are influenced by groups of non-state actors. Public diplomacy fulfills the function of engaging these strategic publics. (cf. Brown, 2012, p. 4).
2. The conception of public diplomacy as a mode of national projection is closely linked to the concept of nation branding (see for instance Kaneva, 2011; Olins, 2002; Szondi, 2008). In this conceptualization, public diplomacy aims at establishing a positive image of an international actor. This positive or favorable image constitutes the basis for establishing support for an international actor’s policies, stimulating investments or for instance a growth in tourism. (cf. Brown, 2012, p. 5) While the conceptualization of public diplomacy as a mode of national projection may aim at overcoming misperceptions and misunderstandings as well as improving political relations between international actors, it also advances the idea of “the international system as a competitive market place” (Brown, 2012, p. 5).
3. The understanding of public diplomacy as cultural relations groups a number of different approaches that stress the political and/or economic effects of cultural connections (cf. Brown, 2012, p. 6). Elements of cultural relations, including arts, literature, language learning as well as exchange programs encompass both a dimension of mutuality and instrumentalism (cf. Brown, 2012, p. 6). Brown (2012) distinguishes between a national and a liberal understanding of cultural relations: The national understanding of cultural relations strengthens and values the distinctiveness of national cultures, while the liberal idea of cultural relations perceives cultural differences as an obstacle to mutual understanding.
4. Public diplomacy as political warfare conceptualizes public diplomacy as a “tool of military or ideological struggle” (Brown, 2012, p. 6). Public diplomacy efforts are geared towards the objective of defeating an opponent (cf. Brown, 2012, p. 6).

These four types of public diplomacy practice constitute ideal types that may overlap in practice (cf. Brown, 2012, p. 2). While public diplomacy as political warfare and public diplomacy as a mode of national projection can be clearly assigned to the goal of political information/persuasion, public diplomacy as an extension of diplomacy takes an intermediate position between political information and cultural communication. Brown (2012) argues that this systematization goes beyond the majority of public diplomacy typologies (see for instance Fisher & Bröckhoff, 2008; Leonard, 2002) that focus on the type instead of the purpose of communication. He remarks critically that the same type of

communication can be used for different purposes. However, the same holds true for public diplomacy as cultural relations. Public diplomacy as cultural relations covers a wide range of activities including art exhibitions, language learning, and exchange programs. These activities are not per se geared towards achieving mutual understanding, but can also imply an instrumental dimension (cf. Gregory, 2005, p. 15, see sub-chapter 2.5.1). That cultural relations can serve different purposes is also illustrated by an analysis of foreign cultural political goals conducted by Hansgert Peisert (1978). He conceptualizes the goals of foreign cultural policy by their intent to change the status quo in a target country and their openness towards the culture within a target country. Based on these two dimensions of analysis, Peisert (1978) develops four different types of goals of foreign cultural policy: 1) exchange and cooperation (wish to change the status quo combined with an openness towards the culture of the target nation), 2) information (acceptance of the status quo combined with an openness towards the culture of the target nation), 3) one-sided transmission of culture (wish to change the status quo combined with no concern for the culture of the target country), and 4) self-representation (acceptance of the status quo combined with no concern for the culture of the target country). Drawing on Rivera (2015), it may be assumed that organizations engaging in cultural relations are more likely to pursue goals at the ‘cultural communication’ end of the spectrum, the more independent they are from the government.


The review of the state of the research outlined above guides the empirical analysis of public diplomacy goals. This study draws on the following systematization of public diplomacy goals<sup>32</sup>:

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<sup>32</sup> Even though persuasion can also be regarded as a goal of propaganda, this thesis differentiates between propaganda and public diplomacy. Both concepts may be geared towards similar goals, but they seek to attain them by different means. Whereas public diplomacy practitioners feel obligated to the truth and aim to persuade their strategic publics on the basis of truthful, credible information and argumentation, organizations engaging in propaganda are more likely to present one-sided information, lie or exercise coercion (see for instance Zaharna, 2004). However, Brown (2008) rightfully stresses that this differentiation is based on ‘ideal types’ of public diplomacy that may blur in practice. Moreover, it needs to be taken into consideration that the negative connotation of propaganda in Western scholarship and public diplomacy practice is not reflected in all regions of the world. Wang (2008), for example, shows that propaganda is not negatively connotated in China.



**Illustration 1: Public diplomacy goals**



(Source: own depiction based on Brown, 2013; Cowan & Cull, 2008; Deibel & Roberts, 1978; Fitzpatrick, 2010b; Signitzer, 1993)

While a number of these goals (for instance advancing the interests and values of international actors or shaping the image of an international actor) are more competitive in nature, a set of goals can be both competitive or cooperative: A country may seek to influence the policies and activities of a foreign government to advance its own political interests, but it may also participate in a joint, transnational initiative to promote democracy in North Africa. Similarly, an international actor can either seek to influence the knowledge, the attitudes, and/or the behavior of strategic publics to advance its own political interests or to address transnational challenges like climate change or terrorism. Both generating mutual understanding and building relationships are public diplomacy goals that are more cooperative in nature, but that may also be used for competitive purposes. Educational and cultural exchange programs are tools to foster relationship building between individuals from different countries and cultures. However, they can also contribute to shaping the foreign perception of a country by deliberately choosing the participants of an exchange programs.

In most cases, public diplomacy goals cannot be attained directly, but require intermediate steps. Intermediate steps of reaching public diplomacy goals include knowledge objectives such as raising awareness, attitude-related objectives such as a favorable assessment of a policy or idea, intermediate action objectives such as information seeking and information sharing as well as post-action objectives such as the repetition of specific actions like participating in public debates. (cf. Hallahan, 2015, pp. 252-253) Thus, the public diplomacy goal of influencing the knowledge, the attitudes, and the behavior of strategic publics (see above) consists of several smaller communication objectives. The number and the nature of the intermediate steps necessary to reach a public diplomacy goal depend on 1) the goal itself and 2) the strategic public that is addressed.

Public diplomacy goals are “social constructions” that are “co-created or enacted within organizations through the process of communication” (Hallahan, 2015, p. 249, see also Weick, 1995). Public diplomacy goals may also be defined together with other organizations. Embassies and government agencies for example have to coordinate their goals with the government. In addition to that, public diplomacy organizations can also develop joint goals with organizations of the same or a different international actor in the context of a cooperative public diplomacy strategy.

### *Analytical dimension 3: Public diplomacy goals*

This study seeks to map both public diplomacy goals and more specific communication objectives that are necessary to attain overarching public diplomacy goals. It proposes the following analytical sub-dimensions to deduce public diplomacy goals from strategy documents and guided interviews:

- **Public diplomacy goals:** This analytical sub-dimension sets out to identify all public diplomacy goals organizations seek to reach on the basis of their public diplomacy efforts.
  - **Intermediate communication objectives:** If organizations break their public diplomacy goals down in single communication objectives, they are captured by this sub-dimension.
  - **Reference to strategic publics:** This sub-dimension examines if public diplomacy goals are connected to specific strategic publics. Strategic publics of public diplomacy are explored in greater detail in sub-chapter 2.5.2 Strategic publics below.
- **Coordination of public diplomacy goals with other organizations:** This analytical sub-dimension fathoms if organizations define public diplomacy goals (and subordinated communication objectives) on their own, if public diplomacy goals are primarily determined by other organizations such as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, or if organizations coordinate their public diplomacy goals with other organizations on EU-, national or transnational level.

### **2.5.2 Strategic publics of public diplomacy organizations**

Even though the term ‘target group’ has been widely used to describe the individuals and groups of people that public diplomacy practitioners seek to reach, this study does not take up the term ‘target group’, but applies the term ‘strategic publics’ instead. The term ‘target group’ implies a one-directional influence from public diplomacy organizations to the individuals and groups of people that

they wish to address. The terms ‘stakeholders’ and ‘publics’, on the contrary, refer to individuals and groups of people “who can affect or [are] affected by the achievement of [an organization’s] objectives” (Freeman, 2010, p. 31). Thus, stakeholders or publics are not only influenced by the public diplomacy organization, but also exercise influence on the goal attainment of public diplomacy organizations in a mutually dependent relationship. While many scholars use the terms ‘stakeholders’ and ‘publics’ interchangeably (cf. Fitzpatrick, 2012, pp. 423-424), James E. Grunig and Fred C. Repper (1992) argue that organizations choose stakeholders, publics choose the organization. In other words: “[P]ublics organize from the ranks of stakeholders when they recognize an issue and decide to do something about it” (Rawlins, 2006, p. 3). Fitzpatrick (2012, p. 422) criticizes that only few scholars (see for instance Zaharna, 2011) have provided reflections on the meanings and the implications of the terms ‘publics’ and ‘stakeholders’ for public diplomacy theory and practice (cf. Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 422). The author contributes to the debate by suggesting the application of the term ‘strategic public’, referring to “an individual or group that has the ability to enhance or constrain an [international actor’s] ability to accomplish its mission” (Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 424). To Fitzpatrick (2012), public diplomacy organizations need to pursue “a strategic approach to the identification and segmentation of publics” (Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 422, see also Kim, Ni & Sa, 2008) that is based on a conscious decision on including or excluding certain publics on the basis of limited public diplomacy resources.

### *Mapping strategic publics*

The majority of public diplomacy definitions remain rather vague about strategic publics in public diplomacy. Both Cull (2009c, p. 12) and Tuch (1990) concentrate on foreign publics. Similarly, Gullion (1965) emphasizes “other peoples and governments” (The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, n.d.) as strategic publics of public diplomacy. Malone (1985, 1988) argues that foreign citizens constitute strategic publics of public diplomacy through which both the thinking and the behavior of their governments is influenced. Based on a comprehensive, empirically grounded analysis of the understanding and the practice of public diplomacy in Germany, Löffelholz et al. (2011a) have disclosed groups of strategic publics of public diplomacy organizations. The analysis by Löffelholz et al. (2011a) serves as a starting point for identifying strategic publics in this study. On a general note, strategic publics include state political bodies, businesses, the media, civil society organizations, and citizens, which can be grouped into decision-makers, multipliers and the general public. Political bodies act in the role of decision-makers, taking and implementing decisions at foreign/external and domestic/internal level that public diplomacy organizations may seek to influence. Decisions on foreign/external and domestic/internal policy issues are influenced by businesses and civil society organizations through lobbying<sup>33</sup> as well as the media through processes of agenda-setting, priming and framing (see sub-chapter 2.6.1). The media can also be regarded as a strategic public due to its role as multiplier. However, businesses and civil society organizations may also resume the role of multipliers as they can be considered as a link between public diplomacy organizations and for instance customers of a business or members of the general public that are interested in specific social issues and perceive civil society organizations as a credible source of information. In addition to that, public figures (see sub-chapter 2.3.1) like celebrities and intellectuals as multipliers that receive a lot of public attention may also be targeted through public diplomacy activities.

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<sup>33</sup> Terry (2001) defines lobbyists as “communication professionals to represent their public policy interests and concerns within a political culture that individual voices may be less empowered to navigate on their own” (p. 266).

Members of the general public can also become multipliers themselves: Based on a case study on the information flow in interest-based online communities, Stansberry (2012) shows that a small number of primary influencers from within online communities are central to information collection, collation, and distribution” (p. iv). Moreover, these ‘primary influencers’ play a key role in contextualizing and interpreting information, and by that, creating a shared culture (cf. Stansberry, 2012, pp. 123-124). ‘Primary influencers’<sup>34</sup> “act as both content filters and communication facilitators” (Stansberry, 2012, p. 124).

As outlined in sub-chapter 2.1, public diplomacy addresses primarily, but not exclusively foreign publics. The ‘domestic dimension’ of public diplomacy involves communication with domestic citizens that aims at legitimizing foreign policy programs, generating public support for these external actions (see for instance Huijgh, 2013; Potter, 2009) and sensitizing citizens for their role as ambassadors of their home country abroad (Cull, 2008a). The ‘domestic dimension of public diplomacy’ also reflects the interconnection of the national and the international sphere that is fostered by the cooperation on transnational challenges like climate change or terrorism (see for instance Gonesh & Melissen, 2005). As a consequence, Brian Hocking (2008) refers to “the distinction maintained in some countries [...] between “public affairs” directed at domestic constituencies and “public diplomacy” directed at foreign audiences [as] no longer helpful or sustainable” (p. 71)<sup>35</sup>. In fact, Bátora (2005) considers the interaction with domestic publics as a point of departure for all public diplomacy activities abroad:

*“Hence, although public diplomacy in the most commonly used meaning of the term seeks to engage actors abroad (that is, outside the state), an essential pre-condition for a successful public diplomacy is the attractiveness of the ideas and values that a state represents to the actors inside the state. The state, in other words, needs to be attractive not only to foreigners, but also (and perhaps more importantly) to the domestic constituency, who will then gladly associate their actions abroad with their state and hence promote its soft power.”* (Bátora, 2005, p. 5)

The notion that “an effective overseas public diplomacy strategy may often have to precede by an equally effective domestic public diplomacy strategy” is also shared by Riordan (2005, pp. 3-4). Huijgh (2011) goes one step further and conceptualizes domestic constituencies not only as publics, but as partners. “The bottom-up engagement of [domestic publics] is the precondition for an effective overseas public diplomacy strategy, identity-building, and communication with foreign publics” (Huijgh, 2011, p. 64). Asian public diplomacy has long recognized the relevance of domestic publics in public diplomacy. Chinese public diplomacy practitioners understand public diplomacy as a means of national cohesion and attribute the same importance to domestic publics as to foreign publics (see for instance d’Hooghe, 2011, p. 165; Wang, 2008, p. 260): “In addition to ensuring that people around the world gain a fair understanding of China, the Chinese government’s public diplomacy also aims to ensure that the Chinese people gain a better understanding of the global situation and China’s diplomacy” (Wang, 2012, p. 464). With regard to the public diplomacy of Western countries, Canada is often used as an example of recognizing and integrating the ‘domestic dimension’ of public diplomacy (see for instance Huijgh & Byrne, 2012; Potter, 2009). Similar to the Chinese government’s approach public diplomacy practice, the Canadian Foreign Ministry seeks to enable its domestic

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<sup>34</sup> ‘Primary influencers’ in online communities correspond to active publics in the Situational Theory of Publics (cf. Stansberry, 2012, see below). They collect, collate and distribute information provided by mass media, state and non-state organizations or for example online sources.

<sup>35</sup> Hocking (2008) provides the example of the United States as a country that maintains a distinction between public diplomacy and public affairs. Today, the Under Secretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy in the U.S. Department of State takes responsibility for both areas (cf. U.S. Department of State, n.d.).

publics “to be more informed about the country’s international role” (Potter, 2009, p. 55) and “to share, or at least understand, the government’s perception of the national interest” (Potter, 2009, p. 56). Fitzpatrick (2010a) discusses the effects of neglecting the domestic dimension of public diplomacy. To Fitzpatrick, not taking domestic publics adequately into consideration can result in “heightened negative attitudes towards the United States among people abroad, increased security risks, a diminished ability to compete effectively in the global marketplace of ideas, products, and services, and diminished public diplomacy capacity. Most importantly, the lack of attention to [domestic] publics means that public diplomacy will continue to operate without a domestic constituency to support its work” (p. 15). Similarly to nation states, regional organizations like the EU address internal publics within the EU and external publics outside of the EU (cf. Melissen, 2011a). ASEAN even focuses on regional community and identity building in its member states (cf. Chachavalpongpun, 2011, p. 111; Smith, 2014, pp. 135-136).

Rana (2013) points to an increasing recognition of “the role of immigrants as a mechanism of international cultural communication” (p. 24) in public diplomacy. He identifies diaspora communities as important foreign and domestic strategic publics. A diaspora is a “migrant community [...] [that] retains a memory of, and some connections with, its country of origin” (Rana, 2013, p. 70). Diaspora communities are targeted by public diplomacy organizations of their home countries and their host countries. Members of diaspora communities are also regarded as multipliers and mediators that can for instance contribute to creating a positive image of their home country in their host country, to increasing foreign investments in their home country and to building relationships between home and host countries (cf. Rana, 2013, pp. 79-83).

Public diplomacy organizations seek to address strategic publics within specific target regions which “are constituted by the organization’s mission statements, policy priorities, regional expertise and structural conditions” (Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015, p. 448). Moreover, the amount of resources an international actor commands has a decisive impact on the breadth and variety of target countries and regions that public diplomacy organizations, that communicate on behalf of this international actor, can address: Whereas bigger countries like the USA or France can engage with many different target regions and countries at the same time, smaller countries like Sweden or Norway operate on a smaller public diplomacy budget and concentrate on a few target countries and regions (cf. Bátora, 2005; Löffelholz et al., 2011a, p. 20).

Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008) differentiate between three different strategies of targeting: 1) global coverage, 2) focus outside of the region, and 3) local region. An international actor that pursues a global coverage approach is active in most countries worldwide and develops public diplomacy strategies on a global scale. Despite the global dimension of this approach, regional priorities and local adaptation remain crucial to the success of public diplomacy strategies. A global coverage approach may only be adopted by international actors who command a big amount of public diplomacy resources. (cf. Fisher & Bröckerhoff 2008, p. 36). International actors with a smaller amount of public diplomacy resources may either focus on strategic publics outside or within their own region. In the first case, public diplomacy programs are primarily adopted to promote an issue that is particularly crucial in a certain region or country (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 37-38). Norway, for instance, focuses on positioning itself as a mediator and carrier of peace (cf. Leonard & Small, 2003). The selection of target countries, such as Sri Lanka or Colombia (cf. Bátora 2005), is guided by Norway’s role as a peace broker and mediator<sup>36</sup>. In the latter case, an international actor targets primarily strategic publics


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<sup>36</sup> Countries like Norway engage in “niche diplomacy”. The term was originally coined by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans (cf. Evans & Grant, 1991, p. 323) and refers to the focus on one or a few core areas, in which public diplomacy organizations hold a key position. A niche is an “advantage, or ‘corner’, that a country may have by virtue of its favoured situation, special competence or unique product” (Henrikson, 2005,

within its own region. Reasons for adopting this strategy may include the goal of securing borders and resources, the regional importance of specific issues or the aim of creating a regional hub of influence (cf. Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008, pp. 39-40). All three strategies may include strategic publics at the transnational/multilateral, national, and sub-national level. The transnational/multilateral level refers to multilateral fora such as international or regional organizations or transnational initiatives of state and non-state organizations, for example.

Based on the literature review above, this study presents a taxonomy of the different types of strategic publics in public diplomacy. It describes the possible foreign and domestic publics that public diplomacy organizations may address and serves as a starting point for a more in-depth analysis that takes the goals of a public diplomacy organizations as well as its situational context into consideration.


**Illustration 2: Types of strategic publics of public diplomacy organizations**



(Source: own depiction based on Löffelholz, 2011a; Stansberry, 2012)

p. 71). Henrikson (2005, p. 71) identifies locational (based on geographic realities, for example the volcanically and geologically active Iceland), traditional (based on past commitments, for example the Nobel Peace Prize that has been selected and awarded for more than one century by the Norwegian Nobel Committee) and consensual niches (based on strong support and identification, for example both Canada's and Norway's long-standing engagement in international peacekeeping). "Niche diplomacy, although often associated with very small countries, has in fact been more fully developed by countries that have sufficient size and capacity to play notable roles on the international stage but that are not strong enough to impose their positions or solutions. [...] Even if not considered 'middle powers' in terms of military or other basic strength or in terms of international rank, they can sometimes play significant roles as intermediaries, as key providers of assistance, or in other precise ways". (Henrikson, 2005, p. 67)

**Illustration 3: Dimensions of strategic publics**



(Source: own depiction based on Bátora, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2010a; Huijgh, 2011; Potter, 2009)

#### *Identification and prioritization of stakeholders in specific contexts*

In the course of developing a public diplomacy strategy, organizations need to identify 1) all possible strategic publics, 2) classify them in groups, and 3) prioritize these groups of strategic publics (cf. Rawlins, 2006, p. 13). The linkage model of public relations, developed by James E. Grunig and Todd Hunt (1984), allows to identify all (internal and external) publics that have a relationship with the public diplomacy organization. Grunig and Hunt (1984) differentiate between four types of linkages: 1) enabling linkages, 2) functional linkages, 3) normative linkages, and 4) diffused linkages. 1) Enabling linkages characterize the relationships with groups “that provide the authority and control the resources that enable the organization to exist” (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 140). The relationship between the Goethe-Institut and the German Federal Foreign Office constitutes such an enabling linkage, as the German Federal Foreign Office provides a big share of the Goethe-Institut’s financial resources and, thus, enables the viability of the Goethe-Institut as a public diplomacy organization (cf. Goethe-Institut, 2014). Enabling linkages also depict relationships between cooperation partners that work together to achieve public diplomacy goals. They are discussed in greater detail in sub-chapter 2.7) Functional linkages can either have an input function (e.g. human resources to conduct public diplomacy activities) or an output function (e.g. participants of a language learning course, foreign investors). This study, however, only focuses on strategic publics outside of a public diplomacy organization. The role of internal publics is discussed in sub-chapter 2.3.1. 3) Normative linkages arise between public diplomacy organizations and publics that “face similar problems or share similar values” (Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 142). This can also include competitors (cf. Rawlins, 2006, p. 4). 4) Diffused linkages exist between public diplomacy organizations and “groups that are not typically

involved with the organization, but may become more involved as a result of the organization's words or actions" (Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 427, see also Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 142). This broad group of publics may include the media, the general public or for instance civil society organizations at home and abroad. To Rawlins (2006), enabling and functional linkages "have the greatest priority as [publics] because their power/dependency/influence relationship is frequent and critical to the regular operations of the organization" (p. 8). Normative linkages should always be present in minds of the organization, but are set at a lower priority than enabling or functional linkages, as they do not "have a stake in the operations of the organization" (Rawlins, 2006, pp.8-9). Diffused linkages remain a low priority, unless these publics react to specific public diplomacy or (foreign) policy initiatives. An increasing level of activism of any of these groups automatically increases the priority assigned to these different publics. (cf. Rawlins, 2006, pp. 9-11).

According to Rawlins (2006), strategic publics can be prioritized on the basis of 1) their attributes, and 2) situational conditions. Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) propose a stakeholder management model and define power, legitimacy and urgency as important attributes of publics. Publics can have coercive, utilitarian or symbolic power to influence the organization or other publics linked to the organization. At the same time, publics may also be dependent on organizations, for instance businesses may be dependent on public diplomacy organizations in the area of foreign trade promotion to increase their export sales. (cf. Rawlins, 2006, p. 5). The degree of legitimacy refers to the question to what extent publics "[have] a legal, moral, or presumed claim that can influence the organization's behavior, direction, process, or outcome" (Rawlins, 2006, p. 5). The attribute urgency can either refer to time pressure – an issue or a relationship with publics demands a timely reaction – or an issue or relationship that is particularly critical to the respective public. Publics can either possess one, two or three of these attributes. Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) describe publics that combine all three attributes as definitive stakeholders. They are strategic publics with the highest priority. Publics that possess two of the attributes are called expectant stakeholders<sup>37</sup>, while publics that either have power or legitimacy or urgency are considered latent stakeholders<sup>38</sup> or publics with a lower priority for public diplomacy organizations. If none of these attributes apply to individuals or groups, they are not considered as (strategic) publics of a public diplomacy organization (cf. Rawlins, 2006, p. 6). Rawlins (2006, p. 7) argues that priority, expectant and latent stakeholders can either be supportive or non-supportive of an organization and adds this dimension to the stakeholder management model of Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997).

None of the attributes of strategic publics are static, but are they subject to change under specific situational conditions (cf. Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 424). The situational theory of publics provides a theoretical framework to explain and predict why publics become or remain active (cf. J. E. Grunig & Repper, 1992, p.125). It differentiates between four different types of publics (active publics, aware publics, latent publics, and non-publics) that develop on the basis of the three independent variables problem recognition, constraint recognition and level of involvement (see for instance J. E. Grunig, 1997; J. E. Grunig & Repper, 1992; J. E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984). Problem recognition refers to realizing that there is a connection between a specific problem and publics. The level of involvement measures if publics act on a problem, for instance by actively seeking and sharing information.

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<sup>37</sup> Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) further differentiate expectant stakeholders into dominant stakeholders (have power and legitimacy, but lack urgency), dependent stakeholders (have legitimacy and urgency, but lack power) and dangerous stakeholders (have power and urgency, but lack legitimacy, may engage in protests, boycotts or even violent actions).

<sup>38</sup> Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) further differentiate latent stakeholders into dormant stakeholders (have power, but lack urgency and legitimacy, potential of power remains unused), discretionary stakeholders (have legitimacy, but lack power and urgency) and demanding stakeholders (have urgency, but lack power and legitimacy).



Constraint recognition describes to what extent publics believe that they are capable of doing something about a problem. Active publics are characterized by high levels of involvement and problem recognition as well as a low levels of constraint recognition. Aware publics, on the contrary, show either lower levels of involvement and/or problem recognition, or feel more constrained to act on a problem. Latent publics face a problem, but are not (yet) aware of this problem. Non publics are not related to the problem at all. (cf. J. E. Grunig & Repper, 1992; Rawlins, 2006). Hallahan (2000) argues that “the situational theory [of publics] is intended to serve as a predictor of activism” (p. 500), and thus, may neglect some publics an organization may need to build relationships with in order to attain its goals.

#### *Analytical dimension 4: Strategic publics of public diplomacy*

To empirically analyze the strategic publics of EU and member state organizations, this study proceeds in two steps. In a first step, the types of strategic publics are identified. EU public diplomacy organizations may address the following strategic publics within and/or outside of the EU:

- **Political bodies** on transnational, national or sub-national level
- **Business organizations** on transnational, national or sub-national level
- **Media organizations** on transnational, national or sub-national level
- **Civil society organizations** on transnational, national or sub-national level
- **Public figures**
- **Citizens** in general or of a specific region, country or sub-national level

In addition to these five types of strategic publics, the analysis of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations also explores the question to what extent domestic publics and diaspora groups are regarded as strategic publics. Moreover, the study seeks to capture to what extent EU and member state organizations prioritize strategic publics:

In a second step, the researcher has developed a set of analytical sub-dimensions that allow for a more detailed description of strategic publics on the basis of approaches by Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), Rawlins (2006), Grunig and Hunt (1984) as well as Grunig and Reper (1992). For each strategic public identified in the guided interviews or strategy documents, the analysis captures statements regarding their level of knowledge on the respective international actor, their degree of activism as well as their level of support regarding the respective international actor:

- **Level of knowledge on an international actor:** This sub-dimension analyzes the extent to which strategic publics hold knowledge on the international actor in general, the issues and problems addressed by the international actor as well as its specific policies and actions. The level of knowledge serves as an indicator of the level of problem recognition of strategic publics.
- **Degree of activism:** This sub-dimension examines to what extent strategic publics actively seek and share information as well as participate in discourses on an international actor, the issues addressed by the international actor and/or its policies and actions. It also looks at possible constraints to activities of strategic publics.
- **Attitude towards international actor:** This sub-dimension captures the attitude of strategic publics towards an international actor, its policies and actions and analyzes to

what extent strategic publics are supportive or non-supportive of the respective international actor.

Fitzpatrick (2012, p. 429) criticizes both the linkage model of public relations and the situational theory of publics as too organization-centered. The same applies to the stakeholder management model developed by Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) and extended by Rawlins (2006). These views largely neglect “the multiple and interdependent interactions [between organizations and publics, but also among publics] that simultaneously exist in stakeholder environments” (Rowley 1997, p. 890). Rowley (1997) proposes a “network theory of stakeholder influences” on the basis of social network analysis that is valuable to studying relational and especially collaborative approaches to public diplomacy that perceive the international environment as “a network of interconnected communities and interests” (Fisher & Lucas, 2011, p. 300). This study examines cooperations and networks with other public diplomacy organizations which are connected to an organization through enabling and functional linkages (see sub-chapter 2.7). As it concentrates on public diplomacy from the perspective of the organization, it does not focus on relations between (different groups of) strategic publics. However, the qualitative method of data collection still allows the researcher to capture interactions between strategic publics that influence the public diplomacy practice of the organizations analyzed.

### **2.5.3 Approaches to Public Diplomacy**

Drawing on the work of Zaharna (2009), this sub-chapter introduces an information and a relational communication framework of public diplomacy. While the information framework refers to “communication as a linear process of transferring information” (Zaharna, 2009, p. 86), the relational communication framework perceives “communication as a social process of building relationships and fostering harmony” (Zaharna, 2009, p. 86). These different frameworks of public diplomacy build on the differentiation of communication as one-sided and two-sided processes. Communication as a one-sided process focuses on the “transmission of a fixed quantity of information – the message is determined by the sender or source” (McQuail, 2010, p. 70, italics in original). This understanding of communication corresponds to the publicity model of communication suggested by McQuail (2010)<sup>39</sup>. Based on this model, communication seeks to “catch and hold visual or aural attention” (McQuail, 2010, p. 72). Gaining and maintaining attention is conceptualized as a zero-sum game (cf. McQuail, 2010, p. 72). Communication as a two-sided process encompasses the notion of 1) communication as exchange of tangible and intangible goods between people (see for instance Homans, 1958), 2) communication as participation, meaning that individuals are “trying to establish a ‘commonness’ with someone” by “trying to share information, an idea, or attitude” (Schramm, 1971, p. 3), 3) communication as a process of generating understanding and conveying meaning between individuals (cf. Noelle-Neumann & Schulz, 1971), and 4) communication as a ritual (cf. Bonfadelli, 2010, p. 116-117). “A ritual conceives communication as a process through which a shared culture is created, modified, and transformed” (Carey, 1989, p. 43). McQuail (2010) defines ritual communication as latent and ambiguous, “depending on associations and symbols that are not chosen by the participants but made available in the culture” (p. 71). Ritual communication is not instrumental by nature, but its principles are sometimes adopted in planned communication campaigns (cf. McQuail, 2010, p. 71).

The information framework is coined by unilateral decision-making „on the goal, message, time frame, channels and target audience“ (Zaharna, 2009, p. 88) of public diplomacy. In the information

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<sup>39</sup> This model focuses on mass communication and particularly on commercial media institutions (cf. McQuail, 2010, p. 73).

framework, organizations have a high degree of “control [over] the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the [public diplomacy] initiative” (Zaharna, 2009, p. 88). The relational communication framework draws on normative approaches to conceptualizing public relations as well as dialogue (cf. Brown, 2013, p. 44) and is more differentiated. It has received particular scholarly attention after increasing calls for a “relational turn” in public diplomacy after 9/11. The relational turn in public diplomacy has been reflected by definitions of public diplomacy that centered on achieving mutual understanding (see for instance Fitzpatrick, 2010b, p. 105; Leonard et al., 2002,) or the deliberate attempt of delimiting the relational public diplomacy practices from linear public diplomacy by introducing the concept of the ‘new public diplomacy’ (cf. Melissen, 2005). Although this terminology was not adopted by most scholars, there is a general agreement on the basic features of the ‘new public diplomacy’, including “long-term relationship-building, a dialogical practice that does not underestimate the listening dimension, and an emphasis on the importance of social actors as credible interpreters and receivers, particularly in cross-cultural dialogue” (Lee & Melissen, 2011, p. 2)<sup>40</sup>. Zaharna, Fisher and Arsenault (2013) point to a “connective mindshift” in public diplomacy that “recognizes the power of connections and identifies the nature of these relationships as a key unit of analysis for public diplomacy” (p. 1). Similarly, Zaharna (2005, 2007) introduces a ‘Network Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy’. Relational public diplomacy varies in terms of “the level of participation (individuals, institution, or community), degree of coordination (limited, shared, or negotiated), scope (single-issue or multifaceted), time duration (days, months, or years), and policy objectives” (Zaharna, 2009, p. 93).

Zaharna’s (2009) differentiation between an informational and a relational communication framework allows for “categorizing and analyzing a broad spectrum of public diplomacy initiatives” (Zaharna, 2009, p. 86). It serves as an analytical framework that allows for the integration of existing public diplomacy models. This sub-chapter therefore introduces Cowan and Arsenault’s (2008) conceptualization of monologue, (true and technical) dialogue as well as collaboration as layers of public diplomacy as well as the seven-level continuum of public diplomacy approaches introduced by Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008) to further specify the initial differentiation between an information and a relational framework of public diplomacy. Both models imply an underlying differentiation between competitive and cooperative approaches to public diplomacy (cf. Leonard et al., 2002). Moreover, it discusses a set of models that focus on the time frame of public diplomacy approaches (cf. Gilboa, 2008; Leonard et al., 2002; Nye, 2004) and that allow for a differentiation of reactive and proactive approaches to public diplomacy.

This sub-chapter does not present a normative reflection on effective and ethical ways of conducting public diplomacy, but a framework to identify and categorize different approaches to public diplomacy. Thus, it does not highlight relational approaches to public diplomacy that are, by definition, opting for cooperation, but it also discusses relational approaches to public diplomacy as “competitive, and at times even combative, process[es]” (van Ham, 2013, p. 20).

### *Monologue, dialogue and collaboration*


Cowan and Arsenault (2008) define three layers of public diplomacy: monologue, dialogue and collaboration. Monologue is based on one-way communication and part of the information framework to public diplomacy. It aims at informing strategic publics about a certain idea, policy and/or interest of an international actor as well as generating understanding and support for the respective ideas,

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<sup>40</sup> While long-term relationship building and dialogue have been elements of the public diplomacy practice of international actors for a long time, the introduction of the term ‘new public diplomacy’ accentuates these elements more strongly in academic research.

policies and/or interests (cf. Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, pp. 13-16). Monologue may manifest itself in speeches, such as the address of former U.S. president John F. Kennedy in West Berlin in 1963, including the famous quotation “Ich bin ein Berliner”, brochures, press releases, but also movies, songs or books. Cowan and Arsenault (2008) refer to monologue as a means of providing information as well as a “tool for advocacy” (p. 15). Based on Cull (2009c), advocacy is defined as “an [international] actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by undertaking an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea or that actor’s general interests in the minds of a foreign public, e.g. embassy press release” (pp. 18-19). Furthermore, public diplomacy organizations may apply monologues to “correc[t] and adap[t] to inadvertent or private one-way communication flows that if left unanswered could undermine transnational relationships and national reputations” (p. 15). While Cowan and Arsenault (2008) encourage public diplomacy organizations to address and engage with these one-way communication flows, they also sound a note of caution regarding the conceptualization and implementation of unified public diplomacy strategies, which are “not only impossible but also often undesirable” (p. 15). The authors highlight the efficacy of pluralistic, diversified public diplomacy strategies, as for instance pursued by Germany (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013; Löffelholz et al., 2011a, 2011b), as they do not only “highlight [an international actor’s] commitment to democratic debate, [but] they may [also] help to ensure that those who disapprove of a regime or its policies do not automatically hate the nation or its people” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 15). One-way communication is an integral part of public diplomacy practice, but also shows a number of weak points: By and large, monologic communication does not provide feedback channels. As a consequence, it often remains unclear to what extent communication activities resonate with the strategic publics and if they have to be adjusted to specific audiences. Thus, one-way communication needs to be supplemented with other forms of public diplomacy (cf. *ibid.*, p. 13), that Cowan and Arsenault (2008) describe as ‘dialogue’ and ‘collaboration’. Both dialogue and collaboration refer to the relational communication framework outlined by Zaharna (2009).

**Illustration 4: The three layers of public diplomacy**



(Source: own depiction, based on Cowan & Arsenault, 2008; Zaharna, 2013)

To Carl Botan (1997), “dialogue manifests itself more as a stance, orientation, or bearing in communication rather than as specific method, technique, or format” (Botan, 1997, p. 192). *Dialogue* refers to the exchange of information and ideas. The flow of communication can be characterized as

reciprocal and multidirectional (cf. Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 18). Tools of dialogue-oriented public diplomacy range from summits, panel discussions and workshops to student exchange programs or interactive web 2.0 applications. While the role of international broadcasting was particularly stressed during the Cold War as a tool “used [by both the United States and the Soviet Union] [...] to shape favorable public attitudes toward their respective rival ideologies” (Gilboa, 2008, p. 59), the example of the Deutsche Welle program ‘Dialogue of Cultures’<sup>41</sup> (cf. Zöllner, 2006, 2009) shows that international broadcasting can be both a tool for monologue-oriented and dialogue-oriented public diplomacy.

Dialogue can be further subdivided into a technical and a genuine or true<sup>42</sup> dialogue. James E. Grunig and Todd Hunt (1984) propose a differentiation between a technical dialogue as part of the two-way asymmetric model of public relations and genuine dialogue as integral part of a two-way symmetric model of public relations<sup>43</sup>. Two-way communication serves different purposes in the two types of dialogue: A technical dialogue is predominantly instrumental in nature (cf. Gregory, 2005, p. 12). In this case, two-way asymmetric communication is perceived “as a strategic tool to advance [a public diplomacy organization’s interests]” (Fitzpatrick, 2011, p. 8). The purpose of a genuine dialogue rather lies within advancing understanding than winning a particular argument (cf. Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 19). The concept of genuine dialogue draws on a number of disciplines, including psychology, and relational communication (cf. Taylor & Kent, 2002, p. 21). “I and Thou” by theologian Martin Buber lays the foundation of the contemporary understanding of genuine dialogue: Buber (1970 [1923]) conceptualizes dialogue as a form of interaction, in which the communication partner is perceived as equal and “an end and not merely as a means to achieving desired goals” (Taylor & Kent, 2002, p. 22). All parties involved are subject to persuasion (cf. Fitzpatrick, 2011, p. 8).

Buber defines reciprocity, mutuality, involvement, and openness as key elements of a genuine dialogue (cf. Kent & Taylor, 2002, p. 22). These elements are taken up in the analysis of normative criteria to assess a dialogue in both public relations and public diplomacy research (cf. Srugies, 2015). Building on Buber (1970 [1923]), Cissna and Anderson (1994), Deetz (2006) as well as Kent and Taylor (2002), Fitzpatrick (2011) identifies the following criteria to characterize a genuine dialogue in public diplomacy: 1) authenticity, implying “honesty, transparency and genuineness” (p. 20) of both public diplomacy practitioners and their strategic publics, 2) (mutual) trust, embodying the recognition of the views of strategic publics as well as transparent decision-making procedures (cf. *ibid.*, p. 20), 3) respect for and acknowledgement of the diversity of strategic publics, 4) a mutual interest in collaboration (cf. *ibid.*, p. 21), as well as 5) risk, which goes along with the acceptance of the “uncertainty of dialogic outcomes” (*ibid.*, p. 21). Moreover, Fitzpatrick (2011) includes 6) presence in the set of criteria, which draws on the notion of openness introduced by Buber (1970 [1923]), but also encompasses that strategic publics “are consulted before [...] foreign policy decision are made or actions taken” (p. 19). Zaharna (2012) points to the pivotal role of culture in dialogic communication: Cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity constitute indispensable preconditions to fulfilling the criteria of a genuine dialogue.

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<sup>41</sup> The program ‘Dialogue of Cultures’ fosters a dialogue between the Arab and the Western world by featuring discussions between German and Arab thinkers on current topics (cf. Zöllner, 2006, p. 174).

<sup>42</sup> The terms genuine and true are used interchangeably in this thesis.

<sup>43</sup> James E. Grunig (2001) suggested to replace the two-way asymmetric and two-way symmetric models by a mixed motive model of public relations. The new mixed motive model of public relations positions organizational objectives and motivations of publics at opposite ends of a continuum. According to James E. Grunig (2001), there is a win-win zone on the continuum that covers both organizational goals and motivations of publics. It is the task of public relations practitioners to “negotiate with both publics and dominant coalitions [within the organization] to reach an outcome or relationship in the win-win zone” (p. 26)

While this study does not analyze the approaches to public diplomacy from a normative perspective, the criteria defined by Fitzpatrick (2011) serve as an analytical framework to distinguish a technical dialogue from a genuine dialogue. Just as monologue, dialogue and collaboration as three layers of public diplomacy, Cowan and Arsenault (2008) argue that a technical and a genuine dialogue can also build on each other: “Both a [genuine] dialogue and a technical dialogue can be useful to advancing public diplomacy goals since sometimes the very act of exchanging information, or illustrating a willingness to exchange information, can lay the groundwork for deeper attachments” (p. 18).

Many scholars (see for instance Fitzpatrick, 2010b; Lee & Melissen, 2011; Zaharna, 2005, 2007; Zaharna, Fisher & Arsenault, 2013) have highlighted the value of dialogue in public diplomacy. A critical reflection of dialogue is, however, largely missing. Taylor and Kent (2002) make an important point when stating that “dialogue is often called “more ethical”, but no “evidence” exists to support such a claim” (p. 33). Moreover, they remark that “not everyone agrees [...] whether dialogic public relations [and public diplomacy respectively] is even possible or practical” (Taylor & Kent, 2002, p. 33). They point to empirical findings from studies on town meetings (see for instance McComas, 2001) as well as community workshops (see for instance K. A. Pearce & B. W. Pearce, 2001) that show that participants are not necessarily committed to engage in a dialogue, although organizations create conditions that enable a genuine dialogue. Gregory (2005) calls into question if a genuine dialogue can be separated from power. Similarly, Risse (2010) points to power considerations and power imbalances in the international environment that influence dialogue between different parties. The relationship between power and a genuine dialogue is, however, not per se viewed as negative: Chambers (1995) notes that dialogue makes an important contribution to will formation in elections or referenda.

*Collaboration* as the third layer of public diplomacy also builds on two-way communication and “refers to initiatives in which participants from different nations participate in a project together. These projects can be short term with a clear endpoint, such as putting on a play or writing a piece of music; or larger in scale and long-term such as side-by-side participation in natural disaster reconstruction efforts” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 21). Zaharna, Fisher and Arsenault (2013, p. 7) describe collaboration as the equivalent of negotiations in diplomacy. Public diplomacy organizations cooperate within the framework of a joint goal or a joint strategy in order to strengthen relationships among collaborators “through common experience and/or achievement” (ibid., p. 21) and to create synergy effects through a joint use of public diplomacy resources.

Collaborative public diplomacy abandons the concept of the passive audience and “recognize[s] a reliance on the knowledge and the behavior of others” (Fisher, 2013, p. 213). Organizations engaging in collaborative public diplomacy do not aim at asserting pre-defined goals, but take on the role of network weavers (see sub-chapter 2.7) who facilitate ties between organizations and/or (groups of) individuals (cf. Fisher, 2013, p. 222, see also Taylor & Kent, 2013). Examples of collaborations in public diplomacy include for instance the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (cf. Zaharna, 2013), the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra, which connects Jewish and Muslim musicians that play and tour together (see for instance Usher, 2002), and the inter-religious sports initiative ‘Unity through Sports’ in Lebanon (see for instance The India Center for Cultural Exchange, n.d.).

Fisher (2008) introduces an open-source approach to advance the practice of (collaborative) public diplomacy that draws on insights from open-source software development. He takes up the differentiation between ‘the cathedral’ mindset and ‘the bazaar’ mindset proposed by Raymond (1999)<sup>44</sup>. The cathedral mindset refers to centralized public diplomacy initiatives that aim at reaching

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<sup>44</sup> The differentiation between ‘the cathedral’ mindset and ‘the bazaar’ mindset is taken from Eric Steven Raymond’s (1999) influential essay and book “The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary”.


pre-defined goals that are planned by single public diplomacy organizations and only involve other actors at the implementation stage (cf. Fisher, 2008; Zaharna, 2007). Moving from ‘the cathedral’ mindset to ‘the bazaar’ mindset involves the recognition that, in most cases, public diplomacy organizations are not the only actors working in a given field like development cooperation or foreign trade promotion, but one “part of a wider community” (Fisher, 2008, p. 133, see also Henrikson, 2005; Rana, 2006; Zaharna, 2007)<sup>45</sup>. ‘The bazaar’ mindset already involve partners and strategic publics in the planning of public diplomacy initiatives and advocates a process of co-creating ideas that do not belong to a single public diplomacy organization, but all parties involved (cf. Fisher, 2008, pp. 141-142).

As collaboration builds on (genuine) dialogue, the preconditions for a genuine dialogue outlined above also apply to collaboration. However, the willingness to compromise on public diplomacy goals, strategies and tools as well as the openness towards collaboration partners are particularly crucial to the success of collaborations in public diplomacy. Disagreement and conflict about the goals of a collaboration as well as the ways how to reach these goals may inhibit collaboration (see for instance Cowan & Arsenault, 2008; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips 2002), whereas “clearly identifiable and concrete outcomes” (Cowan & Arsenalt, 2008, p. 24) contribute to its success. Furthermore, Fisher (2013) identifies autonomy, inclusion and fairness as crucial factors of success in collaborative public diplomacy initiatives. Autonomy refers to the intrinsic motivation of organizations and communities to collaborate. Inclusion stimulates a sense of belonging and relatedness and can for instance be achieved through “active, reciprocal participation in decision-making, task sharing, and social activities among the participants” (Fisher, 2013, p. 219). Not least, the feeling of being treated fair in a collective contributes to the success of collaborative public diplomacy efforts. (cf. Fisher, 2013, pp. 218-221)

### *From listening to telling*

Ali Fisher and Aurélie Bröckerhoff (2008) further refine the differentiation between monologue, dialogue and collaboration introduced above. They introduce a seven-level continuum of public diplomacy approaches that places telling and listening at the opposite ends of this continuum.

#### **Illustration 5: Seven-level continuum of public diplomacy approaches**



(Source: Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008, p. 25)

Telling or direct messaging implies purely one-way communication with no desire of reciprocity. It includes nation branding, tourism or trade promotion activities and corresponds to the notion of advocacy put forward by Cull (2009c) in his taxonomy of public diplomacy elements. Both international broadcasting and cultural diplomacy rely largely, but not exclusively on one-way communication (cf. Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008). International broadcasting refers to an international

<sup>45</sup> Not taking members of this wider community into consideration can decisively reduce the impact of public diplomacy initiatives: „As a result, in some instances an organization may be unsuccessful if it unveils a finished product — that is, the cathedral — and then invites people in the hope that they will accept a single and un-nuanced interpretation of a given issue. This is because while the cathedral was being built, numerous other groups were engaging in similar initiatives“. (Fisher, 2008, p. 135)

actor's attempt to influence the international environment through mass-mediated communication channels such as radio and television (cf. Cull, 2009c, p. 21). Cultural diplomacy draws on an international actor's cultural resources to promote its policies, interests and values as well as to influence the international environment (cf. Cull, 2009c, p. 19; Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008, pp. 28-29). The main difference between cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange lies within the power dynamics in both approaches: While cultural diplomacy embodies a focus on one-way communication and presentation, cultural exchange rather concentrates on two-way communication through direct or mediated communication channels. Cultural exchange seeks to establish a "genuine exchange of people, cultural goods or ideas, based on reciprocity and a symmetrical relationship" (Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008, p. 28). Furthermore, Arndt (2005) uses the role of the government to distinguish between cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange: Cultural diplomacy activities are guided by an international actor's policy agenda and contributes explicitly to the assertion of the international actor's goals. Cultural relations concentrate on the mutual cultural exchange between people. Governments may also fund cultural relations activities, but influence them politically to a much lesser degree. (cf. Arndt, 2005; Rivera, 2015)

In order to build long-term relationships and networks that facilitate the realization of public diplomacy goals, organizations need to identify "individuals or groups who will be influential in the future" (Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008, p. 27). Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008) point to the need of jointly developing goals and priorities with others in order to establish successful and sustainable public diplomacy networks. Facilitation implies the idea that "providing others with the means of achieving their goals can allow an organization to change the way the target audience acts" (Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008, p. 26). Public diplomacy activities in the category of facilitation include projects in the field of development cooperation that are tailored to specific strategic publics. Similar to the establishment of public diplomacy networks, this approach relies on a joint definition of project goals and priorities with strategic publics (cf. *ibid.*, p. 26).

To Cull (2009c), "[l]istening is an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly" (p. 18). The conceptualization of listening by Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008) goes beyond polling and "reflects a genuine interest in the other's perspective" (p. 23). By that, listening can build the basis for opening up negotiations, developing mutual trust and lasting relationships as well as inducing behavioral change. Furthermore, it is perceived as an important approach to easing the tension in an unbalanced power relationship. (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 23-24). Nonetheless, Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008) also point to the limits of listening: "if there is a particular position which requires advocating, for example, action on climate change, the listening programme can only create a more open platform, but it cannot provide that message" (p. 24).

Direct messaging or telling, international broadcasting as well as cultural diplomacy rather focus on the projection of messages than on two-way communication. The closer public diplomacy approaches are to the 'listening end' of the continuum, the more importance is placed on mutual understanding and relationship building. (cf. Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008, pp. 31-32). Cultural exchange, network building, facilitation and listening are elements of the new public diplomacy, introduced by Melissen (2005). The new public diplomacy marks the "departure from an actor-to-people communication" (top-down approach) with a focus on targeted messaging to a "people-to-people contact [...], with the international actor playing the role of the facilitator [...]" (Cull 2009c: 13). While direct messaging or telling can be categorized as monologue-oriented communication, international broadcasting and cultural diplomacy feature elements of both monologue and dialogue. Cultural exchange and listening foster a dialogue between public diplomacy organizations and its strategic publics. Finally, both



facilitation and building networks correspond to collaborative public diplomacy. (cf. Cowan & Arsenault, 2008; Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008)

#### *Time frame of public diplomacy approaches*

This section introduces three models to describe and analyze the time frame of public diplomacy practice. Leonard et al. (2002) define news management, strategic communications and relationship building as three dimensions of public diplomacy that reflect the different time horizons of public diplomacy initiatives. This public diplomacy typology was taken up by Nye (2004, pp. 107-110), who differentiates between daily communication, strategic communication and the development of lasting relationships. Furthermore, Gilboa (2008) draws on the work of Leonard et al. (2002) to develop a framework of comparative public diplomacy analysis. Gilboa (2008) distinguished between public diplomacy on an immediate, intermediate and long-time range. He argues that “[e]ach [dimension] presents different purposes and means, different attitudes to the media and public opinion, a different degree of desirable association or ties with the government, and matching public diplomacy instruments” (p. 82).

News management refers to public diplomacy activities with a duration of a few hours to a few days. It involves day-to-day communication like answering press inquiries, but also immediate reactions to unforeseen events such as a crisis. (cf. Leonard et al., 2002, pp. 12-14). News management can be part of monologue- and dialogue-oriented public diplomacy as well as collaborative public diplomacy. Both advocacy and international broadcasting are highlighted as suitable elements of news management (cf. Gilboa, 2008, p. 72). Communication channels applied in short-term oriented public diplomacy include mass media, controlled media like press releases and online media that allow public diplomacy organizations to reach a large number of people in a short amount of time. Whereas news management is primarily reactive, strategic communications describe proactive public diplomacy initiatives that are designed for several weeks to several months. Strategic communications involves planned public diplomacy initiatives such as campaigns to “proactively creat[e] a news agenda through activities and events which are designed to reinforce core messages and influence perceptions” (Leonard et al., 2002, p. 11). The dimension strategic communications directly refers to the concept of agenda setting (see for instance Cohen, 1963; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Public diplomacy organizations engage in an ongoing competition to place issues onto the agenda by capturing the attention of decision-makers, multipliers and the general public (cf. Dearing & Rogers, 1996). Maurer (2010) conceives agenda setting as a zero-sum game, in which each topic on the agenda reduces the attention for other topics. Strategic communications corresponds to monologue-oriented public diplomacy as well as dialogue-oriented public diplomacy that focuses on establishing a technical dialogue. The third dimension relationship building concentrates on long-term public diplomacy initiatives with a duration of several years. Relationship building aims at building mutual trust as well as establishing favorable conditions for achieving foreign political goals. Leonard et al. (2002) define “scholarships, visits and other exchange programmes” as “most effective instruments for building enduring relationships” (p. 18). Gilboa (2008, p. 73) points to the pivotal role of non-governmental organizations as public diplomacy organizations in relationship building initiatives.

The analytical frameworks to categorize public diplomacy approaches introduced by Zaharna (2009), Cowan and Arsenault (2008) as well as Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008) assume an underlying differentiation between a competitive and cooperative conceptualization of public diplomacy: While monologue-oriented communication as well as activities at the ‘telling end’ of the communication spectrum point to a primarily competitive approach to public diplomacy, genuine dialogue and collaboration as well as activities at the ‘listening end’ suggest a more cooperative approach to public diplomacy. Similarly, strategic communications or intermediate public diplomacy approaches are

more competitively oriented than long-time approaches that focus on relationship building. News management can include elements of both competitive and cooperative public diplomacy practice. (cf. Gilboa, 2008; Leonard et al., 2002; Nye, 2004).

#### *Analytical dimension 6: Public diplomacy approaches*

Building on the models and theoretical reflections on public diplomacy approaches outlined above, this analytical dimension details how EU as well as French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations describe their mode of communication and the role they attribute. In addition to this broad, overarching dimension, the following sub-dimensions have been developed:

- **Time frame:** This sub-category explores if public diplomacy organizations concentrate on immediate and intermediate public diplomacy initiatives and programs or rather pursue a long-term approach (cf. Gilboa, 2008; Leonard et al., 2002; Nye, 2004). It also looks at the time frame for which organizations develop their public diplomacy strategies.
- **Key issues:** This sub-dimension concentrates on thematic foci of a public diplomacy approach. It captures statements that address the key issues and core areas that organizations concentrate on in their public diplomacy approach. Exclusively national foci can be regarded as indicators of a more competitively oriented approach to public diplomacy, whereas transnational key issues are assumed to play a bigger role in cooperative approaches to public diplomacy.
- **Adaptation of public diplomacy approach to strategic publics:** This sub-dimension poses the question to what extent public diplomacy organizations adapt their public diplomacy approach to specific groups or strategic publics and/or target regions. Adaptation may refer to may refer to key issues, the mode of communication or for instance the role of strategic publics. This sub-dimension serves as a link between public diplomacy practice at strategy and tactical level.
- **Evaluation of public diplomacy approach:** The analysis of the evaluation of public diplomacy approaches allows the research to make statements about the (perceived) success of a public diplomacy approach as well as planned measures to continue or alter the respective approach. This sub-dimension also sheds light on planned or applied mechanisms of evaluating European public diplomacy.
- **Challenges of public diplomacy approach:** Challenges of conceptualizing and realizing a public diplomacy may refer to reaching strategic publics, cooperation with other organizations or public diplomacy resources. They are closely linked to the internal and external environments of public diplomacy organizations.

In addition to these analytical sub-dimension that focus on the public diplomacy practice of single organizations, this dimension also includes two sub-dimensions that center on actors' constellations (observation, influence, and negotiation) (cf. Schimank, 1996) and already disclose information on interorganizational cooperation (see sub-chapter 2.7):

- **Observation of other public diplomacy organizations:** This sub-dimension explores to what extent public diplomacy organizations observe as well as evaluate public diplomacy activities by other organizations and to what extent the public diplomacy conceptualization and practice of other organizations influence their own public diplomacy approach. This sub-dimension provides information on the extent to which characteristics of an organization's public diplomacy practice can be explained by specific actors' constellations as well as interorganizational cooperation.

- **Coordination of public diplomacy strategy:** This sub-dimension examines to what extent organizations coordinate their public diplomacy strategy with each other. Coordination of the public diplomacy strategy can refer to coordination among single units within a public diplomacy organization, coordination between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of one international actor or coordination between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors. The coordination of public diplomacy strategies among public diplomacy organizations serves as an indicator of the extent of interorganizational cooperation.

## 2.6. Public diplomacy practice on the tactical level

This sub-chapter explores the implementation of public diplomacy strategies in order to realize public diplomacy goals. Public diplomacy practice on the tactical comprises the development and communication of public diplomacy messages as well as the identification of suitable tools and communication channels for communicating with strategic publics.

### 2.6.1 Messages of public diplomacy organization

Adapting Werder's (2015) conceptualization of strategic communication messages to public diplomacy, this study defines public diplomacy messages as "symbolic communication that contains unique physical, psychological and social properties" (Werder, 2015, p. 270). *The physical properties of a message* refer to the manifest content of a message, the "tangible stimuli that can be perceived" (ibid., p. 270) in a strategy document, a press release or a speech. Physical properties of a message provide cues for the meaning that public diplomacy organizations attribute to the respective message (*psychological properties of messages*). Public diplomacy messages are socially constructed (*social properties of messages*): They are developed in a process of co-creation either within single public diplomacy organizations or within public diplomacy networks (see sub-chapter 2.7). Furthermore, communication intermediaries may reinforce, contradict or contest a public diplomacy message and, thus, influence how strategic publics evaluate the respective message (cf. Hazleton & Long, 1988, p. 85). The analysis of public diplomacy messages focuses on 1) thematic issues addressed in messages as well as 2) aspects of issues that are either highlighted or neglected by organizations.

This research uses the framing approach to examine the message content. Framing presents an interdisciplinary concept that has been extensively researched in communication science (cf. van Gorp, 2007), but that is also applied in sociology (see for instance Goffman, 1974), economics (see for instance Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) or linguistics (see for instance Tannen, 1979) (cf. Srugies, 2013b, p. 5). The strength of the framing approach is its integrative nature (cf. Dahinden, 2006): It allows for the analysis of all phases of the communication process and is, thus, applicable to different fields of research, ranging from public diplomacy and public relations to journalism and media effects (cf. Matthes, 2012, p. 248; Srugies, 2013b, p. 9). By that it goes beyond other approaches like the indexing hypothesis to examine media and/or message context. The indexing hypothesis (cf. Bennett, 1990), positing that news content on political issues tends to follow the parameters of political elites' debates, only focuses on the media as communicators and the relations between the media and political actors. In contrast to agenda-setting, that looks at the topics and issues selected and emphasized by communicators, as well as priming, that centers on influencing the criteria people apply to evaluate political candidates and issues (cf. Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), framing enables researchers to examine patterns of messages or media content by identifying content elements.

A “frame determines whether most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it” (Entman, 1993, p. 54). It serves the purpose of structuring information in the form of abstract interpretative patterns, reducing complexity and guiding the selection of new information (cf. Dahinden, 2006, p. 194; Srugies, 2013b, p. 3). Frames may highlight or direct attention away from certain aspects (cf. Entman, 1993, p. 54). Robert M. Entman (1993) has provided one of the most influential definitions of framing<sup>46</sup> : “To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described” (p. 52, italics in original). The particular strength of this definition lies within its identification of single frame elements that have laid the foundation of many empirical framing studies.

De Vreese (2005, p. 51) and van Gorp (2007, p. 64) identify three different levels of framing that also correspond to three different streams of framing research: 1) the strategy level, 2) the media level and 3) the recipient level. 1) Strategic framing or framing on the strategy level conceives frames as part of the communication strategies of organizations to attain organizational goals and reach strategic publics (cf. Srugies, 2013b). 2) Media frames or framing at the media level “refer to the arguments, words, or images that journalists use when relaying information about an issue to an audience” (Hänggli, 2012, p. 301; see also Gerth & Siegert, 2012). 3) Finally, strategic publics interpret frames that are communicated by organizations and the media at the recipient level (cf. Entman, 1993, pp.52-53).

This study focuses on the strategy level<sup>47</sup> to analyze public diplomacy messages. Matthes (2012) stresses that “the key idea of framing is one of strategic communication: to bring one’s views to news attention and to win public support for one’s position” (p. 252-253). Similarly, Azpiroz (2013) argues that “framing is the process by which political actors [...] select and establish priorities when interpreting and explaining reality” (p. 181, see also Entman, 2008). Thus, frames constitute strategic issue positions (cf. see Gerth & Siegert, 2012) developed by public diplomacy organizations to shape issue interpretations (cf. Wettstein, 2012) as well as the behavior of strategic publics (cf. Matthes, 2012, p. 253). A large share of framing research concentrates on the influence of journalistic frames on the production of news and the media content as well as media frames (cf. Srugies, 2013b, p. 6, see for instance Brosius & Eps, 1995; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). On the contrary, framing at the strategy level is seldom addressed in empirical research (cf. Hänggli, 2012, p. 301). Scholarship on strategic framing has turned its eyes on social movements (see for instance Benford & Snow, 2000) as well as communication activities of governments, particularly the U.S. government (cf. Bennett, 1990; Entman, 2004). Sheaffer & Gabay (2009) are among the few who apply the concept of strategic framing to public diplomacy. Their analysis centers on the question how two rival nations compete for the access to and the influence on the international media using the example of Israel and Palestine. Moreover, Azpiroz (2013) applies the framing approach to analyze speeches of former U.S. President George W. Bush in the context of the “War on Terror”. In contrast to that, Zhang (2005) has conducted a case study on the media coverage of the international relief efforts for the tsunami in Asia

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<sup>46</sup> Matthes (2009) conducted a content analysis of media framing studies that were published in important communication journals from 1990 to 2005. 28,7% of the frame definitions in the articles were based on Entman (1993) (cf. Matthes, 2009, p. 349).

<sup>47</sup> This process is often referred to as frame building. This study does not use the term frame building, because governments, non-state organizations, businesses and journalists all generate frames first and promote frames subsequently, irrespectively of if this is through a speech, a press release or a news article. This study applies the term ‘strategic framing by organizations’ to describe the first level of the framing process. (cf. Srugies, 2013a, p. 4, see also Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012)

in 2004. He has combined the conceptualization of public diplomacy as symbolic interactionism<sup>48</sup> with framing as a research framework. Not least, Zhang and Benoit (2004) explore the potential of the image restoration theory to analyze rhetorical strategies of public diplomacy organizations in crises.

#### *Analytical dimension 6: Public diplomacy messages*

This study employs the framing approach to examine key messages by public diplomacy organizations of the EU as well as its member states France and Sweden that are either communicated in strategy documents or highlighted in the guided interviews. The context and the focus of the key messages as well as the depiction of other public diplomacy organizations and/or international actors will be explored in the following analytical sub-dimensions:

- **context of key message:** This sub-dimension looks at the context in which the key message is embedded in. Key messages can be depicted in a global/trans-regional, in a European, a transnational (focusing for instance on two or more countries), a national, or a sub-national context. A key message that is embedded in an international, European or transnational context serves as an indicator of a cooperative public diplomacy strategy that is geared towards common problem-solving and focuses on transnational, common challenges. On the contrary, key messages that are embedded in a national or sub-national context provide cues for a more competitive public diplomacy that aims at differentiating one international actor from other international actors as well as highlighting achievements, goals and actions of this particular international actor.
- **focus of key message:** This sub-dimension scrutinizes if key messages exclusively focus on the goals, activities and achievements of the international actor a public diplomacy organization communicates on behalf of or if key messages also include goals, activities and achievements of other international actors. Whereas an exclusive focus on own goals, activities and achievements points to a more competitively oriented public diplomacy strategy, the inclusion of goals, activities and achievements of other international actors hint at a more cooperative approach to public diplomacy.
- **depiction of other organizations:** This sub-dimension analyses to what extent key messages make references to other public diplomacy organizations and/or international actors. It examines how other public diplomacy organizations and/or international actors are depicted and which roles are assigned to them. Possible roles include the role of the scapegoat or competitor that provide cues for a more competitive approach as well as the role of the partner that suggests a more cooperative approach towards public diplomacy. The roles assigned to other public diplomacy organizations and/or international actors are developed inductively.

Hänggeli and Kriesi (2012) describe framing as a two-step process: In a first step, organizations build or construct frames: They decide on the aspects of an issue that they want to highlight as well as the narrative techniques to put a particular interpretation of an issue forward. In a second step, organizations promote these frames through a variety of communication channels, ranging from press releases and speeches to communication on social networking sites. Frames may be contested by other organizations, as there is a constant “struggle over meaning, a battle to define a dominant interpretation of an issue” (Matthes, 2012, p. 252). Furthermore, journalists and recipients may also

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<sup>48</sup> Zhang (2005) conceptualizes public diplomacy from a symbolic interactionist perspective “as the active participation by nations in the construction of meanings, in which each nation is one of the many players in the international community that continually interacts through exchanging symbols, forming and negotiating meanings, and performing acts based on their respective meanings. The dynamics underlying the symbolic interaction are the power relations among the nations”. (Zhang, 2005, p. 27).

challenge the frames promoted by an organization (cf. van Gorp, 2007, p. 64). These considerations can also be transferred to the development and communication of public diplomacy key messages: In a first step, public diplomacy organizations construct key messages and make strategic choices on the issues as well as the particular aspects of issues they seek to communicate. In a second step, they communicate these key messages through various communication channels. (cf. Srugies, 2013b). The following sub-aspect of the dimension ‘Public Diplomacy Messages addresses the aspect of frame promotion:

- **Challenges of communicating public diplomacy messages:** This sub-dimension captures challenges public diplomacy organizations experience when communicating key messages to strategic publics. Challenges may include the contestation of messages by journalists or political bodies, difficulties in adapting key messages to strategic publics or problems of coordinating message with other public diplomacy organizations.

Public diplomacy organizations can develop and communicate key messages on their own or in cooperation with other public diplomacy organizations. The analysis of the development and the implementation of public diplomacy approaches discloses to what extent public diplomacy organizations develop and implement key messages together with other public diplomacy organizations. The more public diplomacy organizations cooperate with organizations that communicate on behalf of other international actors, the more they are expected to focus on a cooperative approach to public diplomacy that highlights transnational challenges and common problem-solving.

### 2.6.2 Tools and communication channels of public diplomacy organizations

In addition to public diplomacy messages, this study also examines tools and communication channels as indicators of the public diplomacy approach on the tactical level. The analysis of public diplomacy tools and communication channels is based on the ‘Integrated Public Relations Media Model’ by Kirk Hallahan (2001) and its application to the study of public diplomacy by Claudia Auer et al. (2010, see also Löffelholz et al., 2011a; Auer & Srugies, 2013). The model by Hallahan (2001) aims at facilitating efficient and strategic public relations program planning. It concentrates on the selection and integration of appropriate types of media for achieving desired public relations outcomes. The strength of Hallahan’s (2001) model lies within the scope of media that it encompasses, ranging from “broad-based traditional mass communication to highly individualized interpersonal communication” (Hallahan, 2001, p. 463). He allocates public relations tools into five broad categories: public media, controlled media, interactive media, events/group communication and one-on-one communication. Furthermore, Hallahan (2001, pp. 464-465) provides a comprehensive analysis of each type of media, including the purpose of its use, the directionality of communication, the use of technology, ownership of the communication channel, the degree of control over the different types of media, their reach, and key challenges in the use of each type of media. Auer et al. (2010) combine the ‘Integrated Public Relations Media Model’ by Hallahan (2001) with models systematizing public diplomacy approaches and instruments developed by Cowan & Arsenault (2008), Gilboa (2008), Leonard et al. (2002) as Nye (2004) (see sub-chapter 2.5)<sup>49</sup>. The following Table 2 shows how the different approaches to systemizing public diplomacy tools and initiatives discussed above are combined in this study:

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<sup>49</sup> This sub-chapter builds on the discussion of the public diplomacy models Cowan & Arsenault (2008), Gilboa (2008), Leonard et al. (2002) as Nye (2004) in sub-chapter 2.5.3. Basic assumptions of these models are not presented again here.

**Table 2: Systematization of public diplomacy tools & communication channels**

	Controlled (Online) Media	Public Media	Interactive Media	Events / Group Communication	One-on-one Communication
Goals	information, mobilization, advocacy of policies, positions and ideas	information, mobilization, advocacy of policies, positions and ideas	information, identity and relationship management	relationship building	range from advocacy of policies, positions and ideas to relationship building
Time frame	immediate to intermediate	mainly immediate	immediate to intermediate	intermediate to long-term	immediate to long-term
Nature of communication	mediated	mediated	mediated	mainly interpersonal	mediated or interpersonal
Directionality of communication	monologue-oriented	monologue-oriented	monologue- and dialogue-oriented	mainly dialogue-oriented	mainly dialogue-oriented
Role of strategic publics	passive	passive	moderately active	moderately active	active
Degree of control	high	low	moderate to low	moderate to low	moderate to low

(Source: own depicted based on Auer et al., 2010; Cowan & Arsenault, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Hallahan, 2001; Leonard et al., 2002; Nye, 2004)

The following section provides an overview of the single groups of public diplomacy tools: controlled media, public media, interactive media, events/group communication and one-on-one communication. Controlled (online) media include brochures, leaflets or a public diplomacy organization's website<sup>50</sup>. "Unlike either public or interactive media, information sponsors assume total responsibility for the design, production, manufacturing, inventory, and distribution of controlled media" (p. 467). Controlled media are implemented as public diplomacy tools to inform strategic publics as well as to advocate specific policies, positions or ideas (cf. Auer et al., 2010, p. 178). The time horizon of controlled media can either be immediate, for instance when issuing a press release on an unforeseen event (cf. Leonard et al., 2002), or intermediate, for instance when creating publications in the context of a proactive public diplomacy initiative (cf. Gilboa, 2008, p. 72). Hallahan (2001) defines communication through controlled media as non-personal and mediated (through printed products or for instance computer-mediated). Controlled media tools may include feedback

<sup>50</sup> Hallahan (2001) limits controlled media to „all categories of media that are physically produced and delivered to the recipient" (p. 467). This study categorizes both physically produced and digital media as controlled media if public diplomacy organizations assume responsibility for these tools.

options, for instance contact details listed on a website, but in comparison to interactive or one-on-one communication, controlled media tools attribute a rather passive role to strategic publics. International broadcasting is grouped into controlled media by both Hallahan (2001) and Auer, Krichbaum and Srugies (2010). While international broadcasting stations are (partly) funded by state actors like governments and contribute to shaping an international actor's image abroad (cf. Harnischfeger, 2009; Zöllner, 2006), they often stress their journalistic mission and their independence from state actors (cf. Zöllner, 2006, p. 162).

Public media encompasses "all channels owned and operated by third-party media organizations" (Hallahan, 2001, p. 463), including newspapers, radio stations and television channels, but also books or movies<sup>51</sup>. Public diplomacy tools that belong to this group primarily serve the purpose of informing and mobilizing strategic publics as well as advertising specific policies, positions or ideas (cf. Auer et al., 2010, pp. 148-149). Public media can be part of a public diplomacy organization's daily communication, for instance when answering press inquiries, or strategic communication, when organizations seek to influence the media and public agenda over the course of several months (cf. Nye, 2004, pp. 107-110). Communication via public media can be characterized as non-personal, mediated and mostly one-way. Thus, the use of public media attributes a passive role to strategic publics such as citizens. Public media as public diplomacy tools possess the advantage of reaching a large number of people at very low costs per impression. (cf. Hallahan, 2001, p. 465). At the same time, public media present "a highly competitive and cluttered message environment" (ibid., p. 465), in which public diplomacy organizations need to capture the attention of strategic publics. As outlined in sub-chapter 2.3.1, public media cannot be reduced to the role of a public diplomacy channel or tool. It needs to be acknowledged that media can be public diplomacy organizations in their own right that select specific issues that they report on (agenda setting), highlight specific perspectives on these issues (framing) and influence the criteria by which recipients assess the public diplomacy actors that are covered (priming) (see for instance Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Srugies, 2013b). Public media are used for both disseminating messages and listening. Regularly monitoring the media coverage enables public diplomacy organization to detect crucial issues that are debated in public media outlets and identify different positions on these issues. However, Noelle-Neumann (2004, p. 398) rightfully stresses that the mass media coverage, the 'published opinion', may not necessarily reflect the public opinion within a specific target region or country or the opinion of strategic publics. In addition to mass media outlets like newspapers, radio stations or television channels, books, records or movies also belong to the public media category. While public diplomacy organizations may influence the initiation, the process and the distribution of records or movies by promoting artists or funding cultural projects, the majority of cultural products are created and published independently from the efforts of public diplomacy organizations. Nonetheless, they contribute decisively to the perception of an international actor by publics. For instance, 'The Reader' by Bernhard Schlink was voted the second most popular books by German authors in an international survey conducted by Goethe-Institut (cf. Die Welt, 2010). The novel is set in post-war Germany and addresses the moral question how

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<sup>51</sup> Hallahan (2001, p. 463) also includes out-of-home media in the public media category. This study does not take up Hallahan's (2001) suggestion, but defines out-of-home media as controlled media. Out-of-home media is marketed by third-party organizations, but it is the public diplomacy organization itself that determines the content and the messages communicated via out-of-home media ads.



German citizens come to terms with their country's National Socialist past and the atrocities caused by the Holocaust.

Interactive Media, such as web 2.0 applications, contribute to the information, identity and relationship management of public diplomacy organizations (cf. Auer, Srugies & Löffelholz, 2012, p. 17). They are implemented to distribute and exchange information, establish and maintain contacts as well as to generate mutual understanding (cf. Auer et al., 2010, p. 178). Public diplomacy organizations may use web 2.0-applications like Facebook to carry out public diplomacy campaigns over the course of several months or to interact with strategic publics in an immediate time frame (cf. Gilboa, 2008, p. 72). Interactive media lay the technological foundations for actively engaging strategic publics and engaging them in a dialogue. However, as Kent and Taylor remark, "[t]echnology itself can neither create nor destroy relationships; rather, it is how the technology is used that influences organization-public relationships" (Kent & Taylor 1998: 324). Interactive media do not only present new opportunities, but also new challenges to public diplomacy organizations. Online and social media accelerate the speed of communication and facilitate the access to information (see for instance Seib, 2012). This development makes citizens less susceptible to influences by public diplomacy initiatives (cf. Auer et al., 2012; Leonard et al., 2002; Potter, 2002). Moreover, interactive media also broaden the range of communicators. Web 2.0 tools are for instance coined by a network structure, in which individuals can become opinion leaders in their personal social networks. As Cull (2011) puts it, "[t]he essential challenge of the Web 2.0 world is that it enabled the preferred source of 'someone like me' to become the principal point of contact for all information" (p. 4). Many individuals perceive information presented by members of their own social network as more credible than for instance official government sources (see for instance Palen & Liu, 2007; Zaharna, Fisher & Arsenault, 2013, pp. 1-2).

The state of research on the use of web 2.0 in public diplomacy discloses that the majority of organizations apply web 2.0 tools primarily for identity and information management purposes. A genuine dialogue (see sub-chapter 2.5.3) with strategic publics is rarely thought. (cf. Auer et al., 2012; Lee 2007; Seo 2009; van Noort, 2011) At the same time, single governments have started to explore the potential of interactive media for relationship-building and exchange in greater detail. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has for instance organized the 'Stockholm Initiative for Digital Diplomacy' that brought international diplomats, but also representatives from academia, the media or business together to discuss developments, participation and collaboration online (cf. Government Offices of Sweden, 2014a).

Events and Group Communication include exchange programs, cultural events or for instance language courses and are mainly based on direct, interpersonal communication between a public organization and a group of people (cf. Hallahan, 2001, p. 467). Similar to interactive media, events and group communication are also implemented to exchange information, establish and maintain relationships. Exchange programs or cultural events contribute to the realization of 'milieu goals', for example the promotion of an international actor's image abroad (cf. Auer et al., 2010). Language courses utilize language and education as gateways to ideas and values of a particular nation (Pamment, 2013a). Moreover, the implementation of these public diplomacy tools may entail political effects (cf. Scott-Smith, 2008, p. 174), such

as the rapprochement of two countries<sup>52</sup> (see sub-chapter 2.5.1). In contrast to public media or controlled media tools, events and group communication, including scholarship and exchange programs, usually span across several months to several years. Auer et al. (2010) point to the application of the two-step flow of communication concept (cf. Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1968) to public diplomacy and the crucial role of individuals participating in exchange programs as opinion leaders. Individuals participating in exchanges and events assume the role of small-scale ambassadors and function as a link between the sending and the receiving country (cf. Scott-Smith, 2008, p. 177). The participation in exchange programs may result in overcoming prejudices, “previously fixed notions of identity and interest” (Scott-Smith, 2008, p. 54) as well as strengthening positive attitudes towards a country, but its success is to a great extent dependent on the personalities of the participating individuals (cf. Zaharna, 2009, p. 93). Subsequently, public diplomacy organizations have limited control over the course and the success of events and tools of group communication.

When public diplomacy organizations implement events and tools of group communication, they do not assume the role of spokespersons, but the role of architects that set the framework conditions of an educational exchange or a cultural event. Communication primarily takes place between third parties like artists, university lecturers and audience members. (cf. Auer, 2015, p. 157). However, Auer (2015) emphasizes that the framework conditions, for instance the location of an event or the topic of a discussion, can embody a communicative message themselves. Events and tools of group communication can be carried out solely by public diplomacy organization or in cooperation with other public and/or private organizations (cf. Hallahan, 2001, p. 467).

One-on-one communication can either refer to interpersonal, non-mediated communication between representatives of a public diplomacy organization and an individual member of a strategic public (cf. Hallahan, 2001, p. 468) or between two individual members of a strategic public (cf. Auer et al., 2010, p. 173). As “highly individualized” forms of communication, tools of one-on-one communication “[are often] unstructured, unplanned, and ephemeral in nature” (Hallahan, 2001, p. 468). One-on-one communication can either be carried out directly, for instance in personal meetings, or in a mediated way, through telephone or for instance skype conversations. It actively involves members of strategic publics and can serve many different purposes, ranging from generating mutual trust to advocating specific policies (cf. Auer et al., 2010, p. 178). To Hallahan (2001), the success of one-on-one communication “is highly dependent on the personal dynamics that evolve in the interaction between the parties” (p. 468). The single public diplomacy tools within these five different groups cannot stand alone, but need to be integrated in a public diplomacy strategy (see for instance Zerfaß, 2008, pp. 88-89). Schneider (2010) illustrates the need for media convergence using the example of social media: “Social media can complement, but not substitute for personal ties that build trusting relationships with opinion leaders” (p. 3).

#### *Analytical dimension 7: Public diplomacy tools and communication tools*

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<sup>52</sup> The example of the German-French relationship after the Second World War illustrates the pivotal role of cultural and educational exchanges for the amelioration of diplomatic relationships between two countries. Privately organized student exchanges as well as the initiation of partnerships between French and German cities have paved the way for signing the Élysée Treaty in 1963. (cf. Karten, 2008; see also Cull, 2008b).

The ‘Integrated Public Relations Media Model’ by Hallahan (2001) as well as its application by Auer et al. (2010, see also Auer & Srugies, 2013) serve as a conceptual framework for studying the tools and communication channels applied by public diplomacy organizations of the EU and its member states. The following sub-dimensions guide the analysis of the main dimension ‘Public Diplomacy Tools’:

- **Purpose of the public diplomacy tool:** This sub-dimension identifies the function a public diplomacy tool is supposed to fulfill. The purpose is closely connected to the time frame of the tool.
- **Strategic publics of public diplomacy tool:** On the basis of this sub-dimension, the researcher explores the strategic publics that should be reached through a specific communication channel or public diplomacy tool. Moreover, it investigates to what extent public diplomacy organizations tailor tools to the respective strategic publics.
- **Mode of communication:** This sub-dimension examines whether a public diplomacy tool is primarily designed for monological, one-way communication, whether it combines elements of one-way and two-way communication, or whether it focuses on two-way communication. This also encompasses the role and the involvement of strategic publics.
- **Resources allocated to the public diplomacy tool:** This sub-dimension concentrates on human, financial and/or other resources that are allocated to the planning and realization of public diplomacy tools. The amount of resources dedicated to a tool is an indicator of the tool’s relevance.
- **Evaluation of the public diplomacy tool:** This sub-dimension explores to what extent and how public diplomacy tools are evaluated. It discloses how public diplomacy organizations perceive the success of the tools applied and to what extent the organizations intent to work with the same tools in the future.
- **Challenges of the public diplomacy tool:** This sub-dimension refers to perceived challenges of planning and realizing public diplomacy tools. Challenges may refer to reaching strategic publics or for example budget constraints.

In addition to the five ‘media-centered’ instruments presented by Hallahan (2001), Auer et al. (2010, pp. 175ff.) define brand diplomacy, NGO diplomacy or for instance diaspora diplomacy as ‘actor-centered instruments’ of diplomacy. The term ‘actor-centered instruments’ refers to “non-state actors that serve as intermediary organizations and play a vital role in implementing government programs and strategies” (Auer & Srugies, 2013). Non-state organizations may be integrated in the public diplomacy of an organization through cooperations in the context of single public diplomacy initiatives or transfer entire areas of responsibility to intermediary organizations (cf. Auer et al., 2010, p. 175).

This study does not adopt ‘actor-centered instruments’ as a sixth group of public diplomacy tools, as non-state organizations may utilize public media, controlled media or events, either in the role of a completely independent public diplomacy organization, in the role of an intermediary organization or in cooperation with other state or non-state organizations. Aspects of cooperation are addressed in the following sub-dimension:

- **Coordination of the public diplomacy tool:** This sub-dimension captures all statements that refer to the coordination of public diplomacy tools with other

organizations. This includes statements regarding the involvement of other public diplomacy organizations in the planning, implementation and evaluation of public diplomacy tools. Moreover, this category also captures statements that disclose that public diplomacy tools are not coordinated with other public diplomacy organizations, but are solely planned, implemented and evaluated by the respective public diplomacy organization. Please also code all statements that disclose if a joint planning, implementation and/or evaluation of public diplomacy tools is part of a more encompassing cooperation agreement between public diplomacy organizations. The coordination of public diplomacy tools provides important cues for interorganizational cooperation in public diplomacy.

## **2.7 Interorganizational cooperation among public diplomacy organizations**

Drawing on the social-integrative approach by Uwe Schimank (1996, 2002a), Auer and Srugies (2013) argue that “[i]n order to attain common goals, [public diplomacy practitioners] form constellations. By doing so, actors mutually influence their actions: they observe and thus form conclusions on what they can expect from others, how they can be influenced and the effects their actions have on realizing their own goals” ( p. 13). This sub-chapter centers on the constellations between public diplomacy organizations. It applies the term ‘interorganizational cooperation’ to refer to these constellations. Wukich (2011) defines interorganizational cooperation as “any multiparty initiative between agencies intended to achieve operational or administrative goals” (p. 4). This study analyzes interorganizational cooperation on three levels:

1. *Interorganizational cooperation on a national level:* Public diplomacy organizations within single EU member states engage in cooperation to advance the country’s international relations and to facilitate the assertion of national interests.
2. *Interorganizational cooperation on a regional level:* Public diplomacy organizations within the EU engage in cooperations to advance the EU’s international relations and to facilitate the assertion of European interests.
3. *Interorganizational cooperation on a transnational level:* Public diplomacy organizations of different countries as well as public diplomacy organizations operating below and beyond the national level engage in cooperations to take on political, economic, social, cultural or environmental challenges that demand transnational cooperation.

These different levels can refer to both dyadic relationship and public diplomacy networks as types of interorganizational organization (see sub-chapter 2.7.1). The work of both Leonard et al. (2002) and Fisher (2010) suggest that interorganizational cooperation on a national level is more likely to be part of “a competitive public diplomacy” strategy (Leonard et al., 2002, p. 22, see also Fisher, 2010, p. 1). Interorganizational cooperation on a transnational level, on the contrary, is more likely to support a multilateral, cooperative approach to public diplomacy (cf. Fisher, 2010, p. 1; Leonard et al., 2002, p. 22).

### **2.7.1 Types of interorganizational cooperation**

Dyadic relationships describe the social interaction between two public diplomacy organizations or the individual representatives acting on behalf of the organization. The types of cooperation between public diplomacy organizations can be located on a continuum from information sharing to the joint definition of goals and priorities: Biermann (2008) differentiates between 1) information sharing as the

most basic form of cooperation, which aims at ensuring transparency and avoiding unintended conflicts, 2) coordination, which aims at adapting (public diplomacy) strategies and activities to the respective cooperating organization, and 3) joint decision-making, which implies the definition of common public diplomacy goals and strategies.

Information sharing and joint decision-making do not only constitute two poles of a continuum, but can also represent developmental stages of interorganizational cooperation. Drawing on Biermann (2008), inter-organizational cooperation moves from an ‘embryonic stage’ to a ‘mature stage’. At the ‘embryonic stage’ the relationship between two organizations is characterized by ad-hoc, informal cooperation that is focused on a single issue. If the organizations perceive this initial stage of cooperation as effective, the organizations 1) expand and diversify the personal ties among the representatives of the organizations, 2) develop common working routines, and 3) extend as well as deepen the communication among them. Based on the intensification of cooperation, the organizations may enter into a formal cooperation agreement. At the same time, the intensified cooperation also increases the level of mutual trust between the two organizations (cf. Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 23) and may also lead to converging organizational cultures (see sub-chapter 2.3.1). At a ‘mature stage’ of cooperation, organizations have 1) developed formal and informal rules of behavior, 2) established formal and informal channels of communication and cooperation and 3) share long-term goals as opposed to engaging in a short-term, ad-hoc cooperation. (cf. Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 161; see also Wukich, 2011, pp. 3-5). The motivational, structural and operational characteristics of interorganizational cooperation identified in sub-chapter 2.7.2 allow to identify the type of cooperation public diplomacy organizations engage in. Using the example of international organizations operating in the field of security, Biermann (2008) understands dyadic relationships between single organizations as “building blocks for entire networks” (p. 161).

Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve and Tsai (2004) define networks broadly as “a set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, or lack of relationship, between the nodes” (p. 795). As this study focuses on interorganizational networks, each ‘node’ presents one (public diplomacy) organization within a network. Ties describe the connections between organizations and their representatives within a network. Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007) point to a large number of definitions of the term ‘network’. They identify “social interaction, relationships, connectedness, collaboration, collective action, trust, and cooperation” (p. 481) as features of networks that are present in the majority of the definitions. This study concentrates on ‘whole networks’ of organizations that consists of a “group of three or more organizations that cooperate in order to facilitate the achievement of shared or complementary goals” (ibid., p. 482). These organizations are linked by “multilateral ties”, which may be informal, relying primarily on trust or more formal, based on written agreements such as contracts (cf. ibid., p. 482). Kenis and Oerlemans (2008) distinguish between nominalist and realist strategies in specifying network boundaries: In nominalist strategies, network boundaries are defined on the basis of the researcher’s interests. Realist strategies, on the contrary, focus on the perception of network boundaries by network member organizations themselves (cf. Provan & Oerlemans, 2008, pp. 290-291). Organizations may define themselves as part of a network if they perceive each other as “most relevant in a given issue-area<sup>53</sup> and thus direct most attention towards one another” (Biermann, 2008, p. 162). This study adopts a realist definition of network boundaries, as it seeks to analyze cooperation from an organizational perspective, focusing on the perceptions of public diplomacy organizations and the practitioners that constitute them.

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<sup>53</sup> Multi-purpose organizations like the EU and the UN constitute an exception, as member organizations do not only focus on one particular issue-area, but many different issues.

Holley and Krebs (2002) identify four stages of network building. Networks emerge on the basis of “small emergent clusters organized around common interests or goals” (Holley & Krebs, 2002, p. 6). At this early stage (*Stage 1: ‘Scattered Clusters’*), the different clusters are still separated from each other (cf. *ibid.*, p. 6). A ‘network weaver’, occupying a central role in the network, creates and encourages interactions between the previously separate clusters. Zaharna (2013) refers to ‘network weavers’ also as ‘network sponsors’ who “seek to identify, attract, and retain active network members or strategic stakeholders” (p. 175). The ‘network weaver’ constitutes the hub of the emerging network (*Stage 2: Single Hub-and-Spoke*). (cf. *ibid.*, p. 7) As communication among the previously isolated clusters starts to grow and intensify, more hubs develop. Multi-hub networks (*Stage 3: Multi-Hub Small-World Network*) are less fragile than networks only relying on a single central entity. Moreover, a multi-hub network topology or network structure enhances the “work flow, information exchange and knowledge sharing” (*ibid.*, p. 12) and makes networks more resilient (cf. *ibid.*, p. 12). Holley and Krebs (2002) refer to the ‘core/periphery’ model as the desirable goal for an already established, stable network (*Stage 4: Core/Periphery*): “The network core in this model contains the key community members who have developed strong ties between themselves. The periphery of this network contains three groups of nodes [or actors] that are usually tied to the core through weak ties” (Holley & Krebs, 2002, p. 14). These different types of actors of the periphery either 1) strive for establishing strong ties with actors at the core of a network to acquire a central network position themselves, 2) serve as a bridge builder to other, similar networks or 3) irregularly connect to networks (cf. *ibid.*, p. 14).


The work of Holley and Krebs (2002) concentrates on community networks that can involve both individuals and organizations like small business, but does not look specifically at inter-organizational networks. Nevertheless, the stages of network building presented by Holley and Krebs (2002) can be adopted to explaining the emergence and development of inter-organizational networks. The single dyadic relationships between organizations described above represent the ‘scattered clusters’ introduced by Holley and Krebs (2002, see above). One organization that has strong authority and legitimacy, commands a large number of resources and/or distinguishes itself from other organizations by its expertise and experience in a specific issue-area, may take the role of a ‘network weaver’. As community networks, interorganizational networks may also develop a multi-hub topology in which several organizations occupy a central position. The increasing communication and contact among organizations in a network leads to a diffusion of norms and ideas as well as an emulation of organizational designs and/or policies (cf. Biermann, 2008, p. 171). For example, Peters (2004) refers to the EU as “NATO-ified” (p. 399), as the EU “acquir[ed] military crisis management capacities which closely resemble NATO’s” (Biermann, 2008, p. 172). EUNIC serves as an example of the ‘Core/Periphery’ model of network development. The EUNIC Board consists of key organizations like the Swedish Institute, the Spanish Instituto Cervantes or the Danish Cultural Institute<sup>54</sup> that have strong ties and a set of regional clusters in which EUNIC members cooperate with local partner organizations that are at the periphery of the network (cf. EUNIC, n.d.a).

Illustration 6 below displays a simplified depiction of types of interorganization cooperation in European public diplomacy. It visualizes dyadic relationships and networks between EU organizations and organizations within and among EU member states. The central space highlighted in grey symbolizes cooperation between EU and member state organizations. The scope and intensity of cooperation activities range on a continuum from information sharing to joint decision making:

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<sup>54</sup> In the period 2014 to 2015 Annika Rembe, Director-General of the Swedish Institute, holds the presidency of EUNIC. She is assisted by Rafael Rodríguez-Ponga y Salamanca, Secretary General of Instituto Cervantes (First Vice-President), and Michael Metz Mørch, Secretary General of the Danish Cultural Institute (Second Vice-President) (cf. EUNIC, n.d.b).

**Illustration 6: Types of interorganizational cooperation**



(source: own depiction)

### 2.7.2 Motivational, structural and operational characteristics of interorganizational cooperation

A multitude of disciplines, including organizational science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics, management research, computer science, international relations as well as public diplomacy research, have looked at interorganizational cooperation and networks (see for instance Biermann, 2008; Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2007)<sup>55</sup>. It goes beyond the scope of this study to present approaches to interorganizational cooperation in all of these disciplines. To characterize cooperation between public diplomacy organizations, this study looks at the following approaches to examine the following aspects of interorganizational cooperation:

1. **Goals of cooperation:** This study draws on public diplomacy literature (cf. Zaharna, 2013) to fathom why public diplomacy organizations engage in cooperations with one or more organization(s) and which purposes are pursued by interorganizational public diplomacy networks.

<sup>55</sup> In a meta-analysis of academic journals from 1980 to 1996, Oliver and Ebers (1998) have analyzed theoretical approaches to studying interorganizational cooperation and relationships. They identified the social network approach, evolutionary theory, transaction cost theory, management research perspectives as well as critical approach as most commonly used to research interorganizational cooperation.

2. **Structure of cooperation:** The structure of cooperation refers to the role and the responsibilities public diplomacy organizations accompany in cooperations as well as the position they hold within public diplomacy networks. The social network approach presents a valuable theoretical approach to study the structure of cooperation, as it does not focus on the attributes of single public diplomacy organizations, but on the social interactions between different public diplomacy organizations and their representatives (cf. Kenis & Oerlemans, 2008, p. 290, see also Borgatti & Foster, 2003, p. 991; Freeman, 2004, p. 16). It allows for an empirical analysis of the structural and relational properties of public diplomacy organizations that engage in networks (cf. Kenis & Oerlemans, 2008, p. 291).
3. **Mode of cooperation:** The mode of cooperation refers the channels and tools public diplomacy organizations use to communicate in dyadic relationships and public diplomacy networks. This study draws on insights from public diplomacy research (cf. Zaharna, 2013) to explore how public diplomacy organizations communicate with one another in a setting of interorganizational cooperation. Furthermore, it applies models of network governance research (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2007) to analyze how public diplomacy networks are steered and administered.
4. **Perception of cooperation:** To analyze how interorganizational cooperation in dyadic relationships and within networks is perceived, this study applies the concept of organization-public relationships (see for instance Broom, Casey, Ritchey, 2000; Hon & J. E. Grunig, 1999) to the analysis of public diplomacy networks.
5. **Factors that influence interorganizational cooperation:** The emergence and development of interorganizational cooperation can be facilitated or constrained by a number of different factors within the organization, the network or the external environment. This study draws on public diplomacy research, studies on international organizations and public bodies, resource dependency as well as transaction cost theory (see for instance Biermann, 2008; Wukich, 2011) to identify these intervening factors.


Interorganizational networks can be analyzed at the organizational level, from the perspective of the single organizations that engage in a dyadic relationship or constitute a network, and at the whole network level. Ibarra, Kilduff and Tsai (2005) also refer to these different levels of analysis as micro and macro streams of network research. Zaharna (2013) points to a dominance of network studies that concentrate on individual nodes (individuals and organizations) within a network and how dyadic relationships evolve over time. “By focusing only on the members themselves and their interactions with others, however, the importance of individual organizations tends to be exaggerated and the importance of collective behavior underemphasized” (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 480). Analyses at the whole network level facilitate our understanding of network development, network governance as well as the generation of collective outcomes (cf. *ibid.*, p. 480). In contrast to the number of empirical studies at the organizational level, macro-level analyses of whole networks remain an understudied subject (see for instance Hafner-Burton, Kahler & Montgomery, 2009; Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). This general observation can also be transferred to the study of international organizations in international relations scholarship: Researchers have for instance explored the relationship between the NATO and the EU (cf. Cornish & Edwards, 2001; Varwick, 2005; Yost & Dufourcq, 2006) and interorganizational cooperation in the Balkan region (cf. Biermann, 2006). The majority of these studies focus on the dyadic level of cooperation. Only few scholars (see for instance Borchert, 2001; Schmidt, 2001; Peters, 2004; Yost, 2007) have analyzed “system-induced network effects” on individual organizations.

Moliterno and Mahony (2011) as well as Ibarra, Kilduff and Tsai (2005) remark that the majority of scholars concentrate on single levels of network analysis (micro or macro level), while only few



researchers (see for instance Ibarra, Kilduff & Tsai, 2005; Kim, Oh & Swaminathan, 2006) look at multiple levels of analysis. By that, many scholars have neglected the strength of multi-level analyses: Multi-level analyses enable scholars to detect cross-level effects and processes. Moliterno and Mahony (2011) apply the graph theoretical notion of systems of nested networks (see Harary & Batell, 1981) to the study of interorganizational networks: This perspective “suggests that each node in a given network at a given level of analysis is, itself, a network at a lower level analysis” (Moliterno & Mahony, 2011, p. 444). Transferring this understanding of networks to public diplomacy, each public diplomacy network consists of organizations, which in turn represent networks themselves that are composed of the single representatives of an organization.

**Illustration 7: Analysis of interorganizational cooperation on the organizational and network level**



(source: own depiction)

Illustration 7 provides an overview of the analytical sub-dimension, which characterize interorganizational cooperation on the organizational and the network level. They are explored in greater detail in the section below.

#### *Analytical dimension 8: Interorganizational cooperation*

This study combines the organizational level and the whole network level of analysis to detect “how organizational phenomena at one level affect organizational phenomena at other (higher or lower) levels” (Moliterno & Mahony, 2011, p. 447). On the organizational level, the study examines why, how and to what extent public diplomacy organizations engage in national, regional and transnational public diplomacy networks. It concentrates on the analysis of the following sub-dimensions: 1) the organizations’ motivation to engage in a network, 2) their role and position in a network, 3) the mode of communication applied, 4) the perceived quality of interorganizational relationships, and 5) the perceived factors that influence interorganizational cooperation.

- **Motivation to engage in interorganizational cooperation:** Zaharna (2013, p. 176) identifies the following purposes of creating public diplomacy networks: Creation of awareness (for instance about a political or social issue), information (for instance information about a specific policy), influence (for instance cultivation of shared norms, influencing attitudes on a specific issue), collaboration (for instance working together toward a shared outcome), and innovation (for instance knowledge generation, common problem-solving). Each of these goals can be motivated by a competitive public diplomacy approach (for instance creating awareness about a specific country as a tourism destination, or generating knowledge on web

2.0-tools as instruments of a national public diplomacy strategy) or a collaborative public diplomacy approach (for instance informing about joint policies of democracy promotion). This study seeks to test to what extent the categorization of network purposes by Zaharna (2013) can be applied to the analysis of dyadic relationships between public diplomacy organizations as well as networks the EU and its member states engage in or whether it needs to be modified on the basis of the empirical results.

- **Role and position in interorganizational cooperation:** Each organization accompanies a specific role and has specific responsibilities in a dyadic relationship with another organization, for instance with regard to the resources each party contributes or the specific tasks within cooperations. Similarly, each organization has a specific position in a network that is defined in relation to other organizations within a network (cf. Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999, p. 1448). The positions that public diplomacy organizations can occupy within interorganizational networks range on a continuum from core to periphery. Holley and Krebs (2002) assign different functions to the core and periphery of a network: The periphery provides a network with new ideas and innovations, allows for an exchange of information as well as knowledge and monitors the environment. Actors at the core of a network act on the basis of the input gained by networks members at the periphery. (cf. Holley & Krebs, 2002, pp. 14-15). Organizations that are part of a network develop shared behaviors and expectations (see for instance Rowley, 1997). In addition to resources, norms and rules are important steering mechanisms of interorganizational networks (cf. Sydow & Windeler, 1998). Public diplomacy organizations at the core of the network serve as main carriers of norms and rules, developing “dominant logics that set the pace within the network” (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 506, see also Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004).
- **Communication mode applied:** The communication mode constitutes the third main dimension of analysis at the organizational level and focuses on the question which tools and channels public diplomacy organizations use to communicate with other public diplomacy organizations in dyadic relationships and networks. According to Young and Pieterse (2015), there is only little research on the role of communication channels in the interaction of individuals and organizations. This holds also true for public diplomacy scholarship: Zaharna assumes that technologically mediated communication is the “fastest and most efficient way to spread information to the greatest number of people” (Zaharna, 2013, p. 177). On the other hand, she argues that interpersonal face-to-face communication provides individuals with a “full sensory experience [they] look for when assessing such factors as trust, credibility, and satisfaction” (Zaharna, 2013, p. 177) and is, thus, perceived as more persuasive. There are, however, no empirically grounded studies to support or run counter to these assumptions.
- **Perceived quality of interorganizational relationships:** A multitude of scholars (see for instance Fitzpatrick, Kendrick & Fullerton, 2013; Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005; L’Etang, 1996; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Snow, 2009) have pointed to conceptual convergences between public relations and public diplomacy as well as the potential of applying approaches in public relations to the analysis of public diplomacy. This study fathoms to what extent models of organization-public relationships (OPR) can benefit the analysis of the perceived quality of interorganizational cooperation in public diplomacy. OPR are „patterns of interaction, transaction, exchange, and linkage between an organization and its publics. These relationships have properties that are distinct from the identities, attributes, and perceptions of the individuals and social collectivities in the relationships” (Broom, Casey, Ritchey, 2000, p.18).

Both Seo (2013) and Lee and Jun (2013) have used OPR as a theoretical framework for analyzing the quality of relationships between the U.S. embassy in South Korea and South

Korean students<sup>56</sup>. This study argues that models of OPR cannot only be applied to the study of the perceived relationship between public diplomacy organizations and their target groups, but that they can also be extended to the analysis of interorganizational cooperation in public diplomacy. The examination of the perceived quality of these “inter-organizational relationships” allows to make statements about 1) the relevance public diplomacy organizations attribute to these relationships, 2) the degree of satisfaction public diplomacy organizations experience within these relationships, and, closely connected to that, 3) their commitment to interorganizational cooperation. As not all parties of a dyadic relationships and/or networks can be analyzed, this study can only make tentative statements about 4) the stability of dyadic relationships and networks, as well as the degree of symmetry of relationships in interorganizational cooperation.

This study concentrates on the following four sub-dimensions of organization-public relationships as key relational features identified by James E. Grunig & Hon (2000) as well as Huang (2001)<sup>57</sup>:

- **Control mutuality** refers to the degree to which organizations within a public diplomacy network agree on the organization(s) that is/are legitimate to define the purpose of the network and set the norms, rules and regulations, on which the public diplomacy network is based on (cf. Hon & J. E. Grunig, p. 19; Stafford & Canary, 1991, p. 66).
- **Trust** between organizations within a public diplomacy network reflects “the willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviors” (McEvily, Perrone & Zaheer 2003, p. 92). Trust as an OPR-dimension (see for instance L. A. Grunig et al., 1992; Stafford & Canary, 1991) measures the confidence in other organizations within a network as well as the willingness to develop and maintain fair and honest relationships with other organizations within the respective network (cf. Huang, 2001, p. 66). Hon and James E. Grunig (1999) rightfully stress the complexity of trust as an analytical concept. The authors point to three underlying dimensions of trust: One of these is integrity, the belief that an organization is fair and just. A second is dependability, the belief that an organization will do what it says it will do. A third is competence, the belief that an organization has the ability to do what it says it will do”. (Hon & J. E. Grunig, 1999, p. 19).
- **Relational satisfaction** (see for instance L. A. Grunig et al., 1992; Ferguson, 1984) refers to the degree to which an organization perceives a relationship with another organization as positive, because positive expectations about this relationship are fulfilled or reinforced (cf. Hon & J. E. Grunig, 1999, p. 20; Huang, 2001, p. 67) and/or “the benefits outweigh the costs” of a relationship (Hon & J. E. Grunig, 1999, p. 20, see also Stafford & Canary, 1991, p. 225).

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<sup>56</sup> Seo (2013) has conducted a case study on Café USA, an online community maintained by the U.S. embassy in Seoul to interact with young people in South Korea. The author measures OPR on the basis of seven dimensions: access, assurance, networking, openness, positivity (corresponds to relational satisfaction), trust and relational commitment. Seo (2013) identifies South Korean members of Café USA, South Korean Fulbright scholars as well as South Korean journalists as most important publics using the online community. These different publics highlight different aspects of a relationship: South Korean members of Café USA consider trust and sincerity as most important to a positive and lasting relationship, Fulbright scholars, on the other hand, consider it essential that a relationship yields outcomes and provides opportunities. The relationship between the U.S. embassy and South Korean journalists is described as access-based, accentuating the role of information sharing

<sup>57</sup> Huang (2001) has extended this typology by adding ‘face and favor’ as an important relational feature in the Asian context. This dimension is not included here. Instead, this study openly codes all statements that refer to aspects of the perceived quality of interorganizational relationships that are not covered by the four key relational dimensions outlined above.

- **Relational commitment** (see for instance Canary & Spitzberg, 1989; Burgoon & Hale, 1984) characterizes the degree to which an organization considers it worthwhile to invest resources in the development, maintenance and promotion of relationships with other organizations within a network (cf. Hon & J. E. Grunig, 1999, p. 20). The sub-dimension 'relational commitment' also discloses information on the relative importance public diplomacy organizations attribute to interorganizational relationships within a network. As Brown (2013) argues, "[a] dyad may be more important for one side than the other, which in turn creates an imbalance of power that can be exploited" (pp. 45-46).

In his doctoral thesis on collective action in the domain of emergency management, Wukich (2011) has identified a number of factors that can enable and/or constrain the emergence, development and sustainability of interorganizational cooperation. Drawing on the work of Wukich (2011) as well as findings from public diplomacy research, organizational science, economics, management research, sociology and international relations, this study identifies factors that 1) enable, 2) constrain, and 3) either enable or constrain cooperation of public diplomacy organizations on a national, regional and/or transnational level:

Problems that simultaneously affect several public diplomacy organizations open up the opportunity to engage in cooperations and networks to reach common or complementary goals (cf. Bardach, 1998; Gray, 1989) as well as to reduce shared risks (cf. Comfort, 1999; Wukich 2011). However, cooperation requires mutual recognition. Whereas "the ability to recognize common problems and causes" (Wukich, 2011, p. 25) serves as a catalyst for cooperation, different or even conflicting perspectives on a given problem constitute a barrier to cooperation and network development (cf. Weber & Khademanian, 2008). Representatives of an organization link their perception of a problem with past experiences, and based on this assessment, develop a strategy for action that may or may not involve cooperation (cf. Wukich, 2011, p. 26). Wukich (2011) stresses the role of intuition and past experiences in this process: "If decision-makers have not experienced and/or learned of positive cooperative arrangements relative to a specific situation, they are less likely to choose a cooperative strategy" (pp. 26-27).

Wukich (2011) defines fiscal stress, the presence of focusing events as well as changing demands of the external environment as conditions that facilitate mutual problem recognition: In situations of financial stress, public diplomacy organizations can ensure organizational survival if they pool human as well as financial resources in networks (cf. Kearns, 2000). Moreover, focusing events (Wukich, 2011) or trigger events (Biermann, 2008) point to the urgency of a common problem. Focusing or trigger events can be endogenous, for example a change in leadership in one or more organizations, or exogenous, in the environment the organizations operate in (cf. Biermann, 2008, p. 160). In both cases, they "create environments in which people are willing to contemplate strategies not previously considered feasible and take steps to initiate change" (Wukich, 2011, p. 14). The same applies to changing demands of the external environment, which can make organizations more vulnerable (cf. Wukich, 2011, pp. 14-15).

The joint recognition of a common problem serves as a pre-condition for defining common or complimentary goals. Common or complementary goals facilitate cooperation and may include the generation of synergies or the increase in the visibility of a public diplomacy initiative (cf. Wukich, 2011, p. 15). Furthermore, Axelrod (1984) points out that the anticipation of immediate benefits increases the likelihood of engaging in cooperations and/or networks. Mutual trust is an important factor that stimulates cooperation and network development (cf. Putnam, 2000; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). If organizations have trust in one another prior to a cooperation, this level of trust lowers transaction costs such as bargaining costs that often present barriers to developing cooperative

agreements and networks (cf. Feiock, 2007; Wukich, 2011). Moreover, trust goes along with the expectation that the resources an organizations invests in cooperation will be reciprocated by the cooperation partners (cf. Ostrom & Walker, 2003). Not least, proximity between organizations enables cooperation as well as the emergence and development of networks. In a physical sense, proximity can refer to geographical closeness. In a conceptual sense, proximity addresses the similarity of ideas, values and goals (cf. Axelrod & Cohen, 1999). Both the geographical closeness and the conceptual similarity of organizations increase the likelihood of interorganizational cooperation.

Decision-making processes within interorganizational networks are more complex and, thus, more time-consuming than decisions taken by single organizations (cf. Biermann, 2008, pp. 157-158). Interorganizational cooperation does not only require additional time, but also the investment of other types of resources including personnel, financial capital or international reputation. The return on investment does, however, often remain uncertain (cf. Gottfredson & White, 1981, p. 477). Transaction costs, including bargaining costs, coordination costs or monitoring costs (cf. Feiock, 2007), thus, serve as barriers to cooperation and network development.

Drawing on neorealism and social network theory, Biermann (2008) argues that, ultimately, all network members strive for acquiring and maintaining a central position in a network, as these positions are associated with “power, influence and prestige of an organization” (p. 170). This struggle for central positions and, thus, power can also cause rivalry among network members and lead to processes of destabilization and/or fragmentation. Rivalry among organizations, the (perceived) dependence of organizations as well as the asymmetry of relationships present serious threats to the sustainability of a network. The perceived asymmetry of interorganizational cooperation encourages ‘free-riding’. Organizations that ‘free-ride’, seek to benefit from cooperations at little to no cost (see for instance Fisher, 2013; Ostrom, 2005). Fisher (2013) argues that the inclusion and involvement of all participating organizations in a network is crucial to avoid or, at least, minimize ‘free-riding’.

Interorganizational networks are primarily constituted by organizations that operate in a similar domain, for instance education and research or security, and that share common interests, for instance capacity building in Afghanistan (cf. Biermann, 2008, p. 155). Cooperation is further encouraged if the respective domain is characterized by a high issue density and a high issue duration (cf. Biermann, 2008, p. 160, see also Wallander & Keohane, 1999, p. 31): “Issue density refers to the number and importance of issues arising within a given policy space; issue duration refers to the length of time an issue remains unresolved” (Biermann, 2008, p. 160). Nonetheless, similar fields of activity can also lead to competition among public diplomacy organizations, as they may seek to reach the same strategic publics, such as foreign academics or investors (see for instance Pamment, 2013a).

Incentives for interorganizational cooperation can either be externally generated or endogenous. Externally generated incentives comprise rewards, pressure or punishment (cf. Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Salamon, 2002). Biermann (2008) applies resource dependency theory (see for instance Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967) to explain endogenous motivations for organizational collaboration within networks. Resource dependency theory is based on “rational cost-benefit considerations” (Biermann, 2008, p. 160) and assumes that organizations either provide or pool resources in order solve problems through synergies and improved efficiency (cf. Biermann, 2008, p. 160). Resource provision and resource pooling does not only refer to tangible resources such as financial capital, but also intangible resources, including organizational reputation (see for instance Eisenegger & Imhof, 2009), the relative position in a network (see for instance Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007), organizational culture (see for instance Ortega, 2005) and social capital (see for instance van Ham, 2013).

Wukich (2011) defines three different types of endogenous incentives: careerist, bureaucratic and value-creating. Careerist incentives are coined by the self-interest of organizations and their representatives as well as the desire to maximize their own benefits. Bureaucratic incentives, on the other hand, include the motivation of organizations and their representatives to maintain and improve their own resources. (cf. Bardach, 1998, p. 32; Wukich, 2011, pp. 23-24). While both careerist and bureaucratic incentives focus on the interests of single organizations and are assumed to be more pronounced in a competitively oriented public diplomacy practice, value-creating incentives concentrate on collective benefits and encourage a more cooperative public diplomacy practice (cf. Wukich, 2011, p. 24). Endogenous motivations for cooperation may be more successful in stimulating the efficiency and the persistence of a network than externally generated incentives, such as rewards, pressure or punishment (cf. Fisher, 2013). In this context, Fisher (2013) argues that public diplomacy organizations need to “focus on facilitating the autonomous form of motivation” (p. 218): “Respecting the autonomy of others allow communities to opt in to a network rather than resent being co-opted or publicly included without consultation” (ibid., p. 219).

The willingness of an organization and its representatives to learn and change serves as a pre-condition for interorganizational cooperation. According to Wukich (2011), the technical infrastructure, the degree of flexibility and the organizational culture play a key role in determining an organization’s capacity to change and learn. The technical infrastructure describes an organization’s possession and use of technology to assess, exchange and store information (cf. Comfort, 2007; Wukich, 2011). Technology can facilitate cooperation, but it is the use of technology that determines if interorganizational cooperation can materialize and sustain (cf. Fountain, 2001; Wukich, 2011).

Flexibility refers to 1) the adaptation of the formal and informal rules organizational acting is based on (cf. Ostrom, 2005), 2) the flow of information, 3) organizational practices, and 4) the training and the professional background of organizational representatives (cf. Wukich, 2011, p. 31). Asymmetric flows of information may impede a common recognition of a problem and thus interorganizational cooperation (cf. Comfort, 2007). Organizational practices that facilitate interorganizational cooperation and network building include the collocation of personnel, symmetric information exchange as well as the organization’s awareness to be interdependent (cf. Bardach, 1998; Wukich 2011). On the other hand, the fear that cooperation may disrupt organizational actions and processes as well as worries to lose organizational reputation inhibits interorganizational relations and network development (cf. Wukich, 2011, p. 33; see also Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). The more education and training representatives of an organization have undergone and the more professional experience they have collected, the more problem-solving strategies they have at their disposal (cf. Wukich, 2011, pp. 33-34). Moreover, training and professional experience improve the network management skills of organizational representatives, including mediation, interpersonal communication as well as team building skills (cf. Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004, p. 158).

An organizational culture (see sub-chapter 2.3.1) that supports interorganizational cooperation and network development, acknowledges and values an open information exchange with other organizations, commits to addressing common public diplomacy challenges, is open towards new information and new problem-solving strategies as well as able and willing to recognize mistakes (cf. Comfort, 1999; Wukich, 2011). A high employee turnover (cf. Feiock, 2007; Kearns, 2000; LeRoux, 2006) as well as the prevalence of organizational routines constrain interorganizational cooperation. Furthermore, Biermann (2008) argues that organizational culture inhibits cooperation when different organizational cultures are not complementary and facilitates cooperation in the case of “close affinity of organizational cultures” (p. 158). Organizational leaders can play a crucial role in stimulating and supporting cooperation as well as network building if they challenge the organizational culture and fixed organizational action patterns (cf. Kearns, 2000; Schein, 1992).

Power is a relational concept that involves at least two different public diplomacy organizations. It can manifest itself in resources such as financial means, the structural position a public diplomacy organization holds in a network, its formal authority and the influence on public discourses (cf. Huxham & Beech, 2008). Moreover, single representatives of an organization enact power on a day-to-day basis in workshops or meetings. In interorganizational cooperation, power ranges on a continuum from exercising control (*power over*) over power as a means of achieving common goals (*power to*) to the empowerment of less powerful public diplomacy organizations (*power for*). (cf. *ibid.*, 2008, pp. 555-556, see also Barnett & Duval, 2005; Hayden, 2012) While the exercise of power over other public diplomacy organizations is more likely to inhibit cooperation and network development, power to achieve common goals and empowerment are more likely to enable interorganizational cooperation and public diplomacy networks. Huxham and Beech (2008) argue that power on a micro level (cooperation between representatives of single organizations) “changes rapidly within relatively stable, but nevertheless changing macro-power context” (p. 571). The state of research discloses different assumptions on the dynamics of power over the course of time: While Gray (1989) states that power is shared more and more due to increasing trust, Mayo and Taylor (2001) find that power imbalances increase over time, as partnering organizations tend to fall back into old routines.

To what extent the influencing factors outlined above apply to interorganizational cooperation of EU and member state organizations, is analyzed on the basis of the following sub-dimensions<sup>58</sup>:

- **Factors that enable cooperation:** This sub-dimension identifies factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation.
- **Factors that constrain cooperation:** On the basis of this sub-dimension, the researcher analyzes all factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation.
- **Factors that enable or constrain cooperation:** A number of factors can either enable or constrain interorganizational cooperation. This sub-dimension centers on these factors and explores the circumstances under which they may benefit or inhibit interorganizational cooperation.

The aggregation of data collected on single public diplomacy organizations and their representatives allows for tentative statements about 1) the purpose, 2) the structure and 3) the governance of whole public diplomacy networks. The dimension network purpose looks at the overall goals, the time frame and the issues addressed by the network. The sub-dimension network structure can be subdivided into the density, the size, the degree of diversity, the degree of centralization as well as the degree of permeability of a network. Based on a typology suggested by Provan and Kenis (2008), the dimension network governance analyses if networks are characterized by shared governance, governed by a lead organization or a network administrative organisation. Along with the findings on the perceived quality of interorganizational relationships, the analysis of these three dimensions also allows for cautious statements about the sustainability of public diplomacy networks.

- **Network Purpose:** Public diplomacy networks may focus on a single issue (for instance the promotion of the French language abroad) or address multiple issues (for instance a public diplomacy network at a national level that is designed to develop, implement and monitor a

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<sup>58</sup> All three sub-dimensions examine influencing factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.

country's public diplomacy strategy in the core areas society/culture, economy and education/research). The time frame, for which a public diplomacy network is designed, is closely connected to the network purpose. Public diplomacy networks may be open-ended and created with a long-term perspective in mind or based on a short-term goal and a clearly defined ending point (cf. Zaharna, 2013, p.177). Public diplomacy networks that are designed for a shorter period of time are primarily task-oriented and may "accommodate greater stakeholder diversity" (ibid., p. 177). Moreover, this also includes 'improvised public diplomacy networks' that are created to deal with immediate challenges, such as a crisis (cf. Fisher, 2013, p. 212). Long-term oriented public diplomacy networks, on the other hand, aim at strengthening trust and relational commitment among the participating organizations (cf. ibid., p. 177).

This study seeks to examine the purpose of whole public diplomacy networks on the basis of aggregated statements from both guided interviews and strategy documents. The overarching goals of public diplomacy networks may be in line or conflict with the motivations of single public diplomacy organizations to engage in a network. The more these individual motivations are taken into consideration in the goal formation of a network, the more resilient and sustainable the network is going to be (cf. Zaharna, 2013, p. 177), while diverging interests threaten the viability of a network (cf. Biermann, 2008, p. 158). To Biermann (2008), a "lack of complementary goals and role expectations" and "histories of rivalry hinder the formation of a cooperative relationship" (p. 158) and present obstacles to the emergence and development of interorganizational relationships.

To describe and assess the structure of whole networks, this study looks at the density, the size, the degree of diversity, the degree of centralization as well as the degree of permeability of a network:

- **Network density:** The density of a network refers to the number and the quality of links between members of a network. Denser networks are characterized by more frequent and easier communication between the members of a network (cf. Zaharna, 2013, p. 179). The density of a network is measured on the basis of the strength of ties between organizations within a network.

There are three different types of ties: strong, weak and absent ties. Strong ties "imply a substantial quantity and quality of cooperation, including compromising through coordination and joint decision-making" (Biermann, 2008, p. 165). They are characterized by frequent and intense communication among members of a network and are more resilient as weak ties (cf. Holley & Krebs, 2002, p. 12). Weak ties are less costly to maintain than strong ties and can function as a bridge between different organizations or groups of organizations within a network (cf. Zaharna, 2013, p. 180). Absent ties lack a "relationship [...] [of] substantial significance" (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361), for instance when representatives of two public diplomacy organizations both participate in meetings of a large network, without directly interacting with each other. Granovetter's (1973) work suggests that "tie strength is curvilinear [...]: no tie (or an extremely weak tie) is of little consequence; a weak tie provides maximum impact, and a strong tie provides diminished impact" (Krackhardt, 1992, p. 216)<sup>59</sup>. Krackhardt (1992), on the other hand, stresses the role of strong ties, as "they constitute a base of trust that can reduce resistance and provide comfort" (p. 218), particularly in situations of change. "The strength of strong ties", postulated by Krackhardt (1992) is also emphasized by studies that have analyzed the role of tie strength in the search for employment in different cultural contexts. Both Bian (1997) and Xia and Tsui (2007) stress the role of strong ties in job-seeking in China. The state of research on the role of tie strength in networks has outlined strengths and weaknesses of strong and

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<sup>59</sup> see Krackhardt (1992) for a critical review of Granovetter's (1973) work on tie strength



weak ties: “Weak ties provide people with access to information and resources beyond those available in their own social circle; but strong ties have greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically more easily available” (Granovetter, 1983, p. 209). Strong ties are more beneficial than weak ties in enhancing knowledge transfer and learning. This holds especially true for sharing complex information. (cf. Phelps, Heidl & Wadhwa, 2012). Zaharna (2013, p. 180) points to the benefits of small networks with strong ties if frequent communication among public diplomacy organizations is required. Additionally, Biermann (2008, p. 166) stresses the role of strong ties in relationships that require joint coordination and decision-making. Single clusters of strong ties within a large network, on the contrary, may lead to processes of network fragmentation and destabilization (cf. Zaharna, 2013, p. 180).

Drawing on the work of the work of Phelps et al. (2012), Zaharna (2013) and Biermann (2008), this study assumes a close relationship between the density and the size of public diplomacy networks. Furthermore, the degree of diversity of a network also influences its density. The degree of diversity of a network sheds light on the types of public diplomacy organizations (governmental and non-governmental as well as sub-national, national, regional) that a network is composed of. A homogenous network brings similar types of public diplomacy organizations together, whereas heterogeneous networks are composed of different types of actors. Whereas homogenous networks are assumed to be more stable and better to coordinate (cf. Zaharna, 2013, p. 181), the strength of heterogeneous networks lies within fostering new ways of thinking about a problem (cf. Page, 2008). Krebs and Holley (2002) argue that “[s]imilarity helps the communication and building of trust, while diversity presents new ideas and perspectives” (p. 12). The size and the degree of diversity of a network do not constitute independent analytical sub-dimensions. Rather, information on member organizations of a network allow for inferences regarding the network’s size and degree of diversity<sup>60</sup>.

Each member of a network accompanies a specific role and position within a network (see analytical dimension ‘Role and position in interorganizational network’). Information on the role and position single organizations occupy in a network allows for tentative statements about the degree of centralization of a network, defined as the “degree to which one or a few actors act as central or focal points in the network” (Zaharna, 2013, p. 180). The degree of centralization also allows statements about the distribution of power within networks (see for instance Brass, 1984; Friedkin, 1993) and the role single public diplomacy organizations play within a network. A high degree of centralization correlates with the integration of network members and the coordination of network actions (cf. Provan & Milward, 1995). On the other hand, a high degree of centralization runs counter to a dense network in which most organizations are connected by strong ties (cf. Morrissey, Calloway, Bartko, Ridgley, Goldman & Paulson, 1994).

In addition to the aspect of centralization that focuses on the core of a network, this study also looks at a network’s periphery and examines its degree of permeability:

- **Degree of permeability of a network:** The degree of permeability describes a network’s openness to influences from outside (for instance by external public diplomacy organizations or other public diplomacy networks).

Open networks engage in external coalition building processes that contribute to “boost[ing] the network’s reach, resources, impact, and legitimacy” (Zaharna, 2013, p. 183). These relations with organizations outside of public diplomacy networks are also referred to as non-local ties (cf. Burt, 1983; Gargiulo, 1993; Powell et al., 1996). To Holley and Krebs (2002), network weavers play a key

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<sup>60</sup> Sub-chapter 5.2.4 describes how information on single public diplomacy networks is gathered in the analysis of strategy documents and interview transcripts.

role in “maximiz[ing] the reach of the periphery into new areas, while keeping the core strong” (p. 16). Furthermore, Zaharna (2013) points to the role of members at the periphery of a network that “serve as a conduit for information and resources and can facilitate external relationship building on behalf of the network” (p. 184). The degree of permeability of a network is expected to be higher in a more mature and developed public diplomacy network (cf. Holley & Krebs, 2002).

Network governance constitutes the third important building block of analyzing public diplomacy networks at the whole network level. Network governance is empirically investigated on the basis of the following sub-dimension:

- **Network governance:** This sub-dimension addresses two central questions: Firstly, it explores how interorganizational networks are steered and controlled. Secondly, it fathoms how processes of network development and maintenance are organized within networks.

This study adopts a typology of network governance introduced by Provan and Kenis (2008). Provan and Kenis (2008) present the first theoretical approach to systematize approaches to network governance in this understudied field. They define 1) shared governance, 2) governance by a lead organization, and 3) governance by a network administrative organization (NAO) as three basic models of network governance and discuss the conditions under which these different concepts are perceived as most effective. Shared governance or participant governance refers to interorganizational networks in which organizations “collectively work to make both strategic and operational decisions about how the network operates” (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 504). Organizations may either steer and control network activities on the basis of joint meetings or, in a more informal way, “through ongoing interactions and collaboration” (ibid., p. 504). The model of shared governance is more inclusive than models of governance by a lead organization or a NAO, but may also be very time- and resource-consuming. As all organizations within an interorganizational network participate in the coordination and the control of its activities and no fixed hierarchies exist, shared governance also constitutes the most flexible form of network governance. (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008, pp. 242-245)

Governance by a lead organization involves one organization (in some cases a few organizations) that commands a considerable amount of resources and has a high level of legitimacy within the network. This organization plays a lead role in coordinating the actions and the decision-making processes within a network (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008). Lead organizations first take on the role of a ‘network weaver’ that “actively creat[es] new interactions between the clusters [of a network]” (Holley & Krebs, 2002, p. 7), while a network emerges. As interorganizational networks continue to evolve, lead organizations facilitate “the maintenance of existing internal relationships and the development of external relationships” (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 504). By defining a lead organization to steer a network as well as to coordinate decisions and actions, a network becomes more efficient and stable. At the same time, more hierarchical structures of network governance, that concentrate on one or few lead organizations, may strengthen the interests of lead organizations, whereas the interest of other organizations may not be adequately taken into consideration. If the interests of member organizations are not sufficiently taken into account, their commitment to the network may decrease. (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008, pp. 242-245; see analytical sub-dimensions referring to the perceived quality of interorganizational cooperation above)

Governance by a NAO is similar to the second model of network governance, as it also involves the coordination, control and steering of an interorganizational network by one or a few lead organizations (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008). In this model, however, the lead organization is created for the purposes of coordinating, steering and controlling the network (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 504). It is not involved in the implementation of public diplomacy initiatives of an interorganizational network. NAO are designed to increase the efficiency and the stability of interorganizational networks.

However, they can also limit a network's flexibility due to its bureaucratic structure. (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008, pp. 242-245)

Provan and Kenis (2008) identify four "key structural and relational contingencies" (p. 237) that determine the success of each of these three models of network governance: trust, the size of a network, goal consensus and the need for network-level competences (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 237). In this study, trust is measured on the organizational level as one sub-dimension of the perceived quality of relationships within a network. The aggregation of findings at the organizational level allows for statements about "density of trust relations" (ibid., p. 238) at the network level. The size of a network is covered in the analytical dimension network structure and provides information on the number of participating organizations within a network. To analyze the degree of goal consensus, this study analyzes what extent the individual goals and motivations of participating organizations are similar and match the overall network purposes. Provan and Kenis (2008) point to two critical questions with regard to network-level competencies: "First, what is the nature of the task being performed by network members? And second, what external demands and needs are being faced by the network?" (p. 240). In order to achieve network goals and meet external demands, networks need to define, develop and implement "task-specific competencies" (ibid., p. 241) needed for joint action. These four criteria serve as "key predictors of effectiveness of network governance forms" (ibid., p. 237).

Drawing on Provan and Kenis (2008, pp. 236-241), the model of shared governance is most efficient if there is a high density of trust relations and a small number of organizations within a network, a high consensus between the motivations of individual organizations as well as the network purpose and a comparably low need for developing network-level competencies (see Table 3 below). Networks governed by one or a few lead organizations are, on the other hand, most effective in a centralized network, which does not require a high density of trust relations, which encompasses a moderate number of participating organizations, in which goal consensus is moderately low and, which is characterized by a moderate need for developing network-level competencies. Finally, NAO governed networks are most efficient, if there is a moderate degree of trust relationships within a network, a moderate to high number organizations participating in the network, a considerable agreement between the organizations' interests and the network purpose as well as a high need for developing network-level competencies.

**Table 3: Criteria: Effectiveness of interorganizational networks**

	<b>Shared governance</b>	<b>Governed by a lead organization</b>	<b>Governed by a NAO</b>
<b>Density of trust relationships</b>	high	moderately low, centralized network	moderately high
<b>Size of a network</b>	small	moderate	moderate to big
<b>Goal consensus</b>	high	moderately low	moderately high
<b>Need for network-level competencies</b>	low	moderate	high

(Source: Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 237)


Provan and Kenis (2008) conclude that “[t]he greater the inconsistency between critical contingency factors and a particular governance form (both in terms of the number of inconsistent factors and the extent to which these factors are inconsistent with characteristics of the governance form), the less likely that that particular form will be effective, leading either to overall network ineffectiveness, dissolution, or change in governance form” (p. 241).

Interorganizational cooperation has not received much attention in public diplomacy scholarship yet. In fact, there is no empirically grounded knowledge on interorganizational cooperation in European public diplomacy. As a consequence, this aspect is not included in the discussion of the state of research in chapters three and four. The empirical analysis of interorganizational cooperation of EU and member state organizations only draws on the theoretical framework provided in this sub-chapter.

## **2.8 Research model**

This chapter has outlined that the public diplomacy understanding and practice is guided by the internal and external environment an organization is operating in. The internal environment, comprising an organization’s mission as well as formal and informal communication structures and processes as well as the external environment, which can be subdivided in infrastructure, political environment, cultural environment and media environment, serve as a point of departure for developing a model to guide the empirical analysis.

Illustration 8: Research model



(Source: own depiction)

The external environments of EU and member state organizations influence their understanding and practice of public diplomacy. The definition of public diplomacy as well as alternative concepts and terms used to describe public diplomacy activities provide indications of the extent to which the organizations perceive public diplomacy in competitive or rather cooperative terms. This study has introduced a differentiation of public diplomacy practice on the strategic and tactical level. On the strategic level, organizations define goals, strategic publics, and the public diplomacy approach. Public diplomacy goals are allocated to a continuum ranging from political information or persuasion to cultural communication. Strategic publics – both within and outside of the EU and its member states - include collective actors, including political bodies, businesses, media organizations and civil society organizations as well as individuals, which can be further subdivided into individuals as public figures and citizens. As public diplomacy organizations only command a limited amount of resources, they need to prioritize strategic publics on the basis of their attributes (power, legitimacy, urgency, support of the EU) as well as situational conditions (cf. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Grunig & Reper, 1992; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; Rawlins, 2006). The identification and prioritization of strategic publics can be based on a global strategy, a niche diplomacy strategy or a strategy that concentrates on the region the public diplomacy organization is based in (cf. Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008).

This study has introduced an information and a relational communication framework of public diplomacy to describe the public diplomacy approaches pursued by EU and member state organizations. This framework was further refined by models and taxonomies, which describe the time frame, the mode of communication, as well as the role of strategic publics in public diplomacy approaches. These models imply an underlying differentiation between competitive and cooperative approaches to public diplomacy (cf. Leonard et al., 2002).

To implement public diplomacy goals and reach their strategic publics, public diplomacy organizations develop messages as well as diplomacy tools and communication channels on a tactical level. This study employs the framing approach to examine the context and the focus of the key messages, as well as the depiction of other public diplomacy organizations and/or international actors in these key messages. Public diplomacy organizations have a wide variety of communication tools and channels at their disposal that can be assigned to five different groups of media (controlled media, public media, interactive media, events and group communication, and one-on-one communication, cf. Auer et al., 2010; Hallahan, 2001). These tools differ with regard to their purpose, the time frame, the nature and the directionality of communication, the role attributed to strategic publics as well as the degree of control maintained by public diplomacy organizations.

Public diplomacy organizations can either conduct public diplomacy on their own or cooperate with other public diplomacy organizations on the strategic and/or tactical level. Sub-chapter 2.7 has explored interorganizational cooperation in the context of dyadic relationship and public diplomacy networks. At the level of the single organization, this study fathoms the perception of and the motivation to engage in interorganizational cooperation, the structure and the mode of communication of collaborative public diplomacy efforts as well as the factors that enable and/or constrain interorganizational cooperation. The aggregation of findings at the level of the single organizations allow for cautious statements about the purpose, the structure, the governance as well as the sustainability of interorganizational cooperation at the network level. The actions of single public diplomacy organizations influence structures and processes at the network level. At the same time, the collective behavior within networks has also a decisive impact on the way the single public diplomacy organizations operate and develop. (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 480)

The research model (see above) as well as the analytical dimensions developed in this chapter provide the basis for operationalizing the empirical study. Chapters three and four review the state of research

on European public diplomacy, focusing on the EU as a regional organization as well as France and Sweden as selected EU member states. Building on previous studies on EU as well as French and Swedish public diplomacy, this thesis will formulate a set of assumptions to guide the empirical analysis.

### **3. State of research on public diplomacy I: The European Union as a regional organization**

Chapter two has developed a theoretical framework to guide the review the state of research on European public diplomacy and the empirical analysis. This framework will be now be applied to systematize theoretical and empirically grounded contributions to the state of research on EU public diplomacy on the basis of the following key questions: What are the main public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of the EU? How can the external environments these organizations operate in be described? How do EU public diplomacy organizations understand and practice public diplomacy? The literature review constitutes the basis for developing research assumptions for the empirical analysis.

Scholars have applied different concepts to fathom goals, strategies, tools and structures of EU communication. Both Gramberger (1997) and Brüggemann (2008, 2010) apply the concept of political public relations while Valentini (2008a, 2008b) draws on public communication as a conceptual framework. Aiello (2008) discusses the extent to which the EU implements visual branding as well as corporate communication techniques to reach EU citizens. In addition, Aveline (2006), Szondi (2010) and van Ham (2005) discuss the potential of applying the concept of branding to the communication towards strategic publics outside of the EU.

The state of research discloses a high number of studies that examine EU communication with regard to specific topics and policy areas including transparency (see for instance Laursen, 2013; Brüggemann, 2010), multilingualism (see for instance Romaine, 2013) and audiovisual media (see for instance de Smaele, 2004). Brüggemann (2008) has conducted one of the most ambitious studies on the EU's communication approach in a specific policy area combining analyses of policy documents, wEurope by Satelliteites as well as brochures in a case study on EU enlargement. He focuses on the extent to which the information and communication activities of the EU institutions contribute to the development of a European public sphere or the Europeanization of public spheres respectively (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, p. 264, see sub-chapter 3.3). Furthermore, communication activities of the EU are discussed in various case studies on referenda as well as elections of the EP (see for instance Esser & de Vreese, 2007; de Vreese & Tobiasen, 2007; Taggart, 2006). Valentini (2006), among others, focus on EU communication regarding specific issue campaigns<sup>61</sup>. Furthermore, a number of authors also detail the communication strategies and activities of single EU organizations. The case study on the information network Europe Direct in Italy conducted by Valentini (2010) serves as an example of this group of studies.

The majority of publications deal with the communication of the EU or single EU institutions towards target groups within the EU. Görpe (2010) as well as Börzel and Risse (2009) are among the few scholars who have conducted an analysis on communication towards strategic publics outside of the EU: Based on a case study on Turkey, Görpe (2010) discusses the EU information and communication strategies towards candidate countries. On the basis of research on the diffusion of ideas, Börzel and Risse (2009) discuss the promotion of the EU as a model of regional integration in the context of the neighborhood policy as well as towards other world regions.

While the aforementioned studies contribute to the knowledge of the strategies, structures and influence factors of EU public diplomacy, it is only within the last decade that scholars have applied

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<sup>61</sup> Due to this study's focus on the comparative analysis of the general public diplomacy strategies of the EU and its member states, the state of research does not discuss case studies on single issue campaigns, referenda or elections in detail.



the actual concept of public diplomacy to the study of the EU. In 2005, Lynch provides one of the first discussions of the EU's public diplomacy efforts and their possible improvement, focusing on the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. In the same year, Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge published a general introduction into the EU public diplomacy, comparing strategic foci of EU public diplomacy practice in single member states and defining a set of recommendations for the EU's future conduct of public diplomacy. Along with Szondi's (2010) analysis of the communication model pursued by the EU, these publications provide a general reflection on the status quo of EU public diplomacy. Duke (2013), as well as Duke and Courtier (2011) concentrate on the analysis of the 'Post-Lisbon-Era' of EU public diplomacy, discussing the role and the potential of the European External Action Service<sup>62</sup>.

Whereas the majority of authors focus on the external dimension of EU public diplomacy, Huijgh (2013) focuses on the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy that highlights communication strategies and activities towards strategic publics within the EU. The volume "European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work", edited by Melissen and Cross (2013) makes an important contribution to advancing the study of EU public diplomacy from a theoretical point of view. The edited book does not only approach the object of study from the perspective of communication science, but also applies international relations theory (see for instance Cross, 2013; Manners & Whitman, 2013; van Ham, 2013) as well as network theory (see for instance Fisher 2013) to EU public diplomacy. Pagovski (2015) publishes one of the first reflections on similarities and differences of the public diplomacy approach of multilateral organization on the basis of Cull's (2009c) elements of public diplomacy. He explores public diplomacy goals, strategic publics, resources and tools of ASEAN, the EU and NATO.

Only a small group of scholars has conducted empirical research on the public diplomacy of the EU. Michalski (2005) presents one of the earliest studies on EU public diplomacy combining guided interviews with EU officials with a document analysis. Michalski (2005) addresses the question how values, norms and principles of the EU are integrated into the EU's information and communication strategy. Rasmussen (2009, 2010) pursues a similar methodological approach, but focuses on the interplay between the different EU institutions and member state organizations in communicating public diplomacy messages on the basis of discourse theory. Azpiroz (2015) scrutinizes EU public diplomacy activities in Brazil from 2011 to 2013 and conducts one of the first empirical studies on the EEAS, conducting guided interviews with representatives of the EEAS headquarters in Brussels as well as in the EU Delegation in Brazil.

The doctoral thesis of Valentini (2008a) examines EU communication strategies towards the two member states Finland and Italy on the basis of an ambitious multi-method research design. A document analysis of strategy documents as well as other EU communications in the time period from 2001 to 2006 and guided interviews with EU commission officers in Brussels as well as communication professionals from representations in the selected member states were combined with a quantitative survey among Finnish and Italian journalists as well as a secondary data analysis of Eurobarometer surveys. The study primarily works with the concept public communication, but also addresses the concept of public diplomacy in the theoretical framework. It makes an important contribution "to a better understanding of EU-national government relations" (Valentini, 2008a, p. 108) and adds to a small body of comparative research on public diplomacy.

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<sup>62</sup> The European External Action Service (EEAS) was introduced in December 2010 in order to implement the EU's CFSP and coordinate the EU's external representation. Sub-chapter 3.2 provides more detailed information on the EEAS.

The brief overview of the state of research on EU public diplomacy above has disclosed two groups of studies: Publications that explore EU communication in a broader sense and contributions that specifically work with the concept of public diplomacy. This chapter integrates both types of studies. Sub-chapter 3.1 covers EU communication towards internal and external strategic publics from the 1970s until the time frame of the empirical analysis (2004 to 2015). It reviews both academic publications and EU strategy documents that have paved the way of EU communication. While neither the studies nor the documents explicitly draw on the concept of public diplomacy, they make an important contribution to understanding the historical evolution of EU public diplomacy, the relevance attributed to public diplomacy, the development of its structures as well as its practice on the strategic and tactical level. Building on this diachronic analysis, chapter 3.2 to 3.5 discuss theoretical and empirically grounded contributions to the state of research on EU public diplomacy organizations and their public diplomacy understanding and practice. The analysis of EU public diplomacy organizations includes an assessment of their external environments, including infrastructure as well as political, cultural and media environments (sub-chapter 3.3). The chapter concludes with a reflection on the question of what the insights drawn from the state of research imply for the empirical analysis.

### **3.1 The state of research on the communication of the European Union and its contribution to public diplomacy research**

Terra (2010) challenges the assumption “that the European Union (EU) only began to concern itself with developing an information policy aimed at the general public during the 1990s, in the wake of problems that arose during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty” (p. 49) and provides an overview on EU information and communication policy in the 1970s and 1980s. She argues that the 1970s mark a transition from presenting the European integration as an “ideological enterprise” to “a more concrete realistic approach” to information policy (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 50). This transition can be explained by an increasing demand for information as well as the production of information as the progress of European integration went along. The demand for more specific information rose particularly with regard to the introduction of the customs union in 1968. (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 50)

Whereas previous records had primarily focused on multipliers, the documents issued by European institutions on information policy in the 1970s disclose an increasing orientation towards citizens within the member states and, closely linked to that, a decentralization of the information architecture of the EEC. Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza (at that time Commissioner and responsible for communication) stresses the need of listening to the citizens within member states and creating a dialogue with these citizens in the “Programme pour une politique d’information en 1973” (cf. CCE, 1973a). This acknowledgement of the wider public as an important target group of European information policy went along with the accession of new member states in 1973 and the introduction of the first direct elections of the European Parliament held in 1979 (cf. European Parliament, n.d.b). In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the EEC expanding the community to 256 million inhabitants (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 51). The accession of these member states further diversified the strategic publics of the EU information policy. In addition, the publics in the new member states proved to be more sceptical towards the project of European integration than the founding states (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 51). The ‘Programme d’information 1974-1975’, issued by the EC in 1973, identifies younger politicians, a number of trade unions and parts of the general public to be skeptical to hostile towards the project of European integration. Based on these observations, the EC identifies young people and educators, trade unions as well as political actors as priority publics of the EC’s information policy (cf. CCE, 1973b). Moreover, the document advises a bigger budget for the information of consumers “about the benefits of the common market” (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 52). These priorities were reinforced in the 1976 Information Program of the EC (cf. CCE 1975, pp. 3-5). In

addition to these specific strategic publics, the 1976 Information Program also stresses the need for extending and improving information activities directed at the public at large, particularly via radio and television (cf. CEC, 1975, p. 1).

The first EP elections constituted a main focus of the EC's information policy in the second half of the 1970s. The EC aimed at providing objective information on the EP, making the citizens of member states aware of the elections and, eventually, making them vote (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 56, see also CCE, 1977). These goals were detailed in the EC's 1979 Information Program. In the Schujit report, William Schujit (1977) criticized this document for not allocating enough financial resources to planning and implementing information activities regarding the first EP election. Moreover, the Schujit report also suggested a closer cooperation between the EC, the EP and the Council of Ministers with regard to information activities on the EP elections (cf. Schujit, 1977). Schujit's suggestion of a closer inter-institutional cooperation was taken up the EC in 1979 by establishing a working group of EC and EP to plan and coordinate information activities on the EP elections (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 57; see also CEC, 1979). The information campaign on the first EP elections also characterizes the beginning of a more active role of the EP in the information policy of the EC (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 62). 63% of the citizens within member states participated in the first EP elections, held in June 1979. This figure marks the highest voter turnout in the history of the EP elections (cf. European Parliament, n.d.c).

Whereas the majority of documents issued on the information and communication policy of the EU focuses on target groups within the EU, the text 'La Politique d'Information de la Communauté aux Etats-Unis', released by the EC in 1973, the document focuses on the information policy towards the United States. The document reveals four goals of the information policy of the EC towards the United States: 1) Achieving a better understanding for the political ideas and actions of the EEC, 2) emphasizing the common interests of the EEC and the USA, 3) generating a better understanding of the role of the EC in the world, and 4) creating an objective basis for the discussion of current issues on the basis of 'facts and figures' (cf. SEC (73) 1507, p. 5). In order to achieve these goals the document proposes to focus on political, social and economic elites and identifies decision-makers as most important strategic publics within the US (cf. CEE, 1973c, p. 5). This is also reflected by the suggested communication measures: Priority is given to interpersonal communication with communication officers in state organizations. In addition, the document recommends publications, media relations, exchange programs as well as public opinion surveys as auxiliary instruments (cf. CEE, 1973c, p. 6). The report describes the communication from Europe to the USA as fragmented, as the single member states as well as the EEC pursue individual communication strategies. This fragmented communication strategy should give way to more coherent communication efforts. (cf. CEE, 1973c, p. 2)

By 1975, the EEC had established agreements with 76 non-member countries. In addition, 103 non-member countries have sent representatives to the EEC (cf. CEC, 1975, p. 7). The 1976 Information Program identifies the USA, Canada as well as Japan as the most important trading partners and, thus, priority countries with regard to information policy (cf. CEC, 1975, p. 9). Moreover, state and non-state actors from developing countries have shown an increasing interest in information on European institutions that the EEC seeks to satisfy by "[redoubling] its efforts" in these countries (cf. CEC, 1975, p. 8). Similarly to the information policy towards member states, the EC also pursues a strategy of decentralization towards non-member countries. Information offices, delegations as well as delegates were defined as relay channels in non-member countries (cf. CEC, 1975, p. 9). Due to scarce resources, the EEC concentrated its information efforts in non-member countries primarily on multipliers (cf. CEC, 1975, p. 10). In addition to that, the 1976 Information Program stresses the need of "speak[ing] with one voice in international gatherings" (CEC, 1975, p. 8) in order to strengthen its role in world politics.

The 1980s were coined by a decreasing support for the European project. This decreasing support manifested itself in “a (re)emergence of nationalism in politics and attitudes” (CEC, 1982, p. 1) and a growing tension between single nation states. Moreover, the results of the Eurobarometer survey show a disillusion of the citizens within the member states with the EEC (cf. CEC, 1982, p. 1). The Eurobarometer survey 17, issued in June 1982, showed a decline in the support for membership in the EEC from 56% in September 1973 to 50% in April 1981. Support for EEC membership was particularly low in Denmark (30%), the United Kingdom (24%), Greece (42%) and Ireland (46%) – the countries that had joined the EEC in 1973 or 1981 respectively. (cf. Eurobarometer 17, 1982, p. 70) In order to reaffirm citizens in these member states of the European project, the 1981 Information Program by the EC set the objective to concentrate information efforts on highlighting past achievements as well as the necessity to develop common solutions for problems that span across the member states of the EEC (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 58). Moreover, the Council of the EU introduced a ‘Committee for a People’s Europe’ in 1985 in order to encourage the development of a European identity. To increase the citizens’ identification with the EU, a number of symbols including a European flag and anthem were introduced (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, p. 50).

With regard to the target audiences within the EEC, the documents published in the 1980s disclose a continuity of the communication strategy outlined in the 1970s. Communication officials of the EC emphasize the need to address the general public – both directly and indirectly (cf. CEC 1982, p. 4). The ‘Information Program 1982’ also confirms the strategy of decentralization and tailoring information to the national and regional demands of the citizens within the member states (cf. CEC 1982, p. 4). The European Year of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in 1983 illustrate the growing importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) as strategic publics of the EEC. In order to improve the communication flow between the EEC and the SMEs, a network of Euro Information Centres was founded in order to provide funding, training as well as information on EU legislations relevant to SMEs (cf. Terra, 2010, pp. 60-61, see also CEC, 1987).

In 1986, Gianni Bagget-Bozzo, member of the EP, issued a report that marks the transition from an information policy to an information AND communication policy (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 58f.). The report by Bagget-Bozzo emphasizes “that an information policy without a communication policy was effectively worthless” (Terra, 2010, p. 60). This idea is supported by the ‘Resolution on the European Commission’s Information Policy’, issued by the EP in 1987. The resolution states that “a modern information policy must embrace two aspects of equal importance — information and communication” (European Parliament, 1987, p. 112). The resolution does however not detail to what extent communication differs from and goes beyond information.

The documents issued by the EC in the 1980s mention information towards non-member countries, but do not discuss the information strategies and structures in these target countries in detail (see for instance CEC, 1982, p. 5). Both the EP as well as the ad hoc Committee on a People’s Europe urged the EC to pay more attention to target groups outside of the EEC: The “Resolution on the European Commission’s Information Policy” by the EP (1987) calls for a “communication policy” which dedicates more attention “to non-member countries on a two-way basis” (p. 113). In the document “A People’s Europe” (1985), the ad hoc Committee on a People’s Europe advised the EEC to “strengthen and promote its identity and its image both [to] its citizens and [to] the rest of the world” (Adonnino, 1985, p. 4).

Despite efforts to improve the planning and coordination of information and communication activities in the 1970s and the 1980s, the Andenna Report (1988) criticizes the lack of coordination among the Directorates-General of the EC that lead to a duplication of activities and, thus, a loss of resources. The European Council also calls for a closer inter-institutional cooperation as well as more effective services, “particularly at regional and local level” (European Council, 1985, p. 23). Furthermore, the European Council remarks “that the people of Europe do not receive satisfactory information about the

construction of Europe” (CEC, 1985, p. 22). This entails more general information about the European project as well as more specific information about policies and their impact on people’s daily lives (cf. CEC, 1985, p. 23). The introduction of Rural Information and Promotion Carrefours in 1988 presented one important step towards improving the communication with EEC citizens in rural areas. The carrefours provided general information about EEC policies and actions, but also informed about specific policies that are relevant for citizens within rural areas like the Common Agricultural Policy (cf. Valentini, 2010, pp. 144-145). The concept of the Rural Information and Promotion Carrefours was extended to capitals of regions or provinces: Local partners opened Info-Points Europe that were supported technically, financially and through the provision of information material by the EC (cf. Valentini, 2010, p. 145). While both the Rural Information and Promotion Carrefours and the Info-Points cooperated with the EC, they were still independent from the European institution and run by a “host organization [within a region or province] which provided the location and the main funding” (Valentini, 2010, p. 145).

This analysis shows that communication officials of the EEC were already aware of the gap between European institutions and citizens in member states in the 1970s and already addressed this problem in documents on information policy in this time (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 63). Moreover, the documents issued by the different European institutions reveal a stronger orientation towards the general public as a direct target group of information and communication activities in the second half of the 1970s as well as the 1980s (cf. Terra, 2010, p. 63). However, Brüggemann (2008, p. 123) questions this proclamation of a citizen-oriented information and communication policy and argues that many processes within the EEC remained secretive prior to Treaty of Maastricht without granting citizens access to EU documents. Documents issued by the EC and the EP in the 1970s relied almost exclusively on the term ‘information’ to describe their communication strategies and activities geared towards member states, non-member countries and international organizations. Only in 1986, the term ‘communication policy’ was introduced.

### *The Maastricht crisis*

The Treaty of Maastricht introduces the term 'European Union' that replaced the designation 'European (Economic) Community' and is still used today. It strengthens and specifies the idea of an “economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty” (Article B). Moreover, the treaty emphasizes the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the a „close cooperation on justice and home affairs“ (Article B). With the introduction of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU has also allowed more room for the discussion of communication-related issues. Gramberger (1997) considers the Treaty of Maastricht a turning point regarding the information and communication policy of the EU (cf. Gramberger, 1997, p. 216f.). The Treaty puts a strong emphasis on the concept of European citizenship that is also visible in its communication approach (cf. Spanier, 2012, p. 34). The “Declaration on the right of access to information”, attached to the Treaty of Maastricht, documents the EU's effort to increase the transparency of its communication.

The introduction of the Treaty of Maastricht was not met with approval in all member states. In June 1992, the Danish citizens voted no in a referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht<sup>63</sup>. In France, only a paper thin majority voted of 51% in favour of the treaty. Thus, the EU was confronted with a serious number of citizens who did not support the planned steps of European integration. While these developments are often referred to as the Maastricht crisis (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, p. 123), they also provided an opportunity of rethinking the existing information and communication activities (cf. Bender, 1997, p. 58). To meet these challenges, the EU officials João de Deus Pinheiro and Willy de

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<sup>63</sup> The Danish citizens voted in favour of the Treaty in a second referendum, after a number of specific regulations for Denmark (‘Edinburgh Agreement’) were added.

Clercq drafted two different communication approaches: De Deus Pinheiro (1993a) concentrated on the information of citizens, building on the assumption that well informed citizens are more likely to engage in a dialogue with the EU (cf. Spanier, 2012). De Clercq (1993), in contrast, suggested a political marketing approach in order to communicate the EU as well as the changes introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. The following paragraphs analyze these two contrasting approaches as well as their reception in the EU institutions.

In 1993, João de Deus Pinheiro, at that time European Commissioner of Internal Political Relations, introduces “A New Approach” (de Deus Pinheiro, 1993a) to the information and communication policy of the EC. In a first step, De Deus Pinheiro (1993a) assesses the internal and external conditions that have an impact on the success of the information and communication activities of the EC. Internal conditions refer to all factors within the single organizations of the EU that facilitate or hinder the information and communication activities of the EC. De Deus Pinheiro (1993) critically addresses the quality, the coherence of the communicated information as well as the accuracy with which strategic publics were defined: The Commissioner attests to a lack of professionalization which manifested itself in the little knowledge of characteristics of strategic publics (e.g. prior knowledge, needs, interests), a language that remains highly specialized and is insufficiently adapted to strategic publics as well as the use of communication channels that do not reflect their current patterns of media usage (cf. De Deus Pinheiro, 1993a, p. 2). Moreover, de Deus Pinheiro (1993a) points to the lack of “a coordinated overall strategy to communicate [the] political objectives” (p. 2) of the EC. These internal factors that constrain a successful information and communication policy reflect the points of criticism that were already addressed in the documents on information policy issued in the 1970s and 1980s (see above). With regard to the external factors that influence the information and communication activities of the EC, de Deus Pinheiro (1993a) highlights the transcultural environment the EC communicates in, the institutional framework of EU communication as well as an increasingly vigilant public that information and communication of the European Commission is targeted at. The framework of actors that inform about the European Union does not only comprise EU organizations, but also actors within member states “with conflicting objectives and without a clear division of tasks” (p. 1). The conflicting interests of the EU and its member state actors involve the risk of a negative depiction by the EU in member state information and communication strategies (cf. De Deus Pinheiro, 1993a, p. 2).

“The new approach” to the information and communication policy of the EC, introduced by de Deus Pinheiro in 1993, is based on the following core principles: 1) Information must be presented in an “open, complete, simple and clear” (de Deus Pinheiro, 1993a, p. 4) way, 2) the information and communication policy “has to respond to the needs of the citizens” (ibid., p. 4) and must therefore be demand-oriented, as well as 3) easily available to target groups (cf. ibid., p. 5). 4) The information and communication policy needs to be well coordinated among all actors that communicate information about the EU (cf. ibid., p. 5). This coordination process does not only include actors of the EU, but also actors from the member states that De Deus Pinheiro (1993a) attributed a particular relevance and responsibility to<sup>64</sup>:

*It is important to note that Member States have a shared responsibility with the Community institutions to provide information to the public, particularly in order to stress the Community's achievements and in as much as Community legislation affects*

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<sup>64</sup> De Deus Pinheiro (1993) specifies the considerations with regard to these communication networks between European and national actors in the document “The Commission's Information and Communication Policy: Relay and Network Policy” (1993c). De Deus Pinheiro (1993c) argued that citizens are more receptive to information of the EU that is provided by national communicators, because they “address[s] them within an organizational framework with which they are already familiar” (p. 1). He called for a greater coherence based on the formulation of agreed goals and improved coordination between actors on the European and national level (cf. ibid., p. 2).

*people in their daily lives, to stimulate debate on the future activities of the Community. This will bring the Community much closer to its citizens, who too often tend to look at it as "something remote in Brussels" (De Deus Pinheiro, 1993a, p. 11)*

Willy de Clercq issued a "Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the European Commission" in 1993. As de Deus Pinheiro (1993a), de Clercq points to a number of internal and external factors that hinder the success of information and communication strategies towards EU citizens. Whereas de Deus Pinheiro (1993a) focuses on the communication of EC, this report addresses communication and information activities by all actors of the EU. Just as de Deus Pinheiro (1993a), de Clercq (1993) criticizes the lack of a consistent overall communication strategy: „Europe does not 'speak with one voice'. There is insufficient coordination between the institutions, and between the institutions and the Member States. There is consequently a multiplicity of transmitters but no consistency of message“ (de Clercq, 1993, p. 4). Moreover, the messages communicated by the EU are described as too abstract, failing to relate to the everyday life of their target audiences (cf. *ibid.*, p. 5). With regard to the resources, de Clercq (1993) concludes that an insufficient amount of resources is allocated to communication and information activities with only little decision-making power in the hands of the communication staff (cf. *ibid.*, p. 5). Similar to de Deus Pinheiro (1993a), de Clercq (1993) also points to the blame game played by EU member states and its negative impact on EU communication.

The reports provided by de Deus Pinheiro (1993a) and de Clercq (1993) resemble in their analysis of the state of EU communication. The suggestions on how to overcome the identified challenges are, however, quite different. De Clercq (1993) states „build[ing] public awareness and approval of European Union and of the role and function of the European Institutions“ (p. 7) as the overarching goal of the communication strategy that he proposes. In order to achieve this goal, de Clercq (1993) argues that the EU must be made more accessible to its citizens (cf. *ibid.*, p. 7) by highlighting the purpose of EU decisions and how they relate to the lives of EU citizens. Interestingly, de Clercq (1993) clearly distinguishes between information and communication: „It is not more information that is required. Indeed, there may already be too much information in the sense that it is boring, irrelevant and 'cold'. What is needed is more communication: messages that stimulate, excite, motivate and move people: stimuli that change their attitudes“ (de Clercq, 1993, p. 10).

According to de Clercq (1993, p. 14), the „European Union should be positioned in the minds of the people, as the largest democratic, socio-economic and political entity in the world. Its *raison d'être* is that, in the pursuit of its objectives, the whole is greater and more effective than the sum of its parts“. By using the term 'positioning', De Clercq (1993) applies a term that is part of the marketing vocabulary. With regard to the structure of EU communication, de Clercq (1993) suggests the creation of an Office of Communication in order to „provide the guidelines [and take the responsibility] for a coherent communications' policy [...] [to] ensure that the EC speaks with one voice“ and “plan, allocate, and control budgets“ (p. 18). With regard to the professionalization of communication, de Clercq (1993, p. 18, 30) suggests the addition of external expertise as well as hiring public relations practitioners.

De Clercq (1993) focuses on the persuasion of citizens by communicating achievements, benefits and opportunities of the EU, whereas the approach by de Deus Pinheiro (1993a) concentrates on the objective, neutral information of citizens. Whereas the approach by Commissioner de Deus Pinheiro (1993a) resonated well with the EC and was adopted on June 30, 1993, the communication approach suggested by de Clercq (1993) was received very critically and considered as manipulative, not taking the active role of the citizens into consideration (cf. Gramberger, 1997, p. 227, see also Spanier, 2012).

Despite the fundamentally different reception of these two approaches, Spanier (2010, p. 34) argues that ‘neutral’ public information activities and ‘proactive’ political marketing activities become blurred in practice.

In addition to documents issued by de Deus Pinheiro (1993a) and de Clercq (1993), Arie Oostlander, member of the EP’s Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media, provides a third recommendation on how to restructure and redesign EU communication after the failed referendum in Denmark in 1992. Oostlander (1993) applies the terms ‘communication activities’ and ‘public information’. He refers to public information as “a form of persuasion” that entails “a) information on what policy has been adopted; b) information on major policy initiatives; c) information on social problems to which a solution can be found through information geared to a voluntary change in the behaviour of the citizen” (p. 13). Oostlander (1993) distances himself from information as a “selling policy” (p. 13): “An information policy should not be directed solely at achieving a positive response from individuals and their organisations. It can also encourage them to engage in a critical dialogue” (Oostlander, 1993, p. 13). In this sense, Oostlander (1993, p. 15) advocates the open communication of differences of opinion between the different EU institutions.

Despite rising expenditures for EC information and communication activities from 1988 to 1992 (cf. European Commission, 1992), the report issued by Oostlander (1993) still calls for an increase of the communications budget (cf. Oostlander, 1993, p. 18). Oostlander particularly stresses that a bigger share of resources should be allocated to audiovisual media (cf. Oostlander, 1994, p. 9).

In 1995, the Programme prioritaire d’information au citoyen européen (PRINCE) was installed at the initiative of the EP. It doubled the communication budget of the EC (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, pp. 124-125) and can be regarded as “the first time, the EU had made considerable funds available for informing the general public” (Mak, 2001, p. 55, see also Brüggemann, de Clerck-Sachsse & Kurpas, 2006, p. 4). PRINCE constitutes a budget line that funds information and communication campaigns on specific issues such as the introduction of the euro or the enlargement of the EU and promotes inter-institutional cooperation between the EC, the EP and the Council of the EU (cf. Brüggemann, de Clerck-Sachsse & Kurpas, 2006, p. 4).

The year 1995 also marks the launched the wEurope by Satelliteite [www.europa.eu](http://www.europa.eu) as well as the creation of Team Europe<sup>65</sup> and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), which has been labelled as the “greatest single public diplomacy initiative” of the EU by Fiske de Gouveia (2005, p. 18). EUROMED aims at “promot[ing] economic integration and democratic reform across 16 neighbors to the EU’s south in North Africa and the Middle East” (EEAS, n.d.) and is built on three pillars: 1) a political and security dialogue, 2) an economic and financial partnership, and 3) a social, cultural and human dialogue. Fiske de Gouveia (2005, pp. 18-19) particularly highlights the third pillar as an important contribution to dialogue-oriented public diplomacy that particularly stresses exchange and cultural relations among and between EU member states and neighboring states. EUROMED was re-launched in 2008 and is now operating under the name ‘Union for the Mediterranean’.

In 1999, a new Commission under Romano Prodi took office, after the previous commission had been accused of corruption. The Prodi Commission (1999-2004) emphasized the principle of decentralization and sought to upvalue the representations within member states as well as delegations in third states (cf. Michalski, 2005, pp. 127-128). Brüggemann (2008, p. 140), however, questions to what extent the ambition to strengthen the communication of representations was really put into practice, as the budget of the representations did not significantly increase. The White Paper on European Governance (2001) suggests to not only engage representations within member states, but

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<sup>65</sup> Team Europe is constituted by a pool of experts that is run by the EC and that gives speeches on selected European issues.



also “networks, grassroots organisations and national, regional and local authorities” (CEC, 2001b, p. 11) in the communication efforts of the EC. Furthermore, the White Paper advises to foster the dialogue with civil society actors that play a vital role in voicing citizens’ opinions and concerns (cf. CEC, 2001b, p. 16).

The subsequent document “A New Framework of Co-Operation on Activities Concerning the Information and Communication Policy of the European Governance” (CEC, 2001a) is a “first response to requests made by the European Parliament and the European Council [...] to set up a joint strategy in the area of information and communication” (CEC, 2001a, p. 3). It proposes a strategy of inter-institutional co-operation (cf. CEC, 2001a, p. 4). This inter-institutional co-operation includes joint efforts of the EC and the EP on a political (guidelines and priorities of overall information and communication strategy), operational (implementation of strategy) and decentralized level (implementation of strategy in the member states, regions and municipalities) (cf. CEC, 2001a, p. 6-7). The subsequent 2002 Information and Communication Strategy for the European Union aimed at establishing a more “coherent and comprehensive information and communication policy for the European Union” (cf. CEC, 2002, p. 4). In contrast to earlier documents, the EC distances itself from an approach that predominantly relies on the communication of neutral information: “Experience has shown that a given item of information will not remain neutral because its presentation will constantly be reworked by the media, relays and other opinion multipliers” (cf. CEC, 2002, p. 10). Thus, the EC opts for a proactive communication of key messages that include the portrayal of the EU as an institution that stands up for liberty, prosperity and security for its citizens, that “promotes a model of society inspired by solidarity and dynamism and respecting diversity” (cf. CEC, 2002, p. 12) as well as an important player in world politics (cf. CEC, 2002, p. 12). In addition to the proactive communication of these messages, the document also emphasizes the establishment and maintenance of a dialogue on priority topics including EU enlargement, the future of the EU as well as the role of the EU in the world (cf. CEC, 2002, p. 14).

Additionally, the EC seeks to cooperate with member states on a voluntary basis on the communication of these priority topics: Participating member states received a budget from the PRINCE funds in order to develop a national communication campaign on the basis of a central storyline provided by the EC (cf. Michalski, 2005, p. 128). This cooperation with participating member states is assessed positively by EU officials, even though the development of national communication campaigns always goes along with a loss of control over EU messages (cf. Michalski, 2005, pp. 128-129). EU officials, however, call attention to the problem of member states refusing to cooperate with the EU and neglecting a European dimension in the communication with domestic audiences: Consequently, the national political level is “often seen as the stumbling block for enhancing the EU’s legitimacy and credibility” (Michalski, 2005, p. 129).

The document 'Implementing the Information and Communication Strategy for the European Union (COM(2004)196)' details the 2002 Information and Communication Strategy with regard to responsibilities and tasks of single actors on European, national, regional and local level as well as the tools of information and communication. On the basis of focus group discussions<sup>66</sup> conducted in 2003, the EC analyzed how key values of the EU (peace, freedom, solidarity, cultural diversity) were received by EU citizens and citizens within candidate countries. The results of the study disclose that participants lacked basic information on the EU and did not relate key values such as solidarity specifically to the EU (see sub-chapter 3.3). The findings of the study suggest that key values need to be communicated in the context of specific policies as well as topics that touch on areas of the citizens' everyday lives (cf. CEC, 2004, p. 6). Based on these empirical results, the EC described the challenge of communicating with EU citizens is “primarily one of motivation, arousing the public’s curiosity,

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<sup>66</sup> The focus groups were conducted with citizens from the EU15 member states, the countries to join the EU in the fifth wave of enlargement as well as citizens from Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey

stimulating interest, and doing so with a message rooted in common values, but whose substance is sufficiently specific for the public to identify with” (CEC, 2004, p. 7). This notion goes along with the recognition that the ‘facts-and-figures’ approach has become obsolete and communication needs to focus on “concrete and people-focused ‘success stories’” (Michalski, 2005, p. 135). Moreover, the document introduces Management Partnerships, Strategic Partnership and One-Off Partnerships<sup>67</sup> as three mechanisms of cooperation between the EU and its member states. Management partnerships can be described as structured partnerships that are based on a communication plan that is approved and co-financed by EU institutions and national actors. The implementation of this communication plan is carried out and administered solely by the member states (cf. CEC, 2004, p. 11). Within a strategic partnership, EU and national actors also agree on a joint communication plan. The funding of the single measures is, however, clearly distinguished between the EU institutions and the actors within the member states (cf. CEC, 2004, p. 10). One-off partnerships are simply based on the co-financing of single measures that are implemented by actors within the member states (cf. CEC, 2004, p. 12). These three types of partnerships allow the member states to define the scope and the way of cooperation they wish to engage in.

DG Relex, the Directorate-General that was responsible for external policy until 2010 and was succeeded by the EEAS, focused on communicating the EU “as a peace project, which has brought prosperity and stability to Europe and acts as an anchor for democracy and human and fundamental rights in the world” (Michalski, 2005, pp. 134-135). Based on these core values, the EU should be communicated as a model to be emulated towards external strategic publics (cf. Michalski, 2005, p. 135). The decentralization of EU communication does not only apply to efforts to reach target groups within the EU, but also to the communication efforts targeted at groups outside of the EU. Enhancing the responsibilities of EU Delegations in third states and on a multilateral level is central to this process, as EU delegations play an important role in informing about and explaining the EU and its policies together, often in conjunction with member state embassies, and often serve as a first contact point for external strategic publics. (cf. Michalski, 2005, p. 133).

The EC under Commissioner Prodi had to communicatively accompany a number of major steps of the European integration process, including the introduction of the Euro currency as well as the 2004 Eastern enlargement. Strategy documents issued in the years 2001 to 2004 call for an increasing decentralization of EU communication. Whereas these documents contain rather detailed information on the responsibilities of EU institutions, they are “less precise in defining the responsibilities and functions [of] national players” (Valentini, 2008a, p. 111). Moreover, empirical research shows that these claims of decentralizations have not fully been realized: Valentini (2008a, p. 108) argues that there are no significant differences in implementing communication strategies in the single EU member states and that EU communication strategies are insufficiently tailored to the needs of national target groups.

Brüggemann (2008) estimates the efficiency of communication of the EC under Commissioner Prodi as relatively low. The author traces this lack of efficiency back to a lack of inter-institutional coordination between EU institutions, insufficient human and financial resources, the organizational culture within the EU as well as external factors. After allegations of corruptions against the EC under Commissioner Santer and subsequently the resignation of the entire commission in 1999, the communication efforts under Commissioner Prodi were coined by a very rigid interpretation of budget regulations as well as a technocratic rather than a proactive and strategic approach to communication. Additionally, state actors, journalists and civil society actors within the single member states and in

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<sup>67</sup> Representatives of EU public diplomacy organizations use both the terms ‘one-off partnership’ and ‘ad-hoc partnership’ to refer to this type of cooperation between EU and member state organizations. The two terms are used interchangeably in this thesis.

third states greatly vary in their willingness to cooperate with the EC on communicating European issues. (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, pp. 280-281)

#### *Communication as a binding institutional priority*

Valentini and Nesti (2010) argue that “[t]he EU information and communication policy, in fact, has been present in the European agenda since the very beginning of the integration process and has known growing importance at least since the Maastricht crisis, after the Danish rejection of the Treaty on the EU, but only from 2005 it has become a binding institutional priority” (p. 2). In 2004, Margot Wallström was appointed European Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy and set out to reform and strengthen communication as a “policy in its own right” (CEC 2005a, p. 2). The “Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe” issued in 2005 marks the first step of redefining the communication policy of the EU. The document acknowledges communication as a “strategic objective” and “an essential part of the political process” (CEC, 2005a, p. 3). It needs to be viewed in connection to “Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate” (2005) as the “2006 White Paper on Communication”. These three documents were issued in a ‘period of reflection’ as a consequence of the French and Dutch No votes in the referenda on the EU Constitution (cf. Spanier, 2012, p. 35). This section does not discuss these documents in detail, as they are part of the empirical document analysis.

Brüggemann (2008) identifies a number of processes of change with regard to EU communication since the millennium: The EU has diversified its range of communication instruments and professionalized both its media relations and the design of the wEurope by Satelliteite [www.europa.eu](http://www.europa.eu) (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, pp. 283-284). Brüggemann (2008) particularly emphasizes institutional learning processes after Margot Wallström had become Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy. However, Brüggemann (2008) also points to a number of drawbacks: EU communication efforts still suffered from an insufficient budget and personnel and not all changes suggested by the ‘Action Plan’ (2005) had been implemented yet or were implemented (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, pp. 284-286). Not least, the position of the Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy was abolished only four years after its introduction (cf. Wessler & Brüggemann, 2012, p. 89).

From 2005, strategy documents of the EC indicate a shift of the role of citizens: The documents stress the involvement of citizens in EU communication as opposed to only regarding citizens as strategic publics of communication (cf. Valentini, 2008a, p. 111). Brüggemann (2008, p. 142), however, critically remarks that the EU may apply instruments based on two-way communication, but not with the goal of creating an open dialogue, but the persuasive goal to “improve perceptions of the European Union, its institutions and their legitimacy” ((COM(2002)350), p. 11). Similarly, Valentini (2008a, p. 109) also points to a lack of dialogue orientation in the communication practice of the EC.

Moreover, Valentini’s (2008a) analysis of EU communication from 2001 to 2006 discloses that “[w]hile documents on information and communication policies [...] contained a clear statement about mutual collaboration and synergy between European, national, regional and local levels, in practice, the centralized and traditional EU method of dealing with communication towards citizens was the preferred choice in the majority of situations” (p. 112). The author advises to take the “general attitude and knowledge of people” about specific European issues as well as the “types of discourse on the EU created by national politicians, media and relevant experts” (p. 115) into consideration when conceptualizing and implementing EU communication strategies.

The review of EU communication towards strategic publics within and outside of the EU in this subchapter has covered the development of the terminology, the structure, the goals, as well as the approach to EU communication from the 1970s until the Barroso Commission’s period of office.

These insights contribute to grasping EU public diplomacy efforts, as well as the internal and external factors that influence them. The reflections on EU communication serve as a starting point for a more detailed analysis of the state of research on EU public diplomacy in the following sub-chapters 3.2 to 3.5.

### **3.2 Public diplomacy organizations**

EU public diplomacy is characterized by a multilevel structure including organizations “of a different nature and [...] different sources of legitimacy” (Rasmussen, 2012, p. 38) on a regional, national and sub-national level. This sub-chapter presents the most important academic insights into EU organizations that focus on the internal and the external dimension of EU public diplomacy, looking at the organizations’ scope of tasks, their structures, resources as well as challenges they face when conducting public diplomacy. On a regional level, the EC, the EP and the Council of the EU can be identified as communicators. The EC is the main organization of the EU’s public diplomacy, conceptualizing and implementing communication strategies towards internal and external strategic publics. With regard to the public diplomacy of the EU, the EP fulfils four different functions: Together with the Council of the EU, the EP performs the function of the legislator and the budgeteer. In comparison to the EC, the EP’s role in EU public diplomacy is limited (cf. Fiske de Gouveia, 2005, p. 12) and it has only little influence on the conceptualization of EU public diplomacy (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, p. 130). Nevertheless, the EP has provided important impulses for the development of the EU public diplomacy including the introduction of the PRINCE funds (see sub-chapter 3.1). Moreover, members of the EP as well as administrative staff communicate on behalf of the EP itself.

The Council of the EU constitutes the voice of the national governments. Within the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, the Directorate Communication deals with media and public relations. In addition, a Working Group on Information chaired by the General Secretariat debates the budgetary issues and transparency rules, but also serves as a forum for information exchange on EU communication within member states. Recommendations and decisions by this working group are also considered as influential by other EU institutions. (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, p. 132) While all EU bodies make individual contributions to EU public diplomacy, the EC is the main organizations of EU public diplomacy towards internal publics. It therefore constitutes a focus of the empirical study.

On a national level within the EU, public diplomacy organizations include EC Representations, EP Information Offices as well as state and non-state organizations within the member states. The representations of the EC adapt public diplomacy strategies developed in Brussels to the specific communication environment of the single member states and establish relationships with national organizations. In addition to the representations of the EC, there is an information office of the EP in each member states. The information offices aim at increasing awareness and knowledge of the EP as well as increasing voter turnouts.<sup>139</sup> EU Delegations in third countries and to international organizations serve as counterparts of the EC representations outside of the EU<sup>68</sup>. Europe Direct Centres serves as mediators between EU institutions as well as local civil society organizations and the citizens in regions and provinces. They can be characterized as the most important actors of EU public diplomacy organizations on a local level. In addition, local authorities as well as civil society actors contribute to EU public diplomacy. Like state and non-state organizations on a national level, local authorities and civil society organizations engage in EU public diplomacy on a voluntary basis.

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<sup>68</sup> Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, Delegations in third countries and to international organizations only represented the EC. With the adoption of the treaty and the launch of the EEAS, the scope of tasks of Delegations has been widened significantly. EU Delegations now communicate on behalf of the entire EU.

Whereas this section has focused on public diplomacy organizations primarily targeting internal publics, the following paragraphs will explore the most important organizations of the external dimension of EU public diplomacy in greater detail.

Duke (2013) correctly states that EU public diplomacy towards external audiences was “highly fragmented” (p. 116) prior to the Treaty of Lisbon. Public diplomacy-related tasks were shared among the EC and the Council Secretariat. Even though the Relex Information Committee<sup>69</sup> served as a coordination body of public diplomacy efforts by the EC and the EU, Duke (2013, p. 117) argues that cooperation among the different EU institutions was not well aligned. This disjointed EU public diplomacy towards external strategic publics finds its expression in a “lack of a big picture or overarching strategy context” (Duke, 2013, p. 117). Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU was represented by the member states presiding the Council of the EU in some policy areas and by the respective delegation of the EC in other policy areas. The division of representative tasks with regard to policy areas led to confusion about “which person [or organization] legitimately represents the EU in a third state” (Rasmussen, 2014, p. 781). Moreover, Rasmussen (2014, p. 781) argues that the representation of the EU by a small member state with little political weight in the international environment presiding the Council of the EU may be perceived as lack of interest and/or respect towards third states.

The Treaty of Lisbon<sup>70</sup> and the subsequent introduction of EEAS constitute “the most significant reorganisation of its diplomacy since the beginning of the process of European integration” (Rasmussen, 2014, p. 779). It elevates the role of communication towards external publics and international organizations compared to communication with strategic publics within the EU. Structural and procedural innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon include the creation of the new position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). The HR also serves as Vice-President of the EC and is supported by the EEAS. The new office of the HR merges three previous positions into one: It coordinates the CFSP, it presides the Foreign Affairs Council and also acts as European Commissioner for External Relations (cf. EEAS Review, 2013, pp. 7-10; Rasmussen, 2014, p. 790). Its introduction is designed to “increase the weight, coherence, and visibility of the EU’s international activity” (Azpiroz, 2015, p. 8).

Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon established the post of a permanent president of the European Council, serving a two-and-a-half year term of office. This new post increases both the international visibility of the EU in third countries as well as the continuity of EU foreign policy: “With a permanent President setting the agenda and drafting policy statements, the European Council is less likely to be biased towards the foreign policy interests of the Member State holding the rotating presidency” (Rasmussen, 2014, p. 784). Along with the President and the Vice-President of the EC, the President of the European Council plays an important role in representing the EU in third countries as well as international organizations and putting a face to the EU (cf. *ibid.*, p. 785). The Treaty of Lisbon aims at strengthening the coordination between all organizations involved in EU (public) diplomacy, but does not specify mechanisms of cooperation between the different organizations. By

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<sup>69</sup> The Relex Information Committee was composed of the heads of the information units of the following DGs: DG Relex, DG Trade, DG ECHO (Humanitarian Aid), DG Enlargement, DG Press, DG ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs), DG DEV (Directorate General for Development and Relations with ACP States) and DG AIDCO (EuropeAid Cooperation Office) (DG DEV and DG AIDCO have been merged into the DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid in 2011). These different DGs all contribute to shaping the external relations of the EC. The Relex Information Committee aimed at coordinating the information that should be communicated on behalf of the EC as a whole.

<sup>70</sup> The Lisbon Treaty (signed in 2007, came into force in 2009) amends the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the Maastricht Treaty and was developed after the idea of European Constitution was rejected by both France and the Netherlands in 2005.

that, “the vertical coherence of EU diplomacy ultimately falls back on the political will of the member states to coordinate their foreign policies generally, and on the enthusiasm of the individual ambassadors in a given third state” (Rasmussen, 2014, p. 789).

The EEAS is an autonomous body that supports the HR<sup>71</sup>, but is not integrated in the EC (cf. Azpiroz, 2015, p. 7; Rasmussen, 2014, p. 786). The EEAS unites previously separate actors that contribute to maintaining and improving the EU's external relations (cf. Duke & Courtier, 2011, p. 2). Its personnel includes previous staff members of the EC and the Council Secretariat<sup>72</sup>. While DG RELEX has been integrated in the EEAS, other DGs with a strong external dimension (including DG Trade, DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, DG Energy and Climate Change) continue to exist outside of the EEAS. The EEAS cooperates with both these DGs and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (cf. Azpiroz, 2015, 7; Rasmussen, 2014, p. 792). The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments takes care of the implementation of the CFSP, crisis response and prevention measures as well as the promotion of the EU's interests towards external publics. Particularly, the unit ‘Partnership Instrument’ is entrusted with public diplomacy-related tasks (cf. Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, 2015).

Both prior and after the Treaty of Lisbon scholars (see for instance Rasmussen, 2010, p. 273) and practitioners (see for instance Basker, 2006, p. 33) point to the role of delegations as main drivers of EU public diplomacy towards external publics. With the launch of the EEAS, the Delegations of the EC were transferred into EU Delegations, representing the EU in its entirety in third countries and international organizations (cf. Rasmussen, 2014, p. 793, Treaty of Lisbon – Art. 221).

Duke and Courtier (2011) argue that the EEAS provides the opportunity of developing a more consistent and better coordinated EU public diplomacy, but also voice a number of concerns with regard to future EU public diplomacy: The EEAS has at first incorporated a ‘Public Diplomacy (and Electoral Observation)’ unit. This unit was not embedded in the ‘strategic planning’ or ‘strategic communication’ division of the service, but included in the separate division ‘Foreign Policy Instruments’ that directly reports to the High Representative. Today, public diplomacy is handled by the unit ‘Partnership Instrument’ within the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. The term ‘public diplomacy’ does no longer appear in the titles of departments within the EEAS or the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.

Even though the Treaty of Lisbon has elevated the role of public diplomacy towards external publics, Melissen (2013, p. 209) points to an imbalance between the comparably small amount of resources allocated to the EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments in comparison to the spending on communication with publics within the EU. Moreover, Duke and Courtier (2011) criticize that the competences and the resources for public diplomacy activities are not clearly defined among the EEAS, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments’ and DG Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) that for instance play a vital role in communicating with civil society actors in third countries and DG European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) that is an important public diplomacy organization with regard to communicating with (potential) candidate countries as well as neighboring states. The discrepancy between the scholarly understanding and the

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
<sup>71</sup> While the main task of the EEAS is to “support [...] the High Representative in her mandate to implement the CFSP”, the EEAS “also assists the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council in their function as representatives of the EU” (Rasmussen, 2014, p. 787).

<sup>72</sup> DG RELEX (EC) was transferred to the EEAS. Moreover, staff from the Council Secretariat’s DG External and Politico-Military Affairs, intelligence centre as well as military staff was transferred to the EEAS. (cf. Rasmussen, 2014, p. 787).

EU understanding of public diplomacy, that is elaborated in sub-chapter 3.4, offers one possible explanation for the vague definition of resources and competences.

EU governance is not based on a single government, but a network structure that involves organizations on European, national and sub-national levels (cf. Trndki, 2005, p. 23). The same applies to the public diplomacy architecture of the EU. The analysis of EU public diplomacy organizations communicating to strategic public within and outside of the EU has revealed a multilevel system of EU public diplomacy:

**Illustration 9: The Multilevel System of EU Public Diplomacy**



(source: own depiction based on Brüggemann, 2008, p. 128)

The illustration above indicates that public diplomacy strategies developed on a European level are taken up and adapted on national and sub-national levels. To a lesser degree, feedback from member states and single sub-national areas influences public diplomacy strategies and structures that are defined on a regional level. Moreover, the multilevel system, of EU public diplomacy organizations depicted above “functions differently depending on the specific international setting and it also functions differently depending on the political issue area in question” (Rasmussen, 2012, p. 38).

### 3.3 External environments of public diplomacy organizations

To present a comprehensive assessment of the external environmental EU public diplomacy organizations communicate in, this sub-chapter explores the EU as a polity as well as the multilevel system of decision-making it is based on (infrastructure). Building on these infrastructural considerations, it outlines political priorities as well as external relations of the regional organization (Political environment). The sub-chapter continues by introducing the public sphere as a heuristic tool for analyzing cultural and media environments of EU public diplomacy organizations. It adapts Habermas' normative conceptualization of the public sphere to European public sphere to identify characteristics of a vital public sphere at European level. A vital public sphere at the European level can serve as "a solution and an instrument for producing a European identity that might motivate more participation" (Gripsrud, 2007, p. 497). The emergence and further development of a collective European identity constitutes an important focus of EU communication policies towards EU citizens is crucial for gaining acceptance for EU (public diplomacy) goals and policies within member states. This sub-chapter reviews theoretical reflections and empirically grounded studies on the development of a collective European identity. The public perception of the EU among EU citizens is closely linked to the level of identification with Europe. The more positive citizens perceive the EU, the more likely they are to support EU public diplomacy initiatives.

European mass media as well as the coverage of European issues in the mass media is often regarded as a precondition of the Europeanization of national public spheres (see for instance Firmstone, 2008; Kevin, 2003). This sub-chapter summarizes the most important findings on the national and transnational media coverage on the EU as well as the development of transnational and pan-European media outlets. Moreover, it analyzes the relationship between EU communication practitioners and journalists as well as the media use patterns of EU citizens to assess to what extent these factors contribute to a Europeanization of national public spheres.

#### *Infrastructure of EU public diplomacy organizations*

Regional organizations like the EU or ASEAN constitute a specific type of multilateral organizations that unites members in a single geographical area, focus on more than one issue, and have a cooperative or collaborative mandate that is based on a legal instrument like a Treaty (cf. Goertz & Powers, 2011). Among regional organizations, the EU is a unique actor that combines features of an intergovernmental organization (IGO) and a supranational organization. IGOs like UN or the World Bank are characterized by the voluntary cooperation of its members. Even though the cooperation between members of IGOs is formalized by international treaties, members are not legally bound to these IGOs. Members of an IGO remain completely sovereign and do not transfer any decision-making power to the IGO (cf. Lucas, 1999). In contrast, members of a supranational organization transfer parts of their sovereignty to the respective supranational organization. Supranational organizations may pass laws that precede rules in the single member states (cf. Valentini, 2008a).

The "Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community" (1951) put the idea of creating a supranational organization forward. However, the brainchild of setting up an entirely supranational European organization has not prevailed: The three pillar structure that goes back to the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Maastricht and that characterizes the EU today, combines both intergovernmental and supranational elements. The European Community, also labeled as Economic Community, and Euratom are the only two remaining supranational communities within the EU. The



two pillars External Policy as well as Justice and Home Affairs are not subject to the same democratic control as the European Community and share characteristics of an IGO.

Hence, member states pool their sovereignty in single policy areas (cf. Rinke, 2008, p. 449): “Pooling sovereignty means, in practice, that the Member States delegate some of their decision-making powers to the shared institutions they have created, so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European level” (European Commission, 2012, p. 3). There are policy areas in which the EU is sovereign and possesses the exclusive competence of establishing policy directives as well as legally binding decisions like the monetary policy for the members of the Euro-zone. In other policy areas like energy or transport the EU shares competences with the member states. Policy areas like culture or tourism are characterized by the exclusive competence of member states. In these policy areas the EU only has a supporting function. It can only supplement, coordinate or support the decisions and actions made by member states.

“[T]he EU itself has never sought to describe its political character in any clear manner” (Nugent, 2001, p. 492) and is often referred to as a system *sui generis* (see for instance Schmidt & Schünemann, 2009). In official publications, the EU is defined as an economic and political partnership that “sits between the fully federal system found in the United States and the loose, intergovernmental cooperation system seen in the United Nations” (European Commission - DG Communication, 2012, p. 3). This hybrid role is accentuated as a “unique feature of the EU” (European Commission - DG Communication, 2012, p. 3). Nonetheless, Schmidt and Schünemann (2009) argue that the difficulties in defining the EU as a type of actor also contributes to a deficit in legitimacy and transparency (cf. Schmidt & Schünemann, 2009, p. 57).

By 2014, the EU counts 507 million inhabitants (European Union, n.y.a). After the EU had been founded by six member states in 1958, 22 countries have joined the EU in seven waves of enlargement. The most recent state to join the EU was Croatia in July 2013. Besides these 28 member states, there are candidate countries that wish to join the EU in the future. These candidate countries include the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. Apart from this ongoing process of EU enlargement, the EU has moved from a predominantly economic community focusing on market integration to a Union promoting political integration (cf. Rinke; 2008, p. 449; Trenz & de Wilde, 2009, p. 3).

Schmuck (2015) identifies four models of European integration: 1) a European federal state, 2) a European confederation, 3) a Europe of Regions, and 4) differentiated integration. The model of a European federal state is based on the idea that democratically legitimized governments exist on both the European and the member state level. This model is based on a European constitution. The European confederation is often characterized as an alternative model to the notion of a European federal state. The European confederation draws on the idea that member countries have the opportunity of cooperating on a European level without transferring any final decision-making powers to the European level. These two competing models are reflected in European Integration Theory in the main debate between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism (cf. Risse, 2009, p. 144)<sup>73</sup>.

The model of a “Europe of Regions” emphasizes the relevance of sub-national regions and stresses their role in the development of European integration. The fourth model supports the idea of a differentiated process of integration: Stubb (1996) classifies the process of differentiated integration with regard to the speed with which member states adopt EU resolutions (‘multi-speed integration’), the number of member states that adopt these resolutions as well as the specific issues that are subject to processes of further integration (‘Europe à la carte’). The idea of a differentiated process of integration is for instance supported by Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003a) who put forward the idea of a ‘core Europe’ serving as the engine of the EU. However, Schmuck (2015) argues

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<sup>73</sup> see Wiener and Diez (2004) for an introduction to European Integration Theory

that the idea of a differentiated European integration may hold the danger of a decreasing solidarity among member states (see also section ‘Cultural environment of EU public diplomacy organizations’ below). The development of the EU shows that none of these four models has prevailed, but the EU today encompasses elements of all of these models.

Sørensen (2004) states that the EU “has developed into the most ambitious and far-reaching example of regional cooperation” (p. 65). The EU goes beyond “more traditional kind [of regional cooperation], limited to more narrowly defined economic or policy areas [for instance NAFTA or APEC], and without impinging on the sovereignty of their members, defined as their autonomous right to regulate domestic affairs [for instance ASEAN]” (p. 67). This assessment is also reflected in taxonomies on ‘regionness’ or regional complexity by Telò (2006) and Hettne (1997). Both authors consider the EU as the most advanced example of regional integration, describing the EU as a “regional polity” (Telò, 2006, p. 127) and region as acting subject (cf. Hettne, 1997, p. 228) respectively. At the same time, the EU can be characterized as an international actor “under construction” (Rasmussen, 2010, p. 264) - its final stage is intentionally left open. This situation is also described as ‘integration paradox’ (see for instance Fossum & Menéndez, 2009), “an almost inverse relationship between the duration of the integration process and the kind of consensus on what kind of entity the polity should build” (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009, p.3). This uncertain fate of the EU is challenging to its ontological security. Ontological security as “a sense of continuity and order in events” (Steele, 2008, p. 243) is vital for the success of EU public diplomacy and the communication of a generally accepted and stable vision of the nature of the EU, its historical experiences, its current actions and future objectives challenging (cf. Rasmussen, 2012).

The EU is characterized by a complex system of multi-level governance. As outlined in sub-chapter 3.2, governance in the EU is not based on a single government, but a network of European, national, regional and local organizations (cf. Trnski, 2005, p. 23). This network is not built on a clear hierarchical structure, but a cooperation of state and non-state organizations on these different levels. The EU takes on the role of an initiator and coordinator of political interests in this network (cf. Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 5). Whereas the European Council, consisting of the Heads of State or Government of the single member states, defines the general directions and policy priorities of the EU, it is neither involved in the legislation nor the execution of EU laws. It is the EC that both proposes laws and implements them in cooperation with the governments in member states. Laws proposed by the EC are debated and finally adopted by the EP as directly elected body as well as the Council of the EU as the representation of the governments of the single member states. Finally, the Economic and Social Committee as voice of civil society actors and the Committee of Regions as voice of regional and local authorities accompany the decision-making as advisory bodies. (cf. European Commission - DG Communication, 2012) The competences of single organizations vary in the different EU policy areas (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, p. 29).

Just as the EU as a polity, EU governance is subject to constant transformation and, thus, often hard to grasp for the general public. The complexity and, at times, opaqueness of EU decision-making have enabled national actors to play a blame game on the EU using the EU as a scapegoat for unpopular decisions (‘scapegoating’) and highlighting the role of national governments in more favorable decisions (‘credit-claiming’) (cf. Gramberger & Lehmann, 1995; Meyer, 1999). To sum up, the EU is an unparalleled regional actor with characteristics of both supranational and intergovernmental organizations whose final stage is intentionally left open. It is characterized by a multi-level structure that involves state and non-state organizations on European, national, sub-national levels.

#### *Political environment of EU public diplomacy organizations*

The political environment of EU public diplomacy organizations encompasses both political priorities within the EU as well as external relations and policies. In a first step, this section provides a brief

overview of the policy priorities of the EC as the EU's main executive body in the time frame of the empirical analysis (2004-2015). Based on this time frame, this section focuses on political priorities defined by the Barroso (2004 to 2014) and Juncker Commission (2014 until now). In a second step, it specifies external relations and priorities in the context of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The political priorities of the EC under Commissioner José Manuel Barroso reflect the financial and economic crisis the EU had to deal with from 2009 on. The Barroso Commission emphasized "responding to the economic crisis and preparing the conditions for sustainable growth and jobs" (European Union, 2014, p. 6). Additionally, the free movement of people, services, goods and capital within the EU and the further development of the single market constituted a political focus of the EU, which can be illustrated by legislations on the liberalization of the service sector within the EU, the introduction of the European patent or the abolition of roaming charges. (cf. European Union, 2014)

In an opening statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session in October 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker introduced ten political priority areas. As the Barroso Commission before, the Juncker Commission places a lot of emphasis on economic issues, including job growth, the digital single market as well as the further development of the internal market and the Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, energy and climate change as well as strengthening the EU as a global actor have been defined as policy priorities by both Commissions. In addition to that, the Juncker Commission highlights justice and fundamental rights as well as making the EU more democratic as important policy areas. Not least, a common asylum and legal migration policy has become a political priority in the wake of the refugee crisis. (cf. Juncker, 2014)

External relations are managed through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including enlargement and neighborhood policy, crisis management and conflict prevention as well as bilateral and regional cooperation programs, the EU's humanitarian aid and civil protection policy as well as policies in more specific sectors like trade, such as the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (European Commission, 2015a).

External relations comprise relations with (potential) EU candidate countries, neighboring countries as well as other third states and multilateral organizations. In the context of its enlargement policy, the EU accompanies the process of applying for EU membership and the accession of new member states. EU enlargement policy encompasses an external and internal dimension: On the one hand, EU enlargement policy involves negotiations with candidate countries as well as communication with strategic publics in these candidate countries to ensure their support for EU accession. On the other hand, it also encompasses a continuous monitoring of the application process as well as communication with strategic publics in member states to encourage favorable opinions towards EU enlargement and new member states. (European Commission, 2014) The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2003, regulates EU relations with neighboring states in the south and in the east<sup>74</sup>. It seeks to promote peace and economic prosperity and aims at "avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours" (European Commission, 2015). The EU pursues an approach of democratic conditionality, "develop[ing] stronger partnerships with "those neighbors that make more progress towards democratic reform" (European Commission, 2015b). The cooperation with neighboring and other third states is either based on bilateral agreements or regional cooperation frameworks.

To Telò (2006), the EU does not only play an increasingly important role in "military peacekeeping and peace-enforcing" (p. 57), but it also supports the "regionalization of the global regulation

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<sup>74</sup> In the south, neighboring states include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. In the east, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

framework” (p. 57). Within the framework of interregionalism, the EU cooperates with other regional organizations like ASEAN and seeks to promote the model of the EU in other regions of the world (cf. Telò, 2006, pp. 55-56). Despite the EU’s leading role in processes of regionalization, its own member states remain divided on this issue. Telò (2006) traces the hesitant or even opposing positions of single EU member states back to the challenging relationship between keeping national sovereignty and striving for “universal rights and principles [that require] supranational protection” (p. 72).

### *Cultural environment of EU public diplomacy organizations*

This section introduces the concept of the public sphere as a heuristic tool for analyzing the cultural and media environments of EU public diplomacy organizations. There are two different phenomena that can be described with regard to the European public sphere: A genuine, transnational European public sphere and the Europeanization of national, regional or local public spheres (cf. Jarren & Donges, 2006, p. 110). A genuine, transnational European public sphere goes along with a “transnationalization of collective actors, media, and publics superimposed on the established national public spaces” (Koopmans, Neidhardt & Pfetsch, 2000, p. 3, see also Hepp et al., 2010, p. 2). The Europeanization of public spheres implies a growing recognition of and focus on European organizations and issues in national public spheres (cf. Koopmans, Neidhardt & Pfetsch, 2000, p. 3). Due to the different forms of media regulations as well as different languages within the EU (see for instance Brüggemann, Hepp, Kleinen von Königsłow, & Wessler, 2009; Gerhards, 2001; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hardy, 2008), the Europeanization of national public spheres is “less difficult to achieve” than a genuine, transnational European public sphere (Koopmans, Neidhardt & Pfetsch, 2000, p. 3). Official documents on the EU information and communication policy disclose a focus on the Europeanization of existing national, regional and local public spheres, opposed to the development of a genuine, pan-European public sphere (see for instance CEC, 2006). Schlesinger (2007) argues that the genuine European public sphere and the Europeanization of national public spheres are not mutually exclusive constructs, but coexist. Similarly, Eilders and Voltmer (2003, p. 255) understand the development of a genuine European public sphere as a process. In this sense, the Europeanization of public spheres can function as a preliminary stage of a genuine European public sphere.

The state of research discloses both empirical-analytical and normative approaches to conceptualizing the public sphere (cf. Donges & Imhof, 2001). Empirical-analytical contributions focus on the communication structures and processes in the public sphere as well the roles that individuals and organizations resume in the public sphere (see for instance Jarren & Donges 2006; Neidhardt, 1994; see sub-chapter 2.3.1). Normative approaches, on the other hand, “specify ideal characteristics of public communication, as well as conditions conducive to their realization, and help to evaluate critically existing communication” (Wessler, 2011, see for instance Adolf & Wallner, 2005; Neidhardt, 1994). Habermas’ habilitation treatise “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” (1962) constitutes the best known and most debated (see for instance Garnham, 1992; Mitzen, 2005; Susen, 2011) effort to theorize the public sphere. Brüggemann (2008), for example, draws on Habermas to develop an analytical framework for assessing the transparency of EU communication. This sub-chapter fathoms the potential of applying normative approaches to describing the development of a European public sphere. The Europeanization of national public spheres serves as both a prerequisite to the success of EU public diplomacy and a public diplomacy goal in itself (cf. Srugies, 2015, p. 4). The notion of the public sphere allows for a theoretically grounded conceptualization of communication spaces within the EU. Normative approaches, particularly Habermas’ “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” provide the basis for developing criteria that enable or constrain the development of a vital public sphere at the European level.

Habermas (1991 [1962]) models an ideal public sphere, inspired by the bourgeois public sphere in the period of Enlightenment, in his habilitation treatise “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere”. To Habermas (1991 [1962]), the bourgeois public sphere is “a sphere between civil society and the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general interest was institutionally guaranteed” (McCarthy, 1991, xi). It fulfills the political function of monitoring state authority “through informed and critical discourse by the people” (McCarthy, 1991, xi, italics in original). This discourse builds on rational actions of the members of the public sphere. Members’ actions drawn on logic argumentation and are geared towards achieving understanding as well as consensus. “The guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions – about matters of general interests” (Habermas et al., 1974, p. 49) constitutes an important precondition for the functioning of an ideal public sphere. Habermas (1991 [1962]) conceptualization of the public sphere encompasses a communicative space that grants access to every citizen, enables every citizen to participate in the public discourse and is thematically open to every issue of general interest.

Habermas’ habilitation treatise (1991 [1962]) presents a “utopia of a political public sphere” (Brüggemann, 2008, p. 47) that neither reflects the realities of the period of Enlightenment nor the mass-mediated and networked society today<sup>75</sup>. Susen (2011) argues that the Habermasian theory of the public sphere derives a „universalistic conception of public interest“ from the analysis of one particular sector of society and, by that, „fails to take into account the fact that modern society contains a multiplicity of simultaneously existing, and often, competing, public spheres“ (Susen, 2011, p. 55). Nevertheless, the core idea of “rationalizing public authority under the institutionalized influence of informed discussion and reasoned argument” (McCarthy, 1991, p. xii) continues to be relevant.

Castells (2008) as well as Bentele and Nothhaft (2015) outline an evolution of the public sphere that alters “[t]he material expression of the public sphere” (Castells, 2008, p. 79). In addition to physical spaces such as universities, Castells (2008) points to the growing relevance of “media communication networks” (Castells, 2008, p. 79) in shaping and organizing public spheres in today’s society. Mediated communication comprises both traditional mass mediated communication channels as well as new ICT. Habermas (1991 [1962], p. 98) argues that, in a setting of mass communication, not every citizen can resume the role of the communicator, but has to be able to gain access to the issues and topics discussed as well as the different arguments that are voiced in the respective debate (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, p. 48, see also Srugies, 2015, p. 6). Civil society organizations play a crucial role in representing the concerns and voices of individual citizens in mass-mediated societies (cf. Castells, 2008; Habermas, 1998). Van Ham (2013, p. 19) points to the function of civil society organizations to select and aggregate public interests and integrate them into the political system.

The roles members of the public sphere can assume in the public sphere are rather fixed in a setting of mass-mediated communication (cf. Jarren & Donges, 2006; Neidhardt, 1994). This is illustrated by the differentiation between discourse shapers and discourse takers in EU communication, introduced by Rasmussen (2010): Rasmussen (2010, p. 265) notes that discourse shapers, including media and civil

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<sup>75</sup> Donges and Imhof (2001), for instance, note that public discourses have never been completely rational and non-hierarchical in reality: The model of the bourgeois public sphere introduced by Habermas (1991 [1962]) does not take heterogeneity of the society in the period of Enlightenment as well as the role of social movements and counter-publics into consideration (cf. Donges & Imhof, 2001, p. 120). Habermas focuses on a “privileged sector of society” (Susen, 2011, p. 53) with specific interests. While Habermas is aware of the specific nature of the bourgeois public sphere, Garnham (1992) critically remarks that “he neglects the importance of the contemporaneous development of a plebeian public sphere alongside and in opposition to the bourgeois public sphere, a sphere built upon different institutional forms” (p. 359).

society organizations, have a bigger impact on public discourses than individual citizens he refers to as discourse takers. New ICT and the growing significance they have for both private persons<sup>76</sup> and organizations challenge the fixed allocation of roles within the public sphere. The communication on blogs or for instance social networking sites increasingly blur the boundaries between the levels of the public sphere (cf. Neidhardt, 1994, see below) as well as the roles members of the public sphere may assume (cf. Künzler, Wassmer, Oehmer, & Puppis, 2013, p. 14).

Within this new virtual communication environments, state no longer play a central role in defining the public sphere (cf. Castells, 2007; Ricknert, 2013). On the one hand, the virtual public sphere is coined by a greater autonomy of the individual, also by connecting individuals across national and cultural boundaries (cf. Bentele & Nothhaft, 2015, pp. 65-69). On the other hand, Castells (2009) critically addresses that “this potential for autonomy is shaped, controlled, and curtailed by the growing concentration and interlocking of corporate media and network operators around the world” (Castells, 2009, p. 135; see also Dahlberg, 2005; Papacharissi, 2009).

Strugies (2015, pp. 7-8) applies the Habermasian conceptualization of the public sphere and its adaptation to the communicative realities of contemporary mass-mediated and networked societies to European public diplomacy. She identifies the following normative criteria to assess the functioning of a vital public sphere in the EU:

- The public sphere grants access to every EU citizen (cf. Habermas, 1991 [1962], cf. Neidhardt, 1994).
- The public sphere is open towards all issues that matter to EU citizens (cf. Habermas, 1991 [1962]) as well as all the entire spectrum of arguments regarding a specific issue (cf. Brüggemann, 2008, p. 48). The unrestricted access to the public sphere includes the information on EU-related issues, including the explanation and justification of political decisions and actions, in a comprehensible language as well as the open access to EU documents. By that, the public sphere serves the function of providing orientation for citizens (cf. Koopmans & Erbe, 2003; Neidhardt, 1994).
- The public sphere enables all EU citizens to express their attitudes, concerns and suggestions (cf. Dutta-Bergman, 2006, p. 104). This comprises the opportunity of expressing criticism towards EU organizations as well as national and sub-national governments. Ideas, criticism and suggestions can either be voiced by EU citizens directly<sup>77</sup>, through the mass media or by

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<sup>76</sup> The Eurobarometer survey, conducted autumn 2013, analyzes the (social) media use of EU citizens. The study discloses that 44% of all respondents use social networks at least once a week. The value of social media networks is not only recognized with regard to communication on personal issues. Communication on social networks is regarded as a „modern way of keeping abreast of political affairs (52%), „a good way for people to have their say on political issues“ (52%) as well as „a good way of getting people interested in political affairs“ (51%) by half of the interviewed EU citizens. This view is particularly supported by citizens from the Scandinavian countries and the Baltic region, but also by respondents from Spain and Cyprus (cf. Eurobarometer 80, p. 63). These findings illustrate the significance of social networks as a platform for public opinion formation on political issues. The study also addresses the question of the credibility of information presented in traditional mass media outlets, online media outlets as well as social networks. Information communicated on the radio (54%) appears more credible to the interviewed citizens than information on television (48%) or in the press (41%). (cf. Eurobarometer 80, p. 19). Only one third of the respondents (34%) consider online media credible. In contrast to these findings, more than half of the respondents (56%) evaluate the credibility of the information provided on social networks as credible (cf. Eurobarometer 80, p. 63). This finding may be explained by the trust social network users have in communicators that they know personally.

<sup>77</sup> Citizens can either use feedback channels provided by the EU (for instance the discussion forum ‘Debate Europe’ administered by the EU) or create their own communication channels, ranging from blogs to demonstrations (cf. Adolf & Wallner, 2005, p. 8).

civil society organizations on behalf of EU citizens. (cf. Adolf & Wallner, 2005, p. 8; Habermas 1998a; Habermas, S. Lennox & F. Lennox, 1974, p. 49; Srugies, 2015, p. 8)

These criteria allow scholars to analyze to what extent EU public diplomacy towards internal strategic publics contribute to the Europeanization of national public spheres.

In a revision of his original conception of the public sphere, Habermas (1996) abandons the notion of a single public sphere. Habermas (1996) introduces the idea of “a highly complex network of *various* public sphere segments, which stretches across different levels, rooms and scales” (Eriksen, 2005, p. 345, italics in original). This study applies the idea of an interconnected network of public sphere segments to the EU as a communicative space. Single public sphere segments, are not mutually exclusive, but can overlap. They differ with regard to...

- ... the geographical reach of the public sphere segments,
- ... the number of people that participate in debates,
- ... the number of topics debated in public sphere segments,
- ... the degree of specialization of topics debated,
- ... the influence of public sphere members on EU decision-making, and
- ... the knowledge, the interest and the involvement of public sphere members regarding the EU and EU-related issues. (cf. Srugies, 2015, p. 9)

Firstly, public sphere segments within the EU can be differentiated by their geographical reach – they can be set on a local, regional, national, or transnational scale. Furthermore, the single segments can be distinguished with regard to the number of people involved in discourses and the number of issues discussed. Neidhardt (1994) identifies three levels of the public sphere: 1) In the interpersonal public sphere, individuals communicate on a large number of issues in their personal environment. 2) The medium public sphere or citizen public sphere is more thematically focused and restricted to issue-specific systems of interaction, such as trade unions or civil society organizations. 3) The mass media public sphere describes the communicative space, in which a small number of issues is communicated to a large number of people. Issues debated in the mass media public sphere are chosen by professional gatekeepers like news editors and must attest to criteria of news worthiness. Public diplomacy organizations apply both strategic agenda building and framing to gain access to and shape the mass media public sphere (see for instance Entman, 2003, 2004, 2008; Lang & Lang, 1981; see sub-chapter 2.6.1). As outlined above, the influence of the new ICT has made the boundaries between the single levels of the public sphere increasingly permeable.

Eriksen (2005, see also Fraser, 1992) distinguishes single segments of the public sphere by their degree of institutionalization: The strong public sphere, including for example sessions of the EP, is located close to the center of the political sphere and is legally institutionalized. In contrast to that, the general public sphere<sup>78</sup> refers to less institutionalized processes of problem identification and interpretation at the periphery of the political sphere. Additionally, Spanier's (2012) analysis of EU media relations (see section ‘Media environment’ below) suggests a differentiation between a more

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<sup>78</sup> Eriksen (2005) draws on Nancy Fraser's (1992) differentiation between strong and weak public spheres. He has replaced the term ‘weak public spheres’ with ‘general public sphere’ to acknowledge that both the strong public sphere and the general public sphere can exercise decisive influence on opinion formation and decision-making processes.

developed EU expert sphere and a less developed EU public domain sphere. The EU expert sphere consists of persons that have a high level of EU-related knowledge and that actively and regularly engage in debates on EU-related issues. Persons that belong to the public domain sphere, on the contrary, possess comparably little knowledge of EU-related issues. They hardly engage in EU-related discourses. Communication within public sphere segments can either be direct or mediated. The new ICT facilitate the emergence of anonymous segments of public sphere that for instance exchange arguments on EU-related issues in online fora. (cf. Spanier, 2012, Srugies, 2015).

The normative criteria to assess the functioning of a vital public sphere defined above do not apply to the public sphere as a whole, but need to be defined for each of its segments. As Srugies (2015) argues, “[t]his assumption does not conflict with Habermas’ conceptualization of an ideal public sphere, which, in fact, draws on the analysis of a single segment of the public sphere” (p. 9). Both Susen (2011) and Garnham (1992) emphasize that the bourgeois public sphere has been a “privileged sector of society” (Susen, 2011, p. 53) with specific interests that existed alongside and in opposition to other public sphere segments such as the plebeian public sphere (cf. Garnham, 1992, p. 359). It is essential to the functioning of a vital public sphere that its single segments do not merely coexist, but that they are interconnected (cf. Srugies, 2015, p. 9). The relationship between the EU expert sphere and the EU public domain sphere cf. Spanier, 2012; see above) serves as an example of the interconnectedness of public sphere segments: Members of the EU expert sphere “[carry] national discourses onto the European level and, vice versa, [introduce] European perspectives into national public spheres” (Koopmans, Neidhardt & Pfetsch, 2000, p. 4).

A vital public sphere in which single segments are well connected serve as a precondition for the development of a European identity. Kantner (2006) distinguishes between two approaches to describing collective identities: numerical identification and qualitative identity. Numerical identification or categorization refers to highlighting commonalities of group members such as a common cultural heritage. Numerical identification reflects an outsider’s perspective that is rather static. Qualitative identity, on the other hand, also takes the self-understanding of the individuals that constitute a collective identity into consideration (cf. Tietz, 2002, p. 215ff.). In that sense, qualitative identity can be understood as an internal perspective that seeks to define “[w]hen [...] individuals refer to themselves as members of a community” (Kantner, 2006, p. 509). This self-understanding of belonging to a group can be further differentiated in a weak collective identity and a strong collective identity: Collective identity in the weak sense refers to individuals that “share certain beliefs about their common undertakings without holding shared ethical convictions” (Kantner, 2006, p. 515). With regard to the EU, this type of identification with Europe is closely linked to a particular (for instance commercial) interest as well as a pragmatic, problem-solving approach (*EU as commercium*). The understanding of the *EU as communion*, on the contrary, stresses a shared ethical self-understanding and a focus on common values. Kantner (2006) argues that a strong collective identity only emerges “in the group members’ discourses about important policy issues” (Kantner, 2006, p. 516).

European identity is a multidisciplinary object of research that brings scholars from communication and media studies (see for instance Herakova, 2009; Inthorn, 2006; Widholm, 2011), European integration and international relations (see for instance Kantner, 2006; Risse, 2009, Trenz & de Wilde, 2009), linguistics (see for instance Wodak & Boukala, 2015), anthropology (see for instance Bellier, 2002), or cultural studies (see for instance Mokre, 2006) together. This section reviews the communicative efforts of the EU to develop a collective European identity and contrasts EU



communication with studies on the perceived identification with Europe and the EU among citizens in EU member states<sup>79</sup>.

The construction and further development of a European identity is crucial to the functioning and legitimacy of the EU. McGee (2005) emphasizes the political dimension of collective identity: Collective identities contribute to the legitimization of “the governing power over the governed in order to ensure genuine popular support for the political system and compliance with the requirements of the authority without coercion through the use of force” (p. 1). In the process of deepening European integration, in which sovereignty is shifted from nation states to the EU in a number of policy fields, European identity plays a key role in generating acceptance and support for EU governance (see for instance Fuchs & Klingemann, 2002; Roose, 2007). This holds particularly true for policy areas that are subject to majority voting: Gerhards and Hölscher (2005, p. 14) argue that there has to be at least a permissive consensus regarding the support of the EU to ensure that the minority goes along with decisions taken by the majority. Moreover, Roose (2007) also points to the development of a European identity as a form of social integration: Solidarity among EU citizens as well as an emotional connection to Europe make additional burdens or impositions, for instance in the context of the EU enlargement process, more easily acceptable.

The constitution and development of a European identity has a considerable impact on the public diplomacy towards strategic publics outside of the EU, too: Even though individual citizens of the EU are not defined as public diplomacy practitioners themselves (see sub-chapter 2.3.1), they still influence the achievement of central public diplomacy goals such as shaping a specific image or generating understanding for political goals and programs when they interact with people living outside of the EU.

The EU seeks to actively stimulate the construction of a European identity through its communication activities. In 1973, the member states of the EEC have agreed on a Declaration of European Identity. This document 1) outlines how European identity is defined by the Heads of State of the member countries, and 2) expresses the “determination [of the national governments] to introduce the concept of European identity into their common foreign relations” (European Union, 1973, p. 2). The declaration outlines “principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice [...] and of respect for human rights” (European Union, 1973, p. 2) as core elements of a European identity. Political values constitute the basis for a European Identity, including democracy, human rights, and social justice (see for instance Cross, 2013; Weigl, 2007). They were laid down in the preamble of the Single European Act (1986), reinforced in the Treaty on European Union (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) as well as the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), and specified in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) (cf. Weigl, 2007, pp. 106-107)<sup>80</sup>.

At first, the communication of a European identity focused on introducing and promoting unifying symbols such as a European flag and anthem (cf. Wæver, 2009, p. 175). The early 1990s mark a change in communicating European identity that Wæver (2009) labels as a shift from Eurosymbolism to variation (cf. p. 176): The EU started to highlight differences between member states and pluralism as important features of European identity (cf. Wæver, 2009, p. 176). This idea is still reflected by the

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<sup>79</sup> The state of research on European identity also includes a number studies that explore the policies and actions by EU organizations to foster European identity (see for instance Bellier, 2002 for EU language policy, see Bourdon, 2007 for EU audiovisual policy). Moreover, a group of scholars have conducted rhetorical analyses of speeches by national political leaders within the EU constitutes (see for instance Cramer, 2010; Forchtner & Kølvråa, 2012; Weiss, 2002; Wodak & Boukala, 2015). European identity is also addressed as a subject in cultural products like movies (see for instance Mildren, 2013) as well as cultural events (see for instance Sandvoss, 2008; Štětka, 2009). However, the scope and the focus of this study does not allow for a detailed analysis of all of these contributions.

<sup>80</sup> See appendix B4 for a detailed depiction of the European values in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000)

EU motto 'United in diversity' as well as the EU's multilingualism policy. Language learning is one important facet of the EU's multilingualism policy (cf. European Union, 2015a). It embodies the idea "that the ability to speak several languages will help Europeans to develop a European identity and to deconstruct existing cultural and even genetic barriers" (Glaser, 2005, p. 195).

Risse (2009) identifies two contrasting sides of European identity: On the one hand, the EU seeks to communicate a modern and inclusive image of the EU that welcomes diversity and emphasizes post-national values (cf. Risse, 2009, p. 154). This understanding of a European identity is communicated by the EU itself. On the other hand, the notion of 'fortress Europe' emphasizes "Europe's cultural heritage, a common history, and a grounding in Christian-Judean culture" (Risse, 2009, p. 154) and excludes foreigners (Risse, 2009, p. 154). This 'alternative version' of a European identity is predominantly promoted by Eurosceptics and rightwing political parties (cf. Hooghe & Marks, 2007). Furthermore, Weigl (2007, p. 111) points to a Western dominance of European identity: While the European Union has been deepened with regard to political integration and widened with regard to the number of member states, it has passed up the chance of integrating the experiences and the history of newer member states from Central and East Europe. However, the new ICT make an important contribution to the development of a more balanced and multifaceted European identity: Based on an analysis of the social media communication by Eastern European work diasporas, Trandafoiu (2006) points to the bottom-up "construction of a renewed idea of Europe" (p. 91).

While the idea of a European identity embodies the solidarity between all EU member states, this solidarity is not necessarily reflected by member state policies and actions: In 2003, the governments of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK signed 'The Letter of the EU' to express support for the U.S.-American invasion in Iraq. This letter did not represent a common European position and left the EU member states divided (cf. Cross, 2015; Weigl, 2007)<sup>81</sup>. Moreover, Dolea and Ingenhoff (2016) point to striking differences between the positions of 'old' and 'new' member states towards a European policy towards refugees.

Nonetheless, Mokre (2006) critically addresses that European values are not dynamic, but essentialist:

*"They are not understood as dynamic concepts, continually developing and changing according to conflicting interests but as a kind of static quality a political community has or does not have. In this understanding, freedom, democracy, tolerance and solidarity are not political values of a community (or a community-to-be like the EU) which are defined and re-defined in constant political struggles (see e.g. Laclau/ Mouffe 1985) but clearly defined qualities you need to be part of this community, a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion instead of a field of discourse". (Mokre, 2006, p. 4)*

In a similar vein, Kantner (2006) raises the question "[w]hy [...] modern, self-conscious, and rather skeptical citizens [should] be impressed by someone attempting to impose an artificial 'identity' on them" (p. 516). Kantner (2006) argues that collective identities are developed through conflict and discourse rather than identity campaigns.

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<sup>81</sup> As a response to the failure to adopt a European position in the political posturing in the run-up to the war in Iraq" (Michalski, 2005, p. 140), the EU adopted the European Security Strategy 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' in 2003. The strategy calls for a more active, more capable and more coherent Europe in order to address threats like terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime (cf. Council of the European Union, 2003, pp. 2-5). In this context the document points to the "need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention" (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 11) that can also include military capacities. While the European Security Strategy does not directly address EU communication, it contributes to developing the EU's identity in the world. With the European Security Strategy, the EU underlines that it is not solely a normative actor but "that the European Union has a role to play, politically, economically and sometimes militarily" (EEAS Strategic Communication Division & DEVCO Transparency Unit, 2012, p. 3).

The Eurobarometer survey provides valuable information on the extent to which efforts to generate and strengthen a European identity have been successful<sup>82</sup>. The latest survey, conducted in November 2015, discloses that 64% of all interviewees feel at least to some extent as a citizen of the EU whereas 40% of the respondents do not consider themselves citizens of the EU. Data from 2010, when citizens were first asked this question in the Eurobarometer survey, to 2015 point to a slight increase in the identification with Europe (cf. Eurobarometer 84 – First Results, 2015, p. 32). Respondents of the latest Eurobarometer survey have identified history (24% of all respondents), sports (22% of all respondents) as well as values (21% of all respondents) as most important issues that create a feeling of community among EU citizens (cf. Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp. 202-203). The results of an earlier Eurobarometer survey<sup>83</sup>, conducted in November 2013, show that the vast majority of respondents (89%) feel more affiliated with the country they live in than with Europe. Only 7% indicated that they feel more European than national (cf. Eurobarometer 80-Annex, 2013, p. 154). Despite this dominance of national identities, the Eurobarometer survey also reveals that these national identities can be complementary to a European identity: 52% percent of the respondents claim to see themselves both as citizen of their home country and as Europeans (cf. Eurobarometer 80-Annex, 2013, p. 153). These findings endorse the assumption of Risse (2009, p. 152) that national and European identities come to coexist in the EU. Risse (2009) depicts three different forms in which these multiple identities can occur: 1) The approach of nested identities (see for instance Brewer, 1993; Calhoun, 1994) is based on the idea that people can identify with regions ('low-order identities') and nations or transnational communities ('high-order identities') at the same time. The Eurobarometer survey, conducted in November 2013, gives empirical proof that these 'low-order and 'high order' identities also coexist within the EU: 87% of all respondents feel at least fairly attached to their town and village, while 91% of the interviewees express a feeling of attachment to their country. Almost half of the respondents (46%) feel at least fairly attached to the EU (cf. Eurobarometer 80-Annex, 2013, p. 143). 2) The concept of cross-cutting identities posits that several different identities can coexist, without establishing a ranking between these different identities. This concept also applies to nation states – due to the rising mobility and interconnectedness of people, both nation states and their citizens have become increasingly multilingual and multicultural. 3) The 'marble cake'-model of multiple identities assumes that components of different identities influence each other and eventually blend into each other (cf. Risse, 2009, p. 153).

While Risse (2010) emphasizes the growth of a European identity as a second affiliation, empirical data of a Eurobarometer survey realized in November 2013 show that 42% see themselves as a citizen of their home country only. Citizens with an exclusive attachment to the nation state neglect the

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<sup>82</sup> The Standard Eurobarometer, started in 1973, is the most important source of data on public opinion within the EU. The longitudinal study enables researchers to track developments in public opinion over the course of four decades. It is coordinated by the EC (Directorate-General for Communication) and carried out by TNS opinion & social twice a year. It is based on approximately 1.000 quantitative face-to-face interviews with citizens in each EU member state and candidate country. In addition to the Standard Eurobarometer, the EC also commission Special Eurobarometer and Flash Eurobarometer surveys. While the Standard Eurobarometer measures the public perception of the EU as a whole on the basis of a recurring set of topics, the Special Eurobarometer (in-depth surveys) and the Flash Eurobarometer (ad-hoc telephone surveys) address specific issues and EU policies like cybersecurity or gender equality. In addition to these quantitative research tools, qualitative group discussions and guided interviews fathom the thoughts and feelings of selected publics on issues like the economic crisis. (cf. European Commission, n.d.d) A multitude of scholars draws on the Eurobarometer as a source for secondary data analyses (see for instance Dixon, 2010; Hinrichsen, Boomgarden, van der Brug & Binzer Hobolt, 2009; Valentini, 2008b).

<sup>83</sup> A number of questions, for example on the image of the EU or the identification with Europe, are included in every Eurobarometer survey. Data on other aspects like the affiliation with sub-national entities or the nation state was not available in publications on the latest Eurobarometer survey. The researcher draws on the most topical data publicly available.


existence of multiple identities and are likely to support Eurosceptic positions (cf. Risse, 2010, p. 57). “Euroscepticism is a discursive formation in the public sphere” (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009, p. 1) that opposes the EU as a polity rather than single EU policies. Trenz and de Wilde (2009, p. 6) argue that Euroscepticism is a form of reactive communication that either responds to the process of European integration itself or to pro-European narratives that seek to legitimize the process of European integration and the EU as a polity. As stated by Trenz and de Wilde (2009, p. 7), “the constant and increased efforts to provide public justifications for European integration [...], provide the breeding ground for Euroscepticism”. Euroscepticism presents a serious challenge to public diplomacy organizations that seek to communicate pro-European narratives. Euroscepticism is not only debated on the level of EU citizens, but increasingly on the level of political leaders and parties: In an analysis of speeches by Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the British Prime Minister David Cameron, Wodak and Boukala (2015) point to an “increase of discourses about national security and nationalism in Europe” (p. 87). Moreover, the strengthening of Eurosceptic parties like the French Front National and planned coalitions between the Front National and other Eurosceptic parties like the Dutch Freedom Party and the Italian Lega Nord was critically discussed in the context of the 2014 elections of the EP (cf. EurActiv.com, 2014). Nonetheless, Trenz and de Wilde (2009) argue that Euroscepticism is a fundamental “part of the democratisation of the EU” (p. 17), in which competing positions on European integration are voiced.

The Eurobarometer survey does not only provide information on the identification of citizens within member states with Europe and the EU, but it also allows for statements about the public perception of the EU’s image as well as trust in the EU. To depict public opinion towards the EU within member states, this section draws on data collected in Eurobarometer polls from autumn 2004 (Eurobarometer 62) to autumn 2015 (Eurobarometer 84). Half or almost half of the Eurobarometer respondents have perceived the image of the EU as positive from 2004 to 2009 (see illustration 10 below). After 2009, the number of EU citizens who consider the image of the EU as positive has decreased significantly. While the number of respondents that consider the EU image as positive remains low, the evaluation of the EU image as negative has shifted in favor of a neutral perception from autumn 2013 to autumn 2015 (cf. Eurobarometer 84-First Results, 2015, p. 6). These changes of the EU image are directly related to the development of the European debt crisis (also referred to as ‘Eurozone crisis’), that has affected several EU member states including Greece and Portugal since the end of 2009. The strong impact of the European debt crisis on the public perception can be explained by the main concerns of EU citizens<sup>84</sup>. In the period of analysis from 2004 to 2014, economic issues, particularly the economic situation, unemployment as well as rising prices and inflation, are among the three important concerns of EU citizens (cf. Standard Eurobarometer 82, 2014; Standard Eurobarometer 78, 2012; Standard Eurobarometer 74, 2010; Standard Eurobarometer 70, 2008; Standard Eurobarometer 66, 2006; Standard Eurobarometer 62, 2004). In 2015, priorities among EU citizens have shifted. Immigration, that has also become a political priority of the Juncker Commission, is identified as the most important challenge for the EU by 58% of the respondents of the Eurobarometer 84 survey (cf. Eurobarometer 84 – First Results, 2015, p. 13).

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<sup>84</sup> “QA3a: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?” (Standard Eurobarometer 82 – First Result, 2014, p. 13).

**Illustration 10: Image of the EU from 2004 to 2015 (measured each autumn, figures in per cent)<sup>85</sup>**



(Source: own depiction, based on Standard Eurobarometer 64, Standard Barometer 84)

The European debt crisis has also influenced the trust citizens within member states have in the EU<sup>86</sup> as well as their perception of the EU's future<sup>87</sup>. While almost half of the respondents (48%) tend to trust the EU in autumn 2009, trust has steadily declined from autumn 2009 to spring 2012 (31%). Only by autumn 2014 have citizens in EU member states regained trust in the EU to some degree. The Eurobarometer survey indicates a rise of trust in the EU of six percentage points, from 31% in spring 2014 to 37% in autumn 2014. Trust in the EU peaked in spring 2015 (40%) and was followed by a sharp decline in trust by eight percentage points in autumn 2015 (cf. Eurobarometer 84 – First Results,

<sup>85</sup> „QA9: In general does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?“ (Eurobarometer 82, 2014, p. 6; Eurobarometer 84, 2015, p. 6). In the illustration, 'very positive' and 'fairly positive' are summarized as 'positive', 'fairly negative' and 'very negative' are summarized as 'negative'. Data from 2004 to 2006 is based on interviews with respondents from 25 EU member states, data from 2007 to 2012 includes interviews with citizens from 27 EU member states (accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007). The data from 2013 and 2014 draws on interviews with citizens from all 28 EU member states (accession of Croatia in 2013).

<sup>86</sup> „For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it – The EU“ (Eurobarometer 82, 2014, p. 8; Eurobarometer 84, 2015, p. 6).

<sup>87</sup> „Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of the EU?“ (Eurobarometer 82, 2014, p. 11; Eurobarometer 84, 2015, p. 11). The response options 'very optimistic' and 'fairly optimistic' have been summarized as 'optimistic', the response options 'very pessimistic' and 'fairly pessimistic' have been summarized as 'pessimistic'. Data from 2004 to 2006 is based on interviews with respondents from 25 EU member states, data from 2007 to 2012 includes interviews with citizens from 27 EU member states (accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007). The data from 2013 and 2014 draws on interviews with citizens from all 28 EU member states (accession of Croatia in 2013).

2015, p. 8). Similarly, the number of respondents that expressed optimism regarding the future of the EU has dropped significantly from 66% in autumn 2009 to 48% in autumn 2011. Only by spring 2013, have EU citizens started to think more optimistically about the future of the EU. By spring 2015, 58% of all respondents considered themselves optimistic about the future of the EU. Trust in the EU has significantly dropped again (53%) by autumn 2015, which may be directly related to the current European refugee crisis. (cf. Eurobarometer 84 – First Results, 2015, p. 11)

The Pew Research Center, a non-profit and non-partisan organization based in Washington, D.C., has explored public opinion on the EU in general and economic integration in particular in the seven EU member states France, Germany, UK, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Poland in 2014. Based on approximately 1.000 quantitative face-to-face or telephone interviews in each country, the survey results disclose that 52% of all respondents view the EU favorably (cf. Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 1). While favorability of the EU has risen by six percentage points compared to 2013, this figure is still significantly lower than the level of EU favorability prior to the European debt crisis (cf. Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 1; see also Pew Research Center, 2013). The survey indicates that citizens in the selected EU countries perceive the ability to promote peace rather than the generation of economic prosperity as strength of the EU: Seven in ten respondents agree that the EU fosters peace, whereas only three in ten respondents think that the EU promotes economic prosperity (cf. Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 2). Even though these findings point to a disillusionment with the project of European economic integration, more than six-in-ten people are in favour of keeping the Euro as common currency (cf. Pew Research Center, 2013).

#### *Media environment of EU public diplomacy organizations*

European issues are often outside of the citizens' immediate realm of consciousness. Citizens learn about European issues predominantly on the basis of (mass) mediated communication. The coverage of European issues in national and sub-national media, as well as the development of transnational media are thus important drivers of a Europeanization of national public spheres, and the development of a European identity<sup>88</sup> (see for instance Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009, p. 695). This section explores studies that analyze the media coverage on Europe in EU member states and discusses publications dedicated to transnational media outlets, their journalistic practices, and the media content they produce.

A large number of studies that deal with the media coverage of the Europe and the EU concentrate on the amount and valence of news articles published on the EU-related issues (see for instance Raeymackers, Cosjin and Depiez, 2007). The coverage on the Lisbon Treaty (see for instance Cauwenberge, Gelders & Joris, 2009; Gleissner & de Vreese, 2005) as well as the negotiation of Turkey's accession to the EU (see for instance de Vreese, Boomgarden, Semetko, 2011; Negrine, Kejanlioglu, Aissauoui & Papathanassopoulos, 2008) are two issues that have received particular scholarly attention. While many of these studies examine media coverage in one or more EU member states, Postelnicu and Dimitrova (2006) have focused on the EU coverage in candidate countries.

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<sup>88</sup> The majority of comparative studies on the influence of media coverage on the development of a European identity fathoms the influence of print media coverage on the formation of a European identity (see for instance Bruter, 2009; Hepp et al., 2010; Inthorn, 2006; Tjernström, 2008), Riegert (2008) focuses on news bulletins of public service television stations in Sweden, Denmark and the UK. The volume 'European Identity: What the Media Say', edited by Paul Bayley and Geoffrey Williams (2013), looks at both television and print media reporting in four different EU member states (France, Italy, Poland, and the UK) with regard to selected aspects of European identity, including, history, citizenship, and immigration.

Negrine et al. (2008) identify similarities and differences of EU coverage in member states as well as Turkey as a candidate country. The large body of comparative studies on the EU coverage in different countries has also stimulated research on the explaining factors for similarities and differences of EU coverage in different countries (see for instance Boomgarden, Vliegenhart, de Vreese & Schuck, 2009). It is neither possible nor feasible to present all of these research projects. Thus, this chapter focuses on a number of key studies that highlight central research tendencies regarding the media coverage of the EU. It only looks at comparative analyses that examine the EU coverage in more than one country.

Menéndez Alarcón (2010) examines the “role of the media in defining the European Union” (p. 398) on the basis of guided interviews with journalists and a content analysis of newspaper articles in France, Spain and the UK. Menéndez Alarcón (2010) argues that the national media coverage of the EU within member states “tends to reinforce traditional views on economics, politics, and society and the relation among the citizens, the national state, and the EU, particularly reinforcing the widespread belief that a national government is better than the EU for solving society’s problems” (p. 413). The author identifies a number of challenges of covering the EU including the complexity of the process of European integration and the difficulty to report on this complex issue, the goal to reach a mass audience with often only little knowledge about the EU as well as the bureaucratic and political influence on the content produced by newspapers. Reducing complexity is an essential task of journalists, but may also bear the danger of an oversimplified EU coverage that may misinform the audience. Moreover, news values like negativity as well as conflict “undermine information on the EU” (Menéndez Alarcón, 2010, p. 412). This is also confirmed by the dominance of negative articles on the EU as opposed to news items that depict the EU and its institutions in a positive or neutral way (cf. Menéndez Alarcón, 2010, p. 412, see also Norris, 2002). Furthermore, Menéndez Alarcón (2010) argues that the emphasis of conflict and competition as a principle of news production “would most likely reinforce nationalism over the long term rather than attachment to the European Union” (p. 412). While these findings apply to all countries analyzed, the author also states that the EU coverage in the single countries differ with regard to “the national government’s position on the EU, the editorial line of the newspaper, and the media-perceived interest of their national readers” (Menéndez Alarcón 2010, p. 412). In line with Anderson and McLeod (2004), Menéndez Alarcón (2010, p. 413) considers the potential of national newspapers to contribute to the development of a European public sphere as small and disputes the ability of national media to connect citizens with EU institutions. Sievert (2010) does not share this critical position. Based on a meta-analysis of theoretical and empirical studies on journalism practices in Europe, he argues that “[a]lthough news articles on the EU are usually written from a national perspective, the EU is still the subject of articles in the magazines analyzed more often than any other international organization, and more often than most individual countries” (Sievert, 2010, p. 259).

Hepp et al. (2010) present one of the most advanced studies to analyze the mediated Europeanization of national public spheres<sup>89</sup>. The research team combines a synchronic comparison of the media coverage in six EU member states (Austria, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and Poland) with a diachronic comparison of the media coverage from 1982 to 2008. Additionally, the group of scholars has conducted guided interviews with journalists, including EU and foreign news editors, chief editors and foreign correspondents in quality, tabloid and regional newspapers from all selected member states. Hepp et al. (2010) propose a model of a multi-segmented European public sphere. They identify and analyze three dimensions of the “transnationalization of national public spheres” (Hepp et al., 2010, p. 6): A vertical dimension, a horizontal dimension and the collective identification with Europe.

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<sup>89</sup> Further research contributions in this field include Brüggemann and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2009), Volkmer (2008), Trenz (2004), Risse (2003), and Risse and Van de Steeg (2003).

The vertical dimension particularly looks at the extent of coverage on the EU polity and EU politics in media outlets in EU member states. The research team shows that the coverage of EU institutions has increased from 1982 to 2003 in quality newspapers<sup>90</sup>. After 2003, the amount of coverage has either stagnated or even decreased in the analyzed quality newspapers. With regard to the tabloid press, the research team has detected a slight increase in EU coverage from 1982 to 2008. The tabloid press in the selected countries, however, covered the EU only in connection to national politics. (cf. Hepp et al., 2010, p. 7). The study by Hepp et al. (2010) points out that events in other member states as well as opinions voiced by actors in other member states attract more attention in quality newspapers than in the tabloid press: Whereas only 8% of all cited speakers originate from other EU countries in the tabloid press, actors from other EU countries account for a share of 16% of all cited speakers in the analyzed quality newspapers (cf. Hepp et al., 2010, p. 8). Moreover, public service broadcasters cover the EU and European organizations more frequently than private broadcasters (cf. Wessler & Brüggemann, 2012, p. 97). National governments constitute the most cited organizations in the coverage on EU-related issues. In a content analysis of German and British quality newspapers, Gerhards, Offerhaus and Roose (2009) reveal that members of the national governments depict EU organizations in 64% of all cases as scapegoats. These negative assessments of political institutions and their actions are, however, not a European phenomenon. According to Koopmans et al. (2010), national governments are equally skeptical of positions and actions of organizations and individuals within their own country:

*Once Europe gains consequential decision-making powers in an issue-field, both levels of attention and levels of criticism will rise, implying what one might call a normalization of Europeanized contention toward what is customary in national politics, namely intense and controversial debate.*“ (Koopmans et al. 2010, p. 84)

Wessler, Peters, Brüggemann, Kleinen-von-Königslöw and Sifft (2008) have also examined both the vertical and horizontal dimension of Europeanization and focused on qualitative newspapers exclusively. The comparative study in five EU member states (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK) discloses a distinct tendency towards vertical Europeanization of national media opposed to a lack of horizontal Europeanization. The dimension collective identification aims at disclosing to what extent the coverage of the selected newspapers fosters a shared sense of belonging and the development of a European identity among EU citizens. Hepp et al. (2010) argue that the expression 'We Europeans' is used in 5%<sup>91</sup> of all analyzed articles in quality newspapers as opposed to the tabloid press that applies the term 'We Europeans' in less than 0,5% of the analyzed new content. (cf. Hepp et al., 2010, pp. 6-9). Based on this comparative content analysis, they conclude that there is a transnationally shared monitoring of European issues and EU politics, but that this process of monitoring is mostly embedded in a national frame of reference (cf. *ibid.*, p. 11). The horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as the dimension collective identification are influenced by national and transnational context factors: The authors argue that the news production is influenced by nationally specific factors including the media system (see for instance Hallin & Mancini, 2004) and the journalism culture (see for instance Hanitzsch & Seethaler, 2009) of a country. Moreover, specific features of quality and tabloid press also influence the production of EU news across the different EU member states.

Hepp et al. (2010) state that EU news can be embedded in a national, sub-national or historical context. National or sub-national embedding of EU news focuses on the “relevance and consequences

<sup>90</sup> Hepp et al. (2010) have analyzed the EU coverage in the years 1982, 1989, 1996, 2003 and 2008.

<sup>91</sup> This figure refers to the year 2003, a slight decline of the use of the expression 'We Europeans' was noticed in 2008 by Hepp et al. (2010).



of foreign events to one's own nation" (pp. 12-13) or sub-national region. Whereas Danish journalists consider the relevance of EU politics and issues for Denmark as a selection criterion of news, Austrian journalists emphasize the importance of embedding EU news in a sub-national context. News coverage on the EU is embedded in a historical context in Germany, France and Poland. One specific feature of the EU coverage by British journalists is the humorous-satiric embedding of the news content. The research team has also analyzed to what extent journalists discuss national events in a transnational context. France and Poland are the only two countries in the sample that explicitly highlight the role of the own nation in transnational political events and developments. Whereas Austria, Germany and France pay more attention to European news than to other foreign news, Great Britain, Poland and Denmark grant a higher priority to events occurring outside of Europe. (cf. Hepp et al., 2010, pp. 12-16) The authors of the study conclude that "[b]asically, we see an ongoing re-articulation of the nation as the reference point of the journalists coverage practices and in that again national differences how this takes place" (Hepp et al., 2010, p. 18). These findings do not only confirm the results of the content analysis, but are also in line with previous studies that also point to the importance of the nation as a reference point and highlight that EU issues are primarily discussed in the context of national consequences (see for instance Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Firmstone, 2003, 2007; Kevin, 2003; Pfetsch et al., 2008; Trenz, 2007).

Based on an analysis of the journalists' role perception, their attitude towards the EU and the relevance attributed to the EU as well as the journalists' image of their readers, Hepp et al. (2010) identify four types of EU reporters across the countries in the study: 'the analyst', 'the ambassador', 'the caterer', and 'the reporter'. The analyst can be characterized by a preference of background analyses over recency and sensationalism (cf. Hepp et al., 2010, p. 20) as well as "differentiated, profound and diverse EU and foreign coverage" (Hepp et al., 2010, p. 19). In the study of Hepp et al. (2010), this type of EU reporting is predominantly found in quality newspapers such as the French *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. In this context, Brüggemann and Kleinen von Königsłow (2009) point to European and foreign news coverage as a central mission of quality newspapers. As the analyst, the ambassador shows a strong preference for background analyses. However, the ambassador is less critical in reporting about the EU and also "promote[s] a constructive, sometimes even enthusiastic image of the EU and the idea of European integration" (Hepp et al., 2010, p. 21). This type of reporting is not limited to a specific type of media, but occurs in quality newspapers, regional newspapers as well as tabloid press (cf. *ibid.*, p. 21). The third type of journalist, 'the caterer', covers the EU as well as European issues from the perspectives of the lives of the readers. This type of reporting that is primarily found in tabloid newspapers such as the German *BILD* is criticized by Hepp et al. (2010) as 'hypocritical': "On the one hand, journalists of this type present themselves constantly as being in favor of the EU, on the other hand they feel obliged to provide their readers with sceptical, sometimes negative and in many cases sensationalistic coverage in this area" (Hepp et al., 2010, p. 22). The fourth category of journalists covering the EU and European issues is simply labeled 'the reporter': Journalists that belong to this group are often working for sub-national newspapers with only little resources to carry out in-depth research on European issues. 'The reporter' focuses on adapting EU news to the personal, sub-national and/or national context of the readership, avoiding opinion-forming coverage for or against the EU and its policies (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 22-23). The role perception and the readers' image of 'the caterer' and 'the reporter' are in line with the body of research on EU news production that suggests that "news about the EU is more likely to be accepted by domestically based news editors if it has a clear link to the nation state [...]), and that national journalists tend to relocate EU news into national frameworks of meaning" (Firmstone, 2008, p. 427, see also Baisnée, 2002; Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005; Heikkilä and Kunelius, 2006). Whereas 'the analyst' seeks to reach an elite audience, coverage by 'the ambassador', 'the caterer' as well as 'the reporter' is geared towards the public at large (cf. Hepp et al.,

2010, pp. 23-24). These different target audiences reflect the idea of a segmented European public sphere that encompasses both an expert sphere and a public domain sphere (cf. Spanier, 2012). The differences between the coverage and the working routines of journalists based in the single member states and journalists based in Brussels are seldom analyzed in research. Price (2010) is among the few to address this research gap: He studies the amount of EU coverage and the framing of EU news by Brussels-based and national-based journalists taking the example of the UK. Price (2010) looks at both tabloid and quality newspapers that are classified as either Eurosceptic<sup>92</sup> or Europhile<sup>93</sup>. Price (2010) bases his analysis on interviews with Brussels- and UK-based journalists, EC spokespersons in Brussels as well as press officers at the Representation of the EC in the UK. Additionally, the study looks at the EU coverage in selected Eurosceptic and Europhile quality and tabloid papers from 2003 to 2005 (cf. Price, 2010, pp. 220-221). The findings of the study show that UK-based journalists account for almost half of the articles published on the EU, whereas Brussels-based journalists only produce one third of the EU coverage in the selected media outlets<sup>94</sup> (cf. *ibid.*, p. 221). UK-based journalists do not only report on the EU more often, but also more critically: UK-based journalists cover the EU twice as often negatively as Brussels-based journalists (cf. *ibid.*, p. 224). This striking difference can also be traced back to the different role perceptions of the journalists: Whereas Brussels-based journalists see their function in explaining complex issues to an audience with only little prior knowledge on the EU, UK-based journalists stress their watchdog function (cf. *ibid.*, 224-225). Price (2010) confirms findings of previous studies (see for instance Kevin, 2003; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) that suggest that “EU news [are often] framed in terms of conflict” (p. 222). However, he goes beyond previous studies by defining four sub-frames of conflict: 1) The 'domestic conflict' frame presents the EU as an issue of conflict discussed by different individuals or groups of people within a specific country, 2) the 'UK versus EU' frame portrays a specific member state in conflict with the EU, 3) the 'EU versus EU' frame “depicts the EU as a battleground for disputes between individuals or Member States” (Price, 2010, p. 227) that do not involve the UK, and 4) the 'EU versus external power' covers conflicts between the EU and third countries or other external actors. While nation-based journalists apply the 'UK versus EU' frame the most, at times also to depict the EU as an organization separate from the UK, Brussels-based journalists are more likely to use the 'EU versus external power' frame. Opposed to the three other conflict frames, the 'EU versus external power' frame “has the potential to promote unity within the EU by creating a sense of common purpose” (Price, 2010, pp. 223-224). With regard to the relationship between journalists and EU communication officials, Price (2010) points to a lack of contact between EU communicators and national-based journalists. Whereas Brussels-based journalists often concentrate on authorized EU sources as well as information provided by other European organizations, national-based journalists heavily rely on political sources from their home country. The resources that are allocated to the media relations of the EC provide one possible explanation for these findings: A big share of resources is assigned to the communication with Brussels-based journalists, whereas the representations in the member states only have little resources to work with national-based journalists (see for instance Price, 2010; Statham, 2008).

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<sup>92</sup> Based on the circulation, Eurosceptic newspapers like the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail account for 77% of all EU coverage in the UK (cf. Price, 2010, p. 218). Based on Anderson and Weymouth (2010), „Euroscepticism can take varying forms , but tends to portray the EU as badly run, inefficient and corrupt. At worst, the EU is seen as harmful to the interests of the UK; at best, it is presented as a necessarily evil, with further integration vehemently opposed“ (Price, 2010, p. 219).

<sup>93</sup> Based on the circulation, Europhile newspapers like the Independent and the Daily Mirror account for 23% of all EU coverage in the UK (cf. Price, 2010, p. 218). Europhile coverage stresses EU „benefits for the UK, including economic, social and security rewards“ (Price, 2010, p. 219), but also voices constructive criticism (see also Anderson & Weymouth, 1999).

<sup>94</sup> Additional news content on the EU is produced by other foreign correspondents or based on collaborative efforts between Brussels- and UK-based journalists (cf. Price, 2010, p. 221).

Whereas Price (2010) only briefly touches upon the connections between journalists and EU actors, both Balčytienė, Raeymaeckers, De Bens, Vinciūnienė and Schröder (2007)<sup>95</sup> as well as Spanier (2012, 2010) concentrate on the relationship between journalists and EU actors, namely the Spokesperson Service within the DG for Communication. The Spokesperson Service plays a leading role in shaping the relations between journalists and the EC. “[A]s the official voice of the European Commission” (European Commission – DG for Communication, 2014a), the Spokesperson Service is in charge of informing journalists as well as planning the communication of the EC with media representatives. Both Balčytienė et al. (2007) and Spanier (2012, 2010) have analyzed the Spokesperson Service with regard to its working routines and the relationship between spokespersons and journalists. Balčytienė et al. (2007) conducted guided interviews with 14 spokespersons in 2006. Spanier (2012, 2010) has not only gathered empirical data on Brussels-based spokespersons, but also the press corps in EC representations of selected member states. The study is based on both semi-structured interviews and a participatory observation. Both Balčytienė et al. (2007) as well as Spanier (2012, 2010) stress the privileged position of Brussels-based journalists in comparison to national-based journalists. This particularly constitutes a problem if member states only have few correspondents in Brussels (cf. Balčytienė et al., 2007, p. 8). Spokespersons differentiate between the types of media they address: They focus on audiovisual and online media for immediate communication, for instance when a crisis arises. Quality newspapers like *Le Monde* in France or *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Germany are the preferred media if spokespersons seek to influence public opinion (cf. Balčytienė et al., 2007, pp. 8-9). In this sense, spokespersons base their work on the idea of intra-media agenda-setting<sup>96</sup> (see for instance Golan, 2006; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Especially, spokespersons communicating on high EU level competence areas such as trade show a preference for addressing journalists of leading print media such as the *Financial Times* (cf. Spanier, 2012, p. 129). Spanier (2012) offers one possible explanation by stating that “EU topics appear to lend themselves more easily to the written broadsheet press than to audiovisual media” (p. 132). These statements contrast with EU citizens’ patterns of media use described below.

Both Spanier (2012, 2010) and Balčytienė et al. (2007) discuss barriers to communicating EU policies: Brussels-based spokespersons points to the low level of knowledge about and interest in EU issues, the ‘unsexiness’ of EU issues as well as the complexity of EU issues that is contrasted with an often oversimplified media coverage (cf. Spanier, 2012, pp. 121-122). Spanier (2012) highlights the differences between EU spokespersons and national spokespersons that for instance communicate on behalf of a national government: EU spokespersons operate in a multilingual environment as well as in different cultural and political environments. They are confronted with the challenge of managing the complexity of the EU’s multilevel structure and have to cover a larger number of media than most of their national counterparts. (cf. Spanier, 2012, p. 125) This can also constitute a barrier to communicating EU policies:

*“This invariably leads to a situation where the spokesperson's knowledge of the media and home audiences in 27 Member States is effectively limited. [...] Given the lack of in-depth knowledge about a high number of media outlets and also a lack of familiarity with the subtleties of a specific cultural context does in many cases lower the chances of placing a story by giving it the right “spin”, i.e. making it interesting for a particular local audience”.* (Spanier, 2012, p. 127-128)

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<sup>95</sup> The publication has emerged from the EU funded research project “Adequate Information Management in Europe”.

<sup>96</sup> Intra-media agenda setting is based on the idea that mass media agendas exercise influence on each other (see for example Golan, 2006, p. 326).

Furthermore, Balčytienė et al. (2007, p. 11) stress that spokespersons often communicate directives that do not immediately affect the public at large, but may come into effect in two years from their announcement.

The Directorate-General for Communication within the EC offers a number of additional services for journalists in order to facilitate and increase coverage about the EU in member states, third states and in transnational media outlets. This includes the television news agency Europe by Satellite. Wilke and Zobel (2010) provide an in-depth analysis of Europe by Satellite and its use and reception by journalists in the EU member states. Europe by Satellite serves a double function: On the one hand it supplies other television stations with audiovisual material on the EU (role of a television news agency), on the other hand Europe by Satellite also makes this raw material available to television viewers (role of a television station) (cf. Wilke & Zobel, 2010, p. 172). Europe by Satellite is part of the 'Audiovisual Services' under the control of the EC's Directorate-General for Communication. According to Wilke and Zobel (2010), journalists use Europe by Satellite in two ways: "either the material is incorporated into the coverage of their own stations or they follow the broadcast [...] to receive background information about the events within the EU" (p. 181). German journalists positively highlight that Europe by Satellite facilitates their work and saves time, however criticize the absence of counter positions in the material. Whereas public television stations regard the material offered by Europe by Satellite as objective, private television stations are more likely to take a critical stance on its neutrality (cf. Wilke & Zobel, 2010, pp. 181-183).

National and sub-national media account for the lion's share of EU coverage within Europe. Nonetheless, the influence of transnational should not be neglected. Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg (2009) define four types of transnational media: national media with a transnational mission, international media, pan-regional media, and global media. National media with a transnational mission comprise media outlets that aim at reaching beyond their national territory and work on the basis of a political mission like presenting a country's perspective on international issues abroad. One example would be Deutsche Welle in its early days. Today, Deutsche Welle shows "a tendency to develop into a global media organization funded by the German state" (Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009, p. 701). International media refer to cooperations of national media organizations from two or more countries that address two or more national audiences. In Europe, the French-German TV channel Arte serves as an example of this type of transnational media. Pan-regional media set out to reach recipients in a specific region of the world. Pan-European media focus on a European audience and present news from a European perspective. Pan-European media include the TV channel Euronews as well as the newspaper European Voice. Global media seek to reach audiences beyond single world regions, but often focus on specific interests of this transnational audience like economy (e.g. The Financial Times) or geography and science (e.g. National Geographic). According to Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg (2009), "BBC World, France 24 and Al Jazeera English fall into this category, but due to varying degrees of state influence, they are also somewhat close to the ideal-type of national media with a transnational mission" (p. 704). In order to discuss the role of transnational media in the Europeanization of the public sphere, this chapter concentrates on selected studies analyzing Pan-European and global media outlets.

Firmstone (2008) and Cross (2015) are among the few scholars to conduct research on transnational print media. Firmstone (2008) has looked at the "influence of internal and external factors on the production of EU news" (p. 424) in the Wall Street Journal Europe (WSJ), the International Herald Tribune (Tribune), the Financial Times Europe (FT) and the European Voice (EV). Based on the hierarchy of influences model by Shoemaker and Reese (1996), Firmstone (2008) has conducted eight semi-structured interviews with journalists working at these different transnational newspapers (cf. p. 426). The study by Firmstone (2008) indicates that journalists working for transnational media outlets

aim at creating “a counterbalance to the nationalization of EU affairs by the press in member states” (p. 437). Whereas all analyzed newspapers cater a specialized, elite audience, they differ in their approaches to transnational journalistic practices in the analyzed print media: The European Voice pursues an ‘inter-institutional’ approach that focuses on the coverage of “internal issues and events of the EU, its institutions, and European integration as a process” (p. 437) that is primarily targeted at an elite audience based in Brussels. The Financial Times Europe and the Wall Street Journal Europe cover EU and European issues from an external point of view focusing on the economic dimension of EU politics. Whereas the International Herald Tribune also provides an external perspective, it focuses on reporting about the international implications of EU politics and policies (cf. Firmstone, 2008, p. 438). These three approaches to EU reporting are complemented by a fourth approach: the ‘internal member state approach’ pursued by journalists that work for national media outlets (cf. Firmstone, 2008, p. 438). Firmstone (2008) assesses the contribution of these transnational media outlets to the Europeanization of national public spheres critically: She argues that “transnational newspapers [do not only] pursue an EU news agenda that is shaped by the concerns of an elite and unrepresentative readership, their coverage is also influenced by the need to appeal to readers who are not eligible to vote in European Parliament elections ([e.g.] American ex-pats living in the EU), and, in the case of the *WSJ* and *Tribune*, the nationally focused interests of the domestic American public” (439). The author remains sceptical about the emergence of a transnational media landscape that reaches the public at large. Constraining factors include the different forms of media regulation as well as the different languages within the EU member states and the lack of transnational media outlets that address the general public (cf. Firmstone, 2008, p. 438). Cross (2015) has conducted a content analysis of the EU coverage by the elite-oriented media outlets Time Magazine, the Economist, International Herald Tribune as well as Financial Times with a focus on three selected crisis cases: 1) The Iraq crisis in 2003, in which EU member states struggled to agree on a common response to George W. Bush’s call to support the planned U.S. invasion<sup>97</sup> in Iraq, 2) the constitutional treaty crisis in 2005, coined by two failed referenda on the adoption of a EU constitution in France and the Netherlands, and 3) the case of the Eurozone crisis from 2010 to 2012. Based on the analysis of the tone of the coverage as well as the framing of the three crises, Cross (2015, pp. 13-14) concludes that all media outlets primarily use the conflict frame and portray all three crisis cases as serious threats to European integration and, with regard to the Iraq crisis, also as threat to EU enlargement.

Garcia-Blanco and Cushion (2010) have dedicated their attention to EuroNews as an example of a transnational TV channel. EuroNews is a pan-European news channel that was launched on January 1, 1993. The news channel aims at presenting world news from a European perspective: EuroNews currently broadcasts in 13 different languages and stresses its “non-national editorial line as well as its multinational structure” (EuroNews, 2013, p. 6). EuroNews is financed by members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) as well as an annual budget by the EC (cf. CEC, 2008, p. 9). In 2013, EuroNews had daily reach of 7.2 million viewers via cable and satellite as well as national broadcasting windows and, thus, exceeds the number of European viewers of other international news channels like BBC World News and CNN International that – combined - reach 4,2 million daily viewers in Europe (cf. EuroNews, 2013, p. 19-22). Garcia-Blanco and Cushion (2010) have explored “the type and style of Euronews’ journalistic conventions and practices” (p. 396) on the basis of a content analysis of EuroNews news bulletins. The findings of the study suggest that the comparably small budget of EuroNews has a decisive influence on the style of news reporting. In contrast to previous studies that suggest an intense coverage of EU institutions on EuroNews (see for instance Richardson & Meinhof, 1999), Garcia-Blanco and Cushion (2010) show that 17 out of 20 of the

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<sup>97</sup> In 2003, the governments of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK signed ‘The Letter of the EU’ to express support for the U.S.-American invasion in Iraq. This letter did not represent a common European position and left the EU member states divided (cf. Cross, 2015; Weigl, 2007).

analyzed news items did not refer to the EU at all (cf. p. 407). Due to its small budget, EuroNews relies heavily on material from members of the European Broadcasting Union as well as news agencies. These materials are often produced with a national, rather than a regional audience in mind (cf. Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010, p. 408). Consequently, the aim to present world news from a European perspective is contrasted with the actual news production of EuroNews that often fails “to reframe national political material for pan-European relevance” (Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010, p. 408). As Garcia-Blanco and Cushion (2010) argue, “external factors work against its ability to constitute a mediated European public sphere with greater supranational relevance” (p. 408). The Europeanization of national public spheres is not only hindered by a primarily national framing of world news, but also a marginalization of citizens on the news channel: Garcia-Blanco and Cushion (2010) suggest that citizens rather “help to set the scene” (p. 408) and are depicted as victims or background actors than as protagonists that shape and debate European events and issues.

With regard to transnational online media, EurActiv.com constitutes the only wEurope by Satellite that exclusively focuses on issues and events related to the EU. With coverage in 12 languages, EurActiv.com labels itself as “the leading online media on EU affairs” (EurActiv.com, n.y.a). EurActiv.com aims at stimulating debates on EU policies among governments, businesses as well as civil society organizations and emphasizes the goals of covering the different perspectives voiced by stakeholders of EU policy (EurActiv.com, n.y.b). This online news medium is financed by corporate sponsors, advertisement as well as funding from actors on EU, national and sub-national level (EurActiv.com, n.y.c). The readership of EurActiv.com mainly belongs to the EU expert sphere. Findings of the Eurobarometer survey, however, disclose that EU citizens use the internet more and more to acquire information on the EU: While it was only used by 22% of all respondents in autumn 2005 (cf. Eurobarometer 64 - Annex, 2005, p. 94), 38% of the interviewees make use of the internet as a source of information on the EU in autumn 2014 (cf. Eurobarometer 82 - Annex, 2014, p. 51;). Based on the increasing relevance of the internet as a source of EU information, future research should also address pan-European online media platforms.

Despite the growing relevance of online media as sources of national and European political information, television remains the most important source of information on both national and European political matters: 59% of the respondents of the latest Eurobarometer survey conducted in autumn 2015 inform themselves about national and European political matters via television (see table 4 below).

**Table 4: Primary information sources on national & European political matters (figures in per cent)**

	TV	Internet	Press	Radio	Other	Not actively looking for news	Don't know
<b>national political matters<sup>98</sup></b>	58	16	10	9	1	5	1
<b>European political matters<sup>99</sup></b>	55	14	10	7	0	11	1

<sup>98</sup> Question QE4a (Eurobarometer 84): „Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly” (no multiple answers possible) (p. 266)

(Source: Eurobarometer 84 – Annex, 2015, pp. 266-272)

Even though EU citizens use television frequently to inform themselves about political matters, they do not consider television as the most trustworthy source of information. Instead, respondents of the Eurobarometer survey express most trust in EU coverage on the radio (55% of the respondents tend to trust EU information on the radio), followed by television (48%) and the written press (43%) (cf. Eurobarometer 84 – Annex, 2015, pp. 46-50).

### 3.4 Public diplomacy understanding

Although chapter 3.1 has outlined that EU communication officials have already practiced public diplomacy for many decades, the term itself has not been used by the EU until the inception of the Barroso Commission in 2004 (see for instance, Twigg, 2005). This assumption is supported by an empirical study by Michalski (2005): Based on guided interviews with EU officials, Michalski (2005, p. 126) concludes that the concept of public diplomacy was not recognized by the EU and was not a subject of discussion in policy papers or other communications of the EC and the Council Secretariat respectively.

The EU comprehends public diplomacy “as an essential arm of external relations” (Wallström, 2008; see also European Commission, 2007). The Draft Communication “The EU In The World - Towards A Communication Strategy For The European Union’s External Policy, 2006 – 2009” is among the first EU documents to discuss the understanding of the concept. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, at that time European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, defines public diplomacy as “[...] all activities which have an impact on the perceptions and the public opinion in third countries about the country or institution engaging in public diplomacy. They are therefore not only aimed at the media and the political actors of third countries but at their societies at large” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, cited in Consortium PARTICIP-ADE–DIE–DRN-ECDPM-ODI, 2012, Annex 2, p. 5).

The brochure 'The EU's 50th anniversary celebrations around the world: A glance at EU public diplomacy at work', issued by the EC in 2007, specifies this rather general definition of public diplomacy as „activities which have an impact on the perceptions and the public opinion” (p. 13) and predominantly regards public diplomacy as advocacy:

*“Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests by understanding, informing and influencing. It means clearly explaining the EU’s goals, policies and activities and fostering understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens, groups, institutions and the media.”* (European Commission, 2007, p. 13)

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<sup>99</sup> Question QE5a (Eurobarometer 84): „Where do you get most of your news on European political matters? Firstly” (no multiple answers possible) (p. 272)

The notion of public diplomacy as a tool for “advocacy” and “public persuasion” is also present in the public diplomacy conceptualization of the EEAS (see for EEAS Strategic Communication Division & DEVCO Transparency Unit, 2012, p. 3)<sup>100</sup>.

In contrast to the scholarly understanding of public diplomacy as a concept that encompasses communication with strategic publics outside of the EU and within the EU, the EU only applies the term ‘public diplomacy’ to refer to communication with external publics: Former European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006), for instance, contrasts public diplomacy with communication to strategic publics within the EU „whose overall objective is to engage in a more open dialogue with citizens and to better respond to their expectations, contributing to a fuller understanding of the EU’s external policies, instruments and concrete action”.(Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, cited in Consortium PARTICIP-ADE-DIE-DRN-ECDPM-ODI, 2012, Annex 2, S. 5). EU practitioners primarily apply the terms information policy and communication policy to refer to public diplomacy activities towards publics within the EU (see sub-chapter 3.1).

Interestingly, the public diplomacy definitions of the EC and the EEAS do not necessarily reflect the public diplomacy understanding of the single EU Delegations. The EU Delegation in Washington, D.C. for instance conceptualizes the role of delegations within public diplomacy as follows:

*“In non-EU countries, more than 130 EU Delegations increase awareness of the EU; ensure broad understanding of EU policies, initiatives and messages; and build relationships with state and local officials, community and business leaders, the media, students, and civil society.”* (EU Delegation to the United States, 2009)

In contrast to the definitions of the EC, this notion of public diplomacy encompasses a relational dimension. Not only the public diplomacy understanding of single organizations within EU, but also the terms used to describe public diplomacy-related activities in the single EU Delegations differ: Whereas the 'Public Diplomacy and Press' section takes care of these activities in the EU Delegation to the United States, the EU Delegation to China has set up a 'Press and Information Section'.

The public diplomacy conceptualization by EU practitioners differs considerably from the scholarly understanding of the concept: The definitions provided by both the EC and the EEAS perceive public diplomacy primarily as a tool of advocacy (see also Melissen, 2013, p. 209). The notion of dialogue and relational communication, on the contrary, is much more present in the definition of communication activities towards internal publics. Azpiroz (2015) states that the definitions provided by the EEAS only cover a small share of the public diplomacy activities it carries out. The same applies to the EC. The brochure “The EU’s 50th anniversary celebrations around the world: A glance at EU public diplomacy at work” also depicts exhibitions, film festivals, conferences and workshops as public diplomacy tools. While this study examines both the internal and the external dimension of public diplomacy, the EC as well as the EEAS only apply the term public diplomacy to describe its communication activities towards third countries and international organizations. Furthermore, the

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<sup>100</sup> The EEAS Strategic Communication Division released an ‘Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations’ in cooperation with the DEVCO Communication and Transparency Unit. The document defines public diplomacy as a concept “that encompasses a number of elements from *advocacy and public persuasion*, usually aimed at media and policy-makers, to the kind of *basic information provision* that is carried out via the internet, social media platforms, publications, or more explicitly in seminars and conferences, often involving informed audiences that include the private sector, academia, organized civil society and the general public, the citizens” (EEAS Strategic Communication Division & DEVCO Transparency Unit, 2012, p. 3, italics added).



literature review discloses differences in the public diplomacy understanding of the EEAS headquarters in Brussels as well as the single EU Delegations. Both Szondi (2010) and Fiske de Gouveia (2006) point to the need for harmonizing the EU terminology related to public diplomacy.

### **3.5 Public diplomacy practice**

Public diplomacy towards publics within the EU seeks to generate legitimacy for the EU as an international actor as well as for specific EU goals, policies and actions (cf. Huijgh, 2013). Moreover, the development of a European identity among citizens of EU member states constitutes a long-term goal of EU public diplomacy (cf. CEC, 1985; Srugies, 2015, p. 5). Not least, Valentini and Nesti (2010, p. 6) point to the growing relevance of initiating and maintaining public debates on European issues as well as empowering citizens as EU public diplomacy goals.

As outlined in the sub-chapter 3.4 above, EU public diplomacy towards publics in third countries and international organizations aims at increasing the visibility of the EU and raising awareness about EU goals, policies and actions (see for instance Azpiroz, 2005, p. 9; EEAS Strategic Communication Division & DEVCO Transparency Unit, 2012). Moreover, Börzel and Risse (2009) as well as Rasmussen (2010) identify strengthening the EU's role as an international actor as an important goal of EU public diplomacy towards external publics. Not least, the EU seeks to promote itself as a model of regional integration for other regions in the world and, thus, strengthen its normative power (cf. Azpiroz, 2015, pp. 23-24; Börzel & Risse, 2009).

The document "Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility", issued by the EC in 2006, lists priority issues of EU public diplomacy towards external publics. The document defines five communication priorities: EU enlargement, development cooperation, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the CFSP as well as the "Disaster Response, Crisis Management and European Security and Defense Policy" (CEC, 2006b, p. 2). These communication priorities correspond to the aims of the EU's international activity defined in the Treaty of Lisbon, including sustaining peace, eradicating poverty, providing humanitarian aid as well as creating the preconditions for free trade (cf. Azpiroz, 2015, p. 10).

Within the EU, public diplomacy organizations emphasize citizens as strategic publics (cf. Valentini & Nesti, 2010). Due to limited resources, EU Delegations need to focus on specific strategic publics. In the case of Brazil, the EU Delegation concentrates on "current and future opinion leaders across society: in the media, in the political, economic, and cultural sectors, in the younger generation; and among civil society representatives" (Azpiroz, 2015, p. 14).

There is only little empirically grounded research on EU public diplomacy on a tactical level. The small body of knowledge includes a study by Rasmussen (2009, 2010) on public diplomacy messages communicated and a case study on the public diplomacy tools and communication channels of the EU Delegation in Brazil conducted by Azpiroz (2015). Rasmussen (2010, p. 275) has identified two approaches to communicating EU public diplomacy messages: 1) A 'Facts and Figures-Approach' that is based on providing 'neutral' information on what the EU is and does, and 2) a 'Narrative Approach' that turns information into a story and illustrates EU policies and activities using case examples that strategic publics can relate to. For a long time, the public diplomacy strategy of the EU was primarily based on a 'facts and figures' approach to public diplomacy that has concentrated on the communication of objective, neutral and demand-oriented information to strategic publics (see sub-chapter 3.1). The issue of "A New Framework of Co-Operation on Activities Concerning the Information and Communication Policy of the European Governance" in 2002 indicates a departure to a more proactive communication approach highlighting core values and communicating on the

practical benefits of EU decisions (Michalski, 2005, p. 135). This messaging approach is also stressed by public diplomacy practitioners in EU Delegations in third countries – they point to the need to communicate EU messages within the context of the citizens' lives (cf. Azpiroz, 2015, p. 17).

The EU is presented “as an internally diverse political entity of different states that work effectively together for the common good” (Rasmussen, 2010, p. 269) to both internal and external audiences. Public diplomacy messages specifically targeting strategic publics within the EU focus on the legitimization of the EU and its actions by a) explaining what the EU is, what it does and what it stands for, b) highlighting benefits of EU membership, c) emphasizing past achievements of the EU, and d) stressing the necessity to develop common solutions for problems that span across single states (see for instance Rasmussen, 2010; Terra, 2010). The promotion of norms like “human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights” (Bruter, 1999, pp. 199-200) is a central element of communication towards strategic publics within and outside of the EU. Public diplomacy strategies accentuate the EU “as a peace project, which has brought prosperity and stability to Europe and acts as an anchor for democracy and human and fundamental rights in the world” (Michalski, 2005, pp. 134-135). Based on guided interviews with representatives of the EC and a document analysis, Rasmussen (2010) has identified the communication of the EU “as a model of peace to be followed” (pp. 269-270) as a key message of EU public diplomacy towards external publics. This key message corresponds to the goal of promoting and diffusing regional integration (see above). Additionally, the portrayal of the EU “as an important player in world politics” is highlighted in a number of documents from the 1970s until today (see for instance CEC, 1975, p. 9; CEC, 2006b, p. 2). These key messages are often connected to priority topics such as EU enlargement or the European Neighbourhood Policy (see for instance CEC, 2000; CEC, 2006b).

Azpiroz (2015) has analyzed public diplomacy activities directed at strategic publics outside the EU using the example of Brazil. The EU pursues public diplomacy activities on a bilateral level, for instance through a Strategic Partnership with Brazil, as well as on a multilateral level, for instance on the basis of an Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement with MERCOSUR<sup>101</sup>. Azpiroz (2015) groups the EU's public diplomacy efforts in Brazil in three groups: media diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and development cooperation. Media diplomacy subsumes controlled media and public media tools including the EU delegation's website, newsletter, promoting visits by EU officials and answering press inquiries. Moreover, communicators within the EU Delegation in Brazil also apply social media channels to address and interact with strategic publics (cf. Azpiroz, 2015, pp. 15-16). Activities in the field of cultural diplomacy include higher education exchange programs like ‘Erasmus Mundus’ and a European week the EU Delegation organizes every year in cooperation with EUNIC. Foci of development cooperation projects include sustainability with regard to social, economic and ecological aspects as well as exchange programs to enhance mutual knowledge and skills. With regard to MERCOSUR, development cooperation projects concentrate on supporting regional integration as well as the generation of an internal market. (cf. Azpiroz, 2015, pp. 18-23)

### **3.6 Implications for the empirical study**

This sub-chapter summarizes the state of research on EU public diplomacy and discusses its implications for the empirical analysis of strategy documents and interview transcripts. These reflections form the basis for developing research guiding assumptions related to the first research

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<sup>101</sup> MERCOSUR stands for Mercado Común del Sur and is a sub-regional organization in Latin America focusing on economic integration and trade.

question of this study, which investigates how EU public diplomacy organizations understand and practice public diplomacy (see sub-chapter 5.1).

As outlined in sub-chapter 3.3, the sheer size and the complex structure of the EU make communication on EU organizations, policies, and activities a challenging endeavor. These structural conditions present hurdles to establishing a connection between EU organizations and citizens in member states as, well as to stimulating civic participation. Furthermore, the EU is described as an international actor “under construction” (Rasmussen, 2010, p. 264) whose final stage is intentionally left open. The EU’s uncertain fate poses a threat to its ontological security and, by that, the communication of a generally accepted and stable vision of the nature of the EU, its goals, policies, and activities (cf. Rasmussen, 2012). Decision-making in the EU is coined by a system of multi-level governance that involves organizations at the regional, national, sub-national level. Similarly, EU public diplomacy involves a multi-level system of organizations that address strategic publics within and/or outside of the EU. These observations suggest that the complex structure of the EU is reflected in a differentiated public diplomacy practice, in which different public diplomacy strategies coexist.

The state of research on EU communication and public diplomacy (see sub-chapters 3.1 and 3.4) has indicated that the term ‘public diplomacy’ is only used to refer to communication activities in third countries or multilateral fora. The public diplomacy conceptualization by EU practitioners differs considerably from the scholarly understanding of the concept: The definitions provided by both the EC and the EEAS perceive public diplomacy primarily as a tool of advocacy (see also Melissen, 2013, p. 209). The notion of dialogue and relational communication, on the contrary, is much more present in the definition of communication activities towards internal publics. Azpiroz (2015) states that the definitions provided by the EEAS only cover a small share of the public diplomacy activities it actually carries out. The same applies to the EC. It is thus assumed that EU strategy documents and representatives from EU public diplomacy organizations highlight the element of advocacy in their definitions of public diplomacy.

The internal dimension of EU public diplomacy concentrates on developing a European identity and generating legitimacy for the EU as an international actor as well as for specific EU goals, policies and actions. In contrast to that, the external dimension of EU public diplomacy focuses on increasing the visibility of the EU and raising awareness about EU goals, policies and actions in third countries as well as on a multilateral level. In addition, public diplomacy towards strategic publics in third states and in multilateral fora seeks to promote the EU as a model of regional integration (cf. Börzel & Risse, 2009). These findings, presented in chapter 3.5, lead to the assumption that EU public diplomacy organizations put a stronger emphasis on goals of cultural communication in the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy, whereas goals of political information/persuasion are more pronounced in the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. Additional, the chapter has shown that EU public diplomacy organizations stress the importance of a dialogue-oriented communication approach. While EU organizations may apply public diplomacy instruments based on two-way communication, this study examines to what extent Brüggemann’s (2008) assumption that these tools primarily serve persuasive goals holds true.

The EU allocates more resources to the internal dimension of public diplomacy in comparison to communication with third states and in multilateral fora, while the EEAS as well as EU Delegations primarily seek to reach citizens through decision-makers and multipliers. This assumed focus on citizens in EU member states may neglect the important role of journalists in the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. As described in sub-chapter 3.3, the extent to which a European identity can gain ground as a first or second affiliation is closely linked the degree to which national media

integrate EU institutions as well as European issues into their coverage, and the degree to which transnational media reach EU citizens.

Moreover, sub-chapter 3.3 has outlined that national media still constitute the most important sources of information on European matters. EU coverage by national media is, however, mostly embedded in a national frame of reference (cf. Hepp et al., 2010, p. 11). Journalism in EU member states differs with regard to territorial factors, factors immanent to the media system or the content of EU reporting. While these differences may not facilitate the development of a “truly European public”, they indicate a “differentiated process of communicative integration” (Sievert, 2010, p. 259). The state of research reveals that negative EU coverage is more frequent than neutral or positive EU coverage (see for instance Menéndez Alarcón, 2010). This holds particularly true for national-based journalists: In comparison to their Brussels-based counterparts, national-based journalists report on the EU in a more negative way and rely more frequently on national sources of information than on EU authorized sources. Due to scarce resources communication between journalists and EU spokespersons is often limited to Brussels-based correspondents. While more than 1.000 journalists were based in Brussels in 2005, the number of Brussels correspondents has dropped to 900 journalists in 2010 (cf. Philipps, 2010). In addition to employing correspondents permanently stationed in Brussels, media outlets increasingly send ‘parachute foreign correspondents’ that only stay in Brussels for a short amount of time to cover single events like EU summits (cf. Raeymackers et al., 2007). These developments are particularly problematic with regard to EU coverage in small member states that cannot afford to send many correspondents to Brussels. (cf. Price, 2010)

Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg (2009, p. 706) point to an increase in the production transnational media content, in the number of households transnational media reach and the numbers of recipients that use transnational media. However, both Pan-European and global media often address an elite audience and hardly reach a broader audience. In order to reach citizens as the most important group of strategic publics of the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy, EU organizations need to allocate adequate resources to communication with journalists within member states and the development of transnational media outlet that also address the general public.

The internal dimension of EU public diplomacy concentrates on developing a European identity and generating legitimacy for the EU as a policy, as well as its specific goals, policies, and actions. As illustrated in sub-chapter 3.3, the perception of the EU and the level of trust in the EU have declined significantly in the course of the European debt crisis and are currently put to test again in the European refugee crisis. Today, only 37% of citizens within the EU member states express trust in the EU, while 56% of them remain optimistic about the EU’s future. While the majority of EU citizens still primarily identify with their home country, Risse (2009) points to a growth of a European identity as a second affiliation. However, scholars like Weigl (2007) emphasize that the identification with a nation state remains a matter of the heart, whereas the EU is primarily regarded as a community of purpose (cf. Weigl, 2007, pp. 104-105).

The development of a common European identity, and a favorable public opinion among EU citizens are closely connected to the development of a European public sphere. The European public sphere is not a single communication space, but a complex network of various, interconnected public sphere segments. These segments vary for instance with regard to degree of specialization of topics debated and the knowledge on the EU, its policies and actions as well as the degree of Europeanization. EU public diplomacy practitioners need to be aware of the particularities of the members in these different public sphere segments and address them accordingly. Moreover, the public diplomacy organizations of the single EU member states can either facilitate or hinder the emergence and the development of a European public sphere. Public diplomacy actors within member states can contribute to the emergence of a European public sphere if they

- include European perspectives on issues they communicate,
- if they plan and implement joint programs and activities with the EU,
- if they actively communicate these joint programs and activities within their public diplomacy strategy.

A European public sphere is less likely to emerge and sustain if public diplomacy actors of the EU member states

- predominantly communicate issues from a national perspective,
- depict the EU as a whole or single EU institutions rather as a scapegoat than a collaboration partner.

In the same way, the development of a European identity and a favorable public opinion on the EU are dependent on the communication and actions of EU institutions as well as other organizations on transnational, national, and sub-national level including governments, political parties, civil society organizations or media representatives that may support or contest positions of the EU.

It goes beyond the scope of this study, to analyze public diplomacy by organizations in all 28 member states. Therefore, the researcher cannot develop general assumptions on the relationship between EU and member state communication and its implications for EU public diplomacy. The study focuses on France and Sweden as two selected member states. Chapter four will develop specific assumptions on the public diplomacy understanding and practice of France and Sweden, and on the question, whether French and Swedish public diplomacy efforts complement or rather contradict EU public diplomacy.

## 4. State of research on public diplomacy II: Member states of the European Union

The previous chapter has outlined the state of research on the public diplomacy of the EU as a regional organization. This chapter, in turn, approaches European public diplomacy from the perspective of the member states that constitute the EU. It seeks to structure and present studies on public diplomacy by EU member states based on the following lead questions: What are the main public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf EU member states? How can the external environments these organizations operate in be described? How do EU member state organizations understand and practice public diplomacy?

The literature review places a special focus on France and Sweden as objects of the empirical study. The choice of France and Sweden is based on four criteria that describe the relationship of the member states and the EU: 1) the year of accession to the EU, 2) the adoption of the Euro currency, 3) the influence on the decisions of the EU, and 4) the monetary contributions to the EU:

- 1) *The year of accession to the EU:* The Treaty of Rome constituted the European Economic Community on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1958. The treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany, which can be regarded as the six founding states of the EU. Since 1958, 22 new member states have joined the EU in a continuous process of enlargement. This study selects France as one founding member states that has coined the EU's development since its inception. Furthermore, the study selects Sweden as one country that has joined the EU after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Treaty of Maastricht went beyond the original, primarily economically driven goals of the regional actor and added an inherently political dimension to the EU.
- 2) *The adoption of the euro currency:* The adoption of the euro currency marks the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This study selects France as one country that has adopted the Euro currency and Sweden as one country that has kept its own currency.
- 3) *The influence on the decisions of the EU:* Single member states can influence the decision-making process on EU-level through three political organizations: the Council of the EU, the European Council and the European Parliament. Whereas each member state has one vote in the European Council, the decision-making power each member state can exert in the Council of the EU and the EP depends on the size of its population. The Council of the EU has a number of key functions: It passes EU laws, approves the annual EU budget and coordinates the development of the EU's foreign and defense policy. The Council of the EU consists of the respective ministers of each member country that are responsible for a specific policy field that is subject to discussion in a council meeting. All decisions by the Council of the EU are taken by qualified majority voting<sup>102</sup>. Hence, the more inhabitants a country has, the more votes and the more decision-making power does it have<sup>103</sup>. This study selects France as a country that possesses a lot of influence on decisions of the Council of the EU— as Germany, Italy and the UK, France has 29 votes. Sweden, on the contrary, only has 10 votes and, thus, a comparatively small influence on decisions taken by the Council of the EU. The EP functions as the co-legislator of most of the EU laws. Moreover, it also oversees the work of the EC. This study includes France as one country with comparably high influence on the decision-

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<sup>102</sup> There is a total of 345 votes, a majority exists when at least 255 of 345 votes are cast.

<sup>103</sup> The votes each member state has are weighed in favour of the less populous countries.

making process of the European Parliament with 72 out of 751 seats as well as Sweden as one country with comparably little influence on decisions of the European Parliament with 18 out of 751 seats.

- 4) *National Contribution to the EU*: In 2014, the member states have contributed a total of 116.531,8 Mio Euro to the EU. Whereas a small group of states (Germany, France, Italy, UK, Spain) account for almost 75% of the national contributions, 10 member states contribute less than 1/100 to the EU. This study selects France as the member state with the second largest contribution to the EU (19.573,6 million Euro in 2014, which equals 15,8% of the national contributions to the EU). Sweden, on the contrary, contributed a comparably small share of 3.828,2 million Euro in 2014, which equals 3,2% of all national contributions. (cf. European Commission, n.d.b)

This chapter begins by providing an overview of the state of research on public diplomacy by EU member states. It continues by deepening the literature review on French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations and their public diplomacy understanding and practice. In a last step, this chapter discusses implications of the state of research for the empirical analysis of French and Swedish public diplomacy, as well as the relationship of EU and member states public diplomacy.

#### **4.1 Overview of the state of research on public diplomacy in member states**

This sub-chapter provides an overview on the state of research on public diplomacy in European countries. The literature review discloses three research foci: 1) public diplomacy in West European countries, 2) public diplomacy in North European countries, and 3) public diplomacy in Central and East European countries. These three strands of research guide the structure of this sub-chapter.

Research on West European countries concentrates on the UK, Germany and France. Along with Italy, they exercise the biggest influence on decision-making processes in the Council of the EU as well as the EP and contribute the biggest share of financial resources to the EU.

While public diplomacy had received comparably little attention in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s, the election of the Labour government in 1997 as well as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 have increased the relevance attributed to the concept as well as the calls for a more strategic and coherent public diplomacy approach (cf. Brown, 2012, p. 11, see also Rose & Wadham-Smith, 2004). The heightened interest in public diplomacy was mirrored by two government-commissioned reviews (cf. Lord Carter of Coles, 2005; Wilton, 2002) as well as a number of publications by think tanks and consultancies aimed at deriving recommendations to improve British public diplomacy (see for instance Leonard, Small & Rose, 2005; Leonard, Stead & Smewing, 2002; Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008). Moreover, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) also fostered research on public diplomacy by publishing the collection of essays '*Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World*' in 2008.

Based on a review by Lord Carter of Coles (2005), the UK developed a new, more centralized public diplomacy strategy and introduced a Public Diplomacy Board<sup>104</sup> (cf. Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015, p. 448). This board brought the three core actors of UK public diplomacy - the FCO, the British Council as well as the BBC World Service (observer status) – together and was entrusted with the task of conceptualizing and overseeing the implementation of a public diplomacy strategy. Additional organizations like VisitBritain or UK Sport discussed operational matters of this overarching public

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<sup>104</sup> replaced by the Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy Forum in 2009

diplomacy strategy within a Public Diplomacy Partner Group chaired by the FCO (cf. Fisher, 2009, p. 257). While the creation of a Public Diplomacy Board increased the coherence of British public diplomacy efforts, it also created tension between the goals of the FCO as well as the British Council and the editorial freedom of the BBC World Service (cf. Lord Triesman, 2007). Brown (2012) points to growing divergences between the British Council and FCO as well as a decreasing influence of the FCO on both the British Council and the BBC World Service in the second half of the 2000s.

The relationship between the British government and the British Council has undergone through another change, as the 'Triennial Review of the British Council' (2014) indicates. The review recommends a closer alignment of the British Council to the government as well as a stronger focus on promotion (cf. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014; Rivera, 2015). Rivera (2015) refers to the campaign 'GREAT Britain' as one of the most obvious examples of the "British Council's alignment with the government in recent years" (p. 17). In the wake of the Olympic Games 2012 in London, the British government introduced the 'GREAT Britain' campaign with the aim of "promot[ing] trade, investment and tourism under a unified identity emphasizing British achievements" (Pamment, 2015, p. 260, see also Rivera, 2015, p. 17). The campaign was accompanied by a new communication structure: The Secretary for Culture, Media and Sports, ministers representing trade and investment, the FCO, Visit Britain or the British Council for instance came together on the GREAT Programme Board, which succeeded the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Forum (cf. *ibid.*, p. 271). A big share of the resources which had been invested in British public diplomacy efforts before, were now allocated to the campaign 'GREAT Britain' – as Pamment (2015) remarks, the campaign budget "is equivalent to a large portion of the cuts to the communication budgets of the affiliate organisations" (p. 277). The campaign is still running and marks a shift towards a stronger focus on nation branding as well as the creation of wealth and economic growth (cf. Pamment, 2015, p. 276; Rivera, 2015, p. 17).

Public diplomacy scholars started to turn their eyes to Germany in the 2000s. While the first studies and essays on German public diplomacy were published almost exclusively in German language (see for instance Grolig & Schlageter 2007; Hübecker 2008; Ostrowski 2008; Zöllner 2009; Auer, Krichbaum, Srugies 2010), there is a slowly growing body of literature on German public diplomacy in English (see for instance Löffelholz et al. 2011a; Auer & Srugies 2013; Auer, Srugies & Löffelholz, 2015). Drawing on guided interviews with 31 German public diplomacy organizations as well as an accompanying document analysis, Löffelholz et al. (2011a) identify a multifaceted public diplomacy network that is loosely coordinated by the Federal Foreign Office. Government agencies like Goethe-Institut or the German Academic Exchange Service enjoy a comparably high level of autonomy (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013; Auer, Srugies & Löffelholz, 2015). A special feature of German public diplomacy is the crucial role of political foundations. Political foundations are organizations in the pre-political sphere, aligned with a specific political party (cf. Pogorelskaja, 2009). Their scope of action includes projects and activities in the areas of education, cultural relations and development cooperation (cf. Auer et al., 2010, pp. 443-444). In contrast to the UK and France, Germany pursues a decentralized approach to public diplomacy. The pluralistic, decentralized German public diplomacy network reflects Germany's conscious distancing from its National Social past (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013, p. 25; Plumridge, 2005, p. 38).

German public diplomacy aims at achieving both primarily national goals, for instance attracting foreign investors, as well as joint, multilateral goals such as fostering European integration (cf. Auer, Srugies & Löffelholz, 2015; Pamment, 2013a; Plumridge, 2005). While public diplomacy organizations operate worldwide, the U.S. and European countries constitute a focus of German public diplomacy activities. In recent years, Asian and Arab publics have increased in relevance as strategic publics (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013, pp. 29-30). Public diplomacy is not yet received as an



organizational function in most organizations. Based on an analysis of organizational charts, Auer and Srugies (2013) conclude “that departments below the executive level that already manage communication activities take the responsibility in most cases. Only within a few organizations is [public diplomacy] part of the management level” (p. 29).

Germany, France<sup>105</sup> and the UK command a comparably big amount of public diplomacy allowing them to pursue broad public diplomacy strategies. Both Brown (2012) and Pamment (2013a) have provided a discussion of similarities and differences between public diplomacy approaches in Germany, France and UK. Pamment (2013a, p. 14) notes that the term ‘public diplomacy’ is not commonly used by the ‘big three’ UK, Germany and France. France primarily refers to its public diplomacy activities as ‘diplomatie d’influence’ or ‘diplomatie numérique’ (digital diplomacy). Germany, on the contrary, rather applies the concepts of foreign cultural and educational policy as well as foreign political public relations. While the UK used the term ‘public diplomacy’ more frequently in the past, the term ‘(strategic) communication’ is more common today. (cf. Pamment, 2013a, pp. 15-16) One possible explanation for the uncommon use of the term ‘public diplomacy’ is its use in the context of the War on Terror by the Bush administration (cf. Melissen, 2013, p. 206). Melissen (2013) concludes that the public diplomacy practice of Western European countries “did not match the more politicized American approach that was more closely linked to short-term foreign policy objectives” (p. 206). The comparison discloses that all three countries operate in similar domains, including language and culture. By that, Germany, France and UK “promot[e] their own interests in many respects against each other” (Pamment, 2013a, p. 30). Even though both Brown (2012) and Pamment (2013) emphasize competition between the three countries, France, Germany and the UK also engage in cooperations with one another, for instance within the network EUNIC.

The literature review reveals that there are hardly any recent studies on the public diplomacy of other Western European countries. The study ‘European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy’ offers a brief comparison of the public diplomacy efforts of the EU as well as all states that were included in the EU by the year of its publication in 2005. It points to a strong focus on European integration and multilateralism in the public diplomacy approaches of both Austria and Belgium, as both Vienna and Brussels host international organizations (cf. Plumridge, 2005, pp. 30-32). With regard to the Netherlands, Plumridge (2005, p. 47) highlight the country’s engagement in international cooperation in the area of innovation and research.

Josef Batora (2005) explores the public diplomacy of small and medium-sized states using the example of Norway<sup>106</sup> and Canada. Based on this comparative case analysis, Batora (2005) identifies three common features of the public diplomacy approaches pursued by small and medium-sized states: 1) They strive for “recognition by the rest of the world” (Batora, 2005a, 2005b, p. 6) and concentrate on increasing the visibility of their own interests and actions. Small and medium-sized states command less public diplomacy resources than big countries such as the UK, France or Germany. As a consequence, public diplomacy strategies of great powers on the one hand and small and medium-sized states on the other hand differ with regard to 2) the volume and breadth of messages, and 3) the number of issues addressed (Batora, 2005, pp. 7-9). The focus on few public diplomacy core areas and issues is conceptualized as niche diplomacy (cf. Batora, 2005a; Henriksen, 2005). A public diplomacy niche is either preset (for instance the geographical location of a country) or created by public diplomacy organizations (cf. Srugies & Auer, 2013).

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<sup>105</sup> Sub-chapter 4.2 provides a detailed analysis of public diplomacy in France.

<sup>106</sup> Even though Norway is not a member state of the EU, it is included in this literature review. Norway has been one of the first research objectives within Europe. Due to its geographical location and strong ties with other Nordic countries, its public diplomacy efforts have been analyzed in comparison with North European member states of the EU like Denmark and Sweden (see for instance Pamment, 2013c).

As Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark can be regarded as small to medium-sized countries with regard to their economic and military capacities (see for instance Plumridge, 2005, p. 54). Hence, the North European countries concentrate on a few core areas and the communication of core values: Based on recommendations of Leonard and Small (2003), Norway has centered its public diplomacy efforts on the idea of 'Peaceful Nature' and seeks to present itself as a peacemaker that is living in tune with nature (cf. Batora, 2005b, pp. 11-12). Conflict prevention and mediation as well as development cooperation constitute core elements of the public diplomacy of all North European countries (see for instance Arthur, 2005, pp.25-26; Henrikson, 2005, pp. 79-80; Plumridge, 2005, p. 54).

Moreover, both Swedish and Danish public diplomacy organizations stress the economic core area of public diplomacy. Pamment (2011, 2013b) and Meiner-Jensen (2012) argue that their public diplomacy understanding and practice heavily draws on the concept of nation branding. The strong influence of branding on Swedish public diplomacy is visible in the development of 'Brand Sweden', a communication platform that highlights Sweden as a progressive country, and a coordinated, centralized approach to public diplomacy (see sub-chapter 4.2.4).

The Danish cartoon crisis has increased the scholarly interest in the public diplomacy strategy of the Danish Foreign Ministry as well as the Danish-Middle Eastern dialogue (cf. Andreasen, 2008; Pultz, 2012; Rolfe, 2009). While Rolfe (2009) critically remarks that "political elites are more concerned with speaking to their own constituencies [...] rather than engaging in a dialogue", Olsson (2013) points to the relevance of public diplomacy instruments as tools to manage and mitigate transboundary crises. Moreover, Plumridge (2005) stresses the relevance of higher education and research in the Danish public diplomacy approach.

Both the case of Finland and Norway illustrate that public diplomacy is already institutionalized on the level of state organizations: The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a "Unit for Public Diplomacy [that] is responsible for the planning, development, coordination and country-specific support of strategic public diplomacy in foreign affairs" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, n.d.). Similarly, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has set up a 'Department for Culture, Public Diplomacy and Protocol'. Furthermore, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs chairs the Norwegian Public Diplomacy Forum, which fosters the "debate and dialogue between the authorities, business sector, academia and other actors" (Norway Communicates, n.d.) to enhance the consistency and effectiveness of the Norwegian public diplomacy strategy (cf. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

Neighboring countries constitute important cooperation partners for Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark (cf. Plumridge, 2005). The Nordic Council of Ministers is the inter-governmental body that coordinates cooperation among the EU member states Denmark, Finland and Sweden as well as Iceland, Norway, Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Åland. Its cooperation builds on the "common historical, cultural and geographical heritage" as well as "the same fundamental values, such as democracy, human rights and sustainability" (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2014). The Nordic Council plays a crucial role in fostering the international visibility of the Nordic countries as well as joint initiatives to address international challenges (cf. Nordic Council of Ministers, 2014).

Central and East European countries have been "on the receiving end of Western public diplomacy for decades" (Szondi, 2009, p. 292). While West and East European countries had defined themselves primarily against each other for a long time, the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 has initiated a period of transition in Central and East European countries. The changing political and economic system confronted these countries with the opportunity and challenge of re-inventing their image as well as their national identity (cf. Plumridge, 2005, p. 43; Szondi, 2009, p. 294).

Public diplomacy research and practice in Central and East European countries have gained momentum in the negotiations leading up to the EU's fifth enlargement in 2004 as well as the accession to the NATO in some cases. Ociepka and Ryniejska (2005) argue that the term public diplomacy was not widely used in Central and East Europe before. Prior to their EU accession, Central and East European countries had little influence on the European policy and media agenda (cf. Szondi, 2009, p. 293). As a consequence, the public diplomacy efforts of these countries focused on capturing international attention, image building as well as getting support for EU and NATO membership (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 293-395). Ociepka and Ryniejska (2005), Szondi (2009) as well as Plumridge (2005) point to a focus on promotion and nation branding that characterized communication strategies prior to EU and NATO accession. A recent analysis of public diplomacy messaging strategies applied by EU member and candidate countries (cf. White & Radic, 2014) discloses that Romania mostly applies a promotional strategy. Bulgaria and Croatia, in contrast, primarily implement information strategies (cf. White & Radic, 2014, p. 462). Using the example of Poland, Ociepka and Ryniejska (2005) illustrate that public diplomacy strategies of EU candidate countries in Central and East Europe encompass both an international and a domestic dimension: Poland did not only seek acceptance by elites and opinion leaders in EU member states, but also aimed at convincing its own citizens that EU membership was desirable (cf. Ociepka & Ryniejska, 2005, pp. 1-2). Similarly, the Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs created a Communication Strategy Department in the year 2000 to inform its domestic publics about EU-related matters (cf. Huijgh, 2013, p. 75). Andrić, Tarle and Sopta (2012) point to domestic public support as a precondition for gaining EU and NATO membership in the case of Croatia. Additionally, public diplomacy also constitutes a tool for (re-) constructing a country's national identity (Szondi, 2009, p. 295, see also Melissen, 2013, p. 208; Ociepka, 2013, p. 53).

As North European countries, Central and East European countries carve their own public diplomacy niche: They highlight promoting democracy as a focal area of public diplomacy towards countries in Central Asia, the former Soviet Union, but also Latin America (cf. Szondi, 2009, p. 307; see also Melissen, 2013; Peterkova, 2010a). The example of Czech Republic shows that international broadcasting can serve as a tool of democracy promotion: In 2004, Radio Prague aired programs in Cuba and other Latin American countries in which it discussing the Czech experiences of being a country in transition (cf. Szondi, 2009, p. 307).

After having achieved EU and NATO membership, Central and East European countries turned their eyes to new public diplomacy goals. The member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 perceive public diplomacy as "a tool aimed at positioning the countries within the European and transatlantic community, implemented to set the agenda of public debate, and to introduce the Central and East European countries' perspectives to the European discourse in order to gain visibility in international politics" (Ociepka, 2013, p. 40). Estonia, for instance, highlights its role as a partner in bi- and multilateral relations in its public diplomacy strategy (cf. Szondi, 2009, p. 307). Moreover, many 'new' EU member states place a lot of emphasis on diaspora diplomacy (see for instance Peterkova, 2015): Due to the historical background of Central and East European countries, many state boundaries run through the living space of different ethnic and/or linguistic groups (cf. Szondi, 2009, p. 294). Szondi (2009) and Plumridge (2005) stress relationship building with linguistic and ethnic groups in neighboring countries as an important public diplomacy goal. In the case of Hungary, for example, public diplomacy is closely connected to the goal of preserving the Hungarian language (cf. Plumridge, 2005, p. 40). However, the diaspora does not only spread in neighboring countries: For example, Polish dissidents that have left their home country during communism constitute a community of ten million people in the U.S. today (cf. Szondi, 2009, p. 294, see also Ociepka, 2013, p. 41).

While Central and East European countries acknowledge the role of NGOs in public diplomacy, many of these states pursue centralized public diplomacy models with governmental organizations at the core (cf. Ociepka, 2013, p. 53). The dominant role of governmental organizations is also reflected by the influence they exert on cultural institutes such as the Hungarian Magyar Kulturális as well as Instytut Polski (cf. Szondi, 2009, p. 302). Both Szondi (2009) and Ociepka (2013) critically address that the public diplomacy strategies of EU member states from Central and East Europe “are prone to a lack of continuation [...], as internal political conflicts between political parties and changing governments often hamper the follow-up of launched campaigns” (Ociepka, 2013, p. 53). While Central and East European countries compete for achieving a central position in their own region (cf. Szondi, 2009, p. 295), they also engage in interorganizational cooperations. In 1991, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic founded the Visegrád Group to jointly pursue EU and NATO membership as well as to facilitate “discussions about a Central European identity” (Szondi, 2009, p. 294, see also Peterkova, 2010b). Today, cooperation within the Visegrád Group centers on further economic integration into the EU as well as attraction of foreign investments.

The public diplomacy of South European member states remains largely unexplored. Plumridge (2005) points to a common denominator of public diplomacy efforts of Portugal, Italy and Greece: a strong focus on diaspora communities. The countries differentiate, however, with regard to the core areas of public diplomacy: While Italy highlights the promotion of the Italian language abroad and considers higher education as a public diplomacy priority (cf. Plumridge, 2005, p. 43), Greece, for example, puts greater emphasis on tourism (cf. *ibid.*, p. 39). Public diplomacy scholars have begun to explore the public diplomacy of EU candidate countries like Turkey (see for instance Çevik & Seib, 2015). As this thesis focuses on the public diplomacy of the EU and its member states, these studies are not discussed in greater detail.

European public diplomacy is not only conducted by countries, but also by sub-national entities within EU member states. Alexander (2015) argues that governments of sub-state entities recognize public diplomacy “as part of their nation building and national identity exercises” (p. 2, see also Alexander, 2014; Vickers, 2004). Public diplomacy is rather picked up by sub-state regions that strive for a high degree of autonomy. In its “Foreign Affairs Strategy 2010 – 2015”, the government of Catalonia in Spain outlines for instance a public diplomacy strategy (cf. Government of Catalonia, 2010, pp. 108-109, see also Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015, p. 449). Similarly, the Scottish National Party applies public diplomacy in its “Yes” campaign prior to the referendum on whether Scotland should become an independent, sovereign state on September 14, 2014 (cf. Alexander, 2015). The federate entity Flanders in Belgium does not only have “far-reaching international policy competences compared to other sub-national governments” (Huijgh, 2013, p. 62), but it also actively involves domestic publics in its (foreign) policy planning (cf. Huijgh, 2013, p. 63). Furthermore, La Porte (2013) and Melissen (2013) point to the relevance of cities as public diplomacy actors within the EU. Cities facilitate the contact between local civil society organizations and the EU, contribute to solving global problems and stimulating public diplomacy activities at a local level (cf. La Porte, 2013, pp. 102-103). Often, “they are more effective than other political institutions in informing citizens and guaranteeing transparency, as well as empowering citizen participation” (La Porte, 2013, p. 103)

## **4.2 Comparative analysis of research on French and Swedish public diplomacy**

The previous section has provided an overview on the state of research on public diplomacy by EU member states. As outlined in sub-chapter 3.6, it goes beyond the scope of this analysis to compare EU public diplomacy with public diplomacy efforts in all 28 member states. Hence, this analysis

concentrates on France and Sweden as two selected member states. In order to develop a deeper understanding of these two countries, this sub-chapter conducts a literature review on French and Swedish public diplomacy. The analysis centers on organizations, their external environments, as well as their public diplomacy understanding, and practice as key elements of the empirical study, and provides a comparative perspective on French and Swedish public diplomacy.

#### **4.2.1 Public diplomacy organizations**

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development (French Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international - MAEDI), currently headed by Jean-Marc Ayrault, is located in the center of the French public diplomacy network. It governs an extensive network of 163 embassies abroad, 16 permanent representations at the multilateral level as well as 92 consulates general and consulates (cf. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du développement international, 2013a). The press and communication department within the ministry communicates the French government's take on international politics and is the main point of contact for the single directions within the ministry in Paris as well as the French embassies and representations around the world in all communication matters (cf. Melloul, 2010, p. 45). The department is sub-divided into a press department which takes care of day-to-day inquiries as well as the management of media relations and the communication department which manages the website [www.diplomatie.gouv.fr](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr), the ministry's web 2.0 activities, plans and coordinates events and issues publications (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 20).

French public diplomacy efforts are primarily located in the ministry's 'Directrice générale de la mondialisation, du développement et des partenariats'. This directorate-general engages in economic diplomacy, development cooperation, cultural diplomacy, science diplomacy and international broadcasting. In all of these areas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development relies on cooperation with government agencies. (cf. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 2013) The ministry defines government agencies ('opérateurs de l'État') as organizations which provide public services and contribute to the implementation of goals defined by the government. These organizations are primarily financed by the government<sup>107</sup> (cf. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du développement international, 2015). In addition to funding by the state, government agencies can also generate their own revenues (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 18). Their mission as well as their *modus operandi* (cf. Pamment, 2013s, p. 18, see also LOI no. 2010-837) are defined by a state-led board and they are directly accountable to the government.

On behalf of Xavier Bertrand, secretary-general of the (at that time ruling) party Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP), Frank Melloul (2010) has put together the report "Développement de l'influence de la France sur la scène internationale". The report provides a set of recommendations for a French public diplomacy that is "efficient, coherent and coordinated" (Melloul, 2010, p. 8). In the years after this report, French public diplomacy has undergone a number of reforms. The reform process aimed at enhancing coherence and international visibility through strengthening cooperation between the ministries involved in public diplomacy as well as creating a unified brand identity concentrating on the Institut Français as most important French organization in the field of foreign cultural action. (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 23).

Economic diplomacy aims at assisting French businesses in succeeding in the international market, creating favorable conditions for French businesses on the European and international market as well as promoting France as a country to invest in (cf. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du développement international, 2013a). There are two intermediary organizations that are central to

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<sup>107</sup> directly through subsidies and indirectly through dedicated resources

implementing France's economic diplomacy: Business France and Atout France. Business France, created on 1 January, 2015, merges the organizations l'Agence française des investissements internationaux and UBIFRANCE into one comprehensive foreign trade promotion agency. Atout France, founded on 22 July 2009, monitors the international tourism market and is responsible for developing a national strategy for promoting France as a tourist destination. (cf. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du développement international, 2015)

Development cooperation focuses on international cooperation in the areas of health, nutrition, human rights, sustainability and climate as well as the promotion of democracy in the world (cf. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du développement international, 2013b). The French foreign ministry defines four core organizations in this domain: l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Expertise France, France Volontaires and Canal France International. While France Volontaires constitutes an information platform for citizens who wish to volunteer abroad, Canal France International is dedicated to development cooperation in the media sector. The organization assists in the modernization and the democratization of journalism in developing countries through journalist exchange programs or workshops (cf. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du développement international, 2015). The provision of expertise through technical development cooperation or journalism workshops is regarded as an "essential vehicle for the distribution of French norms and standards" (Pamment, 2013a, p. 24) and, by that, increasing the normative power of France.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet) and the Swedish Institute serve as main carriers of public diplomacy in Sweden. Even though Swedish public diplomacy comprises more organizations (see sub-chapter 6.1.2), research has focused on these two main bodies so far. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs engages in a 'quiet conduct' of public diplomacy, the Swedish Institute is "the public face of Sweden's overseas image" (Pamment, 2013b, p. 99). Pamment (2013b, p. 104) points to a clear role division between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute: Whereas the Ministry is entrusted with the task of political advocacy and defines the public diplomacy strategy, its contents and its application, the Swedish Institute assumes a supporting role and handles primarily promotional tasks. Within the ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are two units responsible for public diplomacy: the Department for Export Promotion and the Internal Market (Enheten för främjande och EU:s inre marknad – UD-FIM) as well as the Department for Communication (Kommunikationsenheten – UD-KOM). The latter communicates on the work of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swedish foreign, security and trade policy as well as its engagement in development cooperation towards the media and the general public in Sweden and abroad. In contrast, the Department for Export Promotion and the Internal Market promotes the image of Sweden and Swedish interests abroad, particularly with regard to the areas of trade and investment. It chairs the Council for the Promotion of Sweden (Nämnden för Sverigefrämjande i utlandet - NSU). "The NSU is not so much a public diplomacy actor as coordinator of promotional resources under a national interest heavily informed by economic priorities" (Pamment, 2013b, p. 102), that also comprises the Swedish Institute, Business Sweden, Visit Sweden, the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications and the Ministry of Culture (Kulturdepartementet). Formed in 1995, the Council for the Promotion of Sweden still constitutes the most important forum for coordinating Swedish promotional efforts (cf. Pamment, 2014, p. 5).

The Swedish Institute was created in 1945 based on the model of the British Council. In his doctoral thesis, Glover (2011) examines the history of the government agency on the basis of archival sources and communication materials by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute. He argues that the newly founded Swedish Institute faced a number of tensions in its early years: As a public-private joint venture it was confronted with struggles between public and private stakeholders and it faced the decision between focusing on a more general representation of Sweden opposed to a more

overtly commercial communication of the country abroad. Economic stability as well as well as an increase in exports marked the time period from 1954 to 1961. These developments went along with growing expenditures on international development aid and the foreign perception of Sweden as a neutral country “acting as a force of good in the world” (Hilson, 2012, p. 700).

In the 1960s, the government officially recognized the Swedish Institute and allocated more resources to its task of “promot[ing] Swedish interests abroad, and project[ing] Swedish values and experiences internationally” (Glover, 20143, pp. 4-5). While the Swedish Institute had operated as a public-private organization, funded by both public and private capital since its foundation, it was turned into a non-governmental organization completely funded by the state in 1970. This reorganization placed new economic demands of the Swedish Institute: It had to manage an increasing number of government-assigned tasks without the financial assistance of the private sector. (cf. Glover, 2013, p. 6) The extended mission of the Swedish Institute included for example the communication and relationship building with new, particularly developing countries. After the fall of the Berlin wall, the funding of the Swedish Institute has been increased to intensify relationships with neighboring countries in the east as well as assisting these countries in strengthening their ties with the EU. The 2000s were marked by a stronger accentuation of the Swedish Institute’s promotion efforts. (cf. Swedish Institute, n.d.a)

The analysis of the most important French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations reveals that both the French and the Swedish foreign ministry assume a central role in public diplomacy, and coordinate a network of government agencies. The literature review highlights the relevance of the government agencies Institut Français as well as Swedish Institute in the public diplomacy of the respective country.

#### **4.2.2 External environments of public diplomacy organizations**

To address the question which external factors influence French and Swedish public diplomacy understanding and practice, this sub-chapter comparatively analyzes the political and economic infrastructure of the two countries as well as the political, cultural and media environments French and Swedish organizations operate in (see sub-chapter 2.3.2).

##### *Infrastructure of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

To comparatively analyze the infrastructure of France and Sweden, this section explores two aspects in particular: 1) the countries’ political system and 2) the level of economic development. The president is the powerful center of France’s political system. The head of the state has the sole power of appointing the prime minister and dissolving the parliament. (cf. Kempf, 2009, pp. 352-353) Both the president and the parliament are directly elected by the French citizens. This can lead to a situation of cohabitation in which the president belongs to a different party than the prime minister as a representative of the ruling party in the National Assembly (*Assemblée nationale*), the lower house of the bicameral French parliament. As head of the cabinet, the prime minister serves as a link between the president and the members of the government. Members of the government have undergone a transition from political decision-makers to the helping hand of the president. (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 360-361) They are usually recruited from the upper echelons of the civil service, the ‘Grand Corps de l’Etat’. Kempf (2009) points to a close intertwining between the Grandes Ecoles, the Grand Corps de L’Etat and the political system, creating an elite-driven political class in France.

France has a bicameral parliament, consisting of the National Assembly (representatives directly elected) and the Senate (its delegates represent the French Départements). While the National Assembly usually decides on the adoption or refusal of laws, the role of the Senate is often restricted to suggesting amendments that take regional and local peculiarities and problems into consideration. In comparison to other West European countries, the French parliament has comparably little power<sup>108</sup> – in specific policy fields the government can even pass orders of the minister without parliamentary scrutiny. (cf. Kempf, 2009, pp. 362-367)

The French party system is characterized by a ‘bipolarization’ (cf. Borella, 1990), dividing parties in two almost equally strong political blocks: Left-of-center parties including François Hollande’s Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste), the Green Party (Europe Ecologie Les Verts), the now marginalized Parti Communiste Français as well as a number of small socialist parties. The centre-right block comprises for instance Nicolas Sarkozy’s Republican Party (Les Républicains, formerly l’Union pour un mouvement populaire) and the Christian Democratic Party (Parti chrétien-démocrate). The political block building results from the direct election of the president as well as majority voting system that makes the formation of electoral alliances necessary<sup>109</sup>. The block system leads to a confrontation-oriented style of politics and a high conflict intensity (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 121). After the Social Party had been dominating French politics in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the Republicans took over the political power in 1995. It was only in 2014 that a member of Socialist Power, François Hollande, was voted president again. (cf. Kempf, 2009, pp. 374-376) At the far right, the Front National has gained a lot in popularity after the announcement of Marine Le Pen as new president of the party in 2011. In the election of the European Parliament in 2014, the anti-European and populist party gained 25% of the French votes.

Sweden takes the form of a parliamentary representative democratic constitutional monarchy. The monarch, currently King Carl XVI Gustaf, is the head of state, but does neither exercise political power nor participate in political life. His or her scope of action is limited to symbolic and ceremonial tasks. (cf. Jahn, 2009, p. 109; Sweden.se, 2014) The parliament (Riksdag) plays a powerful role in the political system of Sweden. Its presiding officer (Riksdagens talman) appoints the prime minister and entrusts him or her with the formation of the government. Policy-making in Sweden is characterized by a consensus-oriented, cooperative approach to governance. All government decisions are taken collectively. This consensus orientation originates from a long history of minority coalitions governing the country<sup>110</sup>. Sweden’s cabinet consists of one prime minister and 23 ministers. In comparison to other West European states, the ministries’ scope of action is quite restricted, while the public administration enjoys a high degree of autonomy<sup>111</sup>. (cf. Jahn, 2009, pp.113-115)

In the vast majority of cases, the government initiates legislative proposals, even though this right is also formally granted to the members of the parliament, private citizens, special interest groups and public authorities (cf. Government Offices of Sweden, 2014b). Prior to drafting a legislative proposal, the government assigns a commission or committee of inquiry, including experts, politicians, and public officials, that investigates the respective matter and operates independently of the government (cf. Government Offices of Sweden, 2015). Based on the recommendations provided by the commission or committee of inquiry, the government or the respective ministry consults all parties

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<sup>108</sup> The power of the French parliament is significantly greater in a period of cohabitation than if the president and the prime minister belong to the same political party (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 367).

<sup>109</sup> The attempt to establish The Democratic Mouvement (*Mouvement démocrate*) as a third political force between the two political blocks in 2007 presidential election failed (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 376).

<sup>110</sup> Sweden is currently governed by a left-of-centre minority coalition (cf. Sweden.se, 2014a).

<sup>111</sup> The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs constitutes an exemption, as it is also responsible for the representations of Sweden abroad (cf. Jahn, 2009, p. 115).



that may be affected by a proposed law. These referral groups include government agencies, opposition parties, local government authorities, advocacy groups, as well as the public. Both the legislative proposal and critical comments by referral bodies are forwarded to the Riksdag whose members decide on the adoption of a law. (cf. Government Offices of Sweden, 2014b) The legislative process reflects the consensus orientation of Swedish policy-making, as it already seeks to include all political positions at the proposal stage (cf. Jahn, 2009, p. 119).

Swedish political parties with representation in the Swedish<sup>112</sup> or European parliament can be allocated to a left-to-right political spectrum: The Left Party (Vänsterpartiet), the Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti), the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna) as well as the Feminist Initiative (Feministiskt initiativ) are left of the center. The moderate party (Moderata samlingspartiet), the Center Party (Centerpartiet) as well as the Liberal People's Party (Folkpartiet Liberalerna) constitute the political center, where as the conservative Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) as well as the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) are located right-of-center. After the Social Democratic Party had been the dominating force in Swedish politics for many decades, it has experienced a decline in votes since the end of the 1990s. From 2010 to 2014 Sweden was governed by a centre-right alliance, followed by a minority left-of-centre coalition, elected in September 2014 (cf. Sweden.se, 2014a).

The semi-presidential democracy France allocates a lot more power to head of state than the parliamentary democratic constitutional monarchy Sweden. While the president constitutes the center of political power in France, the Swedish parliament holds comparatively far-reaching competences. The two countries differ substantially with regard to their approach to decision making: While the Swedish political system relies primarily on a cooperative, consensus-oriented approach to decision-making, France draws on a more confrontation-oriented approach to politics. The level of centralization is another important factor that distinguishes the political system of Sweden from France: Sub-national authorities enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in Sweden than in France.

**Table 5: The political systems of France and Sweden**

	France	Sweden
<b>Political system</b>	semi-presidential democracy	parliamentary democratic constitutional monarchy
<b>Distribution of power</b>	powerful president Low level of autonomy of sub-national authorities	powerful parliament Higher level of autonomy of sub-national authorities
<b>Approach to decision-making</b>	Confrontation-oriented	Consensus-oriented

(Source: own depiction)

This study draws on the Human Development Index (HDI) to analyze the economic development of the selected member states, as it goes beyond solely economic measurements and proposes an index that is sensitive to the level of welfare maintained in a society (cf. Gerhards & Hölscher, 2005, p. 50; United Nations Development Programme, n.d.a). The HDI looks at three dimensions: the life

<sup>112</sup> Political parties need to gather at least four percent of the votes to enter the national parliament.

expectancy within a country, the expected and the mean years of schooling as well as the gross national income per capita<sup>113</sup> (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.a). Both France and Sweden are among the countries that are allocated to the group of very high development. France occupies rank 20 out of 187 countries and territories analyzed. With a HDI value of 0.884, France ranks above average of the OECD countries and below average of the countries within the group of very high development<sup>114</sup>. (cf. United Nations Development Programme, n.d.a) Sweden shows a slightly higher level of human development with a HDI of 0.898, equaling rank 12 out 187 countries investigated (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.b).

In addition to the HDI, that does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment” (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.a), the United Nations Development Programme has introduced an inequality-adjusted HDI. Both France (inequality-adjusted HDI value of 0.804) and Sweden (inequality-adjusted HDI value of 0.84) show a comparably low level of inequality (cf. United Nations Development Programme, n.d.a, n.d.b). The Gender Inequality Index (GII) explores inequalities between women and men in greater detail. The GI value draws on three analytical dimension: 1) the reproductive health of women, measured on the basis of maternal mortality and adolescent birth rate, 2) the empowerment of women, indicated by the share of parliamentary seats held by women as well as the gender balance regarding attainments in secondary and higher education, and 3) the labour market participation rate for women and men (cf. United Nations Development Programme, n.d.b). Gender equality is strongly pronounced in Sweden, which occupies position 4 out of 149 countries analyzed (GII value of 0.054). Gender inequality is also comparably low in France, ranking on 12<sup>th</sup> position (GII value of 0.08). (cf. United Nations Development Programme, n.d.a, n.d.b)

#### *Political environment of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

As outlined in sub-chapter 2.3.2, the political environment of public diplomacy organizations goes beyond the structural conditions of a political system. The comparative analysis of the political environment explores the external relations of French and Swedish governments and, more specifically, their relationship with the EU.

France has actively engaged in European and transatlantic integration efforts after the Second World War (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 398). It is a founding member of the EU, the UN as well as NATO. Brincker and Schmidt (2011) describe France’s approach in the EU as paradoxical: On the one hand, French politicians like Robert Schuman and Giscard d’Estaing have formulated initiatives to foster the process of European integration, on the other hand, developments in France, such as the referendum on the European constitution, have hampered the realization of European projects. France promotes the idea of a ‘Europe of nation states’ or a European confederation, in which national sovereignty remains central. Since the French revolution, sovereignty has been perceived as a basis of “democratic participation and as the legitimization of the French state” (Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 123, see also Woyke, 2000, p. 12). Moreover, Brincker and Schmidt (2011) point to the “socially integrative role [of] the nation as a source of identity and unity” (p. 121). French politicians and citizens regard a transfer of powers to the European level as a loss of national autonomy and national capacity to act (cf.

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<sup>113</sup> The HDI draws on the following sources of data: United Nations Population Division, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics, and World Bank (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2014b).

<sup>114</sup> The average HDI value of very high development countries is 0.890. The average HDI value of OECD countries is 0.876. (cf. United Nations Development Programme, n.d.a)

Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 121). The importance of national sovereignty is also mirrored by France's endorsement of a strong role of the intergovernmental EU bodies European Council and Council of the EU. In addition to the support for a strong, intergovernmental executive, both the French Republican Party and the Socialist Party advocate for a more powerful EP to improve the democratic nature of the EU. In contrast to that, French politicians remain sceptical about the extension of majority voting to more policy areas as well as strengthening the position of the EC. (cf. *ibid.*, p. 138; Sauder, 1997, p. 223) In addition to the notion of a 'Europe of nation states', France also promotes the idea of a 'Europe of results' or a 'Europe of projects' respectively that highlights concrete results of European activities. France endorses an intensified cooperation among single member states in specific policy areas in order to make the EU "more capable to act as well as a stronger and more visible global player" (Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, pp. 134-135). The idea of a core of member states that serve as the engine of the EU has also been voiced by a number of intellectuals, including Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003b). To France, international actions to strengthen Europe's role in the world may also include military operations (cf. Deloche-Gaudez, 2004, p. 120).

France seeks to maximize its own national interests through engaging in the EU (cf. Lequesne, 1997, p. 309). Despite its geopolitically weakened position after the end of the Cold War<sup>115</sup>, France perceives itself as an exceptional actor in the international environment and seeks to acquire or rather reclaim a central position in Europe (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 127). As a consequence, France aims at preventing a power shift towards the East European member states. Another important goal of France's EU policy is to establish Europe as a counterbalance to a U.S.-American hegemony through strengthening the European Defence and Security Policy as well as acting more autonomously from the US (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 128, 150; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2004)<sup>116</sup>. Globalization posits a fear of the "'Americanization' of the French society" (Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 160) and a perceived threat to the French economy and social welfare (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 148-149). These perceived threats are reflected by the model of a "protective and secure Europe" (Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 160).

French political parties do not neglect the EU as a polity. However, they are divided on the course of European integration and single EU policies: While center-right parties like the Republicans express the strongest support of European integration, the Socialists demur conflicts between the French economic and social model on the one hand and the influence of liberalization and deregulation on the EU economic and social policy on the other hand<sup>117</sup>. In addition to that, there is a right-wing, Anti-European political force gaining strength with the increasing popularity of the Front National.

Ménudier (2004) argues that "France is rich in ideas and good will, but because of its concept of sovereignty and its defense of national interests it is also a somehow inconvenient partner for the other member states" (p. 135). The conflicting opinions on the EU on political level and among French citizens (see section 'Cultural environment of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations' below) result in different, coexisting conceptions of Europe and European integration, including a 'protective and secure Europe' as well as a 'Europe of projects'. Today, French politicians are more

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<sup>115</sup> By the end of the 1970s, all former French colonies in Africa have become independent. Due to the reunification of Germany, France lost its continental leadership role in Europe (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, pp. 127-128; Kempf, 2009, p. 398).

<sup>116</sup> However, French Foreign policy was coined by a rapprochement to the USA and the NATO during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy from 2007 to 2012 (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 399).

<sup>117</sup> The failed referendum on a European Constitution in 2005 reflected the French citizens' opposition of economic liberalization. French had experienced a period of high unemployment rates and low economic growth in France prior to the referendum. (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 140)

pragmatic and willing to accept European solutions and adapt their international actions to the new structures of the EU. Furthermore, the European enlargement waves in 2004, 2007 and 2013 have reintroduced and strengthened the idea of a flexible European integration ('Europe à la carte', see sub-chapter 3.3). (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 126, 159)

The self-conception of Sweden and the political debate preceding the EU accession of Sweden in 1995 play a key role for understanding the Swedish EU policy today. Democracy, modernity, prosperity and neutrality are at the core of the Swedish national identity (see for instance Child, 1936). Swedish national identity is closely linked to the conception of the 'Swedish Model': The Swedish Model combines a strong state with emancipated and autonomous citizens as well as an egalitarian social order. Welfare (välfärdssamhället<sup>118</sup>) as a key element of the Swedish model connects solidarity and equality with prosperity and progress. (cf. Trägårdh, 2002, p. 131) Trägårdh (2002) describes the Swedish Model as an utopia, an idealistic vision, that has been translated into "a powerful national myth" (p. 131). Swedish politicians have deliberately depicted the Swedish Model as an alternative concept to continental European ideas of federalism and subsidiarity and promoted it internationally as a model to be emulated (cf. Glover, 2011; Marklund, 2009, p. 264; Trägårdh, 2002, p. 132, 150). Foreign relations of Sweden are characterized by a strong commitment to the UN and the commitment to promoting free trade in the context of the WTO on the one hand and a policy of neutrality and non-alignment on the other hand (cf. Jahn, 2009, pp. 141-143, Trägårdh, 2002, p. 152). After the end of the Cold War, the Swedish policy of non-alignment appeared to be less relevant (cf. Jahn, 2009, p. 142) and even "quaintly anachronistic" (Trägårdh, 2002, p. 158) in the new political context. While Sweden still does not pursue NATO membership, it has cooperated with the military alliance in the framework of the 'Partnership for Peace' program since 1994 and has for instance contributed to NATO peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan (cf. NATO, 2014). Moreover, the Nordic region constitutes a focal point of Swedish foreign relations. Sweden, engages in the inter-parliamentary body Nordic Council as well as the intergovernmental body Nordic Council of Ministers along with Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland. The cooperation among Nordic countries aims at enabling the free movement of people or for instance strengthening economic cooperation. (cf. Jahn, 2009, p. 143) The 'Year of the Baltic Countries' in 2000, that aimed at "preparing [Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania] for membership of the EU" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000, p. 1), marked the starting point of an intensified commitment to relations with the Baltic region (cf. Jahn, 2009, p. 143).

Sweden is among the founding members of the European Free Trade Association, established in 1960. The British application for EC membership in the 1960s stimulated a first discussion on joining the EU in Sweden. Particularly, left-of-centre political forces painted a picture of a conservative Western Europe and stressed the superiority of Swedish democracy and welfare in comparison to the EC<sup>119</sup> (Trägårdh, 2002, p. 154, see also Ekström, Myrdal & Pålsson, 1962, p. 33). The first debate on EU accession resulted in a rejection of EU membership in 1971. The discussion on EU membership was taken up again in the 1990s under fundamentally different domestic circumstances. While Sweden had not only perceived itself as one of the most democratic and equal, but also one of the richest countries in the world<sup>120</sup> in the 1960s (cf. Dahl, 1984), an economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s questioned the coexistence of "the economic and egalitarian ethos" (Trägårdh, 2002, p. 152) that had long coined Swedish national identity.

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<sup>118</sup> Literally translated, the term 'välfärdssamhället' means 'welfare society', pointing to a more or less absent distinction of state and society in the Swedish language (cf. Trägårdh, 2002, p. 159).

<sup>119</sup> The publication 'Vi och Västeuropa' [We and Western Europe] by Ekström, Myrdal & Pålsson (1962) provided for example a comparison of the Swedish Model with the EC and had an important influence on the debate on EU membership.

<sup>120</sup> Trägårdh (2002, p. 151) points to the Gross Domestic Product as a part of national identity and national pride.

The economic crisis was a major factor in the debate on EU membership preceding the referendum in November 1994. Both conservatives and liberal parties declared themselves in favor for a Swedish EU membership. The conservative politician Carl Bildt, at that time prime minister, connected the EU accession to the economic success of Sweden, arguing that free trade and deregulation paved the way for prosperity, while the continuing reliance on the model of the welfare state equaled economic stagnation. In addition to the free market, Bildt also highlighted peace, individual freedom, the rule of law as well as the principle of subsidiarity as assets in his pro-European narrative. (cf. Trägårdh, 2002, pp. 160-164) In addition to that, the Christian Democratic Party stressed solidarity and community as key aspects of the EU project and highlighted the leading role of Christian Democrats such as Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman in the process of European integration (cf. Arbøl, 1992). Nationalism played a pivotal role in both narratives supporting EU membership and counter-narratives. The Left Party, which strongly opposed EU accession, emphasized the historical link between Swedish nationalism and democracy, humanity and solidarity (cf. Karlbom, 1993, p. 14). Carl Bildt, on the contrary, painted a picture of an “ugly nationalism”, connected to xenophobia (cf. Trägårdh, 2002, p. 163). The EU-sceptical camp did also comprise the Green Party as well as parts of the Center and the Social Democratic Party. “For the no-side, then, social justice, equality, solidarity, individual autonomy, gender equality, freedom to show solidarity with the poorer countries in the world, all this depended on the continued existence of the nation state” (Trägårdh, 2002, p. 169). The political parties opposing EU membership concentrated on the differences between Sweden and Europe, highlighting Swedish standards regarding democracy, welfare and equality (see for instance Jacobsson, 1997) and, by that, drawing on arguments that had already been brought forward in the discussion on EU membership in the 1960s. Furthermore, the Left Party expressed concern with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, which it associated with a “‘submission’ of local communities and nations to the central rule of Brussels” (Trägårdh, 2002, pp. 166-167).

Both the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party were divided on a possible Swedish EU membership. The EU-sceptical wing of the Center Party criticized the EU for being too market- and business-oriented as well as not taking the concerns of the little people in the countryside adequately into consideration. (cf. Trägårdh, 2002, p. 164). The supporters of the Social Democratic Party tipped the scales in the referendum on EU membership. The yes- and the no-side of the Social Democratic Party both built their arguments on the Swedish national identity – while the pro-European side relied on the aspects of economic success and modernity, the counter-European wing put Swedish exceptionalism in the focus of their narrative (see for instance Greider, 1993). Pro-European Social Democrats including Ingvar Carlsson, Mona Sahlin and Allan Larsson perceived EU membership as an opportunity of actively shaping specific EU policies, for instance in the area of employment, in order to not leave the field to the Conservative Party (cf. Carlsson, 1994; Trägårdh, 2002, pp. 170-171).

On November 13, 1994 a slight majority of 52% of Swedish citizens voted in favor of EU membership. Public opinion polls indicated that economy, employment as well as peace constituted the most important reasons for voting in favor of the EU accession (cf. Trägårdh, 2002, p. 130, 162). Sweden has experienced rapid economic growth after it had joined the EU, especially in the information technology sector (cf. *ibid.*, p. 172). Since its EU accession, Sweden has held the Presidency of the Council of the EU twice, from January to June 2001 and from July to December 2009. The presidency provides the respective member state with more power to shape political outcomes. This applies particularly to smaller member states. (cf. Langdal & van Sydow, 2009, p. 4) At the same time, the presiding country takes the role of a broker that should place community interests before national ones (cf. Kirchner, 1992). In 2001, Sweden concentrated on employment, environment and enlargement. The focus on enlargement was closely connected to strengthening

cooperation between the EU and Russia as well as preparing Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia for EU membership (cf. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000)<sup>121</sup>. The priority issues on the agenda of the Swedish Presidency in 2009 took up a number of issues, including economy and employment as well as the development of a Baltic Sea Strategy, that were already on the agenda of Sweden's first Council Presidency. In addition to that, Sweden also addressed issues of climate change, justice, freedom and security in Europe as well as open institutional and constitutional questions after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty. This agenda contained both issues central to Sweden and issues that mattered on a European level. (cf. Langdal & van Sydow, 2009, pp. 7-15)

Langdal and van Sydow (2009) argue that Sweden views European integration in a rather pragmatic way and focuses on “delivering policy results that [...] are hard to achieve nationally” (p. 7). Sweden has remained rather reluctant to discuss and position itself on aspects of the institutional design of the EU. While Swedish political organizations support further EU enlargement, they remain more hesitant towards a deeper political integration. (cf. Langdal & van Sydow, 2009, p. 7)

The history and the national identity play a vital role in the EU conception of both France and Sweden. France perceives its EU membership as an opportunity of maximizing its national interests, receiving economic protection against threats of globalization, and establishing a counter balance to the perceived U.S.-American hegemony in the world. At the same time, it has always been reluctant to transferring national sovereignty to the EU, making France a paradoxical member state that has both advanced and hampered European integration. Sweden strongly advocates free trade and engages in the EU to achieve policy outcomes together with other nations that could not be attained by individual countries. However, Swedish politicians have often pursued a wait-and-see approach to European integration. Not least, because they feared the need to compromise important Swedish values like “social justice, equality, solidarity, [or] individual autonomy” (Trägårdh, 2002, p. 169).

Today, more ideological perspectives on the EU, that were rooted in the countries' history and self-conception, have given way to a more pragmatic approach to EU policy-making. In this context, France particularly stresses the idea of a ‘Europe of projects’ and ‘Europe à la carte’ to position the EU as a strong and visible international actor. Sweden promotes further enlargement, but remains hesitant towards deeper political integration.

#### *Cultural environment of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

Schwartz's (2006) cross-national comparison of basic cultural value orientations shows that French respondents accentuate intellectual autonomy and affective autonomy<sup>122</sup>, but also egalitarianism. To a lesser degree, French cultural value orientations place emphasis on harmony. (cf. Schwartz, 2006, p. 156) The cultural map, produced by Inglehart and Welzel (n.d.), reveals that French citizens rather emphasize self-expression values like tolerance and equality than survival values. Similarly, the French show a slight preference for secular-rational values that place less emphasis on religion, authority or traditional family values.

<sup>121</sup> Prior to the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU, Sweden conducted The Year of the Baltic Years' in 2000 (cf. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000).

<sup>122</sup> Schwartz (2006) differentiates between intellectual autonomy, “encourage[ing] individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently” (p. 140), and affective autonomy, “encourage[ing] individuals to pursue affectively positive experiences for themselves” (p. 140).

The European Social Survey inquires the relevance respondents attribute to basic human values<sup>123</sup>. More than 80% of the French respondents consider at least somewhat important to be loyal to friends (91%), that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities (92%), to understand different people (83%), to protect the environment (82%), and to help and care for others' well-being (81%). Moreover, more than eight out of ten French respondents agree on the importance of having a good time (80%), and being humble and modest (81%). Not least, three quarters of the French interviews perceive it as important to have a strong government that ensures safety (76%), make own decisions and be free (74%), live in a safe environment (75%) as well as to think new ideas and be creative (74%). The item 'to be rich and have money' appears to be least important (12%) to the French respondents. The relevance of these basic values corresponds to the findings by Schwartz (2006) as well as Inglehart and Welzel (n.d.). The values that are most important to French respondents relate to egalitarianism (for instance caring for others' well-being and understanding different people), intellectual autonomy (for instance new ideas and creativity), affective autonomy (for instance to have a good time), harmony (for instance environmental protection), but also hierarchy (support of a strong government). The basic human values identified in the European Social Survey can be primarily linked to self-expression (for instance environmental protection, caring for others' well-being, support for equality), but also point to a number of indicators that emphasize survival (e.g. living in a secure environment). The European Social Survey reveals that half of the French citizens (50%) belong to a particular religion or denomination. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the French interviewees are moderately religious ( $\bar{x}=4,7$ )<sup>124</sup>.

The analysis of basic cultural value orientations, proposed by Schwartz (2006), reveals that Swedes stress egalitarianism, harmony and intellectual autonomy. To a lesser degree, Swedish respondents emphasize affective autonomy. Swedish respondents hardly focus on embeddedness and oppose both mastery and hierarchy. (cf. Schwartz, 2006, pp. 156-157) The analysis by Inglehart and Welzel (n.d.) shows that Sweden is the country with the highest values in self-expression values, strongly emphasizing environmental sustainability, tolerance, and for instance equality. On the 'traditional/secular-rational' continuum, it is placed at the secular-rational-end of the continuum together with Japan. (cf. Inglehart & Welzel, n.d.)

According to the European Social Survey, more than 80% of the Swedish respondents perceive it at least somewhat important to be loyal to friends (96%), help and care for others' well-being (93%), that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities (95%) to understand different people (89%), to protect the environment (90%), and to think new ideas and be creative (83%). It is at least somewhat important to seek fun and things that give pleasure to eight out of ten Swedes. Three quarters of the Swedish interviewees consider it as important to be humble and modest (76%). These findings illustrate that the Swedish respondents highlight primarily egalitarianism, and to a lesser degree harmony, intellectual as well as affective autonomy. Similarly, the results disclose a preference for self-expression values. Three out of ten Swedish respondents (30%) belong to a particular religion or denomination. On average, the Swedes do not consider themselves as religious ( $\bar{x}=3,2$ ). These figures hint at a more secular-rational value orientation among the Swedish respondents.

Both France and Sweden belong to the West European cluster identified by Schwartz (2006). This region is coined by a high economic development, environmental awareness as well as a dominance of the democratic welfare state (cf. Ester, Halman & Seuren, 1994; Schwartz, 2006, p. 158). While the countries in the West European cluster are united by the accentuation of intellectual autonomy,

<sup>123</sup> The secondary data analysis of the European Social Survey 2014 data has grouped the answer options 'very important', 'important' and 'somewhat important' into the one option: 'at least somewhat important'.

<sup>124</sup> Religiousness measured on a scale from 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious).

egalitarianism and harmony, Schwartz (2006) also points to “substantial cultural variation within the region” (p. 158). In this regard, France shows a higher hierarchy orientation than most West European countries. Inglehart and Welzel (n.d.) do not group Sweden and France into one cluster. Sweden is part of the cluster Protestant Europe that places “the strongest emphasis on secular-rational values and self-expression values” (Inglehart & Welzel, n.d.). France is grouped into the Catholic Europe cluster that generates lower scores for self-expression and secular-rational values. However, France’s position on the cultural map reveals that it sits at the borderline of the Catholic Europe cluster to countries of the Protestant Europe cluster like Switzerland or the Netherlands and countries of the English Speaking cluster like Great Britain and the USA. (cf. Inglehart & Welzel, n.d.). The findings of the European Social Survey support these observations. The importance attributed to basic human values discloses a stronger orientation towards self-expression and secular-rational values in Sweden in comparison to France. Both the cultural value orientations of Sweden and France are compatible to the values of the EU, as laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (see appendix B4).

Both Schwartz (2006) and Inglehart and Welzel (n.d.) draw on the nation state as unit of cross-cultural analysis<sup>125</sup>. This approach, however, does not take the multiculturalism of both societies and the individuals living within them (see for instance Welsch, 2002) into consideration. This holds especially true for the EU, which puts the free movement of people and cultural diversity at the core of its identity (see sub-chapter 3.3). A more differentiated exploration of cultural value orientations provides an opportunity of overcoming this methodological problem. The data set of the European Social Survey allows for a separate analysis of cultural values held by women and men, different ethnic groups, people with different religious affiliations, immigrants or for instance respondents that consider themselves as part of a minority. It would, however, go beyond the scope of this contextual analysis to provide a detailed analysis of the different segments of society and the cultural value orientations they embrace.

Whereas the previous section has compared general value orientations of French and Swedish citizens, this part concentrates on the political culture and the political participation in the two member states. This also includes French and Swedish citizen’s support for the EU and European integration as well as their identification with Europe. French political culture is pervaded by contradictions and conflict. The French nation as well as French history provides an important source of identification for its citizens (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 121; Kempf, 2009, p. 391). At the same time, there is a perceived large gap between the citizens and the ‘classe politique’ (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 121), that is reflected by a very low trust in both national government and parliament<sup>126</sup> (cf. Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp. 52-54). Brincker and Schmidt (2011) point to a “co-existence of a mistrustful attitude among large numbers of citizens towards the state and its interference in the economy and society on the one hand and the belief in the absolute prerogative of the (central) state to solve social and political problems” (p. 121). While the French respondents of the European Social

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<sup>125</sup> In his analysis of basic cultural value orientations, Schwartz (2006, pp. 153-154) has not only compared different countries, but also analyzed subsamples within countries that differed with regard to gender, age and occupation. He acknowledges differences between the single subsamples within one country, which are, however, much smaller than the cultural distances between entire countries. Therefore, Schwartz (2006) regards countries as “meaningful cultural units”, if it is ensured “that the samples from different countries are matched on critical characteristics” (p. 154). Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel (n.d.) argue with regard to the 2010 to 2014 edition of the World Values Survey that “the *within*-societal differences in people’s values are dwarfed by a factor five to ten by the *between*-societal differences” (italics in original).

<sup>126</sup> The results of the Eurobarometer 84 survey, conducted in autumn 2015, discloses that only 20% of the French respondents tend to trust the national parliament and only 19% of the French respondents tend to trust the national government.



Survey stress the importance of living in a democratic country ( $\bar{x}=8,3$ )<sup>127</sup>, they do not express a high level of satisfaction with regard to the way democracy works in their country ( $\bar{x}=4,3$ )<sup>128</sup>. Whereas many French respondents value that national elections are free and fair ( $\bar{x}=7,4$ )<sup>129</sup> and that citizens are able to express their political opinion without restrictions ( $\bar{x}=6,7$ )<sup>130</sup>, they are fairly disappointed with the performance of the national government ( $\bar{x}=2,9$ ). The respondents do not feel that the national government explains decision adequately to its voters ( $\bar{x}=4,8$ ). Similarly, many interviewees do not think that the governments takes sufficient measures to protect all citizens from poverty ( $\bar{x}=4,5$ ) and reduce differences in income levels ( $\bar{x}=4,4$ )<sup>131</sup>. The French economic situation in the 2000s was coined by low economic growth and a high unemployment rate, which has led to a growing insecurity and frustration in the French population. The citizens' frustration resulted for instance in a number of riots in suburbs in 2005. (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 122, 140)

The low trust in the parliament and political parties are mirrored by a low level of political participation in established channels (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 392). Only a small number of French citizens organize themselves in political parties and/or trade unions<sup>132</sup> (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 123). Whereas 61% of the French respondents of the European Social Survey indicate to have voted in the last election, comparably few interviewees have taken part in a public demonstration (14%) or worked in a political party or action group (5%) in the past 12 months. Existing trade unions are highly fragmented and differ with regard to their goals, tools and membership structures. They have comparably little influence on political decision-making. (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 122; Kempf, 2009, p. 389) In contrast to trade unions, social movements, particularly on subjects neglected by the political elite like for instance the nuclear phase-out, gained ground in the last two decades (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 392). In addition to that, people primarily engage in temporary citizens' initiatives at the local level (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 392-393)<sup>133</sup>.

Jahn (2009, p. 134) describes the political culture of Sweden as a cooperative representation and network culture. Even though the trust in national political institutions has decreased since the 1990s (cf. *ibid.*, p. 135), Swedish citizens still maintain a comparatively high level of trust in their parliament<sup>134</sup> (cf. European Social Survey; Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp. 52-54). The findings

<sup>127</sup> Importance of democracy measured on a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (extremely important), figure taken from the European Social Survey 2012, as no more recent data was available on this question

<sup>128</sup> Perception of democracy measured on a scale from 0 (very bad) to 10 (very good).

<sup>129</sup> Agreement to the statement 'National elections are free and fair' measured on a scale from 0 (not agree at all) to 10 (completely agree), figure taken from the European Social Survey 2012, as no more recent data was available on this question

<sup>130</sup> Agreement to the statement 'Everyone is free to express their opinion freely' measured on a scale from 0 (not agree at all) to 10 (completely agree), figure taken from the European Social Survey 2012, as no more recent data was available on this question

<sup>131</sup> Agreement to all statements measured on a scale from 0 (not agree at all) to 10 (completely agree), figure taken from the European Social Survey 2012, as no more recent data was available on this question

<sup>132</sup> French trade unions only represent eight percent of the French workers (cf. Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p.123). Kempf (2009) traces the decreasing willingness to engage in trade unions back to an increasing unemployment rate, the continuing party affiliation of trade unions as well as the perception that French trade unions have not adapted to the current social and economic challenges. Moreover, issues like the minimum wage or working time are not subject to collective bargaining, but regulated by the law. (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 389)

<sup>133</sup> France's political system has been coined by centralized structures since the French Revolution in 1789. Only in 1982, the French government introduced a law to empower the French regions, départements, and municipalities (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 395).

<sup>134</sup> The results of the Eurobarometer 84 survey, conducted in autumn 2015, disclose that 69% of the Swedish respondents tend to trust the national parliament. A smaller number of 55% of the Swedish respondents express trust towards the national government. The European Social Survey, conducted in 2014, has measured trust in national parliaments on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). The statistical analysis shows that the Swedish citizens trust their national parliament at least to some degree ( $\bar{x}=6,2$ ).

of the 7<sup>th</sup> wave of the European Social Survey, conducted in 2014, discloses that 68% of the Swedish respondents are at least quite interested in politics. Voting, petitions as well as volunteering in organizations appear to be the most common forms of political participation among the Swedish respondents: 86% of them claimed to have voted in the last election, 44% indicated to have signed a petition in the past 12 months, while 36% stated to have worked for an organization or association in the past 12 months. In contrast, only 11% of the respondents exclaimed to have taken part in a demonstration and merely 4% have engaged in a political party in the same time frame. These findings are in line with the observation by the public service broadcaster Sverige Television that points to a significant loss in party members in the last years (cf. Cederholm & Eliasson, 2010). Political representation, both with regard to parties and civil society organizations, is more elite-driven than based on initiatives at grassroots level (cf. Jahn, 2009; Lewin, 1992). This holds especially true for established, long-running parties like the Social Democratic Party (cf. Jahn, 2009).

The European Social Survey demonstrates that it is very important for Swedish respondents to live in a democracy ( $\bar{x}=9,4$ )<sup>135</sup>. Swedes are rather satisfied with the way democracy works in their country ( $\bar{x}=6,8$ )<sup>136</sup>. Furthermore, the survey shows that the Swedish respondents generally agree that the political system that they live in enables them to participate in free and fair elections ( $\bar{x}=9,0$ )<sup>137</sup> as well as to express their political opinion without restrictions ( $\bar{x}=9,0$ )<sup>138</sup>. The interviewees hold mixed feelings about the performance of the national government ( $\bar{x}=5,4$ ). They generally agree that the national governments protects the rights of minorities ( $\bar{x}=7,5$ ) and are mainly of the opinion that the national government explains decision to its voters ( $\bar{x}=6,9$ ). The statements that the national government protects all citizens against poverty ( $\bar{x}=6,2$ ) and that the national government takes measures to reduce difference in income levels ( $\bar{x}=6,0$ ) were met with less approval<sup>139</sup>.

Even though Sweden has witnessed a decline of trust in national political institutions, trust in the national parliament and the national government is significantly higher in Sweden than in France. Swedish citizens also express a higher level of satisfaction of how democracy works in their country compared to French citizens. Whereas political participation has decreased in both countries in the last years, there are still substantial differences between the two member states: Trade unions and associations play a much bigger role in Sweden than in France – both on the political level and among the citizenry. It is worth noting, however, that temporal citizens' initiatives at the local level have gained momentum in France in the last years.

The analysis of political cultural and participation in France has outlined that French citizens have little faith in national political institutions like the parliament or the government. The findings of the European Social Survey 2014 and the most recent Eurobarometer survey disclose that French citizens tend to trust the EU more the French national parliament<sup>140</sup>. The EU has an ambivalent image among

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<sup>135</sup> Importance of democracy measured on a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (extremely important).

<sup>136</sup> Perception of democracy measured on a scale from 0 (very bad) to 10 (very good).

<sup>137</sup> Agreement to the statement 'National elections are free and fair' measured on a scale from 0 (not agree at all) to 10 (completely agree), figure taken from the European Social Survey 2012, as no more recent data was available on this question

<sup>138</sup> Agreement to the statement 'Everyone is free to express their opinion freely' measured on a scale from 0 (not agree at all) to 10 (completely agree), figure taken from the European Social Survey 2012, as no more recent data was available on this question

<sup>139</sup> Agreement to all statements measured on a scale from 0 (not agree at all) to 10 (completely agree), figure taken from the European Social Survey 2012, as no more recent data was available on this question

<sup>140</sup> 26% of the French respondents of the Eurobarometer tend to trust in the EU, whereas 20% tend to trust the national parliament and 17% express trust in the national government (cf. Standard Eurobarometer 84 – Annex, 2015, p. 55). The European Social Survey, conducted in 2014, has measured trust in the national parliament and the EU on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). The mean scores for the national parliament

French citizens. While 35% of the respondents of the Eurobarometer survey perceive the image as positive, 38% have a neutral position towards the EU and 5% consider the EU image as negative (cf. Eurobarometer 84- Annex, 2015, p. 57). The more recent past has made clear that French citizens are sceptical and unsure about the future of the EU: Only a slight majority of 51% voted yes in the referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Brincker and Schmidt (2011, p. 121) trace this tight result back to the French understanding of sovereignty that is incompatible with the transfer of competences at the European level. Moreover, the French population rejected the European Constitution in a referendum in 2005. Kuhle (2005) relates the no votes to the economic situation in France, that was characterized by low economic growth and high unemployment, and a perceived 'neoliberal' character of the European Constitution (see also Brincker & Schmidt, 2011, p. 140). Today, French citizens are still indecisive if further European integration should be pursued or not ( $\bar{x}=5,0$ )<sup>141</sup>. This indecisiveness may be linked to a growing indifference of the French population towards the EU. While 61% of the French citizens feel as EU citizens (cf. Eurobarometer 84 – First Results, 2015, p. 32), only 42% of the French citizens voted in the latest election of the EP in 2014 (cf. European Parliament, n.d.).

Referenda on EU-related issues have demonstrated that Swedish citizens are divided on EU membership and European integration: Only a slight majority of 52% have voted in favor for EU membership in November 1994. As the Swedish government, the citizens remain sceptical of adopting the common currency and voted no (56%) in a referendum on joining the European Monetary Union. Both the most recent Eurobarometer survey and the European Social Survey 2014 reveal that Swedish citizens have more faith in national political organizations than in the EU. According to the Eurobarometer survey, a little less than half of the Swedish respondents (46%) tend to trust in the EU, compared to 69% who express trust in their national parliament as well as 55% who tend to trust in their national government (cf. Eurobarometer 84 –Annex, 2015, pp. 54-55). The European Social Survey shows that Swedish respondents have more faith in their national parliament ( $\bar{x}=6,2$ ) than in the EU ( $\bar{x}=4,7$ )<sup>142</sup>. There is thus reason to presume that Swedes generally tend to trust more in national than in international or re bodies. Thgionale data of the European Social Survey, however, also reveals that the respondents have the highest amount of trust in the UN ( $\bar{x}=6,4$ ).

The EU conjures up a positive image for 39% of the respondents of the Eurobarometer survey, while 36% perceive the EU image as neutral and another 25% regard it as negative (cf. Eurobarometer 84 – Annex, 2015, p. 57). Whereas three out of Swedes identify with Europe and feel like citizens of the EU (cf. *ibid.*, p. 4), they are divided on the question if European integration should go further ( $\bar{x}=4,7$ )<sup>143</sup>.

A number of scholars (see for instance Jahn, 2009; Trägårdh, 2002) have argued that Sweden is among the countries with the most negative perception of the EU. Topical data, taken from the Eurobarometer survey, suggests that Swedish and French citizens have a similar perception of the EU image. Moreover, there are a lot more Swedish respondents (46%) that express trust in the EU than French respondents (26%). Nonetheless, it should not be neglected that Swedish respondents have a lot more faith in their national political institutions than in EU bodies. The opposite is true for France: Less than

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( $\bar{x}=4,1$ ) and the EU ( $\bar{x}=4,7$ ) indicate that French respondents express more trust in the EU than in the national parliament.

<sup>141</sup> Agreement to further European integration measured on a scale from 0 (not agree at all) to 10 (completely agree).

<sup>142</sup> The European Social Survey measures trust in political bodies on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).

<sup>143</sup> Agreement to further European integration measured on a scale from 0 (not agree at all) to 10 (completely agree).

one fourth of the French interviewees tends to trust its national parliament, only 19% express trust in their national government. This low level of confidence in national political institutions can be directly related to the perceived gap between French citizens and the political class in France. Data drawn from the European Social Survey reveal that both Swedish and French respondents are divided on further European integration. Three out of four Swedes and six out of ten French citizens, however, consider themselves European citizens and identify with the EU.

### *Media environment of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

This study draws on Sriramesh and Verčič (2009) to depict the media environment in the selected EU member states France and Sweden (see sub-chapter 2.3.2). In a first step, it explores the structure of the media market in the respective country, the degree of editorial freedom as well as the influence of economic and political forces on journalism. In a second step, it explores the role and self-conception of journalists in both France and Sweden including the journalists' tasks, working conditions, norms and professional standards. This analysis corresponds to the dimensions media control and media access. In a third step, this section will provide a comparative perspective on the media use in France and Sweden on the basis of the Eurobarometer survey. While this section focuses on national, regional and local print, broadcast and online media in the selected member states, sub-chapter 3.3 explores the development of transnational media in greater detail.

The French media market has undergone a number of changes since the 1980s (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 393). The privatization of broadcast journalism has led to the establishment of new television and radio stations. The program mandate of these private broadcasting stations is monitored by the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel. It also appoints the directors of public television and radio outlets. However, non-media corporations have taken over numerous print media outlets and broadcasting stations, calling the editorial independence of these media into question (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 393-394). The worldwide economic crisis in 2008 had a significant impact on the French media market and resulted in decreasing advertising revenues for both broadcast media and newspapers as well as many job losses in newsrooms (cf. McMane, 2012, p. 188). The content of print media in France ranges from largely apolitical regional newspapers that hardly cover national or international events to opinion-forming weekly magazines like *Le Point* or *Le Nouvel Observateur*. The satirical weekly newspaper *Le Canard enchaîné* remains one of the only print media outlets to feature investigative journalism. (cf. Kempf, 2009, p. 393)

In 1995, the first newspapers, including *Le Monde* and *Les Dernières Nouvelles*, started to launch news websites. By 2001, most of the French newspaper established an online presence. The trade union *Syndicat de la presse indépendante d'information*, founded in 2009, lobbies for the rights of online journalists. Moreover, online platforms like *Agoravox.com* or *Skyblog.com* that allow for an interactive creation and discussion of news enjoyed a lot of popularity in the 2000s. (cf. McMane, 2012, pp. 188-189) Despite these developments, Desportes and Rampazzo (2008, p. 52) argue that France still lacks behind with regard to the development of online journalism compared to other European countries.

Sweden was the first country in the world to establish the freedom of the press in 1766. The legal framework grants journalists free access to all public and official documents and ensures the protection of information sources. (cf. Jahn, 2009, p. 136) According to the Freedom House (2015)<sup>144</sup>, Sweden is the country that enjoyed the highest degree of press freedom in the world in 2014 along

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<sup>144</sup> Freedom House conducts an annual analysis of press freedom in the world. In 2014, it examined the legal, political and economic environment in 199 countries and territories (cf. Freedom House, 2015, pp. 26-28).

with Norway. Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that Swedish journalists share the “notion of the responsible journalist serving ends of social progress” (p.193) and have a high degree of consensus on the standards of journalistic practice. The Swedish Press Council as a self-regulatory body that enjoys a lot of legitimacy among journalists and publishers alike monitors the compliance with journalistic norms and standards of practice. (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 170-172, pp. 191-192)

By 2012, the Swedish media market comprises about 65 daily newspapers, 80 weekly newspapers, 65 national television channels (8 of them public service broadcasters), 103 national and local radio stations (among them 14 public service stations) (cf. Strömbäck, Nord & Shehata, 2012, p. 306). The state plays a pivotal role in the Swedish broadcasting system (cf. Tenscher, 2008, pp. 420-421). It provides the lion's share of resources for public service broadcasters, while leaving a relatively high degree of autonomy to broadcast journalists. Until the early 1990s, both the television and the radio market have been heavily regulated and monopolized. The 1990s marked the starting point for a still ongoing process of deregulation and commercialization that has led to the creation of many new television and radio stations as well as decreasing audience numbers of public service broadcasting programs. (cf. Carlsson & Facht, 2007) In this context, Djerf-Pierre and Weibull (2008) point to the role change of public service journalist from primarily objective, impartial reporting to exerting more influence on the political agenda.

Newspapers have played an important role in the development of Swedish democracy and public opinion (cf. Höyer, 2005). For most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, party-affiliated newspapers have been more common than independent newspapers. Strömbäck et al. (2012, p. 307) identify for example a politically shaped news coverage, party positions in editorials, politically loyal journalists (307) as well as media ownership by political parties in the 1970s. By the time Hallin and Mancini (2004) conducted their study on Western media systems, 75% of the Swedish newspapers still declared a political affiliation, that does, however, not affect the media content (see also Jahn, 2009, p. 135). In this context, Hallin and Mancini (2004) point to a significant decrease of political parallelism in the Swedish media system. While the press remains strong in Sweden (cf. Jahn, 2009), joint ventures and media mergers have reduced the number of journalists working for newspapers (cf. Strömbäck, Nord, Shehata, 2012, p. 308).

French and Swedish journalism has undergone profound changes in the last decades. Both countries have faced a privatization of broadcast media in the 1980s as well as heightened economic pressures in the last years that have led to processes of increasing media concentration and commercialization. Moreover, the development of the media environment in France and Sweden is coined by a process of de-politicization. Particularly in Sweden, digital media have gained in relevance in the last years.

The literature review did not disclose any empirical studies that assess the relationship between French and/or Swedish journalists with EU communicators. However, a number of publications contribute to enhancing our knowledge on the self-conception of French and Swedish journalists. The self-conception of journalists influences the role of the media as potential multipliers of public diplomacy messages by both member state and EU organizations.

Drawing on a quantitative telephone survey (N=405), McMane (2012) takes stock of the basic characteristics, the working conditions as well as the perception of the media environment and professional standards by French journalists<sup>145</sup>. The majority of the French journalists (62% of the respondents) work in the print sector, followed by broadcasting journalists and journalists working for

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<sup>145</sup> French journalists are defined by the acquisition of a national press identification card (Carte d'Identité des Journalistes). The national press identification card has been awarded to full-time journalists since 1935 and to freelancers since 1974. While it was originally only designed for print journalists, it also includes, broadcasting, online and mobile journalists as well as journalists working in news agencies. (cf. McMane, 2012, p. 189)

news agencies. Interestingly, less than one percent works in online journalism. McMane (2012) points to an aging trend in French journalism. Moreover, the author argues that French journalism is male dominated at the managerial level: Only 32% of the positions at the top editorial management level are held by women. (cf. McMane, 2012, pp. 192-193). Even though a university diploma does not constitute a requirement for working as a journalist in France, Leteinturier (2010) shows that younger journalists are much more likely to hold a journalism diploma than their older colleagues<sup>146</sup>.

While 92% of the surveyed journalists are very or at least somewhat happy to work as a journalists, 63% of them feel that their profession has evolved negatively. They stress insufficient material and human resources, a lack of time, the concentration of media ownership, constraints of compliance as well as economic pressures as biggest threats to journalism as a professional field. While 27% of the respondents have expressed to enjoy complete editorial freedom, the majority of the respondents (61%) feel that they enjoy at least some degree of editorial freedom. Only 12% of the surveyed journalists experience major constraints to their autonomy. (cf. McMane, 2012, pp. 195-198) By 2003, only eight percent of them were organized in a union (cf. Visser, 2006). Despite the limited willingness of journalists to organize themselves in unions, “unions themselves continu[e] to play a strong role in shaping the working conditions of all journalists” (McMane, 2012, p. 199).

Almost all respondents (96%) welcome digital technologies as a feedback channel for citizens to comment on and criticize their journalistic work. Citizen journalism, on the contrary, is only perceived by 43% of the interviewees as a benefit. 45% of the respondents argue that citizen journalism poses a threat to professional journalism. French journalists largely agree “that they should be able to protect anonymous sources, but are less unified on strengthening or changing ethical codes” (McMane, 2012, p. 201), but oppose an extensive set of ethical regulations. 68% of the respondents are of the opinion that French journalists do at least somewhat well with regard to applying ethical codes and practices (cf. *ibid.*, 2012, p. 199).

Strömbäck et al. (2012) provide an overview on the socio-demographic features of Swedish journalists and the journalists’ conception of working conditions, working routines as well as professional standards. They draw on a quantitative mail survey of 621 members of the Swedish Union of Journalists<sup>147</sup> conducted in 2009. While the largest group of Swedish journalists is still employed in the print sector, Strömbäck et al. (2012) point to a rise of digital media: While only seven percent of the respondents are occupied as web editors, 27% of them work with online publishing on a daily basis and an additional 20% work with online publishing several times a week. In fact, only one quarter of the respondents claims to never engage in online publishing. (cf. Strömbäck et al., 2012, pp. 310-312) Both Edström (2007) and Strömbäck et al. (2012) point to a strong correlation between age and university education: While 89% of the journalists younger than 31 years hold a university diploma, the number of university alumni is smaller among older journalists<sup>148</sup>. The political preferences of the

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<sup>146</sup> This study largely confirms the findings by Rieffel (2005): In a longitudinal study, comparing socio-demographic features of journalists in 1991 and 2001, Rieffel (2005) has derived a number of development trends of journalism as a professional field: Journalism in France continues to be a male-dominated profession, even though the number of female journalists has increased. Rieffel (2005) points to a heightened level of education among journalists as well as a growing number of freelancers. Journalists are mostly employed in the print sector in the Paris region. Those working for the national daily press receive the highest salary, followed by magazines, television stations and news agencies (cf. McMane, 2012; Rieffel, 2005).

<sup>147</sup> The Swedish Union of Journalists comprises 85% of the Swedish journalists (cf. Strömbäck et al., 2012, p. 309).

<sup>148</sup> Nonetheless, it needs to be acknowledged that the number of journalists holding a university degree is comparatively high in all age categories: 81% of the respondents aged 31 to 40 years have a university degree. The same applies to 74% of the colleagues aged 41 to 50 years, 75% of journalists in the age from 51 to 60, and, still, 71% of the respondents older than 61 years. (cf. Strömbäck et al., 2012, p. 310)

surveyed journalists do not mirror the political preferences held by the Swedish citizens: Swedish journalists are more likely to hold a left-of-center preference (see for instance Asp, 2007; Petersson, Djerf-Pierre, Holmberg, Strömbäck & Weibull, 2008; Strömbäck et al., 2012).

The analysis of the journalists' perception of their working conditions discloses "often contradictory cross-pressures of professionalism and commercial interests" (Strömbäck et al., 2012, p. 317). On the one hand, Swedish journalists maintain a high degree of autonomy: 27% of the respondents feel that they have almost complete freedom to select the stories they work on, an additional 51% feel that they enjoy this freedom to a great detail. The perception of the autonomy to decide which aspects of a story should be emphasized yields similar results<sup>149</sup>. On the other hand, three out of four journalists point to decreasing resources in newsrooms. The respondents hold mixed feelings with regard to the influence of profit on the development of journalistic quality. (cf. Strömbäck et al., 2012, pp. 312-313) The analysis of the actual and normative importance of news factors for Swedish journalists reflects the contradictions between economic pressures and journalistic professionalism outlined above. While the surveyed journalists perceive it as most important from a normative point of view to select events that increase the citizens' awareness of problems in society, have an impact on citizens' lives and enhance citizens' insights and knowledge, they select events in their actual working practice for different reasons. In their everyday work, journalists claim that events are more likely to be taken up in a news story if they are sensational and unexpected, dramatic and thrilling as well as an exclusive news story for the respective media outlet. (cf. *ibid.*, p. 315) These findings indicate that "commercial pressures tend to pull journalism in a direction not desired by Swedish journalists" (Strömbäck et al., 2012, p. 318).

When asked which tasks Swedish journalists perceive as most important, 93% of the respondents considered it essential to get information to the public quickly, followed by providing of entertainment and relaxation (76%), giving a voice to citizens (68%), as well as presenting analyses and interpretations of complex problems (66%). About six out of ten journalists consider themselves as adversaries of politicians and public officials and stress the task of investigating statements made by the government. (cf. Strömbäck et al., 2012, p. 314) Strömbäck et al. (2012) highlight the strong sense of autonomy (see above) and the strong sense of ethical and professional norms in Swedish journalism. This combination turns journalists into "highly influential actors, both in terms of deciding what topics to cover and how, and in influencing the public" (p. 318). According to the respondents, public service broadcasters like Sverige Radio and newspapers circulated in metropolitan areas possess the greatest power to influence public opinion (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 316-317).

Swedish journalists embrace the idea that people can have more than one cultural identity (cf. Tjernström, 2008, p. 532). Drawing on an analysis of the Swedish television news bulletin 'Aktuellt', Riegert (2008) argues that Sweden is depicted as an internationalist in European news, but also to some kind morally superior to other European countries.

Both France and Sweden are ranked as 'free' with regard to their press freedom. Sweden even enjoys the highest level of press freedom in the world. (cf. Freedom House, 2015) The comparative analysis of the journalists' self-perception indicates that Swedish journalists experience a higher degree of editorial freedom and autonomy than French journalists. While Swedish journalists largely agree on ethical and professional norms and practices, French journalists are less unified with regard to the norms and standards of their craft. Not least, journalism continues to be male-dominated at the top

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<sup>149</sup> 27% of the respondents feel that they have almost complete freedom to decide on the elements of a story that should be emphasized, while an additional 53% of the surveyed journalists express that they have this degree of freedom to a great deal (cf. Strömbäck et al., 2012, p. 312).

editorial management level in France. In contrast to that, the Swedish journalism profession is not coined by a comparable gender divide.

This section looks at French and Swedish citizens as recipients of media content. It sheds light on the citizens' patterns of media use. Moreover, it also fathoms to what extent French and Swedish citizens inform themselves about European political matters and how they evaluate the EU-related coverage by national media. Television constitutes the most important type of medium in France. According to Eurobarometer survey, conducted in autumn 2014<sup>150</sup>, 81% of the French respondents watch television (almost) every day. The internet, used by 69% on a daily basis, as well as the radio, 60% daily listeners, also play a major role in the life of the French citizens. Only 31% of the respondents regard the written press as a daily companion. However, an additional 28% of the French interviewees states to use the written press one to three times a week, which may point to the reception of weekly newspapers and magazines. In comparison to most other EU member states, French citizens remain rather hesitant about the use of online social networks – only three out of ten citizens use them (almost) every day, another 13% at least once a week. This corresponds to rank 21 of 28 EU member states. (cf. Standard Eurobarometer 82, 2014, pp. 10-20).

French respondents express a moderate level of trust in the media. While French citizens have a comparatively high level of trust in radio stations (53% tend to trust) as well as the written press (48% tend to trust), the findings of the Standard Eurobarometer 84 indicate a lower level of trust in television stations (34% tend to trust) and websites (17% tend to trust). 45% of the French interviewees consider online social networks as a good way of getting and staying informed about political matters. But less than one fifth of the French respondents (18%) consider online social networks as a reliable source of information. (cf. Eurobarometer 84, 2015, pp. 291-293)


Less than one fifth (17%) of the French respondents feels well informed about European matters. One possible explanation for this perceived lack of knowledge is the perceived lack of EU coverage in the types of media most frequently used by French citizens: 39% of the respondents state that television covers the EU too little. Similarly, 32% of the interviewees feel that EU matters are not included sufficiently in radio broadcasts. (cf. Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp. 237, 280-289)

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<sup>150</sup> This study draws on the most recent data from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2015. However, a number of subjects relevant to this study were not included in the questionnaire of the latest Eurobarometer survey. In these cases, the study works with older data collected in autumn 2014.



**Illustration 11: Perception of the valence of EU coverage in France – types of media (figures in percent)**



(Source: own depiction based on Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp.285-289)

While the French respondents point to a lack of EU coverage on television and on the radio, the valence of EU coverage is perceived as relatively objective (see illustration 11 above). With regard to online social networks, slightly more French respondents feel that the EU is depicted too negatively (15%) than French respondents that assess the coverage as objectively (14%). The empirical data on websites and in online social networks needs to be treated with caution though, as more than half of the respondents were unable to judge the valence of the EU coverage in both cases. (cf. Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp. 285-289)

Sweden shows a high level of media and information affinity in general (cf. Jahn, 2009; Tenscher, 2008, p. 438) and a high degree of internet affinity in particular (cf. Hoffmann, 2013; Strömbäck et al., 2012). Already by 2009, 72% of the Swedes were using the internet more than once a week (cf. Bergström, 2010). Based Eurobarometer data from autumn 2014, 86% of the Swedish respondents use the internet on a daily basis, with an additional five percent of the interviewees going online at least once a week. By that, Sweden ranks third after the Netherlands and Denmark in a comparison of all 28 EU member states. Furthermore, television and the written press also play a key role in the media usage of Swedish citizens. television consumption is not limited to ordinary television screens, but Swedes use online television more frequently than citizens in any other EU member state. 70% of the Swedish interviewees read the written press daily, with an additional 23% consulting press content at least once a week<sup>151</sup>. These findings correspond to the observation by Strömbäck et al. (2012, p. 307) that newspaper reading and sales per capita are still among the highest in the world, especially due to the economically strong position of sub-national newspapers (see also Tenscher, 2008, p. 433). Swedish respondents are open towards online social networks and use them frequently: More than half of the interviewees log on to online social networks (almost) every day and another 15% of the respondents use them at least once a week. (cf. Eurobarometer 82, 20014, pp.10-20)


The most recent Eurobarometer survey shows that Swedish respondents of the Standard Eurobarometer 82 express a high level of trust in Swedish radio (85% tend to trust) and television

<sup>151</sup> Sweden ranks second after Finland (cf. Eurobarometer 82 – First Results, 2014, p. 15).

stations (75% tend to trust), while more than half of the interviewees (54%) tend to trust the written press and 22% of the respondents expresses trust in online sources (cf. Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp. 45-50). 63% of the Swedish respondents consider online social networks as a good way of voicing concerns and ideas concerning political matters. However, seven out of ten of them remain sceptical if information on political matters communicated via online social networks can be trusted. (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 291-293)

Less than one third (30%) of the Swedish respondents feels well informed about European matters. This can be traced back to the perceived lack of EU coverage in the Swedish media: Almost 30% of the respondents consider the EU coverage on television, on the radio as well as by the written press as too little. (cf. Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp. 237, 280-284) The Swedish respondents perceive the EU coverage in the national media as relatively objective. However, online social networks constitute an exception: While 4% of the respondents consider EU coverage on online social networking sites as too positive and 16% as objective, 40% regard it as too negative. A large share of 56% does not feel in a position to judge the valence of EU coverage on online social networking sites. (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 285-289)

**Illustration 12: Perception of the valence of the EU coverage in Sweden – types of media (figures in percent)**




(Source: own depiction based on Eurobarometer 84-Annex, 2015, pp. 285-289)

A comparison of the media use in France and Sweden shows that television plays a more pivotal role for French than for Swedish citizens. In contrast to that, the empirical findings of the Eurobarometer point to the importance of online media and online social networks as well as the written press for Swedish citizens. The survey also discloses differences with regard to the access to online sources: While only three percent of the Swedish respondents state that they have no access to online media, this applies to ten percent of the French interviewees (cf. Eurobarometer 82, 2014, pp. 18-20).

An index of all five types of media (television, radio, the written press, websites, online social networks) analyzed in the Standard Eurobarometer 82 survey allows for an aggregated view on trust in the media. Illustration 13 shows that trust in the media in France is not only substantially lower than in Sweden, but also lower than the EU average.

**Illustration 13: Trust in the media in EU member states**



(source: Eurobarometer 82, 2014, pp. 30-31)

Swedes feel more informed about European matters than French citizens. Nonetheless, it should not be neglected that the level of perceived knowledge on European countries remains low in both countries. Both French and Swedish respondents point to a lack of EU coverage on television and on the radio. In addition, Swedish interviewees express the need for more EU coverage in the written press. EU coverage is perceived as relatively neutral in both countries.

#### **4.2.3 Public diplomacy understanding**

Sub-chapter 4.2.2 has characterized the external environments of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations, looking at infrastructural considerations, as well as the political, cultural, and media environment. Both with regard to the state of research and the empirical analysis, these external factors constitute a basis for explaining similarities and differences of the French and Swedish public diplomacy understanding and practice.

In a comparative analysis of Western European public diplomacy in France, Germany and Great Britain, James Pamment (2013a) finds that, “[w]hile the core components of PD hold similarities, there are substantial differences in terminology and emphasis which in turn reveal important distinctions in approach and objectives” (p. 14). The term ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘diplomatie publique’ is hardly used when referring to the French public diplomacy practice. Instead, the term ‘diplomatie d’influence’ has gained ground in the last years (see for instance Gazeau-Secret, 2010; Lequesne, 2013; Melloul, 2010; Pamment, 2013a). Renaud Voisin<sup>152</sup> (2012) labels ‘diplomatie d’influence’ as “soft power à la française”. Melloul (2010) understands influence as the exercise of power in the international environment through “prestige, seduction, persuasion, incitation, suggestion” (p. 10). Furthermore, he also connects influence to the ability of a state to develop norms and models that are universally adopted (cf. *ibid.*, p. 10). This point is also taken up by Pamment (2013a) who differentiates the French ‘diplomatie d’influence’ from the notion of influencing that is discussed in many definitions and conceptualizations of public diplomacy (see sub-chapter 2.1): “Influence [...] takes a more subtle route” (p. 24), that does not concentrate on political advocacy, but rather seeks to shape “common frameworks through multilateral organizations” (*ibid.*, p. 24). Similarly, Duchêne and Lamouroux (2011) highlight the “distribution of French norms and standards, whether they are related to social,

<sup>152</sup> Renaud Voisin has worked as a press and communications officer at the French embassy in Singapore and discusses the concept ‘diplomatie d’influence’ on his blog.

legal, health or environmental affairs” (p. 3). Despite a more subtle approach to influence, this example also illustrates that competition has to be regarded as an important driver of French public diplomacy (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 30). “[In Sweden,] public diplomacy is defined in terms of promotional outputs, with self-representation, selling the brand, and the instrumental deployment of culture and ideas to boost trade established as its principle purpose” (Pamment, 2011, p. 128). The strong focus on promotion is reflected by the Foreign Ministry’s budget proposal for 2010: While the ministry dedicated a comparably small amount of 12 million SEK to information on Sweden overseas, it allocated 270 million SEK to the promotion of exports and imports (cf. Pamment, 2013b, p. 103)<sup>153</sup>. According to Pamment (2013a, p. 99), the Swedish understanding of public diplomacy is inseparably linked to branding and Brand Sweden (see sub-chapter 4.2.4).

The Swedish Institute explicitly refers to its activities as public diplomacy, conceptualized as “understanding, informing, influencing and developing relations with people in other countries” (Swedish Institute, n.d.b). While it was originally conceptualized as a cultural organization, its focus shifted towards the promotion of Sweden in the 2000s (cf. Pamment, 2014, p. 6; Swedish Institute, n.d.b). In addition to promoting Sweden in the world, the Swedish Institute also seeks to establish and maintain long-term relationships with publics in other countries. To achieve these goals, it also draws on the concept of strategic communication. (cf. Swedish Institute, n.d.a)

Glover (2013, p. 9) points to a division between information and culture in Sweden since the 1960s<sup>154</sup>. Culture was “elevated to a distinct sphere of activity that should be juxtaposed to that of both information and commercial promotion” (Glover, 2013, p. 6). While the Committee of Inquiry on International Cultural Activities draws a clear between public diplomacy as “a nation directly approaching the citizens of another nation, often with directed initiatives, to achieve short-term goals” and cultural diplomacy as “the establishment of long-term, sustainable relations with other nations with culture as the medium” (Kulturdepartementet, 2003, p. 38). The distinction between culture and public diplomacy as well as nation branding is no longer sustainable. Pamment (2013a) argues that cultural work serves as an instrument “of promoting priority political sectors such as trade and the environment and maintaining a unified brand” today (p. 105). In this context, he points to potential tensions between advocacy, branding and culture in Swedish public diplomacy (cf. Pamment, 2013b, p. 102).

To conclude, the use of the term ‘public diplomacy’ is much more common among Swedish public diplomacy practitioners than their French colleagues. Public diplomacy definitions by Swedish organizations reveal a close link to promotion, and branding. In contrast, French organizations primarily work with the concept of ‘diplomatie d’influence’, which implies the exercise of international influence through persuasion, attraction, and the diffusion of norms, for example.

#### 4.2.4 Public diplomacy practice

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development highlights the promotion of the French image as well as France’s economic, political and cultural interests in the international environment as important public diplomacy goals (cf. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du développement

<sup>153</sup> 12 million SEK equal 1.29 million euro and \$1.44 million respectively. 270 million SEK equal 29.01 million euro and \$32.37 million respectively.

<sup>154</sup> Before, culture was understood as an instrument of commercial promotion and information, as the example of the Swedish Institute illustrates. The Brusewitz Report (1956), commissioned by the Swedish Institute and written by representatives of both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish private sector, pointed to the value of cultural relations as a means of commercial promotion and distributing information about Sweden (cf. Glover, 2013, p. 4).

international, 2013a, see also Melloul, 2010). Moreover, it also seeks to strengthen the role of Europe in the world (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 25, 30).

Furthermore, Pamment (2013a) points to the strong links between influence and the spread of language and culture. French public diplomacy seeks to contribute to a balanced process of globalization, in which the Francophone sphere continues to be relevant. In this sense, French public diplomacy also aims at providing an alternative to an Anglophone dominance in the world (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 15) that may create resistance and hostility in some countries (cf. Melloul, 2010, p. 10). This also imparts the notion of language as an expression of cultural diversity and an element of development cooperation. French public diplomacy organizations cooperate with francophone countries in Africa to strengthen the role of the francophone sphere in the world. (cf. Gazeau-Secret, 2010, p. 10)

Based on a comparative analysis of public diplomacy in France, Germany and the UK, Pamment (2013a) concludes that “these three actors are in many respects competing over similar public groups; particularly the middle classes, the young, and the influential in the emerging economies, but also in Europe, elsewhere in the developed world, and at times domestically” (p. 22). In contrast to other West European countries, France attaches greater importance to developing countries, particularly the Francophonie in Africa (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 22).

Inquiries on the foreign perception of Sweden such as the ‘Study of Sweden’s Image Abroad’<sup>155</sup> by Lundberg (2005) have shown that Sweden was not as known as it desired to be internationally. While the image of Sweden abroad was widely positive, the results of the study also pointed to a persistence of stereotypes including the Swedish welfare model and Ingmar Bergman. As a consequence, Swedish public diplomacy organizations aim at creating more awareness of Sweden, its policies, values and activities as well as generating a modern, updated image abroad (cf. Pamment, 2013b, p. 102, 2014, p. 6). Sub-chapter 4.2.3 above has outlined the strong economic focus in the public diplomacy conceptualization of the country. Swedish public diplomacy practitioners perceive culture and image as channels to reach competitive, economically driven goals (cf. Pamment, 2013b, p. 102).

Strategic publics of Swedish public diplomacy primarily include well connected decision-makers and multipliers. Moreover, organizations like the Swedish Institute also direct their communication efforts at the general public. (cf. Pamment, 2013b, p. 104). In the first decades of its existence, the Swedish Institute had concentrated on strategic publics in West Europe, the USA, and to some extent in East Europe. By the 1970s, developing countries had grown in importance for Swedish public diplomacy and they still remain important target countries for both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute. In the last years, the Swedish Institute has redefined its regional priorities and is now dedicating more attention to emerging economies like India or China. (cf. Swedish Institute, n.d.a) In the context of EU enlargement, Sweden has also identified neighboring countries in the Baltic region as a priority region (cf. Plumridge, 2005, p. 54). Apart from these regional priorities abroad, the Swedish Institute also considers domestic citizens as important strategic publics (cf. Glover, 2011, p. 11). In this context, Pamment (2013a) points to the importance of citizen diplomats in Swedish public diplomacy.

The comparative analysis of public diplomacy goals pursued by both French and Swedish organizations discloses that French and Swedish organizations both seek to promote the image of respective country and predominantly focus on goals that can be allocated to ‘political information/persuasion’ (see sub-chapter 2.5.1). Apart from these commonalities, the state of research

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<sup>155</sup> The study measured public opinion in eight countries strategically relevant to Sweden: Brazil, China, Japan, Germany, Poland, Russia, UK, USA.

shows that French organizations aim at strengthening the influencing of the French culture and language, whereas Swedish organizations seek to create awareness of the country, its policies, values, and actions. Moreover, the literature review suggests that only French organizations take European aspects into consideration in their public diplomacy goals. Public diplomacy organizations in both member states address similar types of strategic publics, including multipliers and decision-makers. Their target countries and regions overlap, for example with regard to emerging countries, but also include distinct regional foci such as francophone countries in Africa in the case of French public diplomacy organizations.

Core areas of public diplomacy include society/culture as well as education/research (see for instance Melloul, 2010; Pamment, 2013a). Apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the Ministry of Defense, Melloul (2010, p. 43) particularly emphasizes organizations in the fields of culture, education, international broadcasting and development cooperation as main pillars of French public diplomacy. Additionally, a number of authors (see for instance Haize, 2013; Lane, 2013) point to the importance of scientific diplomacy. In the years 2013/2014, France has for example been the country to accommodate the third largest number of foreign students (cf. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du développement international, 2014).

According to Plumridge (2005), France has a “strong record in cultural relations and international broadcasting” (p. 36). Salon (1981) illustrates the long history of French cultural diplomacy<sup>156</sup>, taking the example of the chamber of deputies of the French Assemblée Nationale. The chamber of deputies has already recognized French ideas, philosophers and arts as an important arm of the French foreign policy in 1920. In its traditional sense, cultural diplomacy refers to a political approach based on the diffusion of French culture (‘rayonnement’) that has been pursued by the French government for many decades. (cf. Gazeau-Secret, 2010, p. 9) In times of globalization, however, the meaning of cultural diplomacy has to be rethought: Anne Gazeau-Secret (2010), former Director General of International Cooperation and Development at the foreign ministry, points to a shift from a unilateral process of cultural diffusion to reciprocal processes of influence. (cf. Gazeau-Secret, 2010, p. 9).

The consensus-orientation in Swedish policy-making (see section ‘Infrastructure of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations’ above) is mirrored by the country’s public diplomacy approach. Sweden pursues a coherent, highly centralized public diplomacy. The promotion of a unified brand identity that serves as an ideological framework, in which public diplomacy initiatives and messages are embedded in, is at the core of this centralized approach. In 2005, the Council for the Promotion of Sweden started a consultation process based on studies on the foreign perception of Sweden (see for instance Lundberg, 2005) as well as workshops and surveys with Swedish publics to develop “a clearer, unified image that better reflects contemporary Sweden” (Swedish Institute, 2008, p. 1). Two years later, the brand platform ‘Brand Sweden’ was launched as a result of this extensive consultation process. The brand platform describes Sweden as a progressive country. It defines four core values (innovative, open, caring, authentic) as aspects of progressivity that represent “Sweden’s overall distinctive features” (Swedish Institute, 2008, p. 8). The Swedish Institute understands Brand Sweden as an “internal signpost” (p. 8) that guides the selection of projects and issues to focus on – while events displaying contemporary Swedish culture may be linked to the core value ‘innovative’, projects highlighting environmental sustainability or gender equality relate to the core value ‘caring’ (cf. Swedish Institute, 2008, p. 9, 11). By that, core values serve as gatekeepers that decide on the issues and messages that are included in the official communication of Sweden abroad (cf. Pamment, 2013b, p. 3).

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<sup>156</sup> See Lane (2013) for an overview on the development of French cultural diplomacy. Lane (2013) provides a historical analysis of cultural diplomacy as well as the role of culture in the ‘diplomatie d’influence’ today.

Pamment (2013b) argues that Brand Sweden draws on an Anglo-Saxon school of nation branding and public diplomacy, featuring “pre-defined thematic areas, storytelling, public-private coordination, market analysis and evaluation” (pp. 3-4). Brand Sweden resembles nation branding approaches of Norway and Denmark who have developed similar brand platforms highlighting “areas of comparative strength” (Pamment, 2013c, p. 2)<sup>157</sup>. While Brand Sweden contributed an important share to Sweden’s high ranking in international brand and image measurements like the Nation Brands Index and enabled Swedish public diplomacy organizations to pool their resources (cf. Pamment, 2013b, pp. 99-100), it was also met a critical scholarly reflection and skepticism within Sweden, since not all citizens could identify with the overarching vision of ‘Brand Sweden’ (cf. Pamment, 2013b, pp. 100-101).

Both Christensen (2013) and Pamment (2013b) stress that a brand that seeks to represent a nation as a whole, needs to enable critical voices and leave room for counter cultures. Instead, Brand Sweden “neatly glosses over on-going societal struggles over the definition, direction, and coherence of Swedish identity in service of a trade agenda” (Pamment, 2013c, p. 4). By that, Sweden opposes its own core value ‘open’. Furthermore, the political practice of the Swedish government has repeatedly contradicted this core value and, by that, undermined its credibility. The documentary series ‘Diplomaterna’ aired by Sverige Television in 2009 for instance criticizes the Foreign Ministry’s lack of public accountability (cf. Pamment, 2013b, pp. 105-106). Moreover, the Swedish embassy in Switzerland secretly supported a campaign advocating the purchase of 22 JAS-Gripen fighter aircrafts manufactured by the Swedish company Saab in a Swiss referendum in 2014 (cf. Pamment, 2014, p. 5). This case known as the ‘Gripen-gate’ scandal points to an identity conflict between Sweden’s policy of non-alignment on the one hand and its positions as the “12<sup>th</sup> largest national exporter of arms” with “the highest income per capita of global weapons sales” (Pamment, 2014, p. 3) on the other hand. It also “raise[s] ethical (and practical) questions on the role of public diplomacy and nation branding in the pursuit of commercial interests” (Pamment, 2014, p. 2).

It is an important part of the Swedish public diplomacy approach to create meeting places “generating overlapping technological and physical forms for expressing values and ideas” (Pamment, 2013b, p. 99). In that sense, Swedish public diplomacy organizations assume the role of architects in the public sphere. They design communicative spaces in which other individuals and organizations interact with each other. (cf. Auer, 2015, p. 157). The House of Sweden in Washington, D.C., inaugurated in 2006, is illustrative for a meeting place that embodies a public diplomacy message. With construction costs of 480 million SEK, it is Sweden’s flagship embassy. The design of the building seeks to convey openness and transparency as well as to create a “visitor-friendly environment”, in which conferences or interactive exhibitions are set. The topics taken up by events in the House of Sweden, including architecture and design, innovation and technology as well as water and environment, constitute niche areas of Sweden’s perceived strength. (cf. Pamment, 2011, pp. 128-129) The House of Sweden is deliberately linked to Swedish core values and transports these values “through its architecture and aesthetics” (Pamment, 2011, p. 129). Pamment (2011) critically remarks that the House of Sweden may boost the international profile of Sweden, but may not necessarily stimulate a “genuine transatlantic dialogue” (p. 134).

Sweden aims at positioning itself as a digital pioneer (cf. Hoffmann, 2013, p. 3; Huijgh, 2013, p. 69). The online activities of former prime minister and foreign minister Carl Bildt serve as an early example: Bildt was the first statesman to communicate via e-mail in 1994 as well as one of the first politicians to blog, starting in 2005 (cf. Bengtsson, 2011, p. 12). The following paragraphs introduce the Second House of Sweden and Curators of Sweden as two of the biggest and most widely discussed

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<sup>157</sup> While Norway communicates Resources, Engagement and Reliability as its core values, Denmark concentrates on Balance, Innovation and the idea of a Green Nation (cf. Pamment, 2013c, p. 3).

Swedish public diplomacy initiatives concentrating on interactive online media. Along with the Maldives, Sweden was among the first two countries to open up a virtual embassy in May 2007. The Second House of Sweden<sup>158</sup> is a collaborative project of the Swedish Institute, the Swedish PR organization Söderhavet and the US media bureau Electric Sheep and hosted exhibitions, virtual conferences, and for instance Swedish language courses in Second Life.

Bengtsson (2011) has conducted a case study on the virtual embassy drawing on press releases by the Swedish Institute as well as interviews with representatives of the Swedish Institute. Bengtsson (2011) identifies four goals of establishing the Second House of Sweden: 1) strengthening relations with “progressive media audiences around the world” (p. 13), 2) reaching out to “early adopters within Second Life” (p. 13), 3) developing a platform for exploring Second Life, and, from an internal perspective, 4) getting to know the possibilities and limitations of applying Second Life as a communication tool. The Swedish Institute considered both “progressive media audiences” and “early adopters in Second Life” as multipliers to reach a broader public. While the Second House of Sweden primarily sought to address foreign publics, the number of Non-Swedes visiting the virtual embassy decreased after its inauguration in 2007 (cf. Bengtsson, 2011, p. 9). The decline in the number of foreign visitors went along with budget cuts for the project. The blog <https://secondhouseofsweden.wordpress.com/>, that has accompanied the activities of the virtual embassy, published the last entry on an event in June 2009. In December 2012, the Second House of Sweden was officially closed. (cf. Peterson, 2013) Similarly, after an intense and widely positive international media coverage of the Second House of Sweden in 2007, the media presence gradually died down and journalists started to question the relevance of Second Life (cf. Bengtsson, 2011; Pamment, 2011).

In the project ‘Curators of Sweden’, started in December 2011, one Swedish citizen takes over the official Twitter account of the Swedish government (@Sweden) each week. Curators of Sweden draws on the idea that Swedish citizens communicate their own narratives of Sweden through an official channel of communication (cf. Hoffmann, 2013, p. 3; Ricknert, 2013, pp. 8-9). By that, Swedish public diplomacy organizations seek to arouse interest in Sweden:

*“The idea is that the curators, through their tweets, create interest and arouse curiosity for Sweden and everything the country has to offer. The expectation is that the curators will paint a picture of Sweden, different to that usually obtained through traditional media”.* (Swedish Institute, 2015)

Drawing on a comparative analysis of Twitter as public diplomacy tool in Sweden and Germany, Hoffmann (2013) argues that Curators of Sweden is perceived as a brand campaign by its coordinators, the members of the Council for the Promotion of Sweden. The selection of the weekly ‘Curators of Sweden’ enables the project coordinators to exercise a certain amount of control over the flow of information. The sample of curators includes primarily individuals from the “Swedish social media bubble” (Hoffmann, 2013, p. 74) that ought to represent the “modern, enlightened global citizen” (Christensen, 2013, p. 2). Moreover, a crisis committee monitors the communication activities on @Sweden and moderates dialogues if necessary (cf. Hoffmann, 2013, p. 76). The fact that the selection as curator was perceived as an honour by the participating citizens facilitated the display of a favorable image of Sweden through its official Twitter account (cf. *ibid.*, p. 89). The example of the ‘Curators of Sweden’ initiative illustrates that Swedish public diplomacy organizations maintain a comparatively high level of control over choosing citizen diplomats (cf. Pamment, 2013b, p. 125).

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<sup>158</sup> As the name suggests, the Second House of Sweden was modeled after the real-life Swedish embassy in Washington, D.C..



The international media coverage presented the initiative Curators of Sweden in a mainly positive light (cf. Christensen, 2013, p. 32; Ricknert, 2013, p. 10). Furthermore, the initiative was adapted by a number of unofficial Twitter accounts, including @I\_amGermany (cf. Hoffmann, 2013, p. 79). Ricknert (2013) perceives Curators of Sweden as “an example where one wish[es] to use web technology to establish more egalitarian, or horizontal relationships with its publics and at the same time use democracy as a strategic tool” (p. 58) to pursue and communicate “own values, ideals, or policies” (p. 59). The campaign is part of Brand Sweden, embracing the core values ‘innovative’ through web 2.0-technology and ‘caring’ through its focus on interaction between individuals. The idea of communicating a personified image of Sweden is not a novelty of the Curators of Sweden initiative, but was already taken up in the book project “Sweden in Profiles” in 1954, that compiled pictures and biographies of well-known Swedes.

Swedish public diplomacy organizations do not only apply online communication tools in a competitive way to raise awareness and generate a favorable image of Sweden abroad, but also facilitate collaboration within digital diplomacy. In 2014, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs hosted the first Stockholm Initiative for Digital Diplomacy, a conference bringing representatives from international political organizations, businesses, media outlets as well as researchers together. (cf. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, n.d.) In addition, the Stockholm Internet Forum, jointly organized by the The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Internet Infrastructure Foundation and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, explores the link between freedom and transparency on the internet and global economic and social development (cf. Huijgh, 2013, p. 69). It serves an example of Sweden’s strong engagement in development cooperation (cf. Plumridge, 2005, p. 54) that is seldom discussed in the context of public diplomacy.

This brief review of the state of research on French public diplomacy has illustrated that France pursues a rather competitive approach to public diplomacy that utilize culture, language and norms as channels to increase international influence. On a multilateral level, France seeks to position itself as a normative power. Even though competition constitutes a main driver of French public diplomacy (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 30), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development acknowledges the importance of the European dimension of its public diplomacy. French public diplomacy efforts concentrate on the core areas ‘society/culture’ as well as ‘education/research’. Pamment (2013b) recommends drawing on Sweden’s actions abroad, for instance its involvement in development cooperation, instead of pre-defined values. The analysis of public diplomacy practice on the tactical level has mainly focused on Sweden, as the state of research discloses a lack of studies on tools, communication channels, and messages applied by French public organizations.

Sweden pursues a centralized public diplomacy approach that is characterized by strong coordination of public diplomacy organizations under the umbrella of Brand Sweden. Initiatives and projects like the House of Sweden or Curators of Sweden materialize the core values that constitute the Swedish brand (cf. Pamment, 2011, 2013a). On the one hand, the strong focus on branding has contributed to raising Sweden’s international profile and improving its perception abroad. On the other hand, the primacy of branding, and the pursuit of primarily commercial interests have also proven to be deeply problematic for Swedish public diplomacy. The Gripengate case has underlined the relevance of aligning “brand identities and political-economic identities” (Pamment, 2014, p. 14). Moreover, Sweden applies a top-down approach to constructing its nation brand. Even though citizen diplomats play an important role in Swedish public diplomacy, they are instrumentalized to communicate pre-defined values.

### 4.3 Implications for the empirical study

This sub-chapter summarizes the literature review on French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations, their external environments as well as their public diplomacy understanding and practice. Furthermore, it discusses the implications of this literature review for the empirical analysis, which constitute the basis for the research assumptions on similarities and differences between French and Swedish public diplomacy, as well as the relationship between EU and member state public diplomacy (see sub-chapter 5.1).

The comparative analysis of the external environments of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations has outlined that the French president resumes a much more powerful role than the Swedish head of state. Moreover, the French political system grants much less influence to regions and municipalities than the Swedish political system. Sub-chapter 4.2.2 has also pointed out that Sweden pursues a more consensus-driven policy-making approach than France. It is thus assumed that the Swedish consensus-orientation goes along with a coherent public diplomacy approach in which all organizations involved agree on a single public diplomacy strategy instead of juxtaposing different public diplomacy strategies. The fact that trade unions and associations are more active and influential in Sweden than in France (see sub-chapter 4.2.2) suggests that non-state actors also play a more vital part in the public diplomacy practice of Sweden and Swedish state and non-state public diplomacy organizations are more inclined to cooperate with each other.

The analysis of the political environment and the EU conception of Sweden and France encourages the assumption that the two countries pursue different foreign policy goals in and outside of the EU context. France seeks to assert primarily national interests and considers the EU as a way of maximizing these interests as well as establishing a counter-balance to a perceived U.S.-American hegemony. National interests also play a vital role for Sweden. At the same time, the country stresses its commitment in international organizations like the UN as well as its pioneering role in domains like democracy or gender equality. It primarily perceives the EU as an opportunity of attaining policy results that could not be achieved by single nation states. Research on goals of Swedish public diplomacy leads to the assumption that Swedish public diplomacy organizations focus on creating more awareness of Sweden, its policies, values and activities as well as generating an updated image abroad (cf. Pamment, 2014, p. 6, 2013a, p. 102). In contrast, France concentrates on public diplomacy as a tool to attain its economic and political interests abroad as well as to increase the international influence of its culture and language (cf. Pamment, 2013a, p. 24). Whereas France explicitly refers to development cooperation as a pillar of its public diplomacy activities, Swedish organizations do not perceive its engagement in international development cooperation as part of its public diplomacy. This neglects the active role of Sweden in the area of global development and, by that, in the public diplomacy core area ‘society/culture’<sup>159</sup>.

This chapter has also revealed different regional foci of French and Swedish foreign and EU policy: While France pays particular attention to former African colonies, Sweden highlights the Nordic and the Baltic Sea region as regional priorities. These policy priorities are reflected by the state of research on strategic publics of Swedish and French public diplomacy organizations: Both countries compete over similar types of strategic publics including young people and decision-makers, but identify different priority regions, such as former African colonies in the case of France and neighboring states in the Baltic Sea region in the case of Sweden.

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<sup>159</sup> The Government Bill ‘Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development’, adopted in 2003, exemplifies Sweden’s commitment to development cooperation. The bill states that all ministries across different policy areas should comply with goals of a sustainable and equitable development (Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development, 2002).

Small and medium-sized states like Sweden command less public diplomacy resources than great powers such as the UK, France or Germany. Therefore, Swedish public diplomacy organizations aim at pooling their resources in a consistent public diplomacy strategy built around the brand identity 'Brand Sweden'. Both member states pursue a rather competitive approach to public diplomacy utilizing culture as a channel to increase international influence and to "promot[e] priority political sectors such as trade and the environment and maintai[n] a unified brand" (Pamment, 2013b, p. 105) respectively.

The comparative analysis of cultural value orientations has disclosed that both French and Swedish citizens accentuate intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism and harmony. A strong emphasis on egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy positively influences the level of political participation (cf. Schwartz, 2006). In addition to that, Swedish citizens have a higher level of trust in political organizations – particularly at the national level, but also at the EU level – than their French counterparts. These findings support the assumption that Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to integrate domestic citizens in public diplomacy initiatives.

The section 'Media environment' in sub-chapter 4.2.2 has pointed to processes of privatization and de-politicization in both countries. Both France and Sweden media are considered as free, even though Swedish journalists enjoy a higher degree of editorial autonomy than their French colleagues. These findings hint at an independent position of the media in public diplomacy that accommodates the role of intermediaries rather than communication channels. This independent position may be more pronounced in Sweden than in France. Online media play a more pivotal role in the Sweden than in France: They do not only account for a larger share of the media market in Sweden, but they are also used more frequently and intensely by Swedish citizens. The rising importance of online media in Sweden suggests that Swedish public diplomacy organizations rely more heavily on online media, including web 2.0-applications, as public diplomacy tools than French organizations. This assumption is supported by the analysis of the state of research on French and Swedish public diplomacy practice that only discloses studies on Swedish 'public diplomacy 2.0' initiatives (see sub-chapter 4.2.4).

While the aforementioned assumptions have focused on the comparative perspective between the two single member states, the following paragraphs develop a set of assumptions on the relationship between EU and member state public diplomacy. This study concentrates on France and Sweden as two selected member states that were chosen on the basis of 1) the year of accession to the EU, 2) the adoption of the Euro currency, 3) the influence on the decisions of the EU, and 4) the monetary contributions to the EU. It assumes that member states who have kept their own currency are more autonomous than member states who have adopted the Euro currency and thus pursue a more competitive public diplomacy strategy. France as a founding state has already been part of the EU for more than 50 years may pursue a more cooperative public diplomacy strategy, working together with EU organizations, than Sweden.

France does not only have more influence on decisions taken at regional level than Sweden, but it also contributes a comparably large amount of money to the EU. By that, France occupies a more central position in the EU than Sweden and may be more influential in setting norms and rules of cooperation within the EU (see sub-subchapter 2.7.1). France as a more influential member state in the EU may pursue a more cooperative public diplomacy than a smaller member state with less influence on the direction of EU policy. At the same time, it also commands a significant amount of public diplomacy resources that allows France to pursue a competitive public diplomacy strategy highlighting national goals and issues and that makes it less dependent on cooperation with other international actors. Sweden, as a less influential member state, may choose to adopt a more cooperative public diplomacy strategy to attain public diplomacy goals it would not be able to reach on its own. The state of research on Swedish public diplomacy practice outlines that cooperation does, however, not necessarily include

EU organizations. Plumridge (2005), for example, points to the crucial role of organizations like the Nordic Council of Ministers in fostering the international visibility of the Nordic countries as well as joint initiatives to address international challenges. Therefore, this study develops the assumption that Swedish public diplomacy organizations engage in transnational cooperation, but do not perceive EU public diplomacy organizations as sole or most important cooperation partners.

The public diplomacy approach of a member state also depends on the reasons for engaging in the EU: Careerist incentives, which stress the self-interest of organizations and the desire to maximize own benefits, and bureaucratic incentives, that focus on the maintenance or improvement of an organization's resources, are more likely to support a competitive public diplomacy approach. In contrast to that, value-creating incentives, which concentrate on attaining collective benefits, are more likely to motivate a cooperative public diplomacy approach. (cf. Wukich, 2011; see sub-chapter 2.7.1) Sub-chapter 4.2.2 has outlined that France maintains an ambiguous relationship with the EU: On the one hand, French political organizations and citizens strongly embrace the idea of national identity and national sovereignty. At the same time, France has actively stimulated European integration since its foundation. Today, France pursues a fairly pragmatic approach towards cooperation on the regional level: It considers the EU as a framework for facilitating the attainment of national goals and advances the idea of a 'Europe of projects' as well as 'Europe à la carte'. Sweden engages in selected areas of regional cooperation like free trade. At the same time, the Nordic country often pursues a wait-and-see approach to European integration. Based on these considerations, French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to engage in selected, project-based cooperations with EU organizations than in long-term cooperation efforts.

## **5. Materials and methods: Analyzing national and regional public diplomacy in Europe**

This chapter introduces the methodological approach of this study. It pursues two main goals: Firstly, it states the research questions and research assumptions that have been deductively developed in the first part of this thesis (see sub-chapter 5.1). Secondly, it provides a rationale for the selected research design (see sub-chapter 5.2), describes qualitative document analysis as well as guided expert interviews as selected methods of data collection, and outlines the single steps of the research process in detail. These single steps include the sampling of the research material, the operationalization, the data collection, and the data analysis. The chapter concludes by critically reflecting on limitations of the empirical study.

### **5.1 Research questions and research assumptions**

The theoretical treatise presented in chapter two leads to three research questions that guide the empirical analysis:

- 1) How do EU organizations conduct public diplomacy?
  - a. How do EU organizations understand public diplomacy?
  - b. How do EU organizations practice public diplomacy on the strategic level?
  - c. How do EU organizations practice public diplomacy on the tactical level?
  - d. To what extent do EU public diplomacy organizations engage in interorganizational cooperation?
- 2) How do organizations from the EU member states France and Sweden conduct public diplomacy?
  - e. How do French and Swedish organizations understand public diplomacy?
  - f. How do French and Swedish organizations practice public diplomacy on the strategy level?
  - g. How do French and Swedish organizations practice public diplomacy on the tactical level?
  - h. To what extent do French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations engage in interorganizational cooperation?
- 3) To what extent do the public diplomacy efforts of EU and member state organizations complement or contradict each other?

The first two research questions center on the analysis of public diplomacy conducted by EU and member state organizations respectively. Both research questions contain four sub-questions that examine the public diplomacy understanding, the public diplomacy practice as well as cooperation between public diplomacy organizations. The analysis of the public diplomacy practice involves two layers: the strategic level, comprising the definition of goals, strategic publics and the public diplomacy approach, and the tactical level, encompassing the development and realization of public diplomacy messages and tools. The attainment of most public diplomacy goals demands cooperation between single organizations. The sub-research questions on cooperation among public diplomacy

organizations explores to what extent organizations engage in dyadic relationships as well as networks on a national, European and transnational level to realize public diplomacy goals. Examining the internal and external environments public diplomacy organizations operate in serves as a basis for detecting similarities and differences of the public diplomacy conducted by EU and member state organizations. The third research question compares the public diplomacy understanding and practice by EU and member state organizations, focusing on the question to what extent national and regional public diplomacy efforts complement or rather contradict each other. Synergies between national and regional public diplomacy efforts can only be achieved if national public diplomacy organizations pursue a cooperative public diplomacy strategy or include at least cooperative elements in their public diplomacy practice.

Based on the discussion of the state of research on EU and member state public diplomacy in chapters three and four, this study proposes a set of assumptions on the public diplomacy understanding and practice of EU and member state organizations<sup>160</sup>. The single assumptions have been assigned to the three main research questions stated above.

**Table 6: Research assumptions (first research question)**

<b>Public diplomacy understanding</b>	
Assumption 1:	EU public diplomacy organizations primarily apply the term public diplomacy to refer to communication with strategic publics outside of the EU.
Assumption 2:	EU public diplomacy organizations primarily perceive public diplomacy as a tool of advocacy.
<b>Public diplomacy practice on the strategic level</b>	
Assumption 3:	EU public diplomacy organizations put a stronger emphasis on goals of cultural communication in the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. Goals of political information/persuasion are more pronounced in the external dimension of EU public diplomacy.
Assumption 4:	EU public diplomacy organizations emphasize citizens as strategic publics within the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. In contrast to that, EU public diplomacy organizations focus on decision-makers and multipliers in third countries and multilateral fora.
Assumption 5:	The complex structure of the EU is reflected in a differentiated approach to public diplomacy, in which different public diplomacy strategies coexist.
Assumption 6:	EU public diplomacy organizations primarily apply two-way communication to reach persuasive goals.

(source: own depiction)

<sup>160</sup> see sub-chapters 3.6 4.3 for a theoretical deduction of these research guiding assumptions

**Table 7: Research assumptions (second research question)**

<b>Public diplomacy practice on the strategic level</b>	
Assumption 7:	The more consensus-driven decision-making style in Sweden goes along with a coherent public diplomacy approach in which all organizations involved agree on a single public diplomacy strategy instead of juxtaposing different public diplomacy strategies.
Assumption 8:	French public diplomacy organizations consider the goal of gaining international influence most important. They place particular emphasis on increasing and maintaining international influence of the French language and culture.
Assumption 9:	Swedish public diplomacy organizations focus on the public diplomacy goals of promoting the image of Sweden and creating awareness of Sweden, its policies, values, and activities.
Assumption 10:	France and Sweden differ with regard to their geographical priorities. While France pays particular attention to former African colonies, Sweden highlights strategic publics in the Baltic Sea region.
<b>Public diplomacy practice on the tactical level</b>	
Assumption 11:	The importance of online media for Swedish journalists and citizens suggests that Swedish public diplomacy organizations rely more heavily on online media, including web 2.0-applications, as public diplomacy tools than French organizations.
Assumption 12:	The level of political participation and trust in national political institutions among Swedish citizens in contrast to French citizens suggest that Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to integrate domestic citizens in public diplomacy initiatives.
<b>Interorganizational cooperation</b>	
Assumption 13:	Non-state organizations like trade unions and associations play a more vital part in the Swedish than in French public diplomacy.
Assumption 14:	Both French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to engage in selected, project-based cooperations with EU organizations than in long-term, strategic cooperation efforts.

(Source: own depiction)

**Table 8: Research assumptions (third research question)**

Assumption 15:	France as a founding member of the EU pursues a more cooperative public diplomacy approach, working together with the EU, than Sweden.
Assumption 16:	France as a EU member state that has adopted the Euro currency pursues a more cooperative public diplomacy approach, working together with the EU, than Sweden.
Assumption 17:	France as a EU member state with a comparably high degree of influence on EU decisions and comparably large amount of financial contributions to the EU

	pursues a more cooperative public diplomacy approach, working together with the EU, than Sweden.
Assumption 18:	Sweden as a less influential EU member state and less public diplomacy resources than France adopts a cooperative strategy to attain public diplomacy goals it would not be able to reach on its own. Cooperation does not necessarily refer to the EU.

(Source: own depiction)

These research assumptions will be examined on the basis of a comparative research design, outlined in sub-chapter 5.2, which pursues a primarily qualitative approach and combines a document analysis with guided expert interviews.

## 5.2 Research design

The introductory chapter has pointed to a lack of empirically grounded knowledge on the public diplomacy approaches of the EU and its member states France and Sweden. Moreover, it has disclosed that literature on public diplomacy has primarily focused on case studies, analyses of best practice, historical accounts as well as the conceptualization of models and theories. In contrast to that, only few scholars have applied existing theoretical from communication studies, sociology or international relations to public diplomacy. Contributions that integrate two or more theoretical approaches to describe and examine public diplomacy are largely missing. (cf. Auer, 2015) Therefore, the focus of public diplomacy scholarship is still on generating rather than empirically testing theories.

Theory development constitutes an important goal of qualitative research (cf. Flick, Kardoff & Steinke, 2005, p. 24; Kuckartz, 2002, pp. 17-18). A qualitative approach to empirical research focuses on understanding social phenomena. It allows for an in-depth analysis of the public diplomacy understanding and practice of international actors (cf. Marshall & Rossmann, 2006, p. 55). To proponents of qualitative research, context is indispensable for capturing the relevance and the meaning of these single elements in a document or for instance an interview transcript (cf. Kuckartz, 2012; Schreier, 2012). While quantitative research designs primarily treat these context factors as constant and do not integrate them in the empirical analysis (Beichelt, 2005, p. 218ff.; Lauth et al., 2009, p. 40), qualitative research designs allow for an in-depth, holistic analysis of cases in which context factors are a vital part of both data collection and data analysis. This study has developed a framework for assessing the influence of organizations' internal and external environments on their public diplomacy understanding and practice (see sub-chapter 2.3). This framework allows for a systematic analysis of context factors that can be applied to all cases and still enables the researcher to grasp the peculiarities of these single cases. By that, this study takes the pivotal role of context factors into consideration and ensures the comparability of empirical findings at the same time. (cf. Srugies, 2013a, p. 240)

Qualitative and quantitative approaches do not mutually exclude each other, but are located on opposite ends of a continuum (cf. Früh, 2007; Krippendorff, 2004; Kuckartz, 2012; Schreier, 2012). Genuinely qualitative research designs are case-oriented, focusing on an in-depth analysis of single cases. Moreover, they advocate an inductive, data-driven development of research instruments. (cf. Schreier, 2012, p. 23). This study applies a more qualitatively oriented approach that combines qualitative methods of data collection and strategies of data analysis with single elements of



quantitative research. It combines the deductive, concept-driven development of main (and sub-) dimensions of analysis with inductive category building based on the data material.

This sub-chapter introduces document analysis as well as guided expert interviews as methods of qualitative data collection, and explains why they are suited for analyzing European public diplomacy from a comparative perspective.

### **5.2.1 Triangulation of Research Methods**

Triangulation implies the adoption of different perspectives on an object of research to answer research questions. It can refer to the combination of different sources of data, different theoretical concepts, different research methods as well as the analysis of the same research questions by different scholars to assess the influence of the scholars on the object of analysis. (cf. Flick, 2004, pp. 12-17) This study is based on a triangulation of different theoretical approaches (see chapter two) and different research methods. It combines a qualitative document analysis of strategy documents with guided expert interviews.

Margrit Schreier (2012) defines qualitative content analysis as “a method for systematically describing the meaning of qualitative material [...] by assessing successive parts of [this] material to the categories of [a] coding frame” (p. 1). While it has been described as a distinct research method only recently in the Anglo-American literature (see for instance Elo & Kyngäs, 2008), it draws on a much longer tradition in Europe, particularly in Germany (see for instance Ritsert, 1972; Rust, 1980). In contrast to quantitative content analyses, the method of qualitative content analysis puts more emphasis on analyzing latent meaning (cf. Schreier, 2012, see also Berelson, 1952; Kracauer, 1952). Siegfried Kracauer (1952) as an early advocate of qualitative content analysis argues that meaning is not always manifest and easy to grasp, but may require interpretation. Moreover, it does not only look at small segments of a document, but also takes the context surrounding these segments into consideration. The development of the coding frame that guides a qualitative content analysis is at least partly data-driven. Not least, qualitative content analyses provide the researcher with more flexibility with regard to the single steps of the empirical research process. (cf. Schreier, 2012, pp. 15-16)

The expert interview is a qualitative interviewing technique that focuses on the generation of area-specific information (cf. Bortz & Döring, 2006, p. 315; Scholl, 2009, p. 69). Gläser and Laudel (2010) classify expert interviews as non-standardized interviews that are based on an interview guideline. In contrast to fully standardized interviews (predetermined wording and order of questions, closed answer options) and half-standardized interviews (predetermined wording and order of questions, open answers), scholars applying non-standardized interviews do not define the exact wording and order of questions in advance and work with open questions only. The interview guideline encompasses all questions that are relevant in order to answer the research questions. However, the interviewer is neither bound to a specific wording of questions nor to a specific order in which the questions should be asked. The interview guideline provides a framework for ensuring the comparability of interviews, but maintains the flexibility of adapting the structure of the interview to the natural course of the conversation, deepen single aspects of the interview and ask additional follow-up questions. (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2010, pp. 42-43)

Bogner and Menz (2009) define three different types of expert interviews: 1) the explorative expert interview, 2) the systematizing expert interview, and 3) the theory generating expert interview. The explorative expert interview primarily serves the purpose of providing a first orientation in a new or

complex thematic area. It is often applied in the context of a preliminary study to develop a research instrument. Therefore, it constitutes the most open and flexible type of expert interviews. The systematizing expert interview focuses on the systematic collection of practical and experience knowledge. The expert serves as a source of information that the scholars cannot obtain otherwise. In contrast to the explorative expert interview, the systematizing expert interview is based on a much more differentiated guideline that enables a higher degree of comparability of findings. The theory generating expert interview concentrates on the identification and analytical reconstruction of the “subjective dimension” (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 66) of expert knowledge. It aims at conceptualizing (implicit) knowledge, world views, routines, and decision-making procedures. (cf. Bogner & Menz, 2009, pp. 64-66) This research project draws on theory-generating expert interviews. This specific type of expert interviews does not only target the technical knowledge (for example rules of procedure and communication structures) as well as the process knowledge (for example organizational routines, cooperation between and within organizations) of an expert, but places particular emphasis on the expert’s interpretative knowledge (for example subjective priorities, subjective understanding of concepts). By that, the theory-generating expert interview enables an analysis of the perception of the public diplomacy practice of single organizations, the quality of inter-organizational cooperation as well as the factors that enable and/or constrain public diplomacy practice and cooperation efforts.

While a document analysis can provide valuable information on the mission, the communication structure and processes as well as the resources of public diplomacy organizations, public diplomacy goals, strategic publics, public diplomacy core areas, tools and messages as well as mechanisms of inter-organizational cooperation, it cannot yield answers to the question how public diplomacy practitioners understand perceive and evaluate an organization’s public diplomacy practice as well as the cooperations it engages in. Expert interviews allow for an in-depth analysis of the public diplomacy understanding of public diplomacy practitioners, their evaluation of an organization’s current and past public diplomacy practice as well as their perception of inter-organizational cooperation efforts. The analysis of documents discloses information on the question how public diplomacy should be conducted. They are often issued on behalf of an entire international actor like the EU or France. In contrast to that, guided expert interviews enable the researcher to fathom the actual public diplomacy practice and examine similarities and differences between planned and actual public diplomacy conduct. Guided expert interviews present the perspective of the single public diplomacy organization as well as the individuals that represent this organization. The document analysis captures information on formal, binding communication structures and processes that are document in written form, whereas guided expert interviews also enable researchers to collect data on informal communication processes and structures (see table below).

**Table 9: Analytical foci of research instruments**

	<b>Document Analysis</b>	<b>Guided expert interviews</b>
<b>Key Question</b>	How should public diplomacy be conducted?	How is public diplomacy conducted?
<b>Analytical Focus</b>	Planned public diplomacy approach Formal communication	Actual public diplomacy approach Both formal & informal communication
<b>Level of Analysis</b>	International actor	Single public diplomacy organizations

(Source: own depiction)

The triangulation of research methods enables the researcher to level out the weaknesses of one specific method with the strengths of other methods (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2009). In this case, the document analysis allows for collecting data that is not influenced by the interviewer or the interview situation. Moreover, provides access to information that an expert may not be able to provide, as he or she has not been working in a specific public diplomacy organization for a long time or cannot recall specific aspects. Guided expert interviews grant the researcher the opportunity of asking follow-up questions and tailoring the interview to the research questions that guide this study. Moreover, a triangulation of research methods increases the quality of the findings, as they are empirically validated by more than one source of data (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2009, p. 105; Kuckartz, 2012, p. 169).

Even though observation constitutes a crucial method to study the behavior of public diplomacy practitioners, it is not included as a research method in this thesis. Observations demand a lot of resources that go beyond the scope of this analysis. They are suitable to examine the public diplomacy practice of single organizations in greater detail, but less fit to comparably analyze the public diplomacy approaches of a whole spectrum of organizations that communicate on behalf of national and regional actors. (cf. Lamnek, 2010, pp. 503-506)

### **5.2.2 Comparative Public Diplomacy Research**

This study is based on a comparative research design. It comparatively analyzes the public diplomacy understanding and practice of the EU as well as France and Sweden as two selected member states. In a broader sense, all social scientific research can be regarded as comparative (see for instance Beninger, 1992, pp. 35-36), as the process of contextualizing findings always involves a comparison with the already existing body of research (cf. Hanitzsch, 2008, p. 255). This study draws on a more narrow definition of comparative research, proposed by Esser and Hanitzsch (2012): According to Esser and Hanitzsch (2012, p. 7), a comparative study needs to involve at least two macro-level units of comparison such as cultures, markets, systems (or sub-units of these macro-level units), at least one object of investigation, build on a common theoretical framework as well as the application of equivalent methods and concepts to analyze the object(s) of investigation.

Comparative studies seek to identify similarities and differences between specific objects of investigation, detect functional equivalents and establish typologies (cf. Esser, 2010, pp. 9-10). However, the academic relevance of comparative studies lies within its strengths to not only develop typologies and theoretical approaches, but also to challenge existing concepts and paradigms (cf. Esser, 2010; Tsetsura & Kluyeva, 2012). Comparative research does not only look at the particular object of investigation, but also provides insights into the political, cultural or media environment that surrounds the object of study (cf. Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004). In comparative research designs, scholars are required to test their findings and interpretations “against cross-cultural differences and inconsistencies” (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012, p. 4, see also Muno, 2003; Satori, 1994). By that, it makes an important contribution to encouraging a more ethnorelative perspective on social phenomena (cf. Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012, see also Livingston 2003; Esser & Pfetsch, 2004a). Not least, comparative research “provides a key to understanding, explaining and interpreting historical events and processes and their significance for current organizational behavior” (Srugies, 2013a, p. 234, see also Ragin, 1987, p. 6). German public diplomacy practice after the Second World War provides an example of the importance of this historical dimension: After the experience of an asymmetric, expansionist, highly centralized external communication in the Third Reich, German organizations have adopted a decentralized, pluralistic public diplomacy approach to deliberately dissociate themselves from the

propaganda of the Nazi regime. (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013; Löffelholz et al., 2011a; Srugies, 2013a, pp. 234-235) From a practical perspective, comparative research enables both scholars and public diplomacy practitioners to learn from others and to detect different solutions for similar problems (cf. Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990; Esser & Pfetsch, 2004a).


The process of globalization as well as the emergence of new ICT have generally stimulated and facilitated comparative research (cf. Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012, p. 3). Despite these developments, empirical research on public diplomacy has primarily focused on single organizations, events, campaigns, tools or countries (see sub-chapter 1.3). Until now, there are only very few comparative public diplomacy studies (see for instance Pamment, 2013b; Valentini, 2010; Wang & Sun, 2012; White & Radic, 2014). However, the current debate on public diplomacy research shows that scholars stress the demand for (more) comparative public diplomacy research to “prepare the ground for generalizations needed to construct theories” (Gilboa, 2015) and to understand the “often very different cultural and political understandings of why and how states need to communicate to foreign publics” (Hayden, 2015). This study contributes to enriching comparative public diplomacy research by analyzing similarities and differences of the public diplomacy understanding and practice of the EU as well as its member states and by proposing a research model that systematically integrates context factors within the internal and external environment of organizations that influence public diplomacy.

The combination of the research methods qualitative document analysis and guided expert interviews in a comparative framework constitutes the basis of the empirical analysis. The following sub-chapters depict the research design in greater detail and outline the single steps of preparing and conducting the empirical study, as well as analyzing the empirical data. Illustration 14 below visualizes the empirical research process of this study<sup>161</sup>:

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<sup>161</sup> All steps of the empirical research process highlighted in grey have already been completed in the previous chapters two to four.

**Illustration 14: Methodological Approach**



(Source: own depiction, based on Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Kuckartz, 2012; Mayring, 2014; Schreier, 2012)

Having outlined the research questions, the key theoretical concepts as well as the most important insights drawn from the state of research on European public diplomacy in the previous chapters, the following sections concentrate on describing the definition and selection of cases of the empirical analysis, the operationalization of the study's theoretical framework, as well as the process of data collection and analysis.

### 5.2.3 Sampling Strategy

The public diplomacy of a country is not carried out by a single organization like the foreign ministry, but refers to an aggregation of communication efforts of both state and non-state organizations (see sub-chapter 2.3.1). These organizations operate in different social sub-systems as well as in different core areas ('society/culture', 'economy', 'education/culture') and may differ in their understanding of the concept public diplomacy as well as pursue different public diplomacy strategies. As Löffelholz et al. (2011a, b) show in an empirical study on the understanding and practice of public diplomacy in Germany, Germany neither possesses an overall public diplomacy strategy nor a general public diplomacy network. The traditional definition of the nation state as one case (cf. Landman, 2000; Edelstein, 1982) would neglect the pluralistic and diverse public diplomacy landscape in this case.

The definition of one country as one case falsely assumes uniformity within a specific country (cf. McLeod & Lee, 2012, p. 432). In addition to that, it neglects the significant changes in the political, economic and public sphere in the last decades as well as the development of novel social foci of identification and communication that have re-defined the understanding of public diplomacy. As outlined in sub-chapter 2.1, the term public diplomacy does not only refer to governmental and non-governmental organizations of one specific country, but also encompasses organizations operating below and beyond national borders. These observations call for an open, flexible approach to defining cases in internationally comparative public diplomacy research that is based on theoretical considerations (cf. Munro, 2003). As suggested by Peters (1998), "the case itself must still be socially constructed by the researcher" (p. 146).

This study applies the "within-case comparison" (Collier, 1993, p. 112) or "sub-national comparative method" (Snyder, 2001, cited in Munro, 2003, p. 21): Based on the "within-case comparison", this study defines the single public diplomacy organization within a country and within the European Union as one case<sup>162</sup>. This case definition allows for an in-depth analysis of the public diplomacy of the EU and its member states and increases the number of cases at the same time (cf. Srugies, 2013a, p. 239). Moreover, it also enables the researcher to examine transnational diffusion processes as well as the interplay between the domestic and the transnational (cf. Hanitzsch & Esser, 2012, pp. 512-513), for instance in the context of interorganizational cooperation.

This sub-chapter outlines the process of identifying cases in this study. It documents the stratified sampling procedure that preceded both the document analysis and the guided expert interviews. In a first step, it discusses the choice of EU member states. In a second step, it depicts the selection of EU and member state documents as well as the selection of public diplomacy organizations and interviewees within the respective organizations.

#### *Selection of EU member states*

The selection of countries is a crucial step in every cross-national study in order to ensure that the "similarities or differences revealed [in the empirical analysis is not solely] an artifact of the choice of countries" (Hantrais, 1999, pp. 100-101). Sub-chapter 4.2 has provided a rationale for selecting France and Sweden as two EU member states that will be analyzed in greater detail in the context of this study. These two member states were chosen on the basis of four criteria that describe the relationship between member states and the EU. It is assumed that these criteria influence the public diplomacy practice of the respective member state organizations and their motivation to engage in a cooperative public diplomacy strategy with the EU. These criteria include 1) the year of accession to the EU, 2) the

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<sup>162</sup> Interviews fathom the public diplomacy understanding and practice of single organization, whereas strategy documents can either refer to single organizations or the international actor as a whole.

adoption of the Euro currency, 3) the influence on the decisions of the EU, and 4) the monetary contributions to the EU (see Table 10 below). France and Sweden were selected on the basis of a multilevel exclusion procedure that is documented in appendix B1.

**Table 10: Selection of EU member states**

	<b>France</b>	<b>Sweden</b>
<b>year of accession to the EU</b>	founding member	1995
<b>adoption of the euro currency</b>	Yes	no
<b>influence on EU decisions</b>	comparably high (29 votes on Council decisions) (72 out 751 EP seats)	comparably low (10 votes on Council decisions) (18 out 751 EP seats)
<b>Monetary contribution to the EU</b>	comparably high (15,8% of all national contributions in 2014)	comparably low (3,2% of all national contributions in 2014)

(Source: own depiction based on European Commission, n.d.; European Parliament, n.d.a, European Union,n..d.)

### *Selection of documents*

The document analysis includes documents issued from November 22, 2004 to December 1, 2015<sup>163</sup>. By November 22, 2004 the Barroso Commission commenced its work. After both France and the Netherlands had rejected the EU Constitution in referenda in 2004, the Barroso Commission set out to strengthen the role of communication in the EU and to re-define the its communication policy (see for instance European Commission, 2005). The time frame of the analysis allows for an analysis of the public diplomacy understanding and practice of the EU and its member states prior and after the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty (signed in 2007, came into force in 2009) marks an important turning point of EU public diplomacy: The Treaty established a “‘new’ leadership architecture” (Duke & Courtier, 2011, p. 2) of the EU that served as the basis for a more coherent and strategic public diplomacy practice. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty laid the foundation for launching the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a new EU body designed to unify the external representation of the EU. The time frame of the document analysis allows for a comparison of public diplomacy prior and after the Lisbon Treaty. The time frame applies to both the analysis of documents issued by organizations of the EU as well as organizations within Sweden and France.

<sup>163</sup> Originally, the time frame of analysis only included the term of office of the Barroso Commission from November 22, 2014 to October 31, 2014. However, the collection of interview data could only be completed by December 1, 2015. To be able to relate all interview data to strategy documents, the time frame of the document analysis was extended to December 1, 2015.

To identify the relevant documents for the analysis, this study applies a keyword search on the websites and in the archives of the selected public diplomacy organization. Moreover, documents were identified on the basis of references in guided expert interviews and/or other documents. The search is based on the following keywords<sup>164</sup>:

- Public diplomacy
- External representation
- Strategic communication
- Information and communication policy
- External communication
- Communication strategy

All relevant documents of the EU are analyzed in English. The document analysis of Swedish public diplomacy organizations can include documents in both English and Swedish language. Similarly, the document analysis of French public diplomacy organizations may contain English and French documents. To identify all relevant French and Swedish documents, the researcher has translated the keywords in the local language. The coding frame in appendix A2 includes a list of all databases used as well as translations of the keywords in French and Swedish.

The document analysis only includes strategy documents issued by EU and member state organizations. Strategy documents include all documents in the time frame of analysis that

- outline the public diplomacy goals and the means to attain these goals in a long-term or at least mid-term perspective, and
- include information on...
  - goals and strategic publics of international actors and/or public diplomacy organizations,
  - the approach pursued to attain these goals,
  - the roles and responsibilities of single public diplomacy organizations, and
  - relations between these different organizations.

In contrast to that, annual reports and annual communication plans, strategies for specific campaigns and tools as well as controlled media tools like brochures are excluded from the analysis.

#### *Selection of public diplomacy organizations*

As explained in sub-chapter 2.3.1, the empirical analysis includes governmental organizations as well as government agencies in EU member states that operate in one or more of the following core areas:

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164 The keyword search is not limited to the term public diplomacy, but does also include related terms. Even though the concept of public diplomacy is applied by both state and non-state actors within the single member states and within organizations of the EU, the term public diplomacy is not always used to describe these communication activities (see sub-chapters 3.4 and 4.2.3).




‘economy’, ‘society/culture’ and ‘education/research’ (cf. Leonard et al., 2002; Löffelholz et al., 2011a). By that, the study can examine the influence of the type of organization as well as the public diplomacy core area on the public diplomacy understanding and practice as well as the cooperation efforts of the single organizations.

Sub-chapter 3.1 has shown that the EC and the EEAS constitute the two most important bodies in EU public diplomacy. While the EEAS concentrates on the external dimension of EU public diplomacy, EC organizations contribute to both internal and external EU public diplomacy. Organizations within the EC encompass Directorate-General Communication that is responsible for internal political communication on the EC and the EU as a whole, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments that engages in external communication on the EU as well as EC Policy DGs that conduct public diplomacy in specific policy areas. The tasks of the EC and the EEAS correspond to the role of a government and a foreign ministry respectively on a national level. Hence, all EU public diplomacy organizations included in this study contribute to the sub-system ‘politics/military’. However, this study still includes EC Policy Directorates-General that operate in the core areas ‘society/culture’, ‘education/research’ and ‘economy’. The analysis of these different EU public diplomacy organizations allow for identifying similarities and differences between the internal and the external dimension of EU public diplomacy as well as organizations communicating on the EC and the EU as a whole and organizations conducting public diplomacy in specific policy areas.


Governmental organizations may operate at headquarters level within the respective member state or at local level, implementing public diplomacy in target countries or at multilateral level. Similarly, EU organizations may be centrally based in Brussels or placed in member states (EC Representations) or third countries (EU Delegations). This study includes both member state organizations at headquarters level as well as the French and Swedish Permanent Representations to the EU. Moreover, it encompasses EU organizations working from Brussels as well as EC Representations in Paris and Stockholm. This range of public diplomacy organizations enables the researcher to analyze how public diplomacy strategies are developed as well as adapted and to what extent mechanisms of cooperation as well as the perceived quality of interorganizational relations differ at central and local level. The following illustrations summarize the rationale for selecting public diplomacy organizations within the EU and its member states:

**Illustration 15: Criteria for selecting public diplomacy organization in the EU**



(Source: own depiction)

**Illustration 16: Criteria for selecting public diplomacy organization in member states**



(Source: own depiction)

Specific public diplomacy organizations in the single fields depicted in illustrations 15 and 16 above were identified on the basis of the state of research on EU public diplomacy (see chapter three) as well as French and Swedish public diplomacy (see sub-chapter 4.2), strategy documents as well as recommendations in guided expert interviews.

Within each organization, one representative for conducting a guided expert interview was chosen. The term ‚expert‘ is not reserved to elites such as politicians or managers that have power to shape, but refers to people that possess interpretative power and influence the way how others think about specific issues (cf. Bogner & Menz, 2009, pp. 73-74; Gläser & Laudel, 2009, p. 11; Littig, 2009, p. 128). Experts hold knowledge in a specific area of activity to which they contribute in a relevant way. In this study, experts are defined as representatives of a public diplomacy organization that hold specific knowledge on public diplomacy, foreign policy, communication as well as international relations and that make a meaningful contribution to the public diplomacy of the respective international actor under study. The identification of interviewees is based on organizational charts as well as briefings with the organizations.

#### **5.2.4 Operationalization**

The researcher derived eight analytical dimensions on the basis of an integrative theoretical framework in chapter two. This sub-chapter summarizes the main analytical dimensions that guide the empirical analysis. Moreover, it depicts how these analytical dimensions are translated into interview guidelines as well as a coding frame for the document analysis.

##### *Dimensions of analysis*

The empirical analysis draws on the following nine analytical dimensions that have been deductively developed in sub-chapters 2.3 to 2.7:

#### **Dimension 1: Public diplomacy organization**

The first dimension focuses on the internal and the external environment that the public diplomacy organizations under study operate in. As illustrated in sub-chapter 2.3, an organization’s internal and external environment influences its public diplomacy understanding and practice. The internal environment of an organizations comprises the organization’s overall goals and mission, the internal communication structures and processes, focusing on the structural embeddedness of public diplomacy, the public diplomacy resources an organization commands as well as the decision-making power of public diplomacy practitioners within the organization.

Drawing on previous studies, sub-chapters 3.3 and 4.2.2 have discussed the infrastructure as well as the political, cultural and media environment of EU, French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations. To gain additional information on the external environment EU and member state organizations operate in, this dimension analyzes how the public diplomacy organizations under study perceive their political and diplomatic environment, the social sub-system(s) and the core area(s) they work in as well as media coverage and public opinion on the international actor and/or their own organizations.

#### **Dimension 2: Public diplomacy understanding**

An internationally consented definition of public diplomacy is still missing. Moreover, the scholarly understanding of public diplomacy presented in sub-chapter 2.1 does not necessarily reflect the practitioners’ comprehension of the concept (see sub-chapter 2.4). This analytical dimension fathoms how the organizations under study define public diplomacy. The public diplomacy understanding of

the single public diplomacy organizations does also provide first indications of the goals and the approach the respective public diplomacy organizations pursues and the strategic publics it seeks to reach.

The state of research discloses that many West European public diplomacy organizations do not apply the term ‘public diplomacy’ to refer to their public diplomacy activities (see sub-chapter 4.1). This dimension investigates to what extent EU and member state organizations are familiar with the concept of public diplomacy and apply it to describe their own work. Moreover, this dimension also examines what other terms organizations use to describe their public diplomacy activities.

### **Dimension 3: Public diplomacy goals**

This dimension centers on the goals public diplomacy organizations pursue and the more specific communication objectives they define in order to reach these overarching goals (cf. Hallahan, 2015, p. 244). As shown in sub-chapter 2.5.1, public diplomacy goals range on a continuum from political information/persuasion to cultural communication. The choice of public diplomacy goals as well as the degree to which they are coordinated with other international actors provide valuable information on the question if organizations adopt a rather competitive or cooperative public diplomacy strategy.

### **Dimension 4: Strategic publics of public diplomacy**

Strategic publics constitute the focus of the fourth analytical dimension. This dimension explores the geographical regions public diplomacy organizations target as well as the types of strategic publics they focus on, including political bodies, businesses, media organizations, civil society organizations, public figures and citizens. It also examines to what extent diaspora communities as well as domestic or internal publics respectively are regarded as strategic publics of public diplomacy activities. This analysis of strategic publics reveals whether public diplomacy organizations concentrate their efforts on publics within or outside of the EU and to what extent multilateral organizations constitute strategic publics of public diplomacy activities. To characterize single groups of strategic publics in a more detailed way, this dimension also captures the strategic publics’ level of knowledge on the respective international actor, degree of activism as well as level of support regarding the respective international actor.

### **Dimension 5: Public diplomacy approach**

Building on sub-chapter 2.5 that has introduced an analytical framework to categorize public diplomacy approaches, this dimension studies the general approach to public diplomacy that the organizations pursue. It examines the time horizon, the thematic foci, the mode of communication of the respective public diplomacy strategy as well as the role attributed to strategic publics and other public diplomacy organizations. Moreover, it explores how the organizations evaluate the challenges connected to developing and implementing their public diplomacy approach.

### **Dimension 6: Public diplomacy messages**

This dimension scrutinizes the public diplomacy messages the organizations under study seek to communicate. It analyzes the thematic issues public diplomacy organizations focus on as well as the

issue aspects that are either stressed or deemphasized in these messages. Furthermore, it allows for an analysis of the depiction of other organizations and international actors in these key messages. The content of public diplomacy messages provides cues for determining an organization's public diplomacy approach: While messages that focus exclusively on the goals and issues of one international actor and that are communicated on the basis of a coercive messaging or bargaining strategy are indicative of a more competitive public diplomacy practice, inclusive messages, addressing transnational challenges and collaboration with other international actors, suggest a more cooperative public diplomacy conduct of public diplomacy.

### **Dimension 7: Public diplomacy tools**

Whereas dimension five centers on the general approach to public diplomacy, this dimension concentrates on single public diplomacy tools and communication channels. It draws on the 'Integrated Public Relations Media Model' by Hallahan (2001) and its application by Auer et al. (2010, see also Auer & Srugies, 2013). It allows for a detailed analysis of each tool, capturing its purpose, its strategic publics, its mode of communication as well as the challenges public diplomacy organizations experience with regard to this specific tool. In addition to the examination of single public diplomacy tools, this dimension also addresses the prioritization of the different public diplomacy tools: It explores to what extent the organizations under study rank the different public diplomacy tools and looks at both the resources dedicated to a tool as well as tool's evaluation as indirect indicators of relevance.

### **Dimension 8: Interorganizational cooperation**

This dimension encompasses both cooperation processes between two single organizations and the constitution and development of public diplomacy networks of three or more organizations. It examines why, how and to what extent public diplomacy organizations engage in national, European and transnational interorganizational cooperation. Moreover, it scrutinizes how the organizations under study perceive the interorganizational cooperations they engage in as well as the factors that enable and/or constrain these cooperation efforts. In addition to this analysis at the organizational level, this dimension also addresses the purpose, structure and the governance of interorganizational cooperation at the network level, if several of the organizations analyzed engage in the same network. Not least, this dimension fathoms the extent to which public diplomacy organizations coordinate their activities with other governmental or non-governmental organization on the regional, national, and/or transnational level.

### **Dimension 9: Current and future challenges**

In addition to the analytical dimensions developed in chapter two, this study includes a ninth dimension, labeled 'Current and future challenges'. It aims at identifying current and future defiances with regard to public diplomacy on the level of the single organization and on the level of the international actor, the EU or the member state respectively. It enables the researcher to detect additional factors in the organization's internal and external environment that influence the organization's public diplomacy understanding and practice. Not least, the practitioners' perceptions of public diplomacy challenges can also point to demands for future public diplomacy research.


The nine analytical dimensions outlined above constitute a framework for developing the research instruments that guide the process of data collection. The following paragraphs illustrate how the analytical dimensions were translated into the coding frame for the document analysis as well as the guideline for the guided expert interviews.

### *Development of the coding frame*

The coding frame serves as a filter through which the material of the document analysis is viewed. It structures the material in a meaningful way (cf. Schreier, 2012, pp. 61-62). The coding frame guiding the document analysis is divided into three parts: An introductory part defines the objectives of the document analysis as well as the object of investigation and provides general coding advice. A second part encompasses all formal categories. The third part comprises all content categories. Formal categories, including the number of the document, the title and issuer of the document, the number of pages as well as the date of publication, aim at identifying documents. Content categories constitute the focus of the document analysis and are based on the nine analytical dimensions outlined above. These analytical dimensions serve as main categories. This study does not only draw on a deductive approach to derive these main categories, but also applies a theoretically guided procedure to develop a set of subcategories in each dimension (see analytical sub-dimensions identified in chapter two).

In addition to this deductive or concept-driven approach, this study also employs an inductive or data-driven procedure that enables the research to tailor the coding frame to the material under study (cf. Schreier, 2012, p. 7). With regard to inductive category building, it combines features of qualitative content analysis and coding: While creating sub-categories and coding the material are defined as two separate steps in qualitative content analysis, coding allows for a more flexible procedure that enables the scholar to develop additional subcategories in the main coding phase (cf. Kuckartz, 2012, p. 52; Schreier, 2013, pp. 41-42). This more flexible procedure is taken up to identify specific public diplomacy goals, tools, messages and networks. Illustration 17 displays all sub-dimensions deductively defined within the dimension ‘Public Diplomacy Messages’.

**Illustration 17: Deductively defined sub-dimensions of the analytical dimension ‘Public Diplomacy Messages’**



(Source: own depiction)

The coder creates a new sub-dimension for each key message identified in the strategy documents during the main coding. The sub-aspects ‘context of key message’, ‘focus of key message’, ‘depiction of others’ and ‘challenges of communicating key message’ developed in sub-chapter 2.6.1 are coded for each key message (see illustration 18 below).

**Illustration 18: Inductively defined sub-dimensions within the analytical dimension ‘Public Diplomacy Messages’**

Code	Count
2.09_Dimension I: Public Diplomacy Key Messages	0
2.09.01_Prioritization of Key Messages	0
2.09.02_Key Message 1_added value of EU for citizens	0
2.09.02.01_Context of Key Message 1	0
2.09.02.02_Focus of Key Message 1	0
2.09.02.03_Depiction of others in Key Message 1	0
2.09.02.04_Challenges of communicating key message 1	0
2.09.03_Key Message 2_Promote EU achievements	0
2.09.03.01_Context of Key Message 2	0
2.09.03.02_Focus of Key Message 2	0
2.09.03.03_Depiction of others in Key Message 2	0
2.09.03.04_Challenges of communicating key message 2	0

(Source: own depiction)

While this study acknowledges that single text passages can be very important, even though they only occur once, it codes repetitions of information to test to what extent these repetition serve as an indicator of relevance (cf. Schreier, 2012, pp. 155-156). If the key message ‘added value of EU for citizens’, depicted in illustration 18 above, is named multiple times in a document, it is coded every time it appears in the text.

#### *Development of the interview guideline*

The interview guideline as a research instrument ensures 1) the comparability of expert interviews and 2) that all aspects relevant to answering the research questions are covered in each interview (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2009, p. 143). It comprises an introductory note, a warming-up section, a main section, and a concluding section. The introductory note describes the goals and the relevance of the study as well as the procedure of the interview. It points to the confidentiality and the anonymization of the data collected. Moreover, it explains that the interview will be recorded and transcribed for analytical purposes upon approval by the interviewee. The warming-up section contains two ice-breaker questions that focus on the tasks the interviewee performs within the respective public diplomacy organization. These questions provide first insights into the organization’s mission, communication structures and processes as well as decision-making procedures. Moreover, they are easy to answer and serve the purpose of creating a pleasant atmosphere for the interview (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2009, p. 147). The main section encompasses the analytical dimensions public diplomacy understanding, public diplomacy goals, strategic publics of public diplomacy, public diplomacy approach, public diplomacy tools, public diplomacy messages and interorganizational cooperation. Opposed to the coding frame, the interview guideline does not contain an independent dimension ‘public diplomacy organization’. Aspects covered in this dimension are either part of the interview preparation (see sub-chapter 5.2.5 below) or integrated in the other analytical dimensions. The concluding section of the guideline addresses future challenges the interviewees perceive with regard to the public diplomacy of their own organization and the international actor they communicate on behalf of. Questions asked in the concluding section also have the purpose of maintaining a comfortable interview atmosphere and to prepare the ground for possible follow-up communication (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2009, p. 149).

In a first step, the researcher developed a general guideline for EU public diplomacy organizations and public diplomacy organizations in member states (see appendix A5). These two guidelines are entirely concept-driven and draw on the analytical dimensions developed in chapter two. In a second step, the researcher adapted the guideline to each interviewee on the basis of a primarily inductive, data-driven approach. She consulted the organizations' websites as well as material included in the document analysis and included knowledge gained from preliminary conversations and e-mail exchanges with interviewees to tailor the guideline to the specific organizations. The application of an adapted guideline has several benefits: It saves valuable interview time by answering fact-based questions, for instance on the structural embedding of a specific department, in the context of a preliminary research on the respective organizations. It allows the interviewer to tailor the formulation of the questions to the working environment of the interviewees and, by that, approach a rather natural course of conversation. (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2009, p. 151) Not least, the adaptation of the guideline to the specific organizations under study increases the acceptance of the interviewer by the interviewee and enables a conversation on equal footing (cf. Pfadenhauer, 2009, p. 113). While tailoring the guideline yields a number of important advantages, it remains crucial that comparability and the completeness of the different guidelines is ensured (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2009, p. 152).

Four out of five interviewees from French public diplomacy organizations only agreed to participate in this study if the interview is conducted in French. Therefore, the researcher translated the interview guideline into French. The interview guidelines for EU as well as member state organizations and the French interview guideline are documented in appendix A5.

### *Pilot Phase*

The pilot phase fulfils the function of ensuring that the research instruments attest to the quality standards of empirical research. Furthermore, it enables the researcher to detect problems and uncertainties that may impede the process of data collection. Kuckartz (2012) outlines three approaches to defining quality standards in qualitative research: 1) the formulation of universally valid quality criteria for both quantitative and qualitative research, 2) the adaptation of existing quality criteria in quantitative research to qualitative research, and 3) the general rejection of quality standards in qualitative research due to the flexible, open nature of the research paradigm. This study draws on quality criteria that have been adopted to qualitative research to ensure the comparability and quality of both the data collected as well as the findings and to acknowledge the distinct features of qualitative research methods.

To test the quality and the applicability of both the coding frame and the interview guideline, this study assesses the reliability and the (internal) validity of both research instruments. While reliability checks are more crucial than validity checks in quantitative research qualitative research attests the same importance to both quality criteria (cf. Schreier, 2012, p. 16). Reliability evaluates “whether the process of the study is consistent, reasonably stable over time and across researchers and methods” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 278). (Internal) validity, on the other hand, refers to the “extent to which your instruments help you capture what you set out to capture” (Schreier, 2012, p. 27). Content and face validity assess the relationship between concept and research instrument. Content validity relates to “the extent [to which] [...] an instrument covers all dimensions of a concept” (Schreier, 2012, p. 185) and focuses on the concept-driven development of a research instrument, whereas face validity concentrates on the inductive development of research instruments (cf. Schreier, 2012, p. 185).

In addition to ensuring reliability and validity, researchers need to address equivalence in comparative analyses. Hanitzsch and Esser (2012) identify three types of equivalence:



- **Equivalence of concepts:** Equivalence of concepts refers to a similar definition of core concepts across all cases included in the comparative analysis. The public diplomacy definition that serves as a basis for the empirical study draws on a review of the international state of research that takes perspectives of member states and regional organizations into consideration. Moreover, the empirically grounded definition of public diplomacy constitutes an analytical dimension itself.
- **Equivalence of methods and administration:** This type of equivalence comprises the application of the same research instruments in the same way in all cases.
- **Equivalence of language and meaning:** Specific terms and analytical dimensions may convey a different meaning in different countries due to language-specific connotations. As four of the French interviewees only agreed to participate in this study if the guided expert interview is conducted in French language, the researcher needed to translate the interview guideline. To ensure equivalence of language and meaning, the researcher has worked with a French native-speaker with a social science background<sup>165</sup> on the translation of the guideline and applied a translation-back-translation procedure with regard to the analytical main dimensions of the study.

(cf. Hanitzsch & Esser, 2012, pp. 504-505, see also Hanitzsch, 2008; Wirth & Kolb, 2012)

To test the (internal) validity of the coding frame and the consistency of the coding process, this study proceeds in two steps: In a first step, it conducts an expert evaluation of the coding frame. An expert evaluation involves one or more scholars that are familiar with the research method and the concepts under study and that critically assess the coding frame. In this study, a colleague that has a sound understanding of the concept of public diplomacy as well as considerable experience in conducting qualitative content analyses provided a detailed review of the coding frame as well as a set of suggestions for improvement that were discussed with the researcher<sup>166</sup>. In a second step, the researcher conducted an intra-coder agreement test to assess the consistency of coding over time (cf. Schreier, 2012, p. 167).

The validity of a coding frame is based on “the extent that the categories adequately represent the concepts under study” (Schreier, 2012, p. 175). Validity refers to both the extent to which your instrument gives the impression of measuring what it is supposed to measure” (*face validity*, Schreier, 2012, p. 185, see also Neuendorf, 2002, p. 115) and to the “extent [to which] [...] an instrument covers all dimensions of a concept” (*content validity*, Schreier, 2012, p. 185). The expert evaluation primarily focuses on the aspect of content validity, but it is also a valuable tool for assessing to comprehensibility, the exhaustiveness as well as the unambiguity of single categories as well as the overall structure of the coding frame.

Schreier (2012, pp. 72-77) defines four requirements categories in a coding frame ought to fulfill: 1) Unidimensionality, implying that each category corresponds to only one aspect of the material under study, 2) mutual exclusiveness, suggesting that subcategories of one main category do not overlap<sup>167</sup>, 3) exhaustiveness, indicating that each unit of coding can be assigned to at least one subcategory, and 4) saturation, meaning that each subcategory is coded at least once in the coding process. This study adopts the first three requirements for coding frame categories, but does not include the criterion of

<sup>165</sup> The researcher would like to thank Cloé Dauplais for her help in translating the interview guideline into French.

<sup>166</sup> The researcher would like to thank Dr. Liane Rothenberger for her valuable feedback and her suggestions for improving the coding frame.

<sup>167</sup> This criterion does not apply if subcategories are not mutually exclusive by definition and this is documented in the coding instructions (cf. Schreier, 2012, p. 76).

saturation. In concept-driven, deductively developed coding frames it can be a crucial finding that single (sub)-categories remain empty (cf. Schreier, 2012, p. 77; see also Rustemeyer, 1992). For example, if the subcategory 'citizens' in the main category 'Strategic publics of public diplomacy' is not coded, this does not necessarily point to a methodological flaw, but this may be an indicator for a stronger focus on decision-makers and multipliers as strategic publics of public diplomacy organizations.

The review of the first draft of the coding frame by an academic colleague pointed to overlaps within the analytical dimension 'Public diplomacy organization'. In the first draft, the coding scheme included a very detailed system of sub-dimensions to examine 'Strategic publics of public diplomacy'<sup>168</sup>. The reviewer suggested to simplify the coding procedure in this dimension to enhance the practicality of the research instrument. Not least, the reviewer recommended to further differentiate the analytical dimension 'Current and future challenges'. Based on this review, the researcher has revised the coding instructions in the dimension 'Public diplomacy organization' to avoid ambiguities and overlaps in the analysis of the internal and external public diplomacy environment. The dimension 'Strategic publics of public diplomacy' was completely restructured and thinned out to facilitate the coding and the data analysis. Furthermore, the researcher decided to code 'Current and Future Challenges' of single organizations as well as the international actor separately.

The intra-coder agreement test assesses the extent to which results of coding remain stable over time (cf. Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 278; Schreier, 2012, p. 167, see also Bryman, 2008; Seale, 1999). It measures the reliability of the coding frame to ensure a systematic, transparent way of collecting data (cf. Schreier, 2012, p. 35). To determine the intra-coder agreement, the researcher needs to select material for the trial coding. The trial coding should cover 10 to 20 percent of the entire material under study and reflect its variability (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 149-151). Eight documents were selected for the trial coding: Four EU documents (including two documents focusing on the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy - one issued prior and one after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force – as well as two documents centering on the external dimension of EU public diplomacy – again one issued before and after the Lisbon treaty came into effect, two French and two Swedish documents (for each member state one issued prior and after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty). The trial coding was carried out from October 6 to October 10, 2014 (first coding) as well as October 27 to October 31, 2014 (second coding).

The qualitative content analysis software MAXQDA was used to conduct and analyze the trial coding. The program offers three variations of assessing intracoder reliability: 1) code existence in the document, measuring if a specific (sub-) dimension was coded in a document, 2) code frequency in the document, quantifying how often a specific (sub-) dimension was coded in the document and 3) segment agreement in percent. This study measures 'segment agreement in percent' as the most precise tool of assessing intracoder reliability in MAXQDA. It evaluates the level of agreement of each coded segment in each document and allows for calculating Cohen's Kappa<sup>169</sup>. (cf. MAXQDA,

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<sup>168</sup> Initially, the dimension 'Strategic Publics of Public Diplomacy' comprised the sub-dimension strategic publics at transnational level, strategic publics in EU member states and third countries as well as sub-national strategic publics within member states and third countries. Each of these sub-dimensions included the types of strategic publics political bodies, businesses, media, civil society, public figures as well as citizens as sub-sub-dimension. For each type of strategic public, the initial coding frame set out to capture the degree of knowledge, the degree of interactivity and the level of support for the international actor as characteristics of the strategic publics.

<sup>169</sup> Cohen's Kappa has been criticized by many scholars as a conservative coefficient that captures consistent disagreements between coders as expected agreements (see for instance Krippendorff, 2004). As it is the only reliability coefficient provided by MAXQDA, it is still included as an indicator for the quality of the codebook in addition to a critical assessment of all coded text passages that were coded differently.

n.d.) The trial coding yields an overall result of  $\kappa=0.84$  (see appendix x for a more detailed documentation of the trial coding). While this trial coding measure points to a high level of agreement, a critical assessment of all segments that were coded differently is indispensable. The assessment of coded passages document segments pointed to difficulties in differentiating between the sub-dimensions evaluation and challenges in the analytical dimensions 'Public diplomacy approach' and 'Public diplomacy tools'. The researcher revised the coding instructions to avoid ambiguities.

To assessment of the quality of the interview guideline, the researcher also draws on feedback and discussions with a peer that has considerable experience in conceptualizing and carrying out quantitative and qualitative interviews<sup>170</sup>. The academic colleague checked on the comprehensibility, openness, clarity and unambiguity of the single questions as well as the overall structure and completeness of the guideline. She pointed to possible biases in the dimension 'Interorganizational cooperation'. Initially, the interview guideline focused strongly on the relationship between the EU and member states. In the revised version of the interview guideline, interorganizational cooperation was addressed more openly – the relationship between EU and member state organizations only constituted an interview focus if the interviewees themselves stated to cooperate with EU and member state organizations respectively. In addition to the revision of the interview guideline, the researcher also identified questions with a high priority and questions with a low priority that may be omitted under time constraints (cf. Scholl, 2009, p. 69).

The researcher did not conduct an interview with a public diplomacy practitioner in the pilot phase, since all statements by representatives of EU and member state organizations should be included in the data analysis. As it is valid to make (minor) changes to the interview guideline in the main coding process in the qualitative research (cf. Gläser & Laudel, 2010), the researcher prepared an interview protocol after each interviewee to reflect on necessary changes to the interview guideline. After the first two interviews conducted in March 2014, the researcher added an explanatory note on the definition of public diplomacy to the guideline for interviewees that are not familiar with the term 'public diplomacy'.

### 5.2.5 Data collection

The main coding of EU and member state documents took place from January, 2015 to May, 2015 with the computer assistance of MAXQDA. Additionally, the researcher coded a second set of strategy documents in October, 2015. This set included all documents collected after the time frame of analysis had been extended (see sub-chapter 5.2.4 above)<sup>171</sup>. In total, the document analysis comprises 46 strategy documents with a total number of 2.068 pages coded. Chapter six analyzes the allocation of documents in greater detail.

25 guided expert interviews<sup>172</sup> were conducted by the researcher from March 5, 2014 to December 1, 2015. Prior to every interview, the researcher contacted the respective organization via telephone to introduce herself and the study in order to stimulate interest in the research project (cf. Diekmann, 2007, p. 441). Drawing on this telephone conversation, a project description providing further information on the study as well as the procedure of conducting the guided expert interviews was sent

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<sup>170</sup> The researcher would like to thank Eva Schade for her valuable advice and her suggestions for improving the interview guideline.

<sup>171</sup> The last interview was conducted on December 1, 2015. However, the database research (see sub-chapter Selection of documents) did not disclose any relevant documents issued between October and December 2015.

<sup>172</sup> The researcher conducted one full interview with the Swedish Arts Council (SWE I 08a) as well as a shorter follow-up conversation on the organization's international strategy (SWE I 08b). These two conversations are treated as one interview.

via e-mail. In a number of cases, the interview acquisition process took several months, as single interviewees were very hard to reach and/or had to reschedule interview appointments several times.

While the researcher was able to conduct interviews with the EEAS as well as all desired organizations within the EC (see illustration 15 above), she could not realize interviews with French and Swedish government agencies from all public diplomacy core areas (see illustration 16 above). As the overview on the conducted guided expert interviews in chapter six shows, this study includes interviews with Swedish and French governmental organizations on headquarters and local level as well as government agencies. However, the sample of Swedish and French government agencies primarily comprises organizations operating in the core areas ‘society/culture’ and ‘education/research’<sup>173</sup>. This bias needs to be reflected critically when in the analysis and interpretation of the findings (see sub-chapter 5.2.7 below).

While the researcher conducted a series of face-to-face interviews in Stockholm, Paris and Brussels, the majority of conversations was realized via telephone. Opdenakkers (2006) remarks that „face-to-face interviews have long been the dominant interview technique in the field of qualitative research. In the last two decades, telephone interviewing became more and more common”. Telephone interviews significantly reduce the costs of guided expert interviews (cf. Busse, 2003; Christmann, 2009). In view of rescheduled interview appointments, in a number of cases at very short notice, telephone interviews presented the only opportunity to realize all guided expert interviews with the resources available to the researcher.

Nonetheless, disadvantages of telephone interviews need to be taken into consideration: They do not enable the researcher to perceive nonverbal cues (cf. Busse, 2003, p. 28; Opdenakkers, 2006). Moreover, Christmann (2009) points to a higher number of disturbance sources in telephone interviews, as interviewers cannot ensure that interviewees dedicate their exclusive attention to the interview. To address these challenges of telephone interviews, the researcher prepared a well-structured guideline to avoid comprehension problems in purely verbal communication (cf. Busse, 2003, p. 31). Upon request, the guideline was sent to the interviewee prior to the interview appointment. In addition to that, all interviewees agreed to answer questions that could not be answered in face-to-face or telephone interviews via e-mail. On a general level, telephone interviews are reflected more critically in literature on quantitative interviews (see for instance Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2000) than in publications on qualitative interviewing (cf. Christmann, 2009, pp. 209-2010). In an empirical study comparing transcripts of telephone and face-to-face interviews, Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) show that there are no significant differences between the two types of interviews. The majority of interviews involved one interviewer and one interviewee, creating a natural discussion atmosphere (cf. Lamnek, 2005, p. 246). In the case of the EEAS, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments as well as the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the researcher interviewed several members of the respective organizations. These interview constellations did not negatively affect the data collection, as none of the interviewees assumed a dominant role. Rather, the interviewees’ answer complemented each other.

The length of the interviews varies between 35 and 75 minutes. All interviewees agreed to the planned interview duration of 45 to 60 minutes beforehand. In three cases the interview had to be shortened to 30 to 40 minutes at the day of the interview, as the public diplomacy practitioners had to attend to

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<sup>173</sup> The researcher has contacted French and Swedish government agencies operating in the sub-systems ‘education/research’, including Campus France and the Agency for French Education Abroad (AEFE), as well as ‘economy’, such as Atout France, Business France, Visit Sweden and Business Sweden. The organizations did, however, not agree to take part in the study due to a lack of time or did not respond to the request of the researcher.

meetings arranged at short notice. The interview was reduced to questions with a high priority in these cases. With few exceptions, all interviews were recorded. Recording and transcribing guided expert interview do not only facilitate the data analysis, but also ensures the accurate and systematic reproduction of interview statements. Moreover, the audio recording allows the interviewer to focus entirely on the interviewee (cf. Kuckartz, 2012, p. 140). If an interviewee did not agree to record the interview, the researcher took notes during the interview to protocol the conversation as detailed and comprehensive as possible. The researcher stayed in touch with all organizations after the interview in order to ask to follow-up questions and/or provide an executive summary of the findings of this study.

The researcher coded strategy documents in English, French and Swedish in order to capture all relevant public diplomacy strategy documents issued by the EU as well as the respective member states. In addition to that, four out of guided interviews with French public diplomacy organizations had to be conducted in the local language. The multilingual data collection enabled the researcher to gain access to material a study solely conducted in English could not have yielded. At the same time, multilingual data collection also poses challenges to the comparability of the data and the findings (see sub-chapter 5.2.7). While the researcher has a sound knowledge of English, French and Swedish, she cannot detect linguistic nuances in the way a native speaker can. Language constructs reality (cf. Maletzke, 1996, p. 73) and has a decisive impact on the understanding and definition of concepts. This may impede the comparability of interview guidelines, transcripts and empirical findings. Moreover, language constitutes a public diplomacy tool and a channel of enhancing an international actor's definitional power (see sub-chapter 4.2.4). To ensure the comparability of data collected in different languages, the researcher consulted native speakers on the development of the French interview guideline, the transcription of French interviews as well as the coding of French and Swedish documents. Moreover, the dimension 'Public diplomacy understanding' allows for an open analysis of the concepts and terms used in the different countries to describe public-diplomacy related activities.

To prepare the data analysis, all interview recordings were transcribed. Drawing on Bortz and Döring (2006), the researcher has developed a set of transcription guidelines that are documented in appendix B3.7. As this study focuses on the public diplomacy understanding and practice of organizations and does not examine linguistic peculiarities, para-verbal aspects of features of interviews are not included in the transcriptions. The same applies to grammatical peculiarities of the oral language (cf. Scholl, 2009, p. 71). All names of interviewees were anonymized in the transcripts. The researcher developed a coding frame for the coding the guided expert interviews on the basis of the analytical (sub-) dimensions of the interview guideline (see appendix B3.2). All transcripts, interview protocols as well as the written interview with Radio Sverige International were coded with MAXQDA.


### **5.2.6 Data Analysis**

While this study applied two different methods of collecting data, it examines the coded documents as well as the coded interview transcripts, the interview protocol as well as the written interview<sup>174</sup> on the basis of a joint analysis strategy. Illustration 19 below visualizes this strategy:

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<sup>174</sup> Interview transcripts, written interview and interview protocol are subsequently referred to as 'interview documents'.

**Illustration 19: Data analysis strategy**



(Source: own depiction)

The academic literature discloses three types of qualitative document analysis:

- 1) **Content structuring analyses** that focus on the identification of topics and sub-topics as well as the relationship between these topics and sub-topics (nominally scaled variables),
- 2) **evaluative analyses** that concentrate on evaluating and classifying content (ordinally scaled variables), and
- 3) **type analyses** that seek to develop typologies (different scale levels).

This study applies a content structuring analysis of strategy and interview documents. The content structuring analysis corresponds to the structuring approach suggested by Mayring (2014). The structuring approach aims at “filter[ing] out particular aspects of the material, to give a cross-section through the material according to pre-determined ordering criteria, or to assess the material according to certain criteria” (Mayring, 2014, p. 64). This study only draws on nominally scaled variables and seeks to identify specific aspects of the material on the nine analytical dimensions outlined in sub-chapter 5.2.4 and analyze the relationships between these (sub-) dimensions, for instance the relationship between the internal and external environment of public diplomacy organizations and the

organizations' public diplomacy understanding. While this study may contribute to developing public diplomacy typologies, it is not its primary purpose.

The content structuring analysis of strategy and interview documents proceeds according to the following steps:

- 1) **Case summary:** In a first step, the researcher prepared a summary of the most important characteristics of each strategy document and each interview (see appendix B2.5 and B3.6). The case summary serves as a starting point for 'within-case analysis' and 'between-case analysis' and can contribute to the generation of hypotheses and categories (cf. Kuckartz, 2012, pp. 55-58)
- 2) **Category-based analysis:** Category-based analysis aims at decontextualizing text statements through categorization. Category-based analysis corresponds to paraphrasing, generalization and reduction as steps of analysis outlined in Mayring's (2014) structuring approach. In this step of the analysis, that Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) label 'meaning condensation', the researcher rephrases and summarizes the main sense of text passages that refers to single dimensions and sub-dimensions. This process is first applied to single strategy documents and interview transcripts and afterwards to the (sub-) groups of analysis. (Sub-) groups of the document analysis include the type of international actor (EU / member state), the date the document was issued and, specifically with regard to the EU, the focus of the document<sup>175</sup> (internal or external public diplomacy) (see table 11 below). Drawing on the rationale for selecting public diplomacy organizations (see sub-chapter 5.2.3), the analysis builds on the following (sub-)groups of interviews: the type of international actor (EU / member state), the type of public diplomacy organization as well as the level the organization operates on (headquarters level / local level) (see table below).

**Table 11: (Sub-) groups of the document analysis**

Filter variable	Groups of documents
<b>Type of international actor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU</li> <li>• Member states <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• France</li> <li>• Sweden</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Date of issue</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to December 1, 2009</li> <li>• After December 1, 2009</li> </ul>
<b>Focus of document</b> (applies to EU documents only)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on internal dimension of public diplomacy</li> <li>• Focus on external dimension of public diplomacy</li> </ul>

(Source: own depiction)

<sup>175</sup> A preliminary analysis of EU documents has disclosed that documents either focus on internal or external EU public diplomacy.

**Table 12: (Sub-)groups of the interview analysis**

Filter variable	Groups of interviewees
Type of international actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU</li> <li>• Member state <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• France</li> <li>• Sweden</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Type of organization	<p>Member States:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government</li> <li>• Governmental agency</li> </ul> <p>EU:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EC</li> <li>• Service DG</li> <li>• Line/policy DG</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EEAS</li> </ul>
Location of organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Headquarters level</li> <li>• local level</li> </ul>

(Source: own depiction)

- 3) **Relationships between (sub-) dimensions:** This step of the analysis serves the purpose of identifying how different dimensions and (sub-) dimensions are linked to each other (cf. Kuckartz, 2012, p. 95). The tool ‘Code Relations Browser’ of the software MAXQDA allows the researcher to identify and analyze coded segments in which (sub-) dimensions overlap.
- 4) **Interpretation and Contextualization:** Whereas the category-based analysis in step two aimed at decontextualizing text segments, “meaning interpretation recontextualizes the statements within broader frames of reference” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 235). The interpretation and contextualization of empirical data involves detecting similarities and differences between (different groups of) documents and interviews, discussing the findings against the background of the state of research as well as validating findings on the basis of external data like Eurobarometer surveys

### 5.2.7 Limitations

This section considers limitations of the empirical study. It identifies shortcomings and problem areas with regard to the selected research methods, the sampling strategy as well as the process of data collection and data analysis. Both Kuckartz (2012) and Schreier (2012) point to the reflexivity of data and researchers as a criterion of qualitative research. This applies particularly to the guided expert interviews conducted in this study: By prioritizing questions of the guideline, following up on specific



aspects mentioned in an interview or omitting questions due to time constraints, the interviewer co-produces empirical data and influences the kind as well as the amount of data gathered on single analytical dimensions (cf. Kuckartz, 2012; Schreier, 2012). Chapter six addresses all aspects that could not be fully covered in all interviews to make the reflexive process of collecting interview data transparent. Moreover, this study combines guided expert interviews with a document analysis as a non-reactive method to level out this limitation.

The sampling process on the level of EU member states, single documents and single organizations also influences the empirical data collected. Hantrais (1999) argues that “[a]ny similarities or differences revealed by a cross-national study may be no more than an artifact of the choice of countries” (Hantrais, 1999, pp. 100-101). Even though appendix B1 provides a detailed rationale for selecting Sweden and France, the findings of this study may hardly be generalized, as they only refer to two EU member states. Sub-chapter 7.2 discusses possible follow-up studies that extend the number of member states analyzed while still providing a detailed analysis of public diplomacy organizations within the single countries. The document analysis focuses on strategy documents that are publicly available. By that, it excludes documents formulated for internal use only that may contain important information for understanding the public diplomacy approach of the EU and its member states<sup>176</sup>.

Initially, this study aimed at interviewing French and Swedish government agencies that operate in the core areas ‘society/culture’, ‘economy’ and ‘education/research’. However, a number of organizations contacted in the acquisition process could not or refused to participate in this study. As a consequence, the selection of government agencies in both countries reflect a bias toward organizations operating in the area ‘society/culture’ and to a lesser degree ‘education/research’. Information on government agencies operating in the economic area only gathered through the document analysis as well as indirectly, through interview statements by representatives of other organizations.

Public diplomacy organizations are complex actors that “are formed by a fusion of individual actors” (Auer & Srugies, 2013, p. 12, see also Donges, 2008, p. 52). In the case of the EC organizations Directorate-General Communication and Service for Foreign Policy Instruments as well as the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Institute, the Swedish Arts Council, and the Institut Français, the researcher had the opportunity of speaking with several interviewees from the same organization. In all other cases, the empirical findings draw on interviews with one public diplomacy practitioner from each organization. Even though these interviewees represent an organization, they still voice individual positions that may differ from their colleagues’ views. To reduce individual biases, research on public diplomacy organizations should always include the perspectives of several practitioners within one organization. Unfortunately, due to resource constraints, it was not feasible to interview several representatives of each organization included in this study.

As outlined in sub-chapter 5.2.5, not all guided expert interviews were recorded and transcribed. In one case, the researcher had to draw on an interview protocol prepared after a face-to-face interview. In a second case, the organization only agreed to conduct a written interview via e-mail. Furthermore, the guided expert interviews differed with regard to their length, ranging from 35 to 75 minutes. These factors impede the comparability of the interview data and, hence, the findings. Hanitzsch and Esser (2012) identify “equivalence of language and meaning” (p. 505) as a central criterion for ensuring equivalence in comparative research. In this study, the researcher conducted interviews in English as well as French and coded documents in three different languages. While the researcher has a sound knowledge of these languages and consulted with native speakers on both the translation of the

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<sup>176</sup> This critical reflection only applies to the systematic empirical analysis of strategy documents. If interviewees provided additional documents, they were used as background information in the contextualization of empirical findings.

interview guideline and the coding process, she does not have the same nuanced understanding of linguistic and cultural peculiarities of French and Swedish that native speakers do. The limitations outlined above need to be taken into account when interpreting the empirical findings.

## **6. Findings and discussion: Comparing national and regional public diplomacy in Europe**

This chapter presents and reflects on the findings of the empirical analysis. It starts by providing an overview of the sample of EU and member state documents as well as interviews with EU, Swedish and French public diplomacy practitioners. It proceeds by documenting the empirical findings on the EU and member state public diplomacy organizations, their public diplomacy understanding and practice, as well as the forms of interorganizational cooperation they engage in. Sub-chapter 6.1 introduces the most relevant EU, as well as French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations. It details the mission and the communication structure of the respective organizations, the resources and the decision-making power they command (internal environment), as well as the external environment they operate in. The organization's internal and external environments influence the understanding and practice of public diplomacy that are outlined in the sub-sequent sections 6.2 to 6.4.

Whereas sub-chapters 6.1 to 6.4 depict how single public diplomacy organizations conduct public diplomacy on behalf of an international actor, sub-chapter 6.5 focuses on the relationships and the cooperation between public diplomacy organizations on a national, regional and transnational level. It identifies the extent to which public diplomacy organizations observe and integrate aspects of the work of other organizations as well as coordinate goals, strategies, and single programs and initiatives. Moreover, this sub-chapter analyzes why and in what way organizations engage in networks and how they assess and commit to these public diplomacy networks.

The sub-chapters 6.1 to 6.5 are all arranged in three parts that correspond the three overarching research questions on 1) the public diplomacy of the EU, 2) the public diplomacy of EU member states, and 3) the analysis of main similarities and differences between EU and member state public diplomacy (see sub-chapter 5.1). The scope of this thesis does not allow for a comparison of each (sub-) group of documents and interviews included in the sample of the empirical analysis (see sub-chapter 5.2.6). Therefore, chapter six only includes a comparative depiction of findings if the analysis yields striking differences between single sub-groups. Sub-chapter 6.6 provides a discussion of the empirical findings on the basis of the theoretical framework of this study (chapter two) as well as the state on European public diplomacy (chapters three and four). It is structured by the main elements of the empirical analysis: public diplomacy organizations, understanding, and practice, as well as interorganizational cooperation.

### *Description of the sample*

This study draws on a qualitative analysis of 46 strategy documents, comprising 18 EU documents, 10 French documents, as well as 18 Swedish documents. A total of 17 documents (including 10 EU documents, 3 French documents and 4 Swedish documents) were issued from November 22, 2004 (start of the Barroso I Commission) to November 30, 2009. This first interval covers the period of time prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty. The second interval, encompassing the time period from December 1, 2009 (inception of the Treaty of Lisbon) to October 31, 2014 (end of the Barroso II Commission), includes 22 documents (6 EU documents, 6 French documents, and 10 Swedish documents). In addition, the sample features seven documents (two EU documents, one French document and four Swedish documents) that have been issued after the Juncker Commission took office on November 1, 2014<sup>177</sup> (see illustration 20 below).

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<sup>177</sup> As outlined in sub-chapter 5.2.3, the time frame of analysis was extended, as a number of guided interviews were conducted after the Juncker Commission had taken office on November 1, 2014.

**Illustration 20: Distribution of strategy documents (total number of pages coded: 2.068 pages)**

	<u>Barroso Commission</u> (2004)	<u>Lisbon Treaty</u> (2009)	<u>Juncker Commission</u> (2014)	<u>Total amount of documents</u>
<b>EU</b>	10	6	2	<b>18</b> (481 <u>pages</u> )
<b>France</b>	3	6	1	<b>10</b> (835 <u>pages</u> )
<b><u>Sweden</u></b>	4	10	4	<b>18</b> (752 <u>pages</u> )

(Source: own depiction)

Illustration 20 above shows that the EU sample includes a total of 18 documents, containing ten documents that primarily refer to the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy, as well as another eight documents on external EU public diplomacy. Accounts of internal EU public diplomacy were mainly issued in the ‘period of reflection’ after two failed referenda on the planned EU Constitution (see sub-chapter 3.1). In contrast to that, EU public diplomacy organizations issued the lion’s share of documents on external EU public diplomacy after the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force. The majority of French strategy documents were published from 2010 to 2014. In July 2010, France adopted a new regulation on the country’s external actions that also went along with a restructuring and reconceptualization of the country’s public diplomacy efforts (see sub-chapter 6.1.2). Documents issued from 2010 to 2014 detail and further develop this new approach to French public diplomacy. The majority of Swedish documents were also retrieved in the second interval of the document analysis. This finding can be traced back to two developments in Swedish public diplomacy: On the one hand, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs adopted a more strategic approach to public diplomacy in 2013 (see sub-chapter 6.1.2). On the other hand, the Swedish Institute introduced the country’s brand strategy in cooperation with other Swedish public diplomacy organizations in 2013 (see sub-chapter 6.3.2). Illustration 19 above shows an unequal number of 18 Swedish and only ten French documents. Whereas French organizations issued a smaller number of comprehensive documents (total page count: 835 pages), Swedish organizations for example split the conceptualization of the country’s brand strategy into several documents, that each refer to different areas of the strategy (total page count: 752 pages). These documents have been coded separately. Appendix x lists all coded documents and the abbreviations used to refer to these documents in this chapter.

Furthermore, 25 expert interviews were conducted from March 5, 2014 to December 1, 2015. With regard to the EU, the interviews shed light on the public diplomacy understanding and practice of representatives from policy and service Directorates-General (DG) from the EC, the EEAS, as well as the EC Representations in Paris and Stockholm. Interviews with French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations include the perspectives of both governments and government agencies. Moreover, the sample features guided interviews with public diplomacy practitioners from the French and Swedish Permanent Representations to the EU.

**Table 13: Interviews with EU public diplomacy organizations<sup>178</sup>**

	Type of organization	Type of sub-organization	Organizational unit
Headquarters level	EC	<b>DG Communication</b> (Service DG)	Directorate A (EU I 09)
			Directorate B (EU I 05)
			Directorate C (EU I 01, EU I 04)
			Spokesperson Service (EU I 10)
		<b>DG Trade</b> (Policy DG)	Communications unit (EU I 02)
		<b>DG Education and Culture</b> (Policy DG)	Management (EU I 03)
		<b>DG NEAR</b> (Policy DG)	Communications unit (EU I 08)
		<b>DG ECHO</b> (Policy DG)	Communications unit (EU I 11)
	EEAS	<b>FPI</b> (Service DG)	Partnership Instrument (EU I 06a)
			Instrument contributing Stability and Peace (EU I 06b)
Local level	EC	<b>EC Representation in Stockholm</b>	Communications unit (EU I 07)
		<b>EC Representation in Paris</b>	Communications unit (EU I 12)

(Source: own depiction)

Interviews with DG Communication (EC service DG) include one representative at management level (EU I 05) of Directorate B ‘Representations’, one representative in a leading position within Directorate C ‘Citizens’ (EU I 04), one head of a subunit of the Spokesperson Service (EU I 10) as well as two public diplomacy practitioners that work in subunits of Directorate A ‘Strategy and

<sup>178</sup> The abbreviation provided in brackets for each organizational unit (for example ‘EU I 09’) is the abbreviation used to refer to the single guided expert interviews in chapter six.

Corporate Communications’ (EU I 09), and Directorate C (EU I 01). One of these interviewees previously served as Head of an EC Representation in a member state (EU I 01). Moreover, the sample includes four interviews with representatives from EC policy DGs that reflect the different core areas public diplomacy operates in: It features interviewees working at management level at DG Education and Culture (EU I 03), as well as three interviewees working in leading positions in the communications department of DG Trade (EU I 02), DG NEAR (EU I 08), as well as DG ECHO (EU I 11). While EC policy DGs like Trade, NEAR, or ECHO also conduct public diplomacy towards external strategic publics, the EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments constitute the most important organizations of the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. The study encompasses a group interview with a representative of the EEAS ‘Strategic Communications Division’ (EU I 06c), as well as two program officers from the Partnership Instrument (EU I 06a), and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (EU I 06b) as part of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. In addition to these interviewees working in Brussels, the sample comprises interviews with the heads of the respective communications units of the EC Representations in Paris (EU I 12) and Stockholm (EU I 07). Ten out of twelve interviews yielded information on the professional background of the interviewees<sup>179</sup>. At the time of conducting the interviews, four out of ten respondents had worked less than one year in their current position (EU I 02, EU I 03, EU I 07, EU I 10). Two interviewees stated to have been employed in their current position between one and two years (EU I 09, EU I 11), while another four EU representatives have held the same position for two or more years (EU I 04, EU I 05, EU I 08, EU I 12). The majority of respondents had previously served in other positions within EU institutions. In contrast to that, one interviewee from DG Education and Culture had collected prior work experiences in the NGO sector in Brussels (EU I 02), while one interviewee from DG ECHO had previously served in the foreign service of a member state (EU I 11).

**Table 14: Interviews with French public diplomacy organizations<sup>180</sup>**

	Type of organization	Type of sub-organization	Organizational unit
Headquarters level	Government	MAEDI	Directorate General for Globalization, Development and Partnership (DGM) (FRA I 05)
	Government agency	Institut Français	Communications unit (FRA I 01) Functional unit (FRA I 04)
		France Médias Monde	Functional unit (FRA I 02)
Local level	Government	Permanent Representation of France to the EU	Communications unit (FRA I 03)

(Source: own depiction)

<sup>179</sup> Due to time constraints, the professional background of the interviewee could not be discussed in two interviews.

<sup>180</sup> The abbreviation provided in brackets for each organizational unit (for example ‘FRA I 02’) is the abbreviation used to refer to the single guided expert interviews in chapter six.

The sub-sample of interviews with French public diplomacy practitioners encompasses one interviewee in a leading position of a subunit of the ‘Directorate General for Globalization, Development and Partnership’ (Direction générale de la Mondialisation, du Développement et des Partenariats, DGM) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development (FRA I 05). Moreover, it contains three interviews with government agencies, including conversations with representatives of the Institut Français in a leading position of the communications unit (FRA I 01), and one functional unit focusing on relations with the EU (FRA I 04), as well as one head of a functional unit at France Médias Monde (FRA I 02). Additionally, the study includes one interview with a communication officer working with the Permanent Representation of France to the EU (FRA I 03). Whereas all interviewees at headquarters level had already been working in their respective positions for at least two years, the interviewee from the French Permanent Representation to the EU had only recently started working in their current position at the time of the interview (FRA I 03).

**Table 15: Interviews with Swedish public diplomacy organizations<sup>181</sup>**

	Type of organization	Type of sub-organization	Organizational unit
Headquarters level	Government	Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Functional unit (UD-FIM) (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b) Communications Unit (SWE I 05)
		Ministry of Culture	Functional unit (SWE I 05)
	Government agency	Swedish Institute	Management (SWE I 06) Management (focus brand strategy) (SWE I 02)
		Swedish Arts Council	Functional unit (SWE I 08a, SWE I 08b)
		Radio Sverige International	Management (SWE I 04)
Local level	Government	Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU	Communications unit (SWE I 03)

(Source: own depiction)

The Swedish sub-sample features three interviews with governmental public diplomacy practitioners that are operating in leading positions within a functional unit (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b), and the communications unit (SWE I 05) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as well as one head of a functional department within the Ministry of Culture (SWE I 07). At the level of government agencies, this study draws on interviews with public diplomacy practitioners in leading positions within the Swedish Institute (SWE I 02, SWE I 02), as well as program officers within a functional unit within the Swedish Arts Council. Additionally, the study comprises one interview with one representative in

<sup>181</sup> The abbreviation provided in brackets for each organizational unit (for example ‘EU I 09’) is the abbreviation used to refer to the single guided expert interviews in chapter six.

a leading position at the public broadcaster Radio Sverige International (SWE I 04). Similar to France, the Swedish sub-sample also features one interview with a communications specialist at the Permanent Representation to the EU (SWE I 05). The majority of Swedish interviewees works two or more years in their respective positions (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b, SWE I 02, SWE I 02, SWE I 06, SWE I 07, SWE I 08a, SWE I 08b). Similar to their colleague in the French Permanent Representation to the EU, the interviewee from the Swedish Permanent Representation states to have worked for less than one year in their current position (SWE I 03).

## **6.1. Public diplomacy organizations**

This sub-chapter analyzes the main public diplomacy organizations of the EU as well as in France and Sweden. It outlines their scope of activities, their communication structures and processes, including the embeddedness of public diplomacy as well as the resources and the decision-making power they command. In addition to these factors of the internal environment, this sub-chapter also examines the external environments public diplomacy organizations operate in. It fathoms how the public diplomacy organizations under study perceive the political and diplomatic environment, the media environment, and the public opinion on the international actor.

### **6.1.1 The European Union**

#### *The internal environment of EU public diplomacy organizations*

It places the EC in the center of EU public diplomacy organizations because it plays a pivotal role in both the internal and external dimensions of EU public diplomacy. The EC is headed by the President, as of November 2014 Jean-Claude Juncker, that defines the Commission's political priorities. The Vice-President of the EC, currently Federica Mogherini, also serves as 'High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy'<sup>182</sup>. She coordinates the communication within the EC and chairs the Group of Commissioners for Communication and Programming (EU Doc 01). Moreover, the HR/VP represents the EU in matters of the Common Foreign and Security Policy on the level of ministers (EU Doc 11)<sup>183</sup> as well as in international conferences and organizations. Not least, the HR/VP coordinates the EU's external action with the 'Commissioners' Group on External Action' that features the heads of seven policy DGs with a strong external dimension. (EU Doc 11) The EEAS Review issued in 2013 argues that the position of the HR/VP is tasked with too many responsibilities and presents an overwhelming workload (EU Doc 12).

The HR/VP is part of the College of Commissioners that also encompass EC President Jean-Claude Juncker, six more EC Vice-Presidents<sup>184</sup> as well as all heads of EC Policy DGs. Each Policy DG comprises a communication adviser as well as an 'Information and Communication Unit'. Communication advisers shape the profile of the respective Commissioner with the Spokesperson Service and coordinate the DG's political communication (EU Doc 09, EU Doc 18). Representatives of the Information and Communication Unit are included in the management meetings of the

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<sup>182</sup> This chapter applies the abbreviation 'HR/VP' High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' and Vice-President of the EC on all following pages.

<sup>183</sup> This includes neighborhood and enlargement negotiations (DG NEAR), trade, development, humanitarian aid and civil protection (DG ECHO), climate action and energy, transport and migration.

<sup>184</sup> In addition to the HR/VP, the College of Commissioners includes six other Vice-Presidents, responsible for Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, Rule of Law and Charter of Fundamental Rights, Budget and Human Resources, the Energy Union, the Euro and Social Dialogue and the Digital Single Market.



respective Policy DGs and coordinate their communication efforts with DG Communication and the Spokesperson Service on the basis of EC communication priorities and ‘lines to take’<sup>185</sup>.

DG Communication is responsible for the EU public diplomacy towards strategic publics within the EU. Moreover, it is tasked with assisting and overseeing the communication strategies and campaigns of EC Policy DGs. Both DG Communication and the Spokesperson Service act under the direct authority of the EC President, even though the Spokesperson Service is administratively attached to DG Communication. The Spokesperson Service is the only unit within the EC that is empowered to speak on and off the record. (EU Doc 09, EU Doc 18) One interviewee points to a considerable reduction of the Spokesperson Service’s resources with the introduction of the Juncker Commission:

*“I mean, the Spokesperson's Service has been considerably reduced in size, the number of spokespeople has been diminished from, I think, 38 to around 17 and...and overall the size of the Spokesperson's Service including all spots of press officers, secretaries, has been almost halved, so it's a resource constraint, but which can be compensated through new and different working methods inside the Spokesperson's Service.”* (EU I 10, Paragraph 69<sup>186</sup>)

DG Communication coordinates the network of EC Representations in member states. Representations communicate on behalf of the EC and have a listening and monitoring function in member states (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 18). They function as they ‘eyes and ears’ of the EC, monitoring shifts and trends in the public opinion of citizens within the member states and providing feedback on information and communication activities. Europe Direct Centres assume similar communication and listening tasks at a local level (EU Doc 01). They have an important function in reaching out to strategic publics in sub-national regions and local communities, particularly in countries that are very centralized such as France (EU I 12). One interviewee from the EC Representation in Paris states that the Representation comprises 35 people involved in public diplomacy: The political section that primarily communicates with decision-makers, the press section that addresses mainly journalists, and the communication section that works first and foremost with citizens. This structure suggests that public diplomacy is not conducted by a single department within the EC Representation, but understood as a task handled by the entire organization. (EU I 12)

The EC Secretariat General functions as an interface between the EC, other EU institutions, member state parliaments and non-state organizations (EU Doc 18). The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) is a department of the EC that reports directly to the HR/VP (EU Doc 12). In a document issued by the EC in 2011, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments is tasked with handling the public diplomacy budget on behalf of the EC and the EEAS (EU Doc 11) and serves as a link between these two organizations (EU Doc 12). One interviewee from the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments points to the goal of developing a shared public diplomacy approach of the EEAS and respective organizations within the EC (EU I 06b). The EEAS is an autonomous EU body that combines features of a foreign, defense, and development ministry. It acts under the authority of the HR/VP and relies on existing administrative and corporate structures from the EC and the Council on the basis of service agreements. (EU Doc 12) Two documents, issued by the HR/VP in 2013 (EU Doc 12) and the EC in 2014 (EU Doc 17) attribute the role of a catalyst to the EEAS that should bring the foreign policies of EU member states together and strengthen the EU’s position in the world. The tasks

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<sup>185</sup> The expression ‘lines to take’ refers to documents on EC policy priorities, EC actions as well as major topics of public debate prepared by the Spokesperson Service. ‘Lines to take’ are circulated among Commissioners as a daily briefing and serve the purpose of facilitating communication between Commissioners and journalists.


<sup>186</sup> This thesis indicates the paragraph within an interview for each direct quotation. The data analysis software MAXQDA structures interview transcripts in single paragraphs. The MAXQDA files containing the coded interview transcripts are attached in appendix x.

of the EEAS include supporting the HR/VP in their mission to ensure the consistency of EU external action, and providing information and assistance to the EC President, EC Commissioners, as well as the President of the Council in their work on EU external policy (EU Doc 12, EU Doc 17). By that, the EEAS contributes to developing a long-term strategic framework for EU external relations (EU Doc 12). The EEAS possesses a Strategic Communications Division that is responsible for press and communication activities of the HR/VP as well as coordinating the communication matters of EU Delegations in third countries and to international organizations (EU Doc 11).

The EEAS manages a network of 139 EU Delegations (as of January 2016) in third countries and to international organizations. EU Delegations communicate on behalf of the entire EU and adapt EU communication priorities and key messages to the local context they operate in (EU Doc 12, EU Doc 13). One document released jointly by the EEAS Strategic Communication Division and the DEVCO Communication and Transparency Unit in 2012 highlights the role of EU Delegations in “communicating the EU’s values, policies and results of its projects towards third country stakeholders” and “explaining the EU and promoting a positive image in the world” (EU Doc 13, p. 3). Furthermore, the document states that the EU Delegations assist in positioning the EU as “a global player and major aid donor” (EU Doc 13, p. 3). They operate under the authority of the HR/VP and receive instructions from both the EC and the EEAS (EU Doc 11, EU Doc 17). Personnel within EU Delegations includes staff from the EEAS and the EC as well as temporary agents from member states (EU Doc 12, EU Doc 17). The EEAS Review, issued in 2013, suggests to allocate more resources to EU Delegations and less to the EEAS in Brussels (EU Doc 12).

Illustration 21 below shows a simplified depiction of the EU public diplomacy organizations this study focuses on and how they are interrelated:

**Illustration 21: Main organizations of EU public diplomacy**



(source: own depiction)

### *External environments of EU public diplomacy organizations*

Statements reflecting how EU public diplomacy organizations perceive their political environment can be subdivided into the perception of the political environment both within and outside of the EU. EU documents issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty point to an underdeveloped European public sphere (EU Doc 04), as EU issues are primarily viewed through a national lens (EU Doc 05). One interviewee from DG Communication illustrates this challenge, stating:

*“[...] politics is still essentially national, communication is essentially national, press is essentially national - we're not the US, we don't have a common language, we don't have a common national press, so it's always very difficult to get into national conversations. And in communicating the EU, that's the most difficult thing. Because political discussions are national, debates are national, in the national language, by national politicians and usually there is no one there from the EU, or rarely there is one”. (EU I 09, paragraph 62)*

In addition to this general observation, one EU document points to significant differences between single EU member states regarding the extent to which they foster national debates on the EU (EU Doc 03). Three interviewees from DG Communication and DG Trade address the blame game played by member states on the EU<sup>187</sup> as factor that constrains EU public diplomacy (EU I 02, EU I 03, EU I 05, see sub-chapter 3.3). One interviewee from an EC Policy DG expresses doubt if these “dynamics of politics” can be changed (EU I 03, paragraph 101).

To one interviewee from DG Trade, member state governments constitute the most important multipliers of EU messages. At the same time, he perceives member states as “something in-between” that often impedes the communication between the EU as an institutions and EU citizens (EU I 02, paragraph 32). The example of the UK illustrates this perceived divide between regional organization and citizens: “Take a look at the UK, they are an island, they used to rule the world. Because they used to be a superpower, it is not easy [for them to accept supranationality]. And for them there is only one parliament and that is in Westminster” (EU I 05, paragraph 36). The willingness of EU member states to accept supranationality also affects the emergence of a European identity (EU I 05). Besides the relationship between the EU and its member states, the relationship between old and new member states also influences the political and diplomatic environment of EU public diplomacy organizations. In 2006, only shortly after the largest single expansion of the EU in 2004, one EU document stresses that small new member states feel they are not treated equally in comparison to other EU member states (EU Doc 03).

The relationship between EU member states and EU organizations influences the political environment outside of the EU. One document issued after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty highlights the fact that the EU is highly regarded internationally for its civilian and military missions (EU Doc 12), but only possesses a limited capacity to act with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As the Common Foreign and Security Policy is intergovernmental, it is dependent on the political will of EU member states to achieve an impact (EU Doc 12).

While the media ought to play a key role “promot[ing] the added value of the EU” (EU I 05, paragraph 35), EU organizations perceive coverage about the EU as both limited and fragmented (EU Doc 04).

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<sup>187</sup> If something good for the member states and citizens within it is decided, governments communicate it as a decision taken by member states, if something negative or controversial is decided it is communicated as a decision taken by the EU (EU02, EU03, EU05).

As one interviewee from the EC Representation in Paris states, it is very hard for the EC to be and stay present in the French media (EU I 12). One document issued in 2008 points to a discrepancy between the amount of EU coverage in single types of media, and the media use patterns of EU citizens: Whereas the press covers EU issues more often, than audiovisual media, audiovisual media constitute the main source of information on EU issues for EU citizens (EU Doc 08). Citizens also express a demand for more information on EU issues in national media (EU Doc 05). In addition to that, interviewees from both DG Communication and different policy DGs emphasize the priority of bad news and controversial issues in media coverage on the EU (EU I 02, EU I 03, EU I 04, EU I 05).

Both EU documents and EU interviewees draw on findings from Eurobarometer survey (see subchapter 2.3.2) to analyze the public perception of the EU in its member states. EU documents, and interviews with EU public diplomacy practitioners alike point to a rather negative assessment of public opinion on the EU. Documents issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty contain reflections about a decreasing approval of the EU as well as a drop in support of EU membership (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03). Furthermore, both the document analysis and the analysis of the guided interviews address a gap between the EU and its citizens: EU citizens perceive the EU as something distant and abstract (EU I 01, EU I 03). According to EU documents, citizens feel that their voices do not count in the EU, which is underpinned by a decreasing participation in EU elections as well as a lack of knowledge on existing EU consultation mechanisms (EU 02, EU 04). One interviewee from the EC Representation in Paris points to the strong presence of right wing, populist parties in the EP, which is, in their opinion, directly related to the need of encouraging people to vote in the next EP elections (EU I 12). Both inside and outside of the EU, peace is recognized as the most important achievement of the EU (EU Doc 03, EU Doc 12).

The impact of the new ICT on EU public diplomacy organizations are discussed in documents issued prior and after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty. The new ICT do not only put EU policies under more intense public scrutiny (EU Doc 13), but they also present alternative means of expression for journalists and enable both citizens and interest groups to voice their concerns more easily (EU Doc 06). One EU document also addresses the role of the economic environment: It raises the question of what future role the EU will play in international monetary and trade organizations in the light of fast growing new economies (EU Doc 10).

### **6.1.2 EU member states: France and Sweden**

#### *The internal environment of French public diplomacy*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development has a central and coordinating role in French public diplomacy (FRA Doc 05). Its communications department ('Direction de la communication et du porte-parolat') takes care of the external communication of the MAEDI, media relations, and provides the foreign representations with information (FRA Doc 09). The diachronic analysis of French documents shows that the MAEDI, particularly departments responsible for public diplomacy, have been restructured in the time frame of the empirical study. In documents issued in 2004 and 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development (at that time still 'Ministry for Foreign Affairs) encompassed a 'Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development' that covered four core areas: cultural and language cooperation, International Broadcasting and communication technology, academic cooperation, higher education, and development and technical cooperation (FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 09). By 2009, this directorate has been replaced by the 'Directorate General for Globalization, Development and Partnership' that is subdivided into three directorates: One directorate that groups all activities in the area culture, (higher)

education and language, a second directorate concentrating on development assistance as well as a third, newly introduced directorate focusing on economy (FRA Doc 02, see also FRA I 05)<sup>188</sup>.

The MAEDI governs the network of French embassies abroad, permanent representations at the multilateral level, as well as consulates general and consulates. French representations play a crucial role in conducting public diplomacy on a bilateral level as well as adapting the French public diplomacy approach to national and local contexts (FRA Doc 02)<sup>189</sup>. Cultural attachés are an integral part of French Representations. Besides cultural attachés, there is no single department or staff member that is charged with public diplomacy- and/or communication-related tasks within a French representation. Rather, the French government argues that all staff members should include a communication dimension in their work at the Representation (FRA Doc 05).

French public diplomacy draws on nine central government agencies: The Institut Français, the Agency for French Education Abroad (Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger, AEFÉ), as well as Campus France in the area culture, (higher) education and language, Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Canal France International (CFI), Expertise France, as well as France Volontaires in development assistance and Business France and Atout France in the economic domain. These government agencies are primarily coordinated by the 'Directorate General for Globalization, Development and Partnership' within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development. However, the ministry does not have a monopoly on external action and public diplomacy. In addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, the document analysis also identifies the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research (FRA Doc 05), the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and the Digital Sector, the Ministry of Culture and Communication, as well as the Ministry of Defence (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 09) as organizations within the French public diplomacy network. In a number of cases the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development is the only ministry to guide and oversee the work of a government agency (e.g., Agence Française de Développement, Canal France International). In other cases, it shares this responsibility with the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research (Campus France) or the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and the Digital Sector (Expertise France).

Whereas two documents issued by the French government in 2004 and 2008 state that the management of government agencies needs to be strengthened and the network of cultural agencies needs to be modernized (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06), the analysis of French documents published in 2013 or later point to a high level of formalization of the cooperation between the French government and the agencies. Drawing on the restructuration processes of French public diplomacy within the last few years, one representative from the Institut Français stresses that government agencies pursue similar goals, but with different means (FRA I 01). The majority of government agencies, for example Campus France, or the Institut Français are organized as 'établissements public à caractère industriel et commercial' (EPIC). EPICs operate under governmental authority and receive government funding as well as subsidies from international and European organizations. Additionally, they may also generate revenues from their own activities such as offering language courses. EPIC like the Institut Français maintain a network of local offices that are sometimes integrated in French foreign representations. In these cases, the work of these local offices in a given country is coordinated by the head of the foreign representation. (FRA Doc 07)

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<sup>188</sup> In 2014, the competences of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were extended and now also cover foreign trade promotion and tourism promotion in close cooperation with the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and the Digital Sector (FRA Doc 10).

<sup>189</sup> Already in 2008, one document issued by the French government points to the growing relevance of public diplomacy within French Representations (FRA Doc 05).

The Institut Français is the principal government agency in the domain of foreign cultural policy (FRA Doc 09). Its tasks include supporting and promoting French culture abroad, contributing to cultural exchange and diversity, and promotion of the French language in order to strengthen French influence in the world, and to create a favorable environment for exporting. (FRA Doc 07, FRA Doc 09) The headquarters of the Institut Français accompanies a large network of French cultural representations and local IF organizations abroad (FRA I 01, FRA I 04). The Institut Français has replaced CulturesFrance in 2011 and is a merger of previously separate government agencies like l'Association française d'action artistique (AFAA) and l'Association pour la diffusion de la pensée française (ADPF) (FRA Doc 09). To one interviewee from the Institut Français, the consolidation of government agencies in the area of culture has increased the coherence of foreign cultural activities (FRA I 01). At the same time, the Institut Français is confronted with the challenge of taking on a growing number of tasks with comparably few resources (FRA I 01). The work of the Alliance Française can be allocated to the core areas 'society/culture' and 'education/research'. It contributes to promoting the French language and culture as well as fostering cultural exchanges and diversity, provides training in the French language and allocates scholarships to both French and foreign students (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 09). The name 'Alliance Française' can refer to both the Fondation Alliance Française, the organization's headquarters in Paris, as well as local Alliance Française sites abroad that constitute autonomous bodies established by partner organizations (FRA Doc 09). One French document issued in 2004 criticizes the fact that the Fondation Alliance Française in Paris is not directly responsible for managing the network of local Alliance Française sites. Instead, French representations in a given country decide on the amount of resources allocated to the local organizations. This constrains the Fondation Alliance Française's development of a proper strategy for the network of local Alliance Française organizations. (FRA Doc 06)

The Agency for French Education Abroad (Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger, AEFÉ) is the principal government agency in the domain of education. It manages and fosters the network of educational institutions that teach French abroad and ensures the education of children of French expatriates. At the same time, it also receives and teaches international pupils in France. By that, AEFÉ contributes to promoting the French language and culture abroad as well as enhancing the attractiveness of France abroad. (FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 09) Campus France constitutes the government agency that is tasked with the internationalization of French higher education (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 07). It was created in 2012 and integrates the work previously carried out by Egide, and the Centre national des œuvres universitaires et scolaires (CROUS) (FRA Doc 07).

The Agence Française de Développement serves as the most important development assistance organization within the French public diplomacy network. It concentrates on Southern hemisphere countries and engages in capacity building as well as economic and social development. (FRA Doc 08) The report 'Développement de l'influence de la France sur la scène internationale. Une diplomatie publique à la française', issued by Frank Melloul in 2010, points to the steady growth of the agency from 2000 to 2010 and its recognition on an international level (FRA Doc 09). Canal France International, on the other hand, engages in the cooperation and the support of media in developing and emerging countries (FRA Doc 06). Expertise France, created on January 1, 2015, unites six organizations previously working in the field of international and technical development cooperation<sup>190</sup>. Its activities on a bilateral and on a multilateral level contribute to development cooperation as well as increasing French economic influence. (FRA Doc 07, FRA Doc 08). Not least,

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<sup>190</sup> The organizations that have been merged into Expertise France include Adecri, Adetef, France Expertise International as well as the public interest groups Esther, International, and Santé Protection Sociale International.

France Volontaires coordinates an international network of volunteers that engage in development projects.

Business France united the government agencies UBIFRANCE and Invest in France (IFA) on January 1, 2015<sup>191</sup>. It combines the task of fostering the international development of French enterprises, previously assigned to UBIFRANCE (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 09), with IFA's former mission of promoting foreign investments (FRA Doc 09). While UBIFRANCE worked under the authority of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and the Digital Sector (FRA Doc 09), Business France is solely coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development. Atout France promotes France as a tourist destination and seeks to raise the attractiveness of France to both tourists and foreign investors. In 2015, it operated a budget of 34 million euro (FRA Doc 10). The holding society France Médias Monde owns the international broadcasters Radio France International, France 24 and Monte Carlo Doualiya and coordinates their activities (FRA I 02). It also owns a 49% share of the international Francophone channel TV5<sup>192</sup>. Illustration 22 below provides an overview of the most important French public diplomacy organizations:


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<sup>191</sup> Invest in France was a merger itself that has handled tasks previously assigned to the Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale (DATAR), the Délégation aux investissements internationaux and the Association Invest in France (FRA Doc 09).

<sup>192</sup> TV5 Monde is an international TV network of French-speaking countries that broadcasts several programs in the French language.



Illustration 22: Main organizations of French public diplomacy



(source: own depiction)

In addition to these principal government agencies, a number of smaller organizations under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development also contribute to French public diplomacy. The network of 27 Instituts Français de recherche à l'étranger (French Institutes of Research abroad), for example, contributes to the promotion of French ideas, and by extent also French influence in the world (FRA Doc 05). Furthermore, the Union des Français à l'étranger (Union of the French living abroad) aims at facilitating the lives of French expatriates and showing the French way of living abroad (FRA Doc 09).

French collectivités territoriales<sup>193</sup> (C.T.) encompass 26 regions, 80 départements and 400 groupements intercommunaux. C.T. constitute crucial French public diplomacy actors that promote sub-national interests abroad and operate in about 140 different countries. (FRA Doc 03) Even though the national government remains the most important organizations in French external action and public diplomacy, the 'diplomatie de proximité' of sub-national authorities has a multiplying effect on French public diplomacy conducted at the national level (FRA Doc 03). The role of C.T. in French public diplomacy should therefore be valorized (FRA Doc 05). Two documents published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development in 2013 (FRA Doc 03) and 2014 (FRA Doc 02) propose to strengthen the role of sub-national authorities and other sub-national organizations in French public diplomacy. In concrete terms, this includes the suggestion to reinforce the legal position of sub-national authorities and enable them to set up their own conventions on a decentralized level, and to co-sign international or bilateral agreements with the French government.

#### *External environments of French public diplomacy organizations*

The analysis of the political and diplomatic environment in French documents concentrates on the role of globalization, the rise of emerging powers as well as multilateral organizations play for French external relations and public diplomacy. Several documents, issued prior and after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty, emphasize a geostrategic power shift (FRA Doc 01, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 09). Particularly with regard to economic power, Asian countries have gained ground (FRA Doc 05). In addition to new geographical foci, one French document points to the growing relevance of non-state organizations, including NGOs, businesses, churches, and universities in the context of globalization (FRA Doc 05).

One document issued by the French government in 2008 stresses the importance of multilateralism in ensuring international security (FRA Doc 05). This document anticipates an unstable world order, in which direct (for instance terrorism) and indirect dangers (for instance fragile states) persist (FRA Doc 05, see also FRA Doc 09). The degree to which these challenges to international security can be tackled, depends on the relationship between great powers, the power of both regional and international organizations as well as the degree of justice and legitimacy of the international system (FRA Doc 05). In this context, the French Conseil Économique, Social et Environnemental (CESE) highlights the increasing importance of soft law, including Codes of Conduct, as well as the growing influence of international organizations on law (FRA Doc 01).

The French government emphasizes the EU's economic strength, its role in development cooperation as well as its positive image internationally as assets of the regional organization. While the EU has enlarged its political competences in the process of European integration in over the preceding decades, the French government critically addresses the EU's limited impact with regard to justice,

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<sup>193</sup> The term 'collectivité territoriale' refers to all French sub-national entities that are governed by an elected sub-national authority.

security, internal affairs as well as external action in a document issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty (FRA Doc 05). The French document analysis yields contrasting findings with regard to the identification with the EU: One document issued by the French government in 2008 indicates a decline in the collective spirit of EU member states, which is reinforced by a rising economic nationalism (FRA Doc 05). In contrast to that, a more recent reflection of France's political environment, issued in 2010, voices the concern that the ongoing process of European integration leads to a decreasing identification with the nation state (FRA Doc 09). Moreover, one interviewee from the Permanent Representation of France to the EU argues that "Brussels is a symbol of austerity, is a symbol of constraints and not a symbol of growth, a symbol of positive evolution" (FRA I 03, paragraph 40).

Even though the French government recognizes the USA as an important partner in security matters (FRA Doc 05), it emphasizes a growing Anglo-Saxon influence on the EU as an institution and Europe as a whole as a possible threat to the international influence of the French language (FRA Doc 05). Similarly, one document issued in 2004 identifies the EU enlargement as a challenge to preserving the French language as part of linguistic diversity in the EU (FRA Doc 06). Whereas documents issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty highlight the dominance of Anglo-Saxon media in the world (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06), one document issued in 2010 points to the role of Al-Jazeera as an alternative to Western media (FRA Doc 09).

International public opinion regarding France is only the subject of discussion in one document (FRA Doc 09). The document argues that France is perceived as a great cultural power. Moreover, it addresses public opinion on France as an international leader: According to the Gallup World Poll surveys conducted from 2005 to 2009 cited in one document (FRA Doc 09), French international leadership is viewed most positively in countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The document also points to an increase in positive perceptions in the Middle East and Eastern European countries, while a large group of respondents from the USA and Japan state that they don't know how to assess the role of France as an international leader (FRA Doc 09).

The growing relevance of the new ICT is regarded as both an asset and a challenge in French documents issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty. New ICT have lowered the costs of communication and can bridge the physical distance between people. Moreover, they can lead to more openness in authoritarian regimes (FRA Doc 05). At the same time, better accessibility and a growing amount of information does not automatically equal increased comprehensibility of this information. In addition to that, the new ICT also confronts France with the challenge of sustaining the use and the diffusion of the French language online. (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06)

#### *The internal environment of Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

The analysis of Swedish documents and interviews identifies the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute as the two main organizations in Swedish public diplomacy (SWE Doc 05, SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b). The Ministry for Foreign Affairs protects and fosters Swedish political and economic interests on an international level (SWE Doc 01). Public diplomacy-related tasks within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are handled by the communications department (UD-KOM) as well as the 'Department for the EU Internal Market and the Promotion of Sweden and Swedish Trade' (UD-FIM). UD-FIM manages the promotion of Sweden in the areas of trade, investment and culture as well as the image of Sweden abroad (SWE Doc 09). The Ministry for Foreign Affairs coordinates a network of roughly 100 foreign representations (SWE Doc 06). Even though the majority of these missions have a representative for press, information and cultural issues (SWE Doc 06), public diplomacy should not only be carried out by communication officials, but integrated into all activities of the missions abroad

(SWE Doc 09). One document issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2010 states that 70% to 75% of the Foreign Ministry's budget is spent on embassies<sup>194</sup>. In order to adapt the network of Swedish representations to changes in the international environment, the documents suggest the development of more flexible types of representations that also involve cooperation and co-localization with local organizations, representations of other countries, or EU Delegations in states outside of the EU. (SWE Doc 01) Prior to 2013, the Swedish Institute had held the main responsibility for the strategic and operational conduct of public diplomacy. In a reform of the Swedish public diplomacy structures during 2013, one interviewee refers to as a "revival" (SWE I 01a, paragraph 14) of the concept in Sweden, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs took over the strategic planning and coordination of public diplomacy again (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b). In addition to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, as well as the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation also contribute to Swedish public diplomacy and the promotion of Sweden abroad (see for instance SWE Doc 06) and oversee the work of government agencies such as the Swedish Arts Council, Visit Sweden, or Business Sweden.

The Swedish Institute, as the most important Swedish public diplomacy government agency, provides information and knowledge about Sweden to strategic publics abroad (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 06, SWE Doc 12, SWE Doc 13). Moreover, its palette of tasks also include building trust in Sweden, and promoting long-term relations with other countries in the areas of culture, education, research, society, and democracy through exchanges, development cooperation projects, or for instance language courses (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 12). By that, the Swedish Institute should contribute to the realization of Swedish interests, Swedish growth, employment, as well as cultural development (SWE Doc 06). The Swedish Institute operates in three different public diplomacy core areas: 'society/culture', 'education/research' and 'economy'. This variety of tasks poses significant challenges to the governmental agency:

*"I think the challenges for an institute like ours who have activities in such a broad span of areas, which.../ We cannot easily be defined, we are not a traditional cultural institute and we are not the traditional promotion body and this gives us a flexibility, but also puts us under the pressure to.../ how to continue [to] communicate what.../when we are relevant and what are our strengths, [...] what is our complementarity to what others are doing? What should we do, what should we not do? And this is a challenge both in relation to our stakeholders and financers, but also to the internal discussion and, of course, the potential partners in society."* (SWE I 06, paragraph 65)

Whereas the Swedish Institute constitutes a "mid-sized player" in the country's development cooperation efforts (SWE I 06, paragraph 65), the Swedish International Development Agency (Styrelsen för Internationellt Utvecklingssamarbete, SIDA) is the most important Swedish organization within this field. It is funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was established in 1995 on the basis of a fusion of five previously separate development organizations (SWE Doc 06)<sup>195</sup>.


The Swedish Arts Council is the main governmental agency that supports the cultural work of Sweden abroad (SWE Doc 06), and that stimulates cultural cooperation and exchange (SWE I 08a, SWE I

<sup>194</sup> This sum equals 0,14% of Sweden's GDP, which is less money than many other countries spend on their foreign representations (SWE Doc 01).

<sup>195</sup> The researcher aimed at conducting a guided expert interview with a representative of SIDA. However, a communication officer of the organization rejected the request, stating that "our scope is primarily informing the Swedish general public about development cooperation and humanitarian assistance", whereas "national and transnational communication [on development cooperation] is handled by the [Ministry for Foreign Affairs]" (e-mail correspondence from March 3, 2015).

08b). Besides the Swedish Arts Council, the Swedish Arts Grants Committee, the Swedish Film Institute, and Export Music Sweden for example, all contribute to Swedish public diplomacy in the core area 'society/culture' (SWE Doc 06). One document from 2011 discloses the Swedish Trade Council, the Invest in Sweden Agency, Growth Analysis, as well as Visit Sweden as principal government agencies in Swedish public diplomacy in the core area 'economy'. The Swedish Trade Council and Invest in Sweden pursue similar tasks, promoting foreign investments and trade as well as the internationalization of Swedish companies. As a consequence, the two organizations were merged into Business Sweden in 2013. Growth Analysis is commissioned by the government to identify the areas which are most important for economic growth and the conditions that enable or hamper this growth. By that, the organization contributes to strengthening Swedish competitiveness. Visit Sweden aims at communicating Sweden as a tourist destination. Its mission overlaps with the task of promoting Sweden that is assumed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute. (SWE Doc 05) Not least, the public service broadcaster Sverige Radio International informs both foreign audiences as well as migrant and minority publics within Sweden (SWE Doc 06). It does not consider itself as an international broadcaster and stresses its independence from the government and Swedish foreign policy priorities (SWE I 04). The most important Swedish public diplomacy organizations are depicted in illustration 23 below:

**Illustration 23: Main organizations of Swedish public diplomacy**



(source: own depiction)

### *External environment of Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

The document analysis points to three major developments in the last two decades that influence the political environment Swedish public diplomacy organizations operate in: globalization, closely connected to that, an increasingly multipolar world, as well as Sweden's accession to the EU (SWE Doc 01). The Swedish government assesses these changes in the international environment positively, stating that they increase the chances of exercising Swedish influence on its own future and the future of the international environment (SWE Doc 01), and that they provide new opportunities with regard to trade, technology, but also preserving human values and rights (SWE Doc 03). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 as well as the EU enlargement in 2004 has for instance provided new opportunities for Sweden's foreign policy in Central and Eastern Europe (SWE Doc 01, SWE Doc 06). Moreover, the developments outlined above lead to a growing entanglement of domestic, foreign, and European policy that demands close inter-ministerial coordination within Sweden, as well as an increased commitment to multilateral cooperation (SWE Doc 01, SWE Doc 03, SWE Doc 07). Similar to the French government, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs also points to a shift of the world's political and economic center of gravity to the east (SWE Doc 01).

The media environment of Swedish public diplomacy organizations hardly constitutes an issue in the strategy documents, and is not discussed in the guided interviews at all. Only one document issued by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2011 addresses the positive coverage of Sweden in the international financial and economic press, praising Sweden's efforts to address past financial and economic crises (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 12).

The Swedish Institute argues that Sweden is a small country dependent on the world around it. Therefore, the country's international image plays a pivotal role for Sweden. (SWE Doc 14) Both the Swedish Institute and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledge the positive international perception of Sweden (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 05), particularly in the areas of sustainable development, social responsibility, innovation, as well as socio-economic development (SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 12, SWE Doc 14). At the same time, the document analysis also discloses that national and international audiences are often unaware of single areas of strength such as innovation (SWE Doc 14).

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish companies often contribute to a favorable international opinion regarding Sweden, as they are mostly associated with positive values such as reliability, quality, environmental friendliness, and responsibility towards employees and the environment (SWE Doc 05). In contrast, companies hardly ever draw on the image of Sweden, but rather seek to position themselves as international instead of Swedish organizations (SWE Doc 05). One Swedish document and one interviewee also point to the limited influence of national public diplomacy organizations on the country's international image: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs finds that a number of cultural products, including crime novels and movies, do not contribute to a positive image of Sweden abroad. Also, Sweden is not always perceived as a single country, but as part of a bigger entity, such as the EU. One interviewee from the Swedish Institute considers the association of Sweden with "old Europe" (SWE I 02, paragraph 91) disadvantageous and argues that Sweden ought to find its own role in the world in order to stay relevant. Interestingly, the international image of Sweden is only discussed in documents issued after 2011.

The Swedish strategy documents also touch upon Sweden's economic situation (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 06, SWE Doc 07, SWE Doc 12, SWE Doc 15), social tensions within the country (SWE Doc 12), migration (SWE Doc 06), environmental concerns (SWE Doc 12), as well as IT developments (SWE

Doc 01, SWE Doc 07, SWE Doc 09, SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b) as factors that influence the Swedish public diplomacy understanding and practice. The process of globalization has been accompanied by an increasingly free flow of capital and information as well as the growing mobility of people (SWE Doc 06). These developments have facilitated and intensified the intercultural exchange in Sweden (minorities living in Sweden<sup>196</sup>, SWE Doc 06) and between Sweden and other countries (SWE Doc 07). Moreover, they have put issues, for instance in the areas of economy and trade, on the public agenda that had previously only been subject to expert discussions (SWE Doc 07).

Despite the growing intercultural exchange in Sweden as well as the propagation of a strong welfare state and a high level of equality within the country (see sub-chapter 4.2.2), one document published by the Swedish Institute in 2013 draws attention to exclusion as a growing problem in Swedish society. In addition to that, the document points out that a growing number of Swedish citizens find themselves in rising poverty. (SWE Doc 12)

As an export-reliant nation, Sweden is highly dependent on international trade (SWE Doc 12). The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs points to the need for Swedish companies to invest abroad in order to stay internationally competitive, and the need for attracting foreign investors in order to generate jobs within Sweden (SWE Doc 05). Both digitization and an increasing focus on sustainability present new opportunities, but also new challenges, including the development of new business models, to Swedish businesses. However, digitization does not only change the environment Swedish companies operate in, but it also alters the conditions of diplomacy (SWE Doc 09). The Ministry for Foreign Affairs emphasizes the role of digital diplomacy in the wake of technological developments (new ICT) that enable negotiations in real time, enhance transparency in international politics, and that provide individuals with new tools for voicing their opinions and influencing decision-makers (SWE Doc 01, SWE Doc 09).

### **6.1.3 Comparison: Public diplomacy organizations on the regional and national level**

The EC is placed in the center of EU public diplomacy. Its president defines the overarching political priorities that guide public diplomacy within and outside of the EU. Within the EU, DG Communication develops an overarching communication strategy for the EU's internal public diplomacy. Moreover, it oversees and assists the work of Policy DGs that develop communication strategies in specific policy fields. The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments within the EC as well as the EEAS assume the main responsibility for the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. The EC maintains a network of EC Representations in member states, whereas the EEAS coordinates EU Delegations in third countries and to other multilateral organizations. Both EC Representations and EU Delegations fulfill similar functions like member state embassies. Apart from that, the structure of EU public diplomacy can hardly be compared to the French or Swedish public diplomacy architecture. Organizations comparable to government agencies (see below) cannot be detected at the EU level.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is placed in the center of the public diplomacy structure of both France and Sweden. Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development has coordinated and overseen French public diplomacy over the course of the entire period of analysis, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has only recently resumed this task that had previously been handled by the Swedish Institute. The two foreign ministries have a similar perception with regard to

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<sup>196</sup> On 1 January 2010, almost four years after SWE Doc 06 has been issued, the Act on National Minorities and National Minority Languages came into effect in Sweden. It recognizes The Sami, the Swedish Finns, the Tornedalers, the Roma and the Jews as national minorities and grants them the right to information as well as the right to participation and seeks to ensure the protection of their cultures and languages.



the structural embeddedness of public diplomacy within foreign representations: In both cases, public diplomacy-tasks are not assigned to a single department within the representation, but handled by all staff members of a representation. Despite the central role of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in both countries, it does not have a monopoly on public diplomacy. French government agencies either operate under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development alone (e.g. Agence Française de Développement, Atout France) or under the joint authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and other ministries, including the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research (Campus France) and the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and the Digital Sector (Expertise France). In contrast, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs oversees the activities of the Swedish Institute and SIDA, but does not steer the work of government agencies in the areas of trade and tourism, as well as culture. These tasks lie within the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation respectively. Interestingly, the Swedish Institute is the only government agency within Swedish public diplomacy that works in all three core areas, while all other organizations can be clearly allocated to one of the three core areas. There are several government agencies in France that span across different core areas: The Institut Français and Alliance Française both operate in the core areas 'society/culture' and 'education/research', whereas Expertise France is active in the two core areas 'society/culture' and 'economy'. Both France and Sweden have undergone a process of consolidation in the time frame of analysis: The governments of both countries decided to merge a number of government agencies to strengthen the coherence of their public diplomacy.

The empirical analysis disclosed little information on the budgets that individual public diplomacy organizations command. EU documents issued in 2005 and 2006 highlight communication as a binding EU priority. Documents published after the Juncker Commission had taken office in November 2014 do not disclose a lot of information on the role of communications in the new EC. However, one interviewee pointed to substantial budget cuts in the Spokesperson Service (EU I 10) that may at least affect the internal dimension of public diplomacy.

Both French and Swedish organizations place emphasis on globalization and a geostrategic power shift to the east as external factors that influence their public diplomacy practice. One French document from 2008 anticipates an increasingly unstable world order in the future that demands strong multilateral organizations and the legitimacy of the international system in order to sustain international security.

The analysis of the external environments that EU and member state public diplomacy organizations operate in (see sub-chapters 3.3 and 4.2.2) has shown that the willingness of the member states to cooperate and engage in the EU has a decisive impact on the success of EU public diplomacy within and outside of Europe. The influence of the EU on national public diplomacy practice is discussed by both member states, but only constitutes one aspect of the external political environment for both France and Sweden. France recognizes the economic strengths and the EU's role in development, but perceives its capacities in single policy sectors such as security or internal affairs as too limited. The French government has identified a growing Anglo-Saxon influence on the EU as a whole. Both this Anglo-Saxon influence and the EU enlargement in 2004 are perceived as a threat to France's international influence – both linguistically and politically – in the French document analysis. The Swedish government, on the other hand, regards the 2004 EU enlargement as an opportunity of establishing and intensifying relations with Central and Eastern European countries. While Sweden perceives its EU membership as an opportunity of strengthening its international influence as well as promoting national interests such as increasing trade, and transnational interests such as preserving human rights. Moreover, one interviewee argues that the perception of Sweden as part of the EU may impede the country's international promotion efforts (SWE I 02).

While the analysis of the media and public opinion in EU documents and interviews with EU representatives concentrates on the internal dimension of public diplomacy and the relationship between the EU as an institution and its citizens, France and Sweden discuss the external media environment as well as public opinion primarily from the perspective of gaining and maintaining influence. The importance of international public opinion is particularly stressed in Swedish documents that depict Sweden as a small, export-dependent country. Both French and Swedish documents highlight the development of new ICT as a crucial factor that influences public diplomacy practice. While French documents connect new ICT to the challenges of sustaining and promoting the French language online, the Swedish government emphasizes the need for diplomacy to adapt to the new communication environment. Only documents issued by Swedish public diplomacy organizations identify environmental concerns as well as domestic issues such as exclusion, and a rise of poverty as external factors that may affect the country's public diplomacy understanding and practice.

The social subsystem, as well as the core areas public diplomacy organizations operate in, were neither coded in the documents nor addressed in the interviews as external factors that influence an organization's public diplomacy practice.

## **6.2 Public diplomacy understanding**

The organizations' understanding of public diplomacy serves as a starting point for analyzing their public diplomacy practice on strategy and tactical level. The understanding of the concept provides first indications about the public diplomacy goals and the strategic publics that the organizations seek to reach, as well as the tools and messages they apply to attain their public diplomacy goals.

To fathom the organizations' public diplomacy understanding, this study proceeds in three steps: In a first step, the study examines the public diplomacy definitions provided in the documents as well as by the interviewees. In a second step, it scrutinizes to what extent public diplomacy practitioners work with the concept in their everyday work and in a third step, it seeks to identify alternative terms and concepts that are used by the organizations to describe their public diplomacy-related activities.

### **6.2.1 The European Union**

The public diplomacy definitions provided in EU documents (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 10, EU Doc 13, EU Doc 14) describe public diplomacy as communication activities with the aim of:

- strengthening the image of the EU as a global actor (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 13) as well as improving public perception of the EU in third countries (EU Doc 14),
- increasing the visibility of the EU's external actions (EU Doc 10, EU Doc 14),
- promoting a better understanding of the EU's actions and policies in third countries (EU Doc 10, EU Doc 14),
- promoting the EU model in third countries and towards other regional organizations (EU Doc 10),
- building relationships (EU Doc 05), and
- showing the EU's commitment to tackling global challenges (EU Doc 13).

Moreover, one EU document (EU Doc 10) points to the significance of public diplomacy in disaster relief and development assistance. In contrast to the relatively broad set of public diplomacy goals identified in the EU document analysis, the interviewees from EU organizations mainly highlight

influencing opinions (EU I 06c), generating a positive image (EU I 03), and shaping and improving the understanding of an organization as well as the organization's position on a specific issue as public diplomacy goals (EU I 03, EU I 06a).

According to one interviewee from the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, both state and non-state organizations conduct public diplomacy: "I understand public diplomacy as any activity by an organization, state-like or NGO, which aims at shaping and improving the understanding of a specific actor as well as its position on a specific topic" (EU I 06a, paragraph 47). In both EU documents (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 10) and interviews with EU representatives (EU I 09), public diplomacy is considered as a concept that is primarily addressing strategic publics in third countries. These strategic publics comprise decision-makers and the general public (EU I 06c). The analysis does not reveal any differences regarding the goals and strategic publics in public diplomacy definitions published prior to and after the inception of the Treaty of Lisbon. Elements and tools of public diplomacy are only discussed in one EU document issued after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty (EU Doc 13). It identifies advocacy and public persuasion as important components of public diplomacy and lists publications, online and social media tools as well as seminars and conferences as public diplomacy tools.

The level of knowledge on public diplomacy varies among EU representatives. Whereas two interviewees from EC Representations, as well as one interviewee from an external policy Directorate-General (DG) consider themselves not familiar with the concept (EU I 07, EU I 08, EU I 12), the majority of interviewees state that they have a vague idea (EU I 02, EU I 03, EU I 09) of public diplomacy or are (very) familiar with the concept (EU I 01, EU I 04, EU I 10, EU I 11). Even though only the EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments apply the term public diplomacy to describe their own communication activities (EU I 06a, EU I 6c), many interviewees agree that they do public diplomacy in practice (see for instance EU I 01, EU I 02, EU I 03, EU I 04, EU I 05, EU I 09). Interestingly, several units within the EC Representation conduct public diplomacy (see sub-chapter 6.1.1), but only the political section works with the term (EU I 12). Two interviewees from policy DGs with an external relations element point to a growing relevance of public diplomacy in the work of the EU (EU I 02, EU I 08), for instance in the course of the TTIP negotiations (EU I 02) as well as to address neighboring countries (EU I 08). In contrast to that, one interviewee from DG ECHO, the EC policy DG committed to humanitarian assistance, emphasizes that they deliberately do not use the term public diplomacy. The interviewee explains that DG ECHO is not pursuing specific (foreign) political objectives in the interaction with third states, but acts entirely needs-based. (EU I 11)

Asked for alternative terms to describe their communication activities, the vast majority of EU interviewees indicated the terms 'communication' or 'communications' (EU I 01, EU I 02, EU I 04, EU I 05, EU I 07, EU I 09). Both the EU document and interview analysis suggest an understanding of communication that goes beyond providing information and involves dialogue and relationship building (EU Doc 01, EU I 01). Respondents from the EC further differentiate between political communication as a communication on specific policies, as well as corporate communication as communication on behalf of the EC as an organization. Whereas both policy DGs and the Spokesperson Services refer to their own communication activities as political communication (see for instance EU I 02, EU I 10), DG Communication "ensures the corporate approach of the communication of the Commission" (EU05, paragraph 14; see also EU I 09). One interviewee from the Spokesperson Service points to the similarities of public diplomacy and political communication (EU I 10). In addition to communication, DG NEAR, dedicated to enlargement and neighborhood policy, works with the concept of 'awareness raising' to increase the understanding of EU policies in the area of enlargement and neighborhood, as well as knowledge about candidate countries (EU I 08).

The EC Representation in Paris comprehends communication with French citizens as pedagogical work (EU I 12). Moreover, one interviewee from the EC questions to what extent traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy can be separated from each other, asking: “Is there a private diplomacy?” (EU I 01, paragraph 18).

### **6.2.2 EU member state organizations: France and Sweden**

Only one French document (FRA Doc 09) defines public diplomacy. The document draws on a definition proposed by previous U.S. Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, James K. Glassman in 2005. According to Glassman (2005), public diplomacy facilitates the realization of national interests through understanding, information, engagement, and persuasion of international publics. Adapting this definition to the French context, the document depicts public diplomacy as a concept to assist the French government in achieving its foreign public diplomacy goals. More specifically, public diplomacy serves as a complement to traditional public diplomacy which seeks to influence the opinions of foreign publics, as well as the image of France abroad, set favorable conditions internationally for the government to operate in and facilitate the attainment of economic goals. The document stresses the long-term orientation of public diplomacy. (FRA Doc 09) Moreover, it stresses that the international influence and credibility of France does not only draw on the government’s actions, but also on the French citizens who “interact, cultivate relationships and establish lasting dialogues with the goal of defending their values and principles internationally”<sup>197</sup> (FRA Doc 09, p. 5, translated by author).

The understanding of public diplomacy is discussed in two Swedish documents issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 09). Both documents describe public diplomacy as government communication. Similarly, one interviewee defines public diplomacy as a tool of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SWE I 01b). It addresses foreign civil society organizations as well as citizens (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 09, SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b, SWE I 02), and through them, foreign governments (SWE I 05). Based on analysis of Swedish documents, the purpose of public diplomacy is to contribute to achieving foreign political interests defined by the Swedish Government and the Parliament (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 09). This overarching mission can be broken down into the following goals:

- safeguarding Swedish interests (SWE Doc 09),
- creating a favorable environment for reaching foreign political goals and for addressing crises (SWE Doc 05),
- increasing interest in and knowledge about Sweden (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 09),
- increasing understanding for Sweden (SWE Doc 09),
- building trust in Sweden (SWE Doc 05), and
- building relationships (SWE Doc 05).

These goals of public diplomacy overlap to a great extent with the goals named in the interviews: Swedish public diplomacy practitioners stress promoting Swedish policy priorities and Swedish interests (SWE I 01a), strengthening knowledge on, and the understanding for Sweden as well as Sweden’s engagement abroad (SWE I 01b), persuading and promoting Sweden as goals of the concept (SWE I 02). The building of relationships has not been named by any of the Swedish interviewees as a public diplomacy goal, even though one governmental representative stresses the change in the

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<sup>197</sup> “[...] qui interagissent, cultivent des relations, et établissent un dialogue durable dans le but de défendre leurs valeurs et leurs principes sur la scène internationale” (FRA Doc 09, p. 5).

understanding of public diplomacy, moving from one-way communication to mutual exchange (SWE I 07).

According to the definitions presented in the Swedish documents, public diplomacy can be oriented both over the short- and the long-term. Short-term public diplomacy activities address foreign political priorities and/or support crisis management (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 09). In contrast to that, public diplomacy efforts connected to the culture and the promotion of Sweden abroad is more long-term oriented (SWE Doc 05). Short-term oriented public diplomacy activities in the context of a crisis build on long-term efforts to build and maintain a positive image of Sweden abroad (SWE Doc 05).

Both France and Sweden regard public diplomacy as a complement to traditional diplomacy (see for instance FRA Doc 09, SWE I 01a). Drawing on two documents issued by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy pursue the same objectives, but through different communication channels and tools (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 09).

None of the French organizations interviewed apply the term ‘public diplomacy’ to refer to their work. While both representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, and France Médias Monde state to not be familiar with the concept (FRA I 02, FRA I 05), the interviewee from the French Permanent Representation to the EU considers the representation as a public diplomacy organization (FRA I 03). Finally, one respondent from the Institut Français explains that she has heard the term public diplomacy a lot in the European context, but less in France (FRA I 04). Both the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute consider themselves public diplomacy organizations that apply the term in their everyday work (SWE I 01a, 01b, SWE I 02, SWE I 05, SWE I 06). The other Swedish organizations interviewed do not use this term to refer to their work.

Three out of five French interviewees apply the term ‘diplomatie d’influence’ to describe their work (FRA I 01, FRA I 02, FRA I 05). She notes that ‘diplomatie d’influence’ replaces the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ as it is more encompassing and also includes education as well as the diffusion of ideas (FRA I 01)<sup>198</sup>. In addition to ‘diplomatie d’influence’, one French document stresses the relevance of soft power as a concept in French external relations (FRA Doc 09). The document draws on the soft power understanding proposed by Joseph Nye (2004). It conceptualizes soft power as the capacity of a country to get what it wants by persuading others to adopt certain goals. Soft power is considered as an indirect way of influencing the behavior of other international actors through more subtle means like culture, values, and best practices. Not least, the interviewee from the French Permanent Representation to the EU identifies communications and digital diplomacy as core concepts to depict the mission’s work (FRA I 03).

The analysis of Swedish documents discloses cultural diplomacy and cultural policy, branding, promotion of Sweden, as well as digital diplomacy as alternative terms Swedish organizations use to describe their public diplomacy-related tasks. The goals of cultural diplomacy encompass attracting foreign students, tourist and potential cooperation partners (SWE Doc 05), increasing the awareness of and knowledge on Swedish culture and values (SWE Doc 05), exchanging opinions (SWE 06 Doc), as well as facilitating international relations between culturally and religiously different groups (SWE Doc 06). While these conceptualizations of cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy hint at a number of overlapping goals, the Swedish document analysis discloses a bigger focus on relationship and trust building as well as exchange in the definition of cultural diplomacy (SWE Doc 05). Even though the

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<sup>198</sup> The Institut Français has previously applied the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ to describe its activities (FRA I 01). A second interviewee from the Institut Français states to still primarily draw on the concept of cultural diplomacy (FRA I 04).

definitions of public diplomacy focus on Sweden, Swedish values, as well as Swedish interests, the description of cultural diplomacy also encompasses the transnational goal of promoting universal values and human rights (SWE Doc 05). Moreover, one Swedish document stresses that cultural diplomacy is more long-term oriented than public diplomacy (SWE Doc 06).

The analysis of Swedish documents issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty clarifies how the Swedish government relates public diplomacy to both nation branding and the promotion of Sweden. To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, public diplomacy contributes to nation branding, a concept that describes how a country communicates, distinguishes, and symbolizes itself to the outside world (SWE Doc 05). Moreover, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also perceives public diplomacy as part of the promotion of Sweden abroad. The promotion of Sweden abroad combines public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy efforts as well as activities to build and strengthen the image of Sweden (SWE Doc 05). It is geared towards supporting economic growth and employment (SWE Doc 06), and attracting foreign investors and tourists (SWE Doc 05), but also strengthening Sweden's position in the EU and other multilateral organizations (SWE Doc 05).

The interviews with Swedish public diplomacy practitioners point to diverging opinions with regard to the relevance of the concept. Whereas both the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one representative of the Swedish institute point to a growing importance of the concept (SWE I 01a, SWE I 05), a second representative of the Swedish Institute argues that there was more talk about public diplomacy a couple of years ago. The interviewee stresses branding, promotion and development aid as central to the work of the Swedish Institute. (SWE I 02):

*"[...] we talked a lot more about public diplomacy few years ago. Now I think it's just that we don't use the word as much. We just don't talk about it. We haven't changed what we do really, but we talk more about you know promotion and development aid and it's a lot about branding right now."* (SWE I 02, paragraph 93)

Not least, the concept of digital diplomacy is discussed in both Swedish documents and interviews. It characterizes the use of the internet and new ICT to achieve goals of diplomacy (SWE Doc 09). It serves as a complement to public diplomacy (SWE I 05).

### **6.2.3 Comparison: Public diplomacy understanding on the regional and national level**

Whereas both France and Sweden define public diplomacy mainly as government communication and a complement to traditional diplomacy, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments within the EC also acknowledges the role of non-state organizations in public diplomacy (EU I 06a). The EU as well as the France and Sweden identify citizens as addressees of public diplomacy. In addition to that, the analysis of EU documents and interviews disclose decision-makers as strategic publics. Swedish public diplomacy practitioners also highlight civil society organizations as addressees.

The EU comprehends public diplomacy as a tool to influence foreign attitudes, more specifically to strengthen the image and the visibility of the EU, communicating the EU position on specific issues, as well as exporting the EU model to other regional organizations. The idea of public diplomacy as an instrument to evoke understanding for EU policies and actions, as well as to build relationships and encourage joint action is only presented in documents. Both France and Sweden comprehend public diplomacy as a tool that facilitates the attainment of national (foreign) political goals and that contributes to generating a favorable international environment for national governments to act in. Similar to the EU, Sweden only addresses relationship and trust building as public diplomacy goals in

documents, but not interviews. While France stresses the long-term nature of public diplomacy, Sweden voices an understanding of public diplomacy as a concept that can be both short- and long-term oriented.

The EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments within the EU as well as the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute are the only organizations in the study that work with the term ‘public diplomacy’ in a day-to-day setting. The EU primarily applies public diplomacy to refer to (communication) activities directed at third countries, whereas ‘communication’ constitutes the term the majority of interviewees use when addressing publics within the EU. France mainly draws on the term ‘diplomatie d’influence’, that is connected to the goals of influencing foreign opinions and gaining international influence. Swedish organizations apply a number of different concepts to describe their activities, including branding, promotion of Sweden and cultural diplomacy. Interestingly, a number of Swedish interviewees regard promotion of Sweden as an overarching concept that encompasses aspects of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. Both France and Sweden utilize digital diplomacy to adapt to the changing communication environment that new ICT have facilitated.

### **6.3 Public diplomacy practice at the strategic level**

This sub-chapter scrutinizes the public diplomacy goals, geographical foci, as well as the strategic publics of EU and member state public diplomacy. Moreover, it fathoms the main pillars and key issues of the EU public diplomacy approach, as well as the approaches French and Swedish organizations pursue. The comparative analysis of the public diplomacy practice on the strategic level discloses the extent to which public diplomacy goals EU and member state organizations overlap and/or complement each other. Moreover, the findings enable allow for statements about the competitive or cooperative orientation of public diplomacy goals and approaches.

#### **6.3.1 The European Union**

##### *Goals of EU public diplomacy organizations*

The goals of EU public diplomacy that are mentioned in both EU documents and interviews include engaging citizens, developing a European public sphere, strengthening the image of the EU as well as promoting EU values. Engaging citizens in the EU, European issues, and European processes constitutes the public diplomacy goal that is discussed most frequently. It is named in 6 out of 18 EU documents (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 06, EU Doc 07) as well as in two interviews with EU public diplomacy practitioners (EU I 03, EU I 05). The overarching goal of engaging citizens comprises a number of sub-goals, including increasing the voter turnout in the EP elections (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 05, EU I 03, EU I 05), increasing interest and participation in EU initiatives (EU Doc 06, EU I 03), stimulating debates on EU issues (EU Doc 07), increasing civic education (EU Doc 04), as well as connecting citizens with each other and with EU institutions (EU Doc 04). In a more general way, two EU documents published prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty identify the promotion of active European citizenship as a sub-goal of engaging citizens (EU Doc 07, EU Doc 08).

The goal of developing a European public sphere (EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 06, EU Doc 08, EU I 07) embodies both the notion of a Europeanization of national and sub-national public spheres as well as of the establishment of a genuine, transnational European public sphere (see sub-chapter 3.3):

On the one hand the development of a European public sphere is connected to the sub-goal of finding the EU's place in existing national and sub-national public spheres (EU Doc 04), on the other hand the EC seeks to establish a genuinely European debate with common themes (EU Doc 06). Strengthening the image of the EU is a goal that the organizations analyzed only apply to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy (EU Doc 05, EU I 11). Whereas the document analysis identifies the positioning of the EU as a strong global actor as a direct public diplomacy goal (EU Doc 05), one interviewee from Directorate-General (DG) ECHO considers enhancing the EU image as a positive side-effect of informing strategic publics in third countries (EU I 11). The analysis of EU documents and guided interviews reveals that the promotion of EU values is a public diplomacy goal that is directed at both internal (EU I 01) and external strategic publics (EU Doc 15).

The majority of goals solely stated in EU documents refer to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. Three documents, issued both prior and after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty, highlight increasing the awareness and the visibility of the EU in third countries as a public diplomacy goal (EU Doc 10, EU Doc 14, EU Doc 15). Both the EC and the EEAS identify relationship building with strategic publics in third countries as a public diplomacy tool (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 14). Additionally, creating an understanding for EU policies and EU actions in third countries (EU Doc 15), and contributing to achieving EU external goals (EU Doc 05) as well as multilateral goals (EU Doc 10) are named as public diplomacy goals in one document each.

Promoting mutual understanding and cooperation is a public diplomacy goal that can relate to primarily strategic publics within the EU (EU Doc 08), or to strategic publics both within and outside of the EU (EU Doc 14, EU Doc 15). In addition to promoting dialogue and cooperation between political, economic, and social organizations in the EU and its partner countries (EU Doc 15), this goal also incorporates the aim of creating and strengthening people-to-people links between EU citizens and people in partner countries to broaden their knowledge about each others' cultures, languages, and institutions (EU Doc 14, EU Doc 15). One EU document issued in 2005 emphasizes communicating with and listening to EU citizens as a public diplomacy goal (EU Doc 01).

Interviewees from EU organizations name informing strategic publics as the goal of their public diplomacy-related tasks most often (EU I 02, EU I 04, EU I 07, EU I 08, EU I 11, EU I 12). EU public diplomacy practitioners seek to inform about EU organizations (EU I 02), EU policies and the legislative process (EU I 07, EU I 08, EU I 11, EU I 12), EU programs (EU I 03), the election of the EP (EU I 12), as well as candidate countries in the context of the EU enlargement policy (EU I 08). The goal of informing EU citizens is also connected to explaining the legitimacy of the EU (EU I 04). Three representatives from DG Communication also consider promotion as a public diplomacy goal (EU I 01, EU I 04, EU I 10). While the Spokesperson service primarily seeks to promote EU policies and political priorities (EU I 10), the Directorate 'Citizens' within DG Communication understands promotion as a way of decreasing Euro-scepticism and re-establishing citizens' trust in the EU (EU I 04). "[R]epair[ing] [these] cracks in confidence" also constitute a priority in the political program of the current EC President Jean-Claude Juncker (EU I 10, paragraph 29). One interviewee from DG NEAR stresses the focus on information provision and states explicitly that he does not seek to change the perception or the opinion of the wider EU public, as "this would not be achievable with small-scale communication activities" (EU I 08).

The EU public diplomacy goals outlined above are based on the EC's political priorities, which reflect the political will of EU member states (EU I 03, EU I 07). A number of interviewees from DG Communication and one EC Representation explicitly refer to the Ten Strategic Priorities defined by EC President Jean-Claude Juncker in November 2014 as a guideline for developing public diplomacy goals (for instance EU I 07, EU I 09, EU I 10).



### *Strategic publics of EU public diplomacy organizations*

This analysis differentiates between the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy (strategic publics within the EU) as well as its external dimension (strategic publics in third countries and international organizations). Citizens constitute the group of strategic publics within the EU that is mentioned most frequently in both documents and interviews (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07, EU Doc 08, EU I 07, EU I 08, EU I 09, EU I 11, EU I 12). Additionally, the analysis reveals that the EC seeks to dedicate particular attention to young people as a sub-group of citizens (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03, EU I 08). Minorities are also named as a priority within the broader group of citizens in one EU document (EU Doc 02). EU citizens are characterized in a more detailed way in a set of documents issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty (EU Doc 03, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07), as well as in one interview with the EC Representation in Paris. According to these documents and the interviewee, EU citizens hold little knowledge on the EU (EU Doc 03, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU I 12), and show little interest in how the EU works (EU Doc 03, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05). Moreover, the EC as issuer of these documents points to a number of discrepancies between the citizens' expectations of the EU and the perception of their own role within the EU: Citizens wish to be more involved in EU decision-making processes (EU Doc 03, EU Doc 05), but consider EU information as abstract and complex (EU Doc 03) and feel that they have little say at EU level (EU Doc 04). As a consequence, EU citizens exercise their political rights mainly on national and sub-national levels (EU Doc 04). One document also identifies a gap between the citizens' expectations of EU policy and the actual EU decision-making competences (EU Doc 07). Whereas the document analysis provides rather broad, general statements about EU citizens as a group of strategic publics, one interviewee stresses the heterogeneity of EU citizens:

*"We have a 500 million people target group, not 60 or ten or 20, we have 23 languages to work with, minimum 23, because there's also the minority languages, it could be anywhere between 30 and 35. We have to communicate to people of VERY different mentalities, regionally, politically." (EU I 09, paragraph 58)*

The mass media is the second most mentioned type of strategic publics in both documents and interviews with EU representatives (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU I 04, EU I 08, EU I 10, EU I 11, EU I 12). While one document stresses the pivotal role of pan-European and specialized media (EU Doc 04), and one interviewee from the Spokesperson Services accentuates the relevance of Brussels-based journalists (EU I 10), EU public diplomacy organizations generally also consider national (EU Doc 04, EU I 08, EU I 11, EU I 12) and sub-national media (EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU I 08, EU I 11) as important strategic publics. Interestingly, interviewees from EC Policy DGs name both print and audiovisual journalists (EU I 08, EU I 11), but neither EU documents nor interviewees mention online journalists explicitly as strategic publics.

Political bodies, including national governments (EU I 04, EU I 07, EU I 08), national parliaments (EU Doc 02, EU I 07, EU I 08), and political parties (EU Doc 02) are named more often as strategic publics by interviewees than in EU documents. One interviewee from DG Communication even perceives national governments as the most important multipliers of EU public diplomacy efforts:

*"But in terms of the communicators, first and foremost national politicians and THEN everything which follows, because if you have a prime minister who says no on television that the European Union is crap, then you can have the best communication campaign – it will fail, it will simply fail" (EU I 04, paragraph 27)*

Civil society organizations are only explicitly mentioned as a strategic public of public diplomacy activities within the EU in two interviews (EU I 03, EU I 07). Two EU documents issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty make clear that civil society organizations are primarily regarded as partners rather than strategic publics (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 05). Only one interviewee from an EC Representation briefly touches upon business organizations as strategic publics of public diplomacy within the EU (EU I 07). Public figures could neither be identified as strategic publics of EU organizations in documents nor interviews.

In addition to these statements which can clearly be allocated to the types of strategic publics theoretically developed in sub-chapter 2.5.2, both documents and interviewees refer to broader groups of strategic publics that are labeled as decision-makers (EU Doc 02) and members of the EU expert sphere (EU I 02). One interviewee from the EC Representation in Paris states that she generally seeks to reach new publics (EU I 12)<sup>199</sup>. Interviewees belonging to the DG Communication clearly consider citizens as a priority within the EU (EU I 01, EU I 04, EU I 05, EU I 09). Additionally, one interviewee from DG NEAR as well as one interviewee from the Spokesperson Service name journalists as most important strategic publics within the EU (EU I 08, EU I 10). While DG Communication concentrates on EU citizens, single policy DGs within the EU often communicate to more specific, differentiated strategic publics in and outside of the EU (EU I 02, EU I 04). One interviewee from DG TRADE for example remarks that his organization addresses very different types of strategic publics with very different information needs (EU I 02).

The types of strategic publics addressed by these DGs also depend on the policy area covered (EU I 09) – whereas DG SANCO (Health and Consumers) deals with issues that affect many EU citizens, DG COMPETITION for example addresses a much narrower group of publics. By and large, EU public diplomacy organizations do not prioritize single target countries and regions within the EU. A prioritization only occurs with regard to specific policies that are more relevant for some countries than for others (EU I 01, EU I 03).

This section analyzes the most important strategic publics of EU public diplomacy towards third countries and multilateral organizations. The analysis reveals that civil society organizations constitute important strategic publics in both EU documents (EU Doc 13, EU Doc 15) and in interviews with EU public diplomacy practitioners (EU I 06a, EU I 11). Interviews and documents refer to think tanks (EU Doc 13, EU I 06a), persons and organizations in academia (EU Doc 13, EU Doc 15, EU I 06a), NGOs (EU Doc 13, EU I 11), as well as cultural operators (EU I 06a) as subgroups of civil society organizations. Moreover, one document, jointly published by the EEAS and DG DEVCO in 2012, also identifies business organizations as civil society organizations (EU Doc 13). In contrast to that, one interviewee from DG NEAR names business organizations as a separate group of strategic publics (EU I 08). The document that was jointly published by the EEAS and DG DEVCO refers to the mass media as a key priority in third countries (EU Doc 13). The role of mass media in third countries is also emphasized by two interviewees from EC Policy DGs that operate to a large extent in third countries (EU I 08, EU I 11). Foci within the broad group of mass media include national media (EU Doc 13), international press agencies (EU Doc 13), EU correspondents (EU Doc 13), as well as print and audiovisual media (EU I 08, EU I 11). Political parties and politicians in third countries are mentioned as strategic publics of EU public diplomacy in one document issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty (EU Doc 15), and one document published after the treaty came into effect (EU Doc 13). In addition, one interviewee from DG ECHO names international organizations as important strategic publics (EU I 11). Interestingly, documents only refer to citizens in third countries as

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<sup>199</sup> The interviewee explains that events organized by the EC Representation like debates primarily reach students and elderly people (EU I 12).

strategic publics (EU Doc 13, EU Doc 14). The EEAS assesses the level of EU knowledge among citizens in third countries as low, and points to a strong demand for information and training on EU matters among these publics (EU Doc 14). Not least, one document issued by the EC lists ‘opinion formers’ as strategic publics in third countries (EU Doc 16), but does not specify whether these opinion formers belong to political bodies, civil society organizations, or the media, or whether they constitute public figures for example.

In the case of the Partnership Instrument within the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, the geographic foci of public diplomacy are predetermined by the ten strategic partner countries defined in the Partnership Instrument’s ‘First Multi-annual Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2017’ (EU I 06a)<sup>200</sup>. These countries are selected as geographical foci, because they are regarded as political and economic partners, they have similar values, and they play an active role in multilateral fora and in global governance (EU Doc 14, EU Doc 15). In contrast to that, one interviewee from DG ECHO states that the DG does not strategically define priority regions, but considers all countries in need of humanitarian assistance a priority country (EU I 11).

The EEAS recognizes neighboring countries in the South and the East as crucial strategic publics (EU Doc 12). The document analysis discloses a number of geographic priorities in specific policy areas. One document issued by the EC in 2006 highlights Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Region as priority regions of public diplomacy efforts in the area of development cooperation (EU Doc 10). A more recent document issued by the EEAS in 2011 points to North America (USA, Canada), Asia (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong), Australia and Arab countries (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia) as the geographical priorities for the economic dimension of public diplomacy (EU Doc 14).

#### *Approach pursued by EU public diplomacy organizations*

EU documents primarily concentrating on the internal, but also on the external dimension stress two-way communication (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 06) and dialogue as cornerstones of EU public diplomacy (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 02, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 07, EU Doc 15). This dialogue orientation is also emphasized by two interviewees from DG Communication (EU I 01, EU I 04). Two-way communication encompasses listening as well as monitoring of online communication activities (EU Doc 03, EU Doc 06). However, dialogue is also understood as an instrument of persuasion used in order to develop and consolidate important principles of the EU (democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms) in partner countries (EU Doc 15).

EU documents issued in the context of, and after the ‘period of reflection’ after the failed referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands (see sub-chapter 3.1) focus on a citizen-centered approach (EU Doc 01 EU Doc 04, EU Doc 06, EU Doc 07). The citizen-centered approach places EU citizens (instead of institutions) at the core of the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. This approach is connected to a call for more direct communication with EU citizens (EU Doc 07). The goal to create a more citizen-centered approach to EU public diplomacy is reflected by initiatives like Citizens for Europe, Europe for Citizens, Debate Europe, as well as Youth in Action that promote active European citizenship and civic participation (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07)

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<sup>200</sup> The Partnership Instrument identifies China, India, Japan and South Korea, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, the USA, South Africa, and Russia as strategic countries, even though the relationship with Russia is currently affected by the Ukraine crisis. Moreover, the Partnership Instrument also identifies the Arctic Region and the Gulf Region as geographical. With regard to cooperation with strategic partners from Asia, it stresses the cooperation with the regional organization ASEAN.

In contrast to that, interviewees from DG Communication, the Spokesperson Service, as well as an EC Representation state they primarily reach citizens through multipliers including national governments, parliaments, journalists, or for civil society organizations (EU I 05, EU I 07, EU I 10). One document jointly issued by the EEAS as well as DG DEVCO notes that citizens in third countries are either addressed through multipliers or directly via web-based tools (EU Doc 13).

To reduce the perceived distance between EU citizens and EU institutions (see sub-chapters 3.3 and 6.1.1), EU public diplomacy organizations suggest to limit communication with EU citizens to a number of priority issues, and to present these issues in simple language (EU Doc 01). Interviewees from DG Communication and DG ECHO build on a story-telling approach to show the impact of EU decisions and actions within the EU and in third countries (EU I 05, EU I 11). Both documents concentrating on the internal dimension (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 04) and the external dimension (EU Doc 18) of EU public diplomacy emphasize the relevance of giving the EU a 'human face'. Commissioners, as part of the EC's political leadership are considered important public faces in both EU member states and countries. These considerations correspond to the findings yielded by the interview analysis: Representatives from the Spokesperson Service and DG Education and Culture place the political leadership as visible communicators at the center of a communication strategy (EU I 03, EU I 10).

Documents focusing on public diplomacy activities within the EU suggest to strengthen the role of audiovisual and online communication channels as well as to explore the possibilities of increasing cross-media communication (EU Doc 06, EU Doc 08). The website europa.eu is the cornerstone of the EU's online activities: In addition to that, EU officials and public diplomacy practitioners are encouraged to maintain blogs to communicate with strategic publics as well as to cooperate more with external websites that feature content on the EU (EU Doc 06).

The EU documents included in this analysis disclose a set of overarching key issues as well as key issues within single core areas of public diplomacy. Documents published in the years 2005 to 2007 and concentrating on the internal dimension of public diplomacy place a lot of emphasis on diversity and multilingualism (EU Doc 03, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05) as a key feature of the EU, transparency (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03, EU Doc 05), as well as the inclusive and participatory nature (EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05) of the regional organization. Multilingualism constitutes both an approach to facilitate debates (EU Doc 03) and a key component of democracy, transparency, and legitimacy (EU Doc 04). It is closely linked to ensuring the respect for the diversity of EU citizens (EU Doc 04). Inclusiveness embodies the idea that information and communication on the EU should be accessible to all EU citizens (EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05). It is considered a pre-condition in involving citizens in EU decision-making processes (participation, EU Doc 04).

Key issues of EU public diplomacy in third countries and international organizations encompass European Neighbourhood Policy (EU Doc 10, EU Doc 12), enlargement (EU Doc 10), as well as tackling transnational challenges like climate change and health pandemics (EU Doc 10, EU Doc 12, also named by EU I 07). Neighbourhood Policy focuses on institution building and reform (EU Doc 10). Similarly, communication on enlargement is centered on extending peace and stability, the rule of law as well as economic prosperity in Europe (EU Doc 10). EU citizens are also regarded as strategic publics of communication on enlargement. However, one interviewee from DG NEAR argues that enlargement does not constitute a communication priority at the moment, as the budget for informing citizens on enlargement matters has been reduced significantly (EU I 08).

Key issues of EU public diplomacy that can be allocated to single public diplomacy core areas include trade and competitiveness (core 'area economy') (EU Doc 10, EU Doc 13), culture and international cultural co-operation as an important pillar of EU external action (core area 'society/culture') (EU Doc

13), development and humanitarian aid (core area ‘society/culture’) (EU Doc 13). They all primarily refer to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. The EU seeks to develop a strategy of developing European competitiveness on global markets and providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises in markets outside of the EU to stimulate bilateral trade, investment, and economic partnerships (EU Doc 14). Humanitarian assistance is linked to civil protection, reconstruction, disaster response as well as crisis management in (primarily) third countries, whereas the key issue of development is embedded in the global context of the UN Millennium Goals (EU Doc 10). One interviewee from DG ECHO also points to the promotion of international law, as well as education in emergency situation (e.g. ‘Children of Peace’ Initiative) as sub-aspects of humanitarian assistance (EU I 11). Interviewees from the Spokesperson Service and EC Representations, conducted after Jean-Claude Juncker had been appointed as EC President, point to the Ten Strategic Priorities defined by Juncker in November 2014 as a framework for defining key issues of public diplomacy (EU I 07, EU I 10, EU I 12). Furthermore, one interviewee from DG Education and Culture limits the thematic foci of the DG’s public diplomacy activities to non-controversial topics, as both education and culture are policy fields in which the EU only has supporting competences (EU I 03).

Public diplomacy or communication strategies exist in most of the EU organizations interviewed. One interviewee from DG Communication explains that the communication strategy of this DG is usually developed for the term of office of an EC Commission, which corresponds to a time frame of five years (EU I 04). In addition, DG Communication prepares an annual communication planning, particularly with regard to the budget (EU I 04). Both interviewees from EC Representations, as well as an EC Policy DG (DG ECHO) state that they primarily work with annual communication strategies (EU I 07, EU I 11, EU I 12). Despite these predetermined time frames, one interviewee from DG ECHO points to the continuity of aspects that go beyond single communication strategies. At the same time, communication strategies are rolling documents<sup>201</sup> that can also be modified before a new communication strategy is adopted (EU I 04). In addition to these overarching strategies, both DG Communication as well as Policy DGs develop communication strategies for individual programs that are defined for the time period of the specific program (EU I 04, EU I 08).

The Spokesperson Service is responsible for the overarching political communication strategy of the EC. It builds on the priorities defined by the political leadership of the EC. By the time the interview with the Spokesperson Service was conducted in May 2015, the Spokesperson Service was in the process of developing a sub-strategy for each of the ten political priorities put forth by EC President Jean-Claude Juncker in November 2014. Despite these planning efforts, the public diplomacy efforts of the Spokesperson Service remain to a large extent reactive, and are only calculable to a certain degree. (EU I 10)

The Partnership Instrument within the Foreign Policy Instrument contributes decisively to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. Until now, there has not been a public diplomacy strategy that links specific activities to specific messages and strategic publics (EU I 06a). Particularly with regard to the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, that preceded the Partnership Instrument, public diplomacy activities were mainly demand-driven. However, as one interviewee indicates, representatives of the Partnership Instrument and the EEAS are currently in the process of developing a broader public diplomacy strategy. As the activities of the Partnership Instrument are limited to a number of strategic countries (see section ‘Strategic publics of EU public diplomacy organizations’ above), this overarching strategy should also cover activities by EU Delegations as well as Policy DGs that maintain external relations like DG DEVCO or DG NEAR. (EU I 06a) Likewise, DG NEAR is currently in the process of creating an umbrella strategy for public diplomacy activities

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<sup>201</sup> The term ‘rolling document’ refers to documents that can be continuously updated.

in the areas of enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. This strategy is conceptualized by DG NEAR as well as EU Delegations in candidate and neighboring countries. Furthermore, DG NEAR plans to involve DG DEVCO, DG Communication, as well as the EEAS in a wider consultation process. (EU I 08)

### **6.3.2 EU member states: France and Sweden**

#### *Goals of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

The analysis of French documents yields five goals that refer to two or more public diplomacy core areas, as well as a number of goals that relate to single public diplomacy core areas. Gaining and exercising international influence (FRA Doc 01, FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 09, FRA Doc 10) as well as promoting the French language (FRA Doc 01, FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 10) are the two public diplomacy goals that are mentioned most frequently in French documents. French public diplomacy organizations seek to gain and ensure international influence through attracting foreign talents (FRA Doc 10), strengthening international broadcasting efforts (FRA Doc 10), exporting cultural products (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 10), as well as diffusing French expertise and working methods (FRA Doc 09, FRA Doc 10). Furthermore, the communication of French political, economic, and cultural positions and ideas, particularly with regard to global governance and global challenges, also contributes to the international influence of France (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 10).

The public diplomacy goal of promoting the French language is closely linked to the aim of strengthening the role of France in the world. The broad notion of promoting French in the world encompasses language learning and bilingual education (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 09, FRA Doc 10), the presence of French in public media (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 09), academia (FRA Doc 05), business contexts (FRA Doc 05), and in multilateral organizations (FRA Doc 01, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 10). Furthermore, the report by Frank Melloul from 2010 expresses that “the fight for our language is first and foremost a fight for preserving our culture” (FRA Doc 09, p. 66, translation by author)<sup>202</sup>. Both the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the CESE consider the presence of French as a working language in multilateral organizations a contribution to maintaining cultural diversity and promoting multilingualism (FRA Doc 01, FRA Doc 05). The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs regards the linguistic affinity in the francophone world as a pre-condition for strengthening political cooperation in different fields and securing peace (FRA Doc 05). Not least, the promotion of the French language and culture in the world serves as an “irreplaceable instrument of strengthening the French recognition and influence in the international business world” (FRA Doc 06, p. 51, translation by author)<sup>203</sup>.

Two French documents, both issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, highlight the promotion of the French image as a public diplomacy goal (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 05). The communication of the French image abroad encompasses the appeal of France as a destination for scholars and students (FRA Doc 02), as well as the attractiveness of French products, services and French territory (FRA Doc 05). One interviewee from the Institut Français also identifies promoting France and French culture as goals (FRA Doc 01).

France Médias Monde as the representative of the three international broadcasters Radio France International, France 24 and Monte Carlo Doualiya voices both the providing information and the

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<sup>202</sup> “Le combat pour notre langue est d’abord un combat pour défendre notre culture” (FRA Doc 09, p. 65).

<sup>203</sup> “[...] la francophonie et de la diffusion de la culture française dans le monde serait un instrument incomparable de notoriété et d’influence pour le monde des affaires français. » (FRA Doc 06, p. 51)

influencing of societies as public diplomacy goals. International broadcasters aim at providing information to citizens in non-democratic countries where they normally don't have information access. They also aim to close information gaps that national media in developing countries cannot fill. At the same time, these international broadcasters seek to report news from a French perspective and communicate French values through the way news is presented. After the terrorist attacks on the satire magazine 'Charlie Hébdó' for example, the French international broadcasters made a conscious decision to show the caricature of the prophet to underline the separation of church and state. The interviewee from France Médias Monde stresses that French values are understood as a part of European values as well as values of French-speaking countries. (FRA I 02) In addition to these more competitively oriented goals, the analysis also sheds light on three goals that are more cooperative in nature: fostering European integration (FRA Doc 05), addressing global challenges (FRA Doc 10), and fostering an intercultural dialogue (FRA I 01) .

Besides the trans-sectoral public diplomacy goals defined above, the analysis of French documents also disclose goals that can be assigned to the public diplomacy core areas 'society/culture', 'education/research' and 'economy'. The core area 'society/culture' groups goals in the area of development cooperation and culture. Four French documents include development-related goals (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 08, FRA Doc 09). In a general sense, French public diplomacy organizations seek to foster a globalization that is adapted to human values and human rights and that acknowledges equality, poverty eradication (FRA Doc 08), and the promotion of French influence and ideas in global debates on development aid (FRA Doc 05). Moreover, the French government focuses on development aid<sup>204</sup> and capacity building in the poorest countries (FRA Doc 08). In contrast to that, goals related to emerging countries focus on providing French expertise and establishing cooperation projects (FRA Doc 08). The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs also details development-related goals in specific geographical areas: It highlights supporting democracy as a pivotal public diplomacy goal in countries south and east of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as fostering local culture and providing access to education and training in (francophone) African countries (FRA Doc 02). Particularly in these countries, development-related goals are connected to the spread of the French language (FRA Doc 02). The analysis of French documents points to overlaps between goals in the areas of development, culture, and education: The French government seeks for instance to encourage the participation of developing countries in the creation of knowledge and cultural products (FRA Doc 09).

In the area of culture, French public diplomacy organizations seek to contribute to the diffusion of French cultural products and industries (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 09, see also FRA I 01), export the French model of supporting French culture abroad (FRA Doc 02), and maintain cultural diversity (FRA Doc 09). One French document issued in 2010 emphasizes that cultural goals are inseparable from the trans-sectoral aim of promoting the French language (FRA Doc 09).

Goals in the public diplomacy core area 'education/research' can be subdivided into goals related to education, and goals referring to research and higher education (FRA Doc 09, FRA Doc 10). The French government seeks to contribute to the education of children of French citizens abroad (FRA Doc 09) as well as to promote the French educational system (FRA Doc 10). Similarly, it also aims to promote the French model of higher education internationally (FRA Doc 10). Additionally, French

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<sup>204</sup> Development aid, as defined by the French government, comprises the following sub-domains: promotion of peace, stability, human rights and gender equality, women's rights, working towards social justice and human development in the areas of education, health, nutrition, water, fostering sustainable economic development that ensures a balance between material, human and natural capital, and the preservation of the environment and immaterial goods (FRA Doc 08).

public diplomacy organizations aspire to internationalize French research through joint academic projects with other countries as well as reinforcing the visibility of French and European contributions to international research (FRA Doc 09, FRA Doc 10).

Public diplomacy goals with a focus on economy include the promotion of foreign investments, and the promotion of France as an attractive destination for foreign investors (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 10). This is closely linked to the goal of promoting the image of France abroad, and the endorsement of French economic organizations on a bilateral and multilateral level (FRA Doc 05). Moreover, French governmental organizations define a set of goals that refer to security and law. In the context of the fight against terrorism, French public diplomacy organizations seek to react to terroristic messages immediately and ensure that credible voices in conflicts are heard (FRA Doc 09). Moreover, the CESE defines strengthening the influence of both Continental<sup>205</sup> and French law in multilateral fora as well as fostering education and research on the French approach to law (FRA Doc 01).

Swedish documents and public diplomacy practitioners highlight the promotion of Sweden as well as Swedish interests and values as goals. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers public diplomacy as a tool to protect, as well as to generate understanding and support for Swedish interests (SWE Doc 01, SWE Doc 09). Both the Swedish Institute (SWE Doc 04, SWE I 02, SWE I 06) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (SWE Doc 01) identify the promotion of Sweden as a country, and the strengthening of its image as crucial public diplomacy goals. They contribute to attaining political goals and economic growth, fostering trade and investment, attracting tourists and talent, as well as encouraging cultural and scientific exchanges (SWE Doc 04, SWE I 02). As “Sweden is a small country dependent on the world around it”, one document issued by the Swedish Institute stresses the need to “offer something unique that makes us attractive, interesting and relevant” (SWE Doc 14, p. 3, translation by author)<sup>206</sup>. Swedish values constitute a sub-aspect of promoting Sweden (SWE Doc 09, SWE I 06). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks to build knowledge and commitment to Swedish values through cooperation, dialogue, and relationship building with individuals and civil society and, by that, exercise indirect influence on decision-makers and official representatives (SWE Doc 09). The promotion of specific policies like the Swedish model to regulate trafficking for sexual purposes is only addressed in one interview with the Swedish Institute (SWE I 02).

While the aforementioned goals are stated in both Swedish documents and interviews, goals that refer to single public diplomacy core areas are only included in documents. In the core area ‘society/culture’, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs primarily addresses goals related to development (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 03, SWE Doc 06, SWE Doc 18) and humanitarian aid (SWE Doc 08). On a general note, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs seeks to contribute to an environment that enables poor people to improve their living conditions (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 03). The Swedish Ministry of Culture addresses cultural aspects of development cooperation. It strives for promoting cultural diversity, establishing a cultural infrastructure in developing countries, and fostering cultural exchange (SWE Doc 06). Two goals pursued by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Swedish Research Council, belong to two core areas: ‘society/culture’ and ‘education/research’: On the one hand, these Swedish public diplomacy organizations aim at building capacity in low-income countries to realize research projects. On the

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<sup>205</sup> Continental law is also referred to as civil law. The basic conceptions of continental law date back to the Roman law. In contrast to common law, that primarily draws on judge-made decisions, continental law can be characterized by a wide-ranging system of rules and laws that are systemized into codes (see for instance Reynolds, 1998).

<sup>206</sup> Sverige är ett litet land beroende av vår omvärld. Vi måste därför erbjuda något unikt som gör oss attraktiva, intressanta och relevanta.“ (SWE Doc 14, p. 3)



other hand, they seek to encourage research that is relevant to poverty reduction and sustainable development. (SWE Doc 18) Public diplomacy also serves the purpose of fostering the Swedish economy and increasing employment through fostering the export of Swedish products and services as well as securing Sweden's position as a successful trading nation and important player in the global market (SWE Doc 05). These goals within the core area 'economy' are closely linked to the promotion of Sweden.

Whereas all Swedish public diplomacy goals discussed above hint at a competitive approach to public diplomacy, the analysis of the documents and the guided interviews also discloses three goals geared at transnational cooperation. In its OECD strategy, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines spreading the added value of the OECD as well as making its work visible as a public diplomacy goal (SWE Doc 07). Moreover, the Swedish Institute emphasizes collaboration and co-creation as a basis for handling challenges in neighboring countries, but also on a global level (SWE I 06). Encouraging cooperation and exchange in all areas of culture constitutes the most important goal of the Swedish Arts Council. Its public diplomacy-related activities also contribute to strengthening the cultural dimension in other policy areas with an international dimension, including promotion of exports, promotion of Sweden, and development aid (SWE I 08a, SWE I 08b).

The goals of the international broadcasting channel Radio Sverige International differs with regard to different broadcasting languages: While programs in English, German, and Russian aim at informing international audiences, programs in Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Somali, and Romani target strategic publics within Sweden. They concentrate on facilitating the integration of Swedish immigrants into Swedish society and provide information on Swedish society (Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Somali) and supporting Romani as a minority language and culture. (SWE I 04)

French public diplomacy organizations attune their goals to foreign policy priorities stated by the President as well as French policies in the area of development and international solidarity (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 08, FRA I 03). Foreign and cultural political priorities of the government and the Parliament constitute the starting point of developing Swedish public diplomacy goals (SWE Doc 05, SWE I 08a). One document issued in 2010 points to a stronger focus on development within Sweden's foreign policy (SWE Doc 01). Moreover, international free trade and a free internal market within the EU constitute foci of the country's foreign policy (SWE Doc 01). One interviewee from the Swedish Institute stresses a heightened focus on trade and investment promotion with the introduction of a new government in 2014 that also impacts the development of public diplomacy goals (SWE I 06).

In addition to national policy frameworks, French organizations also draw on the UN Millennium Goals to define goals in the public diplomacy core area 'society/culture' (FRA Doc 08). Similarly, Sweden's humanitarian aid policy and public diplomacy goals in the subsystem society/culture are based on international conventions (SWE Doc 08).

#### *Strategic publics of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

French documents and interviewees emphasize foreign citizens as strategic publics of public diplomacy activities (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 09, FRA I 01, FRA I 05). They identify a number of foci within the broader group of citizens, including the middle class (FRA Doc 02), and young people (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 09, FRA I 01, FRA I 05) as potential decision-makers of tomorrow (FRA Doc 02) and alumni of exchange programs as multipliers of French values abroad (FRA I 05). The representative from the French Permanent Representation to the EU highlights media as priority strategic publics and puts particular emphasis on French journalists coming to Brussels, as well as specialized media with considerable influence on decision-makers at regional level (FRA I 03). Civil

society organizations are named as strategic publics of French public diplomacy in one recent document (FRA Doc 02) and one interview (FRA I 05). Civil society includes for example universities as centers of excellence and innovation (FRA I 05). By 2005, there were French diaspora communities in 78 different countries. They constitute important foci of French public diplomacy activities. (FRA Doc 04)

One French document issued in 2010 points to the goal of ‘staying heard’ in all regions of the world (FRA Doc 09). This is mirrored by the findings of the document analysis, which reveals geographical foci of public diplomacy in all regions except North America and Australia. One document issued by the French government in 2008 determines three priorities of public diplomacy efforts: North Africa/Maghreb constitute the first priority, followed by countries with internal tensions such as Afghanistan and Haiti, and major actors in globalization (FRA Doc 05). The emphasis on North Africa / Maghreb draws on France’s past as a colonial power controlling a number of territories in North Africa (FRA Doc 05)<sup>207</sup>. One interviewee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development points to a stronger focus on citizens within Arab countries as a result of the Arab Spring (FRA I 05). The French government also refers to the EU as an important focus of French public diplomacy and stresses the relevance of strengthening bilateral relations with new member states that have joined the EU over the course of the 2004 enlargement (FRA Doc 05). Setting new EU member states as a priority is directly connected to the consideration of investing less resources in cultural relations with the EU 15 countries and shifting the focus to new member states (FRA Doc 04). Moreover, documents published in 2005 and in 2008 also hint at a heightened commitment to EU neighboring countries in order to contribute to the stability and prosperity of these countries (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05). Additionally, one document issued in 2005 specifies geographical foci with regard to single public diplomacy core areas: The French government seeks to extend its public diplomacy effort in the areas ‘society/culture’ as well as ‘education/research’ in Indochina, as well as in the economic core area in Brazil (FRA Doc 04).

French documents issued more recently in the years 2010 to 2014, as well as one interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development underline the importance of new emerging countries including South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, and Colombia (FRA Doc 10, FRA I 05). Moreover, the EU as well as European countries remain a geographical priority of French public diplomacy efforts (FRA Doc 02). With regard to development cooperation, France concentrates on activities in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as countries south and east of the Mediterranean (FRA Doc 08, FRA Doc 09), as “France has a historical responsibility in the South” (FRA I 05, interview protocol, translation by author)<sup>208</sup>. France also seeks to ensure its presence in Indochina and everywhere where troops are present (FRA Doc 09). One document issued by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2013 broaches the issue of public diplomacy activities by sub-national organizations. These organizations are particularly active in Francophone countries, particularly in the Mediterranean area, as well as in China. (FRA Doc 03) French international broadcasters consider African countries as strongholds, but seek to reach more people in Asian and with regard to Radio France International also European countries in the future (FRA I 02).

In addition to these external foci, French public diplomacy organizations also address domestic publics to explain their external actions (FRA Doc 05) and raise awareness of their activities (FRA I 01). French international broadcasters, as publicly financed media, are encouraged to not only target

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<sup>207</sup> The second French colonial empire started with the conquest of Algiers in 1830. Algiers served as a crucial basis for conquering Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1911. Both Tunisia and Morocco gained independence in 1956, followed by Algeria in 1962. (cf. Cohen, 2003, pp 214-218)

<sup>208</sup> “France a une responsabilité historiquement du Sud” (FRA I 05, interview protocol).

foreign opinion-makers and influencers, but also to reach out to domestic audiences (FRA Doc 06, FRA I 02). One interviewee from France Médias Monde also connects a pedagogic mission to addressing domestic publics: Radio France International, France 24, and Monte Carlo Doualiya communicate French values to young French citizens with different cultural backgrounds. Monte Carlo Doualiya for instance is also broadcast in Arabic in Marseille. (FRA I 02)

Both Swedish interviewees (SWE I 01b, SWE I 02, SWE I 06) and documents (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 10) emphasize ‘connectors’ as the most important strategic publics of Swedish public diplomacy activities. The notion ‘connectors’<sup>209</sup> refers to active people with large networks in social, political, economic, and political circles (SWE Doc 10) who can multiply messages (SWE Doc 04, SWE I 01b, SWE I 02) and influence others (SWE I 06). Additionally, ‘connectors’ may also possess the capacity of connecting different networks with each other (SWE Doc 10). This group of individuals includes journalists (SWE Doc 04, SWE I 05), opinion-makers (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 10) - from fashion bloggers to technology experts (SWE Doc 10), trendsetters (SWE Doc 10), people with an impact on social media (SWE Doc 04), or members of an NGO (SWE I 05). While the communications department of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (UD-KOM) does not label their strategic publics ‘connectors’, it also seeks to reach individuals and organizations that can influence the topics, values, and policies that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs seeks to influence or cooperate on (SWE I 05). Moreover, Swedish public diplomacy practitioners also apply the terms ‘international talent’ (SWE I 02, SWE I 06), ‘opinion leaders’ (SWE I 06), ‘change agents’ (SWE I 02), and ‘decision-makers’ (SWE I 06) to refer to individuals who can multiply messages and influence others.

The analysis of Swedish documents and interviews also discloses citizens (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 10, SWE I 02), particularly young people (SWE I 05, SWE I 06) as important strategic publics. The Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU addresses primarily journalists, both from Sweden and from foreign or transnational media (SWE I 03). Representatives from political bodies are mentioned in one document issued by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2013, but only constitute indirect strategic publics (SWE I 09). Moreover, members of international organizations as well as diplomats belong to the audience of Radio Sverige International (SWE I 04). More specific strategic publics include the international business community in the public diplomacy core area ‘economy’ (SWE Doc 05), as well as civil society organizations and marginalized, vulnerable groups of people with regard to development cooperation (public diplomacy core area ‘society/culture’) (SWE Doc 16, SWE Doc 17). Civil society organizations have a crucial role as opinion makers and are considered as strategic publics and partners (SWE Doc 17).

The analysis of geographical foci yields divergent results. On the one hand, one document issued by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2010 refers to the EU as the most important arena for Swedish foreign policy (SWE Doc 01). Within the EU, Swedish public diplomacy organizations dedicate particular attention to the Baltic Sea Region (SWE I 02, SWE I 06). Moreover, the Swedish Institute also points to a focus on the Eastern neighborhood countries of the EU, as well as the Western Balkans (SWE I 06). Swedish public diplomacy organizations also aim to reach strategic publics in countries in which Sweden is less well known and less understood, due to bigger cultural differences (SWE I 02, SWE I 06). These countries include China, India, Brazil, as well as African countries (SWE I 02). Moreover, one interviewee from the Swedish Institute emphasizes the importance of dialogue-based activities in the Middle East and North Africa (SWE I 06). Despite the identification of single geographical foci in both interviews and documents, both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute underline that strategic publics and geographical foci are adapted to specific issues (SWE I 05), projects (SWE I 02), as well as the local context embassies

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<sup>209</sup> The term ‘connectors’ was defined in the context of Brand Sweden (SWE I 01b).

operate in (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b). In addition to that, one interviewee from the Swedish Arts Council stresses that the organizations does not prioritize any regions or countries on purpose, as its work is based on the needs of artists and cultural organizations that want to engage in international projects (SWE I 08b). Swedish public diplomacy concentrates on international strategic publics, but also embodies a domestic dimension: As outlined in one document issued by the Swedish Institute in 2013, the Swedish government and government agencies are dependent on the involvement of national organizations, opinion-makers or companies to communicate public diplomacy messages as well as to initiate international cooperation and dialogue (SWE Doc 14). Moreover, the Swedish Arts Council primarily addresses Swedish cultural organizations in order to stimulate their interest and participation in international exchange and cooperation projects. The Swedish Arts Council also reaches out to domestic publics to raise awareness of culture from other parts of the world and encourage cultural diversity. (SWE I 08a, SWE I 08b)

#### *Approach pursued by French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

In 2004, the French government noted that it is not sufficient to rely only on the cultural resources of France, and pointed to the need of a ‘stratégie d’influence’ to defend and promote national interests in an international context (FRA Doc 06). The report issued by Melloul in 2010 is the only document that provides detailed information on the (suggested) French public diplomacy approach (FRA Doc 09). It draws on the conceptualization of reactive public diplomacy, strategic public diplomacy, and relationship building proposed by Leonard et al. (2002, see sub-chapter 2.5.3) (FRA Doc 09). Reactive public diplomacy should serve the purpose of reacting to false information as well as to provide a French perspective through mass-mediated communication channels. According to Melloul, strategic public diplomacy ought to focus on the international promotion of French values and principles, including security, dialogue, and cooperation. The author of the document suggests applying a story-telling approach to communicate these key values to international strategic publics, even though it may be challenging to maintain control over the respective story in an international communication environment. (FRA Doc 09) Both Melloul and the French government stress the role of listening, stating public diplomacy organizations need to understand their publics before being able to influence them (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 09). Moreover, listening and monitoring debates and public opinion in other countries facilitates the expression of French ideas in foreign policy discussion (FRA Doc 09).

In 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development developed a new strategy for cultural cooperation that defines the role of government agencies as well as international cooperation partners. Moreover, the strategy proposes a new communication approach that should be more encompassing and also include sports or cuisine as elements of French culture (FRA I 01, FRA I 05). Culture also plays a key role in the strategies of French government agencies. One interviewee from the Institut Français refers to culture as a very strong element in the international promotion of France (FRA I 01). The holding society France Médias Monde does not develop a joint strategy for all French international broadcasters, but individual strategies for Radio France International, France 24, and Monte Carlo Doualiya. While the three channels are united by a common vision, “une vision française de l’info” (FRA I 02, paragraph 41), the representative from France Médias Monde stresses the importance of communicating the unique identity of each broadcaster. Radio France International has for instance already built up international credibility as ‘voice of the world’, and France 24 is promoted on the basis of the slogan ‘liberté, égalité, actualité’. (FRA I 02) Whereas the French Permanent Representation to the EU defines an annual communication strategy, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and French government agencies develop multi-annual strategies to plan their public diplomacy activities. Agencies like the Institut Français negotiate a contract with the French government that defines overarching goals, thematic, and geographical

priorities, as well as the governmental agency's budget ('contrat d'objectifs et de moyens') (FRA I 01, see also sub-chapter 6.5.2).

Many issues that are central to French public diplomacy can be allocated to the core area 'society/culture'. Documents issued from 2005 to 2014 highlight environmental protection and sustainable development as important areas that national and sub-national public diplomacy organizations operate in (FRA Doc 03, FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 08, FRA Doc 09). The subject of sustainability is connected to the promotion of French expertise in the protection and valorization of natural and cultural heritage (FRA Doc 10), sustainable tourism (FRA Doc 10), as well as climate change as a global challenge (FRA Doc 08, FRA Doc 09). Moreover, the French documents included in the analysis emphasize France's strong role as a contributor to development aid within the EU (FRA Doc 04) as well as on a global level (FRA Doc 09). Within the field of development cooperation, French public diplomacy organizations concentrate on health and social protection, the fight against malnutrition, the right to education and training (particularly for women and girls), urban and rural development, democracy promotion, economic growth and, combating corruption (FRA Doc 08, FRA Doc 09). In addition to that, two documents issued in 2014 accentuate gender equality and human rights as priorities of French external action (FRA Doc 08, FRA Doc 10), and describe gender equality as a cross-cutting issue that needs to be integrated in different policy fields (FRA Doc 10). About 65% of French development cooperation projects are bilateral. These activities are complemented by activities in multilateral contexts, such as the EU or the UN. (FRA Doc 08) One document issued by the French government in 2008 addresses France's commitment to humanitarian aid and stresses that public diplomacy organizations need to become more engaged in crisis prevention and post-crisis measures, particularly with regard to the stabilization and reconstruction of states (FRA Doc 05). The analysis of more recent documents does not reveal to what extent this sub-aspect of humanitarian aid has actually been strengthened in French external action. The French government comprehends culture as an integral element of French development policy (FRA Doc 02), but also an important tool for increasing French influence in the world (FRA Doc 06). Frank Melloul refers to France as one of the great cultural powers in the world (FRA Doc 09). Culture constitutes a priority area of French public diplomacy that builds primarily on long-term activities (FRA Doc 09).

Key issues in the public diplomacy core area 'education/research' includes the provision of education for children of the French diaspora communities abroad (FRA Doc 06), as well as the support of bilateral linguistic and educational cooperation (FRA Doc 10). In 2012, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development introduced the label 'FrancÉducation' to promote foreign schools that dedicate specific attention to French language and culture in their curricula (FRA Doc 10; see also Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger, n.d.). Furthermore, French public diplomacy organizations operating in the core area 'education/research' concentrate on fostering the attractiveness of French higher education (FRA Doc 05) as well as encouraging scientific cooperation (FRA Doc 02).

Four out of ten French documents outline key issues in the economic core area of public diplomacy. In addition to foreign trade and investment promotion (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 10), the French government also seeks to promote the free movement of commerce and capital (FRA Doc 05), and to strengthen the involvement of developing countries in international trade on a bilateral level and in multilateral organizations such as the EU and the WTO (FRA Doc 08). One document issued in 2014 points to a slight decline in international tourism since 2002 (FRA Doc 10). France is considered the third most popular tourist destination in the world after the USA and Spain, but seeks to reclaim the position as number one tourist destination worldwide. The relevance of tourism in French public diplomacy is mirrored by the development of the sub-strategy 'Destination France 2020' in 2008.

(FRA Doc 10) Tourism constitutes a focus of both national public diplomacy organizations like Atout France, and organizations at the sub-national level (FRA Doc 03).

Moreover, a number of key issues address security as well as international law. As highlighted by the French government, French external action seeks to contribute to both national and international security (FRA Doc 04). Moreover, civil-military cooperation projects listen to and engage with publics in conflict-ridden countries such as Afghanistan (FRA Doc 09). Security matters are closely related to humanitarian issues as well as the promotion of human rights and international law (FRA Doc 05). One document issued by the CESE in 2014 emphasizes the relevance of promoting French continental law within the EU as well as on an international level as it embodies a certain set of (French) values and views on the world. This document points out that the reputation and the diffusion of law translates into international influence, power, and the attractiveness of a country. (FRA Doc 01)

In addition to key issues that can be allocated to single areas of public diplomacy like ‘education/research’ or ‘society/culture’, three key issues span across all public diplomacy core areas: language promotion, new ICT, and transnational challenges. As outlined in the section ‘Goals of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations’ above, the promotion of the role of the French language constitutes an important goal of French public diplomacy. In the core area ‘education/research’, French public diplomacy practitioners seek to advance teaching French abroad (FRA Doc 10), as well as promoting French as a language in academia (FRA Doc 09). In the core area ‘society/culture’, an inter-ministerial working group reflects on the use of sports as a means of promoting the French language (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 03, FRA Doc 06). The French language also constitutes a channel for diffusing ideas, values and knowledge, for instance within multilateral fora (FRA Doc 06).

According to one interviewee from the Institut Français, the internet does not merely constitute a communication channel, but is treated as a cultural subject in itself (FRA I 01). Both the French government (FRA Doc 02) and Frank Melloul (FRA Doc 09) identify new ICT as a key issue of French public diplomacy. Engaging in digital diplomacy enables French organizations to bring all French-speaking people together online, but also to target strategic publics more specifically (FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 09). Moreover, the new ICT also provides important tools for crisis communication (FRA Doc 09). While the aforementioned documents show the advantages of applying new ICT, the French government stresses that it is not only important to be present on online communication platforms, but also to ensure that sound and relevant content is provided (FRA Doc 06).

Documents issued in 2005 and 2008 highlight that France needs to put a bigger focus on transnational challenge. This includes protecting global public goods like water or biodiversity, and the need to allocate an appropriate amount of resources to tackling these challenges (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05). While Europe is not discussed as a key issue in any of the documents, three out of five interviewees address Europe and /or the EU in their public diplomacy approach. One representative from the Institut Français emphasizes that cooperation with the EU should constitute an integral part of the organizations’ new strategy that was developed by the time the interview was conducted (FRA I 04). According to one interviewee, the international broadcasting channels France Médias Monde dedicate a lot of air time to Europe. The Radio France International program ‘Accents d’Europe’ explains the everyday lives of European citizens. In contrast to that the program ‘L’Europe dans tous ses états’, that is co-funded by the EP, places much more emphasis on EU institutions. (FRA I 02) Not least, the French Permanent Representation to the EU seeks to concentrate on issues that concern EU citizens, including social, economic and security issues (FRA I 03).

In a document issued in 2008, the government assesses French public diplomacy efforts in the area of culture and higher education. The document points to the need for a more coherent and targeted public

diplomacy approach that includes a clear hierarchy of goals. Similarly, the French government argues that public diplomacy organizations ought to strengthen the coherence of their activities in multilateral organizations like the UN. (FRA Doc 05) In addition to that, the report issued by Frank Melloul in 2010 calls for a better integration of public diplomacy into French foreign policy (FRA Doc 09). The French Ministry for foreign affairs perceives the public diplomacy activities of sub-national organizations in a positive light, underlining the achievements by sub-national authorities over the previous decades (FRA Doc 03).

Tools of public diplomacy evaluation are discussed in two French documents, one issued in 2008 (FRA Doc 05) and one issued in 2010 (FRA Doc 09). They reveal that the French Foreign Ministry needs to strengthen the capacities for analysis and evaluation, both by making use of existing bodies like the Centre d'analyse, de prévision et de stratégie, a think tank within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, and by including external expertise from universities and/or research institutes (FRA Doc 05). Moreover, they suggest the introduction of a consistent, permanent approach to evaluation that allows for comparisons between different public diplomacy strategies and activities (FRA Doc 09).

The analysis of Swedish documents reveals that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs places emphasis on a strategic approach to public diplomacy (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 09). This approach should be based on an open dialogue with partners and strategic publics, in which listening is as important as speaking (SWE Doc 09, see also SWE I 06, SWE I 07). Additionally, representatives from the Swedish Institute and the Ministry of Culture argue that they pursue a long-term approach (SWE I 06), based on building trust, credibility, and integrity (SWE I 07). As one interviewee from the Ministry of Culture stresses, public diplomacy can only be successful if actions are in line with messages (SWE I 07).

Despite the suggested long-term orientation, public diplomacy has to be flexible, too. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers it a necessity to be able to react quickly if for instance false information is distributed about Sweden. According to findings from the Swedish document analysis, this is primarily the task of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Swedish representations. (SWE Doc 05) Moreover, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs argues that reactive public diplomacy can also be combined with a proactive, strategic approach to the concept:

*“When issues and themes arise unexpectedly on the international political agenda and garner coverage in the media and in civil society in general, we have to work reactively. By putting a political issue and/or crisis abroad in a wider context and linking it to the core values, themes and long-term policy we can link reactive dialogue to proactive dialogue. In this way, current debate can be an opportunity to attract attention to and interest in Swedish issues”* (SWE Doc 09, p. 6)

Sweden draws on both a public diplomacy strategy and brand strategy. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs defines Sweden's public diplomacy strategy as attuned to Swedish policy foci (SWE I 05). In contrast to representatives of the Swedish Institute and the Ministry of Culture that stress the long-term nature of public diplomacy (see above), one interviewee from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs notes that the country's public diplomacy strategy is not as long-term oriented as the Brand Strategy that aims to promote Sweden (SWE I 05). Furthermore, he clearly distinguishes the foci of public diplomacy and Sweden promotion: “In the forefront of [public diplomacy] is a topic that a lot of organizations, countries and entities think is important and we push THAT before Sweden as a country. [...] It's not Sweden promotion, it's a political topic that we want to help solve [...]”. (SWE I 05, paragraph 44)

In 2007, the Council for the Promotion of Sweden (Nämnden för Sverigefrämjande i utlandet, NSU), a network of representatives from the Swedish government and government agencies (see sub-chapter 6.5.2), launched a Brand Platform that served as a basis for creating a distinct profile of Sweden towards strategic publics abroad. The platform sought to portray Sweden as a progressive country that builds on four core values: open, caring, authentic, and innovative. (SWE Doc 04, SWE I 01b) As the branding platform did not prove as sufficient as a tool to promote Sweden for embassies and other organizations, the Swedish Institute crafted a more elaborate and holistic brand strategy in 2013 (SWE Doc 10, SWE I 02). The strategy aims at clarifying, simplifying, and documenting key Swedish messages (SWE Doc 14) and guides the work with the image of Sweden abroad in order to attract tourists, investors and international talent as well as to stimulate cultural exchange and dialogue (SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 13, SWE Doc 15). As outlined by one interviewee from the Swedish Institute, the Brand Strategy concentrates on the ‘connectors’ as strategic publics (SWE I 02, see section ‘Strategic publics of French and Swedish ’). It identifies four profile areas of perceived strength: society, innovation, creativity, and sustainability (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 15, SWE I 01b, SWE I 02) that are communicated on the basis of a story-telling approach (SWE I 02). The Swedish Institute has conceptualized a messaging platform for each profile area to streamline and facilitate the process of developing tactical communication measures (SWE Doc 12, SWE Doc 13, SWE Doc 14, SWE Doc 15). One interviewee from the Swedish Institute stresses the national focus of the Brand Strategy. He claims that the Brand Strategy deliberately does not include European issues and has no intention to promote Europe as such (SWE I 02):

*“So but in other cases, for example in China, Brazil or whatever, we don't really relate very much to the EU at all. It's not a big thing that we talk about at all. Most people would of course know that Sweden is part of Europe and part of the European Union. But it's not something that we see is relevant and it's not in our mission to promote Europe as such.”* (SWE I 02, paragraph 89)

All organizations involved in the promotion of Sweden abroad need to apply the common visual identity developed by the Swedish Institute along with the Council for the Promotion of Sweden. The common visual identity serves the purpose of linking single activities to the overall brand of Sweden and reinforcing positive associations with Swedish values. (SWE Doc 10) Elements of the visual identity include for example the Swedish flag and the name of Sweden in the local language (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 10). The application of the visual identity needs to be approved by the Council for the Promotion of Sweden or one of its member organizations (SWE Doc 10).

In addition to these centrally defined public diplomacy and branding strategies, Swedish Foreign Representations also draft annual communication strategies. One representative from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs explains that embassies do not draft a specific public diplomacy plan, but integrate public diplomacy activities into general and promotional plans (SWE I 01b). In contrast to other Swedish embassies, the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU concentrates on translating the government’s EU strategy into practice in its annual communication strategy (SWE I 03).

Moreover, Swedish government agencies define strategies for the specific areas they work in. SIDA, as the principal government agency in the field of development cooperation, for example, defines multi-annual strategies for its information and communication activities (SWE Doc 16), its support for civil society organization (SWE Doc 17), as well as research cooperation in the area of development (SWE Doc 18). The government agency consults with both Swedish and international organizations prior to drafting these strategies (SWE Doc 16). The Swedish Arts Council defines a three-year strategy for its international activities. This strategy aims at increasing exchanges and cooperation within the field of culture. (SWE I 08b) While none of these strategies explicitly refer to public



diplomacy, they all plan and conceptualize activities that contribute to Swedish public diplomacy in the core area 'society/culture'. Not least, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs also develops specific strategies for its work in multilateral organizations such as the OECD (SWE Doc 07). Similarly, it suggests to also develop specific strategies for the cooperation with single multilateral organizations in the area of development cooperation (SWE Doc 02). While this strategy does not focus on public diplomacy, it contains elements that help understand the Swedish approach to public diplomacy on a multilateral level.

The document 'Public diplomacy: Guidelines and Checklist', issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, suggests to focus on a limited number of key issues to stay effective (SWE Doc 09). In 2013 for example, the Ministry placed its public diplomacy efforts under the umbrella of 'open Sweden' that linked three priority areas: development aid, promotion, and foreign policy (SWEI 01b). These priority areas constitute the basis for developing a thematic calendar that supports and structures the public diplomacy and digital diplomacy work of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as well as of Swedish Representations abroad (SWE Doc 09, SWE I 01b).

Six out of 18 Swedish documents, all issued after 2008, point to development cooperation as a key issue in Swedish public diplomacy as well as an important part of Sweden's foreign and security policy (SWE Doc 01). The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs advocates for a holistic approach that combines bilateral and multilateral development cooperation initiatives (SWE Doc 01, SWE Doc 02). One interviewee from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs highlights the empowerment and equality of women, for instance in the context of the initiative 'Midwives4all' as an important sub-aspect of development cooperation (SWE I 05). Additionally, one document issued in 2014 identifies humanitarian aid as a key issue that includes the support for policy and methodological development, the financial support of Swedish, foreign, and international humanitarian organizations as well as strengthening crisis preparedness (SWE Doc 08). Culture plays a crucial role in many policy fields (SWE I 07), including development cooperation, democracy promotion, and strengthening the image of Sweden abroad (SWE Doc 06). Moreover, it contributes to preserving human rights like freedom of speech (SWE I 07, SWE I 08b). In 2006, the Ministry of Culture outlined music, gender equality as well as cultural exchange as key issues in the cultural domain. Interestingly, cultural exchange is perceived as a contribution to the promotion of Sweden (SWE Doc 06). Culture is also linked to creativity as one of the four profile areas within the Swedish Brand Strategy released in 2013. The profile area depicts Sweden as a strong player in cultural and creative industries (SWE Doc 04), particularly in the areas computer games, design, film, advertising and public relations, literature, and music (SWE Doc 15). Cultural and creative industries constitute an important share of Sweden's economic growth and innovation. They contribute to a modern image of Sweden abroad (SWE Doc 04).

The analysis of Swedish documents and interviews with Swedish public diplomacy practitioners has identified close ties between development and culture as two domains within the core area 'society/culture'. Moreover, the analysis also detects connections between development cooperation and the core area 'economy', as well as development cooperation and the core area 'education/research'. One document, issued by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2007, recommends strengthening cooperation between multilateral development cooperation and international trade (SWE Doc 02). On a bilateral level, SIDA cooperates with developing countries in the context of export assistance programs (SWE Doc 05). Moreover, SIDA fosters capacity-building for research in low-income countries in order to enable them to conduct high quality research independently. SIDA also cooperates with the Swedish Research Council to foster national and international research relevant to reducing poverty and supporting sustainable development. (SWE Doc 18)

Even though the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has not developed a separate strategy for digital diplomacy, it considers digital diplomacy as a key issue closely linked to public diplomacy (SWE Doc 03, SWE Doc 09). Two interviewees from the Ministry stress that Sweden seeks to position itself at the forefront of digital diplomacy (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b).

The Swedish Institute points to one EU-related topic as a key issue of Swedish public diplomacy: the Baltic Sea Program (SWE Doc 12, SWE I 02). The Baltic Sea Program was adopted during Swedish Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers and sets out to increase cooperation within and increase the prosperity of the Baltic Sea Region as well as to protect its marine environment. The Swedish Institute links Sweden's commitment to the Baltic Sea Program to the profile area 'sustainability' within the country's Brand Strategy. (SWE Doc 12) In addition to this regional key issue, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs lists a set of global challenges the Swedish government needs to focus on in a document published in 2008. These global challenges include oppression, environmental challenges, infectious diseases and other health issues, migration flows as well as conflicts and fragile situations. (SWE Doc 03)

### **6.3.3 Comparison: Public diplomacy practice on the regional and national level**

The analysis of the public diplomacy practice on the strategic level reveals that the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy encompasses more goals that can be allocated to the relational framework to public diplomacy than the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. Both EU documents and interviews point to engaging citizens as well as developing a European public sphere as goals of public diplomacy within the EU. Moreover, EU documents also underline promoting mutual understanding and cooperation as well as listening to citizens as goals of the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. Goals of public diplomacy within the EU that can be allocated to the information framework include informing about the EU, as well as promoting EU policies and EU values. Goals of public diplomacy activities in third countries and to multilateral organizations include strengthening the image of the EU, increasing the visibility and the awareness of the EU and its actions, as well as informing about the EU. In contrast to these more persuasive goals, the document analysis also discloses relationship building and promoting mutual understanding and cooperation as two more relational-oriented goals.

Similar to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy, French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations mainly pursue goals that correspond to the information framework of public diplomacy. The analysis of French documents and interviews discloses promoting France, French culture and values, informing, increasing awareness of single public diplomacy organizations, as well as gaining international political influence as important goals. One interviewee points to fostering intercultural dialogue as goal within the relational communication framework of public diplomacy.

The majority of public diplomacy goals mentioned in Swedish documents and interviews can also be allocated to the information framework. They include the promotion of Sweden, Swedish interests, policies and values, as well as increasing knowledge about the country. Only single documents state more relational-oriented goals like fostering cultural diversity and cooperating with neighboring countries to overcome transnational challenges. Both French and Swedish public diplomacy goals hint at a more competitive approach to public diplomacy, while cooperative goals like fostering European integration and addressing global challenges are discussed to a far lesser extent. Swedish and French public diplomacy organization attune their goals to national political priorities. The political will of the EU member states, in turn, guide the political priorities of the EU that serve as a guideline for defining

EU policy diplomacy goals. In addition to national political priorities, Sweden and France also draw on international and multilateral conventions to define development and humanitarian aid goals.

Within the EU, the EC public diplomacy organizations address primarily citizens as well as journalists, political bodies, and civil society groups as multipliers. The analysis of EU documents and interviews shows that DG Communication communicates to more general publics like citizens and journalists, whereas EC Policy DGs often reach out to more specific, narrow strategic publics. Outside of the EU, EC public diplomacy organizations and the EEAS identify civil society organization, mass media, political parties, and international organizations as strategic publics. Citizens in third countries are only named as a direct public in EU documents.

Both French documents and the French public diplomacy practitioners interviewed stress citizens as crucial strategic publics. In addition to young people, this also includes members of the French diaspora in other countries. 'Connectors' are named most frequently by Swedish interviewees and in Swedish documents as strategic publics. The term can apply to a variety of people, from journalists to bloggers or representatives of an NGO, that act as multipliers and/or influence decision-making processes. Both the French and Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU highlight journalists as the most important strategic publics. Domestic publics are also recognized in the public diplomacy approaches of the two countries. Whereas French public diplomacy organizations concentrate on domestic citizens (with different cultural backgrounds), Swedish organizations direct their public diplomacy activities both at minorities and migrants within Sweden and domestic organizations as potential multipliers.

The EU does not define general geographical priorities within the EU. Outside of the EU, it focuses on political and economic partners as well as countries with similar values in the context of the Partnership Instrument. Moreover, neighboring countries in the South and the East constitute a priority for the EU and the two member states France and Sweden. Additionally, French documents and interviewees identify (new) emerging countries as well as Maghreb countries, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa as geographical foci. Swedish interviewees also highlight emerging countries as well as all countries in which Sweden is less known and understood as priorities. As a consequence, the geographical foci of EU, French, and Swedish public diplomacy organizations overlap in the EU neighborhood and with regard to emerging countries.

Public diplomacy practitioners from the EU as well as from France and Sweden highlight two-way communication as an important feature of public diplomacy. Both EU and French documents stress listening as a pre-condition of a dialogue-based public diplomacy approach. The analysis of EU documents discloses, however, that dialogue is also understood as an instrument of persuasion. French and Swedish documents and interviews differentiate between reactive, strategic, and relational approaches to public diplomacy. While the Swedish Ministry of Culture advocates a long-term approach to public diplomacy, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs stress the importance of a flexible public diplomacy approach that combines reactive and proactive elements.

As a result of the failed referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands, EU documents issued from 2005 to 2007 propose a citizen-centered approach within EU countries that involves more direct communication with citizens on a limited number of key issues, in easy language and through EU officials that give the regional organization a human face. Due to resource constraints, communication with citizens in third countries should primarily be realized through online communication tools and multipliers. The analysis of interviews with public diplomacy practitioners from DG Communication and the EC Spokesperson Service reveals that communication with EU citizens also largely draws on multipliers like national political bodies, journalists, or civil society

organizations. Both EU documents and interviewees suggest the adoption of a story-telling approach that is also highlighted in French strategy documents.

DG Communication develops a strategy for the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy that is set for the five-year-mandate of the Commission. Moreover, each EC Policy DG as well as each EC Representation define an annual communication strategy in its respective issue area and its respective country. Until now, there has not been an overarching strategy for the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. By the time the guided expert interviews were conducted with the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments and the EEAS, both organizations were in the process of developing a broad public diplomacy strategy that should also take EU Delegations and EC Policy DGs with an external focus into account. Within France, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development develops a strategy that also addresses inter-ministerial cooperation, as well as the role of foreign representations and government agencies in the French ‘*diplomatie d’influence*’. In addition to that, each governmental agency negotiates and develops a multi-annual strategy with the French government. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs develops a public diplomacy strategy that also includes guidelines for the country’s network of representations. Additionally, the Swedish Institute has created a brand strategy that Swedish interviewees describe as more long-term oriented than the governmental public diplomacy strategy. The brand strategy develops Swedish key messages that can be used by Swedish embassies and Swedish cooperation partners (see also sub-chapter 6.5.2). It is accompanied by a visual identity to ensure consistency when promoting Sweden abroad.

Key issues in the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy reflect the EU motto ‘United in Diversity’. EU documents issued from 2005 to 2007 identify multilingualism, transparency as well as the participatory and inclusive nature of the EU as key issues of the organization’s public diplomacy towards strategic publics within the EU. Key issues referring to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy encompass the political, economic, and social situation of neighboring countries, as well as global challenges such as health pandemics. French public diplomacy practitioners name four key issues that span across single public diplomacy core areas: Both documents and interviews highlight the new ICT as a key issue. The French language and global challenges are only addressed in French documents. Solely one representative from the Permanent Representation of France to the EU highlights European integration as well as European external action as a key issue of French public diplomacy. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs suggests to focus on a small number of key issues. In its public diplomacy strategy it defines an umbrella topic and linked priority areas for each year. As in France, Swedish public diplomacy practitioners consider new ICT or digital diplomacy as well as global challenges as key issues. EU-related issues could only be identified in one interview with the Swedish Institute, which emphasized the EU Baltic Sea Program as a priority (SWE I 06). The four profile areas of the Swedish brand strategy, society, innovation, creativity, and sustainability, also indicate key issues. The analysis of Swedish documents shows that the four profile areas focus on Sweden only, and deliberately do not include a multilateral dimension.

## **6.4 Public diplomacy practice on tactical the level**

This sub-chapter explores how EU and member state organizations put the public diplomacy approach outlined in sub-chapter 6.3 into practice. It explores the messages, tools and channels applied to realize public diplomacy goals.

#### **6.4.1 The European Union**

##### *Adaptation of the EU public diplomacy approach to strategic publics*

EU documents focusing on the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy stress a ‘going local’-approach (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 07, see also EU I 02, EU I 05 – briefing, EU I 09) that adapts key issues as well as public diplomacy messages and tools to citizens in respective member states (EU Doc 01). The EC emphasizes the role of the Committee of the Regions, EC Representations, and EU Direct Centres in adapting the EU public diplomacy approach to both national and local strategic publics (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07). The Committee of the Regions provides regional and local authorities with information adapted to their specific regions (EU Doc 05). EC Representations adopt and prioritize key issues as well as central communication priorities defined in Brussels in the national context (EU I 01, EU I 07). This requires listening to national discourses in order to identify priorities as well as issues that are not on the agenda in Brussels, but central to the respective member state (EU I 07, EU I 12). Moreover, they coordinate their public diplomacy activities with EP Information Offices and member states organizations (EU Doc 01), as well as co-fund public diplomacy activities in member states that are organized by national and sub-national partner organizations (EU Doc 07). The concept of third party endorsement is also discussed on sub-national level in a document issued by the EC in 2005: The EC suggests to implement regional and local celebrities as European Goodwill Ambassadors that communicate on behalf of the EU (EU Doc 02).

EU Delegations play a pivotal role in adapting public diplomacy strategies to third countries (EU Doc 13). As outlined in the ‘Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions’ (EU Doc 16, see also EU Doc 15), EU public diplomacy needs to take the local environment of target countries into consideration and should communicate in the local language whenever possible. Furthermore, this document also underlines that EU public diplomacy in third countries requires a considerable degree of flexibility. Flexibility encompasses the capability of conducting ad-hoc activities with local partners if the occasion arises, as well as the competence to handle politically sensitive situations in an adequate way. Politically sensitive situations and crises may require a high degree of political neutrality and may deviate from the principle of ensuring the visibility of EU funded projects in third countries. (EU Doc 16)

Adaptation refers to national, regional, and local contexts, but also to different types of strategic publics. One interviewee from Directorate-General (DG) Trade argues that EC Policy DGs apply different modes of communication to address different types of strategic publics: “And, of course, you need a very different way of communicating, of engaging, of informing or dialoging if you speak to specialists, [the] kind of lawyers who are really into the field, and the informed public, which includes people who also need to take decisions about it and [...] the public at large, who have vaguely heard about this, but know neither the economic nor the legal basis of it”. (EU I 02, paragraph 19). The next section explores what types of messages EU organizations communicate to these different publics.

##### *Messages of EU public diplomacy organizations*

The analysis of EU documents and interviews discloses three key messages that relate to EU citizens as well as two key messages focusing on the external dimension of public diplomacy. ‘EU Achievements’ are equally communicated to internal and external strategic publics. The first key message, labeled as ‘Added Value of the EU’, seeks to “demonstrate the added value of the existence of the European Union and the added value for the daily life of the citizens” (EU I 05, paragraph 28;

see also EU Doc 01, EU Doc 02, EU I 03, EU I 04), and is directed at the general public within the EU. One document, issued by the EC in 2005, stresses that this message can only be communicated successfully if EU organizations shift the messaging focus from political priorities to citizens' interests and needs (EU Doc 01). Moreover, one EC document focusing on the internal dimension of public diplomacy highlights the 'Inclusive Nature of the EU'. This key message concentrates on the EU as a common project. (EU Doc 04) Similarly, one interviewee from the EC Representation in Stockholm discloses the development of 'European solutions to transnational problems' as a key message related to the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy (EU I 07). The EC Representation in Paris stresses that key messages are not developed by the Representations themselves, but are defined on the policy level in Brussels (EU I 12).

Key messages relating to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy also address transnational challenges. One document published by the EC in 2006 depicts the EU as a committed supporter of multilateralism (EU Doc 11). The key message 'Support for Multilateralism' is also taken up by one representative from DG ECHO. He stresses the promotion of international law, for example the Geneva Convention, towards strategic publics within and outside of the EU (EU I 11)<sup>210</sup>.

In contrast to the key message 'Support for Multilateralism', that puts the focus on international cooperation beyond the EU, the two key messages 'EU Achievements' as well as 'The EU's Role in the World' are solely EU-centered. Achievements by the EU are communicated to both internal (EU I 05, EU I 11) and external strategic publics (EU Doc 12, EU Doc 13). They include fostering peace, security, freedom and prosperity (EU Doc 12, EU Doc 13), as well as contributing to solving major international crises (EU I 11). These achievements substantiate that the EU "has a role to play, politically, economically and sometimes militarily" (EU Doc 13, p. 3). The key message 'The EU's Role in the World' contains a number of sub-messages that aim at depicting the EU as:

- ... a partner in democratic transition,
- ... the biggest development donor in the world,
- ... global economic power that responds to crisis and perceives trade as an engine for change,
- ... security provider, and
- ... advocate of human rights (EU Doc 13).

The 'Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations' encourages EU Delegations to communicate these sub-messages in cooperation with member state representations (EU Doc 13).

#### *Tools of EU public diplomacy organizations*

Controlled media as tools for the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy include publications that are either directed at the general public or more targeted at specific, narrow publics (EU Doc 01, EU I 03, EU I 04, EU I 08). They serve the purpose of informing, engaging citizens (EU I 03), increasing civic education, but are also intended to have a multiplying effect: It includes both materials for teachers (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 04) and anyone else who wants to speak about the EU and EU-related

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<sup>210</sup> The interviewee from DG ECHO differentiates between messages tied to specific crises and more horizontal messages (EU I 11). This thesis only takes horizontal issues that spans across specific issues into consideration.

issues in public (EU I 04). Both EU documents and EU interviewees point to a shift of the distribution of publications from paper to online (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 13, EU I 04). To reach young people, one interviewee from DG Education and Culture also states the use of cartoons (EU I 03). In addition to publications developed in Brussels, EC Representations also produce their own controlled media tools such as a magazine the Swedish EC Representation publishes four times a year (EU I 07).

Controlled media for the general public or more specialized publics do not only include written materials, but also speeches (EU I 03) or personalized briefings for parliamentarians or business organizations (EU I 02). Moreover, one interviewee from DG Communication refers to video ads as well as ads in newspapers and on websites as tools in the context of the campaign ‘EU Working for You’ (EU I 09).

Controlled media implemented in third countries include publications, outdoor visual materials, and the distribution of promotional items and photos (EU Doc 13). The distribution of promotional items aims at increasing the visibility of the EU in third countries. This tool seeks to primarily address schoolchildren and young people. Photography constitutes a cost-efficient way of illustrating the work of the EU in third countries. Pictures are distributed via Flickr and other (online) photo libraries. (EU Doc 13)

EU organizations conduct press briefings (EU Doc 13, EU I 02, EU I 03, EU I 07, EU I 11), press conferences (EU Doc 13, EU I 01, EU I 02, EU I 03, EU I 12), and issue press releases (EU Doc 13, EU I 01, EU I 03, EU I 07, EU I 11), as well as further press materials such as newsletters (EU Doc 13) to inform journalists within and outside of the EU. Whereas the Spokesperson Service and the respective communications units within Policy DGs, EP Information Offices and EC Representations are mainly responsible for informing journalists within the EU (EU Doc 05), EU Delegations primarily handle this task in third countries. They translate press releases by EU institutions that are relevant to the respective country and circulate them among their own journalistic networks. EU Delegations also receive ‘Lines to Take’ from the EEAS Strategic Communications Division along with background information on policy priorities. (EU Doc 13) Audiovisual tools also play a pivotal role in informing journalists both within and outside of the EU. The midday press briefing held daily in Brussels, for example, can also be watched via Europe by Satellite or accessed as an online vodcast (EU Doc 13). Even though Europe via Satellite mainly targets journalists (EU I 01), it is increasingly used by other strategic publics, including civil society organizations, scholars, or interest groups (EU Doc 08). The EC also maintains an audiovisual library that serves as a central access point and dissemination source for all of the EC’s audiovisual products (EU Doc 08, EU I 01). The document ‘Communicating Europe through Audiovisual Media’, issued by the EC in 2008 recommends reinforcing the role of the audiovisual library and increasing the promotion of existing EU audiovisual content (EU Doc 08). According to this document, journalists consider Europe by Satellite as the most useful tool to inform themselves about EU events. It is therefore suggested that news content on Europe by Satellite should be increased, and its capacity doubled. (EU Doc 08; see also EU Doc 05) In addition to that, the EEAS and DG DEVCO encourage EU Delegations as well as partner organizations to produce audiovisual material on EU projects in third countries in order to illustrate the EU’s work on the ground. The EEAS and DG DEVCO emphasize that audiovisual materials should not only be disseminated by EU and partner organizations. External websites on EU-related issues can also serve as important distribution channels. (EU Doc 13)

The website [europa.eu](http://europa.eu) is mentioned most often as controlled online media tool in EU documents (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 06), and by EU interviewees (EU I 01, EU I 04, EU I 07, EU I 10, EU I 11). It features corporate sites that provide general information and that are maintained by DG Communication, as well as specialized websites under the responsibility of the single line DGs

(targeted at more specific publics) (EU Doc 06). In addition to that, the EEAS produces web features on the EU foreign policy issues that are targeted at wide audiences with an interest in foreign policy (EU Doc 13). Based on one document issued by the EC in 2007, the website should provide information on specific services, policies, as well as citizens' rights and communicate the views of the EC and give room for publics to express their views and establish a European community. It is managed by the EC on behalf of all EU institutions and agencies. (EU Doc 06) EC Representation and EU Delegations also have their own websites. The web presences of EU Delegations contribute to increasing the visibility of EU development projects. They are jointly managed by EU Delegations and public diplomacy organizations in Brussels, including the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, the EEAS, and DG DEVCO. While the visual identity of all EU Delegations' websites is crucial, there is only a small amount of centrally directed content, and a high degree of local customization. (EU Doc 13)

In the document 'Communicating Europe through audiovisual media', the EC announces the planned launch of an interactive online EU events calendar that includes background information on events, and aims to stimulate more EU coverage (EU Doc 08). This tool combines features of controlled and interactive online media. Moreover, the website [europa.eu](http://europa.eu) also encompasses interactive features for young strategic publics such as the 'Kids' Corner', with quizzes and games on the EU (EU I 04). EU public diplomacy organizations also draw on a number of external web 2.0 tools like the youtube channel 'EUTube' (EU Doc 06, EU Doc 08), blogs of EC Commissioners and Heads of EC Representations (EU Doc 06), and social networking sites (EU I 01, EU I 03, EU I 07, EU I 11, EU I 12), including FB (EU I 07), Twitter (EU I 01, EU I 07), and Instagram (EU I 07). Interestingly, one interviewee from DG Communication highlights the role of Twitter as a tool of information provision (EU I 1). Documents issued in the period of reflection after the failed referenda on the EU constitution, and in the years 2007 and 2008 emphasize online discussion platforms such as 'Debate Europe' or 'Your Voice in Europe' as important public diplomacy tools (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 06, EU Doc 07). Online discussion platform serve both as a tool for advocacy, and stimulating debates between EU representatives and EU citizens (EU Doc 02). EU Delegations draw on social media tools to reach a wider public and to ensure the EU's presence on communication channels that citizens, as well as national, regional and local opinion makers and influencers use. EU Delegations are also encouraged to promote and follow up on other EU accounts on social networking sites. (EU Doc 13)

EU documents focusing on the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy emphasize visits of EU Commissioners as an important tool within the group '*events/group communication*' (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 03, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07). Visits are jointly organized by the EC Headquarters in Brussels and the EC Representation in the respective member state of the visit (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 05). One document issued by the EC in 2005 suggests to increase the number of visits and to involve both local and regional media (EU Doc 01). Visits can be combined with other events and tools of group communication like debates (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 04, EU Doc 07, EU I 05 – briefing, EU I 12) or conferences (EU I 03). Debates demand coordination among all EU institutions as well as between EU institutions and public authorities, and other national organizations in member states (EU Doc 02). The example of a series of debates on the future of Europe in 2005 / 2006 illustrates that EU institutions perceive debates not only as a tool to learn about citizens' perspectives, but also as a forum for communicating the actions and achievements of the EU (EU Doc 02). EU public diplomacy organizations do not only carry out debates with EU citizens, but also organize civil society dialogues. To one interviewee from DG Trade, these interviews are understood as part of outreach activities: "So we are spending a lot of time on the outreach side and that includes the big issue that we have here under the name of 'civil society dialogue'" (EU I 02, paragraph 33). Moreover, the EC conducts



seminars with think tanks and academic institutions to reach specific groups of strategic publics. Strategic publics may for instance include civil society organizations (EU I 03). One interviewee from the EC Representation in Sweden states that the Representation also conducts seminars to educate Swedish teachers about EU matters (EU I 07). EU officials do not only visit member states, but citizens and more specific strategic publics such as groups of students or civil society organizations also have the opportunity to visit EU Institutions in Brussels (EU Doc 04, EU I 01).

Events to inform about the EU include Europe Day on May 9 (EU Doc 02) as well as open days that allow citizens in member states to explore the work of EC Representations (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03). The ‘Back to School Initiative’<sup>211</sup> (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07, EU I 5) is connected to Europe Day. It builds on the idea that EU officials return to their schools to talk about the EU (EU Doc 05). European Public Spaces (EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07, EU I 05 - briefing) are venues in member states that are jointly run by EC Representations and EP Information Offices, and serve as meeting places that host visits, debates, lectures, and cultural activities like film screenings and exhibitions (EU Doc 02).

EC public diplomacy organizations also engage in events and group activities that are specifically directed at journalists: EC representatives attend media fairs to establish networks with radio and television broadcasters (EU Doc 08). The EC also organizes press visits from EU member states to third countries and vice versa (EU Doc 13, EU I 08). Moreover, the journalists within member states and in third countries can participate in media trainings (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 08, EU Doc 13, EU I 05 - briefing, EU I 08) that is organized by the communications unit of DG DEVCO together with the European Journalism Centre (EU Doc 13).

The ‘Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations’, issued by the EEAS and DG DEVCO in 2012, details that events in third countries should mainly address local publics, and not European expatriate communities. The document points to an increasing role of cultural events in EU public diplomacy towards third countries. The growing relevance is substantiated by an augmentation of the budget for cultural events from 10% to 20% of the overall communication and information budget. (EU Doc 13)

Many event and group communication tools applied to reach strategic publics within the EU are also used in public diplomacy efforts towards third countries, including visits by EC Commissioners (EU Doc 13), and dialogues with civil society organizations (EU Doc 14). Furthermore, EU Delegations organize field and media visits to EU or EU-funded project sites in third countries to raise awareness of the EU’s involvement in development projects (EU Doc 13). In a document issued in 2011, the EEAS also lists the Gateway Program and Executive Training Program as two tools to approach business organizations in the context of the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries<sup>212</sup> (EU Doc 14).

Exchange programs in higher education and research are almost exclusively addressed in documents with regard to third countries. The ‘White Paper on a European Communication Policy’, published by the EC in 2006, and one interviewee from DG Education and Culture accentuate the ERASMUS Program<sup>213</sup> as a successful tool of student exchange within the EU and with associated countries (EU Doc 04, EU I 03) that provides a role model for developing future exchange programs (EU Doc 04). The ERASMUS MUNDUS Program has complemented the ERASMUS Program until 2014, when

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<sup>211</sup> also known as ‘9 May Initiative in Schools’ (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07)

<sup>212</sup> now replaced by the Partnership Instrument within the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments

<sup>213</sup> The ERASMUS Program has been replaced by ERASMUS+ in 2014. ERASMUS+ brings seven previously separate programs in the areas education, training and youth together and adds sports as a new program dimension (European Commission, n.d.c).

both program were merged in the framework 'ERASMUS+'. ERASMUS MUNDUS included student exchanges between EU member states and third countries, the allocation of scholarships, as well as joint degree programs at master and doctoral level. It aimed at promoting mutual understanding between the participants from EU member states and third countries as well as enhancing the quality of European higher education. (EU Doc 14). In the document 'Europe in the World — Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility' from 2006, the EC notes that scholarship programs with third countries also serve the purpose of increasing the awareness and visibility of the EU (EU Doc 10). One document issued by the EEAS in 2011 shows that mobility (students and staff members) and joint degree programs have also been part of the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, and jointly funded by the EU and partner countries such as Australia and Japan (EU Doc 14).

In the document 'Communicating Europe through audiovisual media' from 2008, the EC stresses the role of Euronews as principal international news television channel on the main European market and important public media tool (EU Doc 08, see also EU I 04). Therefore, the EC proposes to not only provide continued support for Euronews, but to also broaden its scope and add more broadcasting languages (EU Doc 08). One interviewee from DG Communication argues, however, that Euronews only reaches a small share of households in comparison to commercial broadcasters like RTL (EU I 04). That is why the EC seeks to collaborate with broadcasters in member states. The cooperation between the EU and RTL on the youth program 'YOLO' serves as an example. (EU I 04) Furthermore, the EC also finances a number of radio and television programs that feature EU content on the basis of multi-annual contracts with editorially independent broadcasting networks (EU Doc 05).

Europe Direct Centres as well as Europe Direct Call Centres constitute the most relevant channels for one-on-one communication with EU citizens. They serve the purpose of informing citizens about individual questions and listening (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 03, EU Doc 05, EU I 05). In addition to Europe Direct (Call) Centers and EC Representations as eyes and ears of the EC, the Eurobarometer and other survey tools also assume a listening function (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 04, EU I 04). In the context of 'Plan D' and related to specific European issues, the EC has also conducted focus groups with primarily young people (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03). EC documents issued in 2005 and 2006 stress the necessity to improve existing feedback tools (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 04). Moreover, the EC argues that survey tools should be used more strategically to formulate policies and to design and evaluate communication activities (EU Doc 05). One EC document issued in 2005 also identifies media monitoring as a listening tool (EU Doc 01). Neither public media nor one-on-one communication and listening tools are discussed with regard to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy.

The representatives of EU public diplomacy organizations differ with regard to the tools they consider as most efficient to realize public diplomacy goals. Two interviewees from DG Communication and DG Trade stress the relevance of the website europa.eu as a repository of information on the EU (EU I 01, EU I 02). It can be combined with other tools, for instance to provide additional information after the publication of a press release or a visit to the EC in Brussels (EU I 01). Based on the media use patterns of EU citizens, one interviewee from DG Communication ranks television as the most important communication channel to reach the general public within the EU, followed by radio and the internet (EU I 04). The EU document analysis discloses that the internet is regarded as the main channel for listening and initiating transnational debates among EU citizens (EU Doc 05). One interviewee from DG Communication refers to the internet as the only really "Cross-European" or global communication channel (EU I 04). Particular advantages of online tools include their cost efficiency, as well as the possibility of targeting specific strategic publics (EU Doc 06, EU I 04).

Both interviewees from DG Communication as well as interviewees from Policy DGs reflect the role of the new ICT for EU public diplomacy. One representative from DG ECHO claims to be very active on social media and to shift the focus more and more to digital tools (EU I 03, EU I 11). Moreover, one interviewee from DG Communication emphasizes the compatibility of web 2.0 tools and ‘offline tools’, for example to promote and accompany group visits to the EU on social networking sites (EU I 01). While the majority of these interviewees state that they increasingly use social media use in their respective DGs (EU I 01, EU I 03, EU I 11), one representative from DG Trade points to an ongoing debate in his DG circling around the question: “Can an institution engage in social media?” (EU I 02, paragraph 33). According to one interviewee from DG Education and Culture, further training of EU public diplomacy practitioners in the application of web 2.0 tools is required. Despite the growing relevance of the new ICT, one interviewee and one document stress the continuing relevance of face-to-face meetings (EU Doc 04, EU I 03).

The analysis does not disclose any information on the prioritization of tools by the EEAS. However, one interviewee from DG Communication notes that the EEAS concentrates on “classic daily press relations” and day-to-day politics instead of big campaigns (EU I 09, paragraph 42). EU documents issued prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty point out the need of using existing tools and resources more coherently as well as integrating them as much as possible in order to fulfill public diplomacy goals (EU Doc 05, EU Doc 06). However, a perceived fragmentation of online and multimedia communication channels due to the digital divide as well as language barriers impedes the realization of goals connected to the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy (EU Doc 06, EU Doc 08). The EC has increased the number of its official languages in the context of the 2004 enlargement. This requires trade-offs between broadening strategic publics (more languages), and the amount of information provided (EU Doc 05). One interviewee also perceives this growing level of multilingualism as a barrier to establishing a European public sphere (EU I 04). Thus, multilingualism is understood as both a distinct feature of the EU (document analysis), as well as a challenge to the EU’s everyday communication work (guided expert interviews).

Moreover, the EC identifies a lack of continuity and focus, mixed messages, and slow, complex processes of implementing communication activities as major constraints of EU public diplomacy towards third states prior to the Lisbon Treaty coming into effect (EU Doc 10). In a document issued jointly by the EEAS and the EC DG DEVCO in 2012 (EU Doc 13), the complexity of the EU is presented as a major challenge of EU public diplomacy in third countries.

#### **6.4.2 EU member states: France and Sweden**

##### *Adaptation of French and Swedish public diplomacy approaches to strategic publics*

French documents and interviewees stress the importance of taking the diversity of strategic publics and geographical regions into consideration, and to reflect these differences in targeted public diplomacy strategies (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06, FRA I 01, FRA I 02). In emerging countries, French public diplomacy organizations concentrate for example on activities that have explicit political purposes, or that can be allocated to the core area ‘economy’ (FRA Doc 05). Moreover, the international broadcasters Radio France International, France 24 and Monte Carlo Doualiya adapt their channels of diffusion to the media access as well as the patterns of media use in a given country (FRA I 02). French Representations abroad play an important role in adapting public diplomacy efforts to the national and sub-national contexts of a target country. Each of these representations defines its own local network of cooperation partners (FRA Doc 02).

Public diplomacy goals and messages defined by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs need to be interpreted by every Swedish Representation within its local context (SWE I 05). Within its own annual strategy, each representation defines two to three overarching themes for its public diplomacy activities that should be based on the Representation's Swedish policy priorities, bilateral relations, the knowledge of, and the interest in Sweden in the host country, as well as the specific strategic publics in the host country (SWE Doc 09). The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs provides a thematic calendar along with articles and tweets to support single issues and events in this calendar. Embassies can make use of these communication materials, but are not obliged to do so (SWE I 01a). Similarly to Representations in other countries, the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU adopts key messages defined in Stockholm. Moreover, the interviewee from the Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU seeks to establish a more proactive approach towards journalists in close dialogue with the Swedish government. (SWE I 03)

The Swedish Institute coordinates with Swedish Representations to implement the country's Brand Strategy. Representations are tasked with adapting stories in the four profile areas of the strategy as well as key messages to the local context (SWE I 02). To one interviewee from the Swedish Institute (SWE I 02), each Representation needs to answer the questions: 'What about Sweden can be relevant to people in a specific environment?', and 'How can Sweden contribute something relevant to the lives of the people in a specific country?'. He indicates a shift in the way the Swedish Institute and the Representations should address strategic publics:

*"I think before a few years ago we tried more to say that you know this is Sweden, this is what we have that is good. Now we realized that people don't really wanna listen to that. [...] So why would a 25-year old guy in Shanghai be interested in Sweden? So you know we need to ask those questions. Why would you know a 45-year old engineer in Sao Paolo be interested in Sweden? What's in for them? So really we try to do it the other way around."* (SWE I 02, paragraph 65)

Sverige Radio International partly adapts its program to specific strategic publics: It broadcasts a number of issues in all languages. In addition to that, it covers specific topics for specific audiences. (SWE I 04)

#### *Messsages of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

The analysis of French documents yields two key messages ('Uniqueness of France', 'Relevance of the French Language') that reveal a national focus and seek to position France in competition to other countries, as well as one key message ('European Integration') that stresses cooperation within the EU. The key message 'Uniqueness of France', identified in the report by Frank Melloul from 2010, concentrates on communicating the things that distinguish France from other countries. Melloul points to the importance of constructing this message bottom-up. (FRA Doc 09) The key message 'Relevance of the French Language', portrays French as an indispensable tool for future international networks. It contributes to defending both the French language and multilingualism. According to French state organizations, these two goals do not contradict, but complement each other. (FRA Doc 06)

In contrast to these two competitively oriented communication foci, the key message 'European Integration' accentuates the pivotal role of the EU. The French government argues that France's present strength is grounded in its EU membership and describes enlargement as a historical accomplishment of the EU. The support of European integration and the work of EU institutions is also part of the key messages communicated by the French Permanent Representation to the EU. Despite the European focus of this key message, the government also highlights France's role as a

leader in important steps of the European integration process. (FRA Doc 05) Similarly, the Permanent Representation connects key messages that address transnational aspects like peace or climate change to achievements of France (FRA I 03).

Key messages of Swedish public diplomacy are only addressed in documents. The key messages identified in the document analysis are closely linked to the country's Brand Strategy, as well as three out of four of the strategy's profile areas: society, innovation and sustainability. Three documents, issued in 2013 and 2014, include the key message 'Sweden as a Free and Open Society' (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 13). This message should add to attracting foreign talent and investments as well as realizing Swedish foreign policy goals (SWE Doc 04). It draws on the Swedish model as a combination of driving social change and economic growth (SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 13; see sub-chapter 4.2.2) and highlights gender equality, openness, tolerance, internet freedom, and security and deregulation as central aspects of Swedish society (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 13). The key message 'Sweden as a Free and Open Society' is not limited to an exclusively national focus, but also communicates aspects of society common to all Nordic countries, such as a generous welfare system (SWE Doc 13).

Similar to the first key message, the notion of Sweden as 'The Innovation' also aims at attracting foreign talent and investments (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 14). Moreover, this key message presents Sweden as a hub for innovation and co-creation (SWE Doc 04, SWE Doc 14), that seeks to strengthen Sweden's global competitiveness, but also fosters cultural exchanges (SWE Doc 04). It centers on Sweden as a progressive country and 'knowledge society' (SWE Doc 13), that has a long tradition of innovations and is home to many innovative companies like IKEA or Ericsson (SWE Doc 14). The focus on innovation does not only cover new technologies and research, but also to the lifestyle and values of people (SWE Doc 13, SWE Doc 14). The mainly competitively oriented key message of 'Sweden as Innovation', also encompasses references to transnational problems: Innovation and co-creation constitute crucial approaches to addressing current global challenges (SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 14). Sweden as well as Swedish companies are presented as attractive partners within this setting (SWE Doc 10). Furthermore, the key message 'Sweden as Innovation' is linked to the notion of 'Sweden as a Free and Open Society': To the Swedish Institute, the country's "open and free society works as a driving force for innovation and co-creation in a world with big challenges ahead" (SWE Doc 13, p. 3, translation by author)<sup>214</sup>. The Swedish Institute comprehends an open and free society as a driver for innovation and co-creation (SWE Doc 10). It points to a number of values that contribute to innovation, including openness towards international influence, expertise and talent, as well as ensuring diversity and equality. Innovation, in turn, serves as a precondition of growth as well as economic, social and environmental development. (SWE Doc 14)

The key message 'Sustainable Development' is the subject of three Swedish documents published between 2007 and 2014 (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 12), and embodies a multilateral dimension. It focuses on Sweden's long-time commitment to global cooperation on sustainable development (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 04). The key message points to the need for global cooperation across policy fields. The Swedish Institute attributes an active leadership role to Sweden to accelerate these cooperation processes. It points to Sweden's experience and expertise in multilateral cooperation in fields like international trade or development cooperation (SWE Doc 12), and the country's "[...] tradition in developing common solutions across political blocs and policy areas" (SWE Doc 12, p. 12,

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<sup>214</sup> "I en värld med stora utmaningar fungerar Sveriges fria och öppna samhälle som ett drivhus för innovation och samskapande." (SWE Doc 13, p. 3)

translation by author)<sup>215</sup>. In addition, two documents issued by the Swedish Institute in 2013 depict ‘Sweden as Advocate of Human Rights’ (SWE Doc 12, SWE Doc 13). This key message emphasizes Sweden’s long tradition of, and experience in human rights<sup>216</sup>. Moreover, it highlights human rights as a basis for Swedish society as well as a cornerstone of Swedish (foreign) policy, development cooperation, as well as humanitarian aid policy (SWE Doc 13).

#### *Tools of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations*

The web presences of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the French foreign representations constitute important tools of public diplomacy (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 09, FRA I 01, FRA I 03). On the one hand, the French government argues that controlled online media enables public diplomacy practitioners to offer the same communication and information tools to all French-speaking people (FRA Doc 06). On the other hand, the document analysis discloses a number of multilingual websites including EduFrance.fr (FRA Doc 06), as well as the cultural online platform culture.fr that is maintained by the Institut Français and provides information about events as well as thematic and regional dossiers (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 10). Both documents published in 2004 and 2014 recommend to strengthen and dedicate more attention to culture.fr (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 06).

The report ‘Développement de l’influence de la France sur la scène internationale: Une diplomatie publique à la française’ by Frank Melloul perceives interactive online media like social networking sites as tools for the diffusion of French public diplomacy messages to a large group of people, including those strategic publics that do not visit the website of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (FRA Doc 09). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development also encourages its foreign representations to integrate more web 2.0 tools in their public diplomacy activities (FRA Doc 02). The interviewee from the Permanent Representation of France to the EU claims to use social media tools such as Twitter frequently, as they provide the opportunity of communicating fast and directly with strategic publics (FRA I 03). Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development highlights the role of interactive online media in promoting the French language abroad (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 06). The Institut Français, for example, works with online language courses for specific publics in the hotel sector or in gastronomy. Moreover, it regards social networking sites as tools for showcasing the organizations’ work, as well as reaching out to young people. (FRA I 01)

Language learning courses are also identified as instruments that can be allocated to events/group communication in three documents (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 09). In addition to more general offers in schools abroad to obtain French language certificates, French public diplomacy organizations also adapt language courses to specific groups of strategic publics including business professionals and candidates that seek to apply for an EU job (FRA Doc 06). Furthermore, the annual ‘Semaine de la langue française et de la francophonie’ links a stream of events that aim at encouraging language learning and promoting the French language (FRA Doc 06). Events, for instance in the context of the cultural seasons organized by the Institut Français, combine the purposes of promoting the French language and the French culture in both France and abroad (FRA Doc 10, FRA I 01).

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<sup>215</sup> „Sverige har här en viktig styrka i traditionen av gemensamma lösningar och breda uppgörelser över politiska block och mellan politikområden.“ (SWE Doc 12, p. 12)

<sup>216</sup> Sweden was for example the first country in the world to introduce the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech in 1766 (see sub-chapter 4.2.2). The documents also list a number of Swedes that have been engaged in the international promotion of human rights, including Dag Hammarskjöld, Jan Eliasson, and Margot Wallström. (SWE Doc 12, SWE Doc 13)

Moreover, one document issued by the French government in 2004 qualifies bilateral seminars and conferences on architecture (as a sub-domain of culture) as an interactive public diplomacy goal (FRA Doc 06).

Four out of ten documents, issued from 2004 to 2014, as well as one interviewee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development identify programs of school, student and scholarly exchange as important instruments of long-term oriented public diplomacy (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 10, FRA I 05). These complement double degree programs in secondary school education (FRA Doc 06). While one document published in 2005 highlights young people from European countries as primary strategic publics (FRA Doc 04, focus on exchange of pupils and interns), a more recently issued document considers the purpose of scholarship and exchange programs as the attraction of high potentials, future decision-makers, and elites from abroad, particularly master and doctoral candidates from emerging countries (FRA Doc 10). Furthermore, two more recently published documents stress the launch of alumni projects for foreign students led by Campus France and coordinated with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, embassies, as well as higher education and business organizations (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 10). In addition to exchange and scholarship programs for pupils, students, and researchers, French public diplomacy organizations also foster the mobility of diplomats and experts (for example in the field of technology) (FRA Doc 10). To strengthen the European community spirit, one document issued in 2005 suggests to strengthen the staff exchange between Representations of EU member states (FRA Doc 05). The same document also highlights short time visits like the 'Programme d'Invitation des Personnalités d'Avenir (PIPA)', introduced in 1989. The program addresses young people that are perceived as future influencers in their home countries and are not familiar with France. While the program had focused on participants from Europe and North America, the document indicates a growing number of participants from Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, the document suggests to extend the program to other groups of strategic publics such as journalists. (FRA Doc 05) French public diplomacy organizations also maintain visiting programs specifically designed for journalists. These programs aim at bringing journalists in touch with French decision-makers (including government representatives, businesses and civil society organizations and should be extended. (FRA Doc 09) Not least, Canal France International offers training for journalists in Southern hemisphere countries (FRA Doc 02).

Instruments of French development cooperation and capacity building encompass the (co-) funding of cultural, educational and academic cooperation projects (FRA Doc 10), the allocation of micro-credits in developing countries, as well as the provision of technical expertise to developing and emerging countries (FRA Doc 08). The provision of technical expertise is connected to the goals of promoting French expertise and increasing France's international influence (FRA Doc 08).

Public media play a pivotal role in French public diplomacy. Four out of ten documents address international broadcasting (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 09) as an instrument to diffuse French language (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 05), as well as the French take on world events as an alternative position to Anglo-Saxon and Arab broadcasters (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06). As a consequence, international broadcasting is also perceived as a channel for generating international political influence (FRA Doc 06). International broadcasters, coordinated by France Médias Monde, seek to reach the French diaspora abroad, French-speaking people in Africa and Maghreb (primarily TV5), as well as influencers and decision-makers (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06). The French government states that France 24 is more elite-oriented than other international broadcasting channels (FRA Doc 05). The report issued by Frank Melloul in 2010 points to France 24's steady progress in audience numbers, making it the third most viewed online broadcaster after CNN and the BBC (FRA Doc 09). At the level of international radio broadcasting, the report suggest observing programs that successfully combine music and news, such as Radio Sawa (FRA Doc 09). Public media also include

cultural products like the French cinema, which is perceived as a channel of diffusing the French language and the French way of thinking (FRA Doc 02). In addition to that, a planned modernization of French libraries seeks to establish (multimedia) documentation centres of a contemporary France that contributes to updating the country's image (FRA Doc 06). In the area of research, one document from 2004 voices the idea of establishing a European citation index that dedicates more attention to academic publications not published in English. It is closely connected to the suggestion of creating a 'publishing house' for French electronic journals that provide access to scholarly work in the French language. (FRA Doc 06) The French government also highlights the internet as an increasingly important channel for distributing intellectual and/or cultural products (FRA Doc 05). Despite the relevance of online communication channels, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs points to the need of adapting diffusion channels to the demands of strategic publics (FRA Doc 02).

There is only one reference to one-on-one communication tools in French documents: The report by Frank Melloul issued in 2010 highlights the French focus on off-the-record conversations in working with journalists (FRA Doc 09). The interviewee from the Permanent Representation of France to the EU also lists off-the-record conversation and e-mails as crucial tools in the group one-on-one communication (FRA I 03). Four out of five French interviewees point to a growing relevance of online communication tools (FRA I 01, FRA I 02, FRA I 03, FRA I 05), particularly in places where France cannot be present physically (FRA I 05). Social media applications are also implemented to support and/or complement other public diplomacy tools like events or controlled media (FRA I 01, FRA I 03).

Controlled media as instruments of Swedish public diplomacy include publications on Sweden targeting a broader audience, as well as more specific publications in the area of culture like the 'Yearbook of Swedish Films', issued by the Svenska Filminstitut (SWE Doc 06), as well as information reports on multilateral development cooperation (SWE Doc 07). In addition to that, one interviewee from the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU claims to have almost forgotten to name newsletters as instruments of controlled online media (SWE I 03).

The website [www.sweden.se](http://www.sweden.se) serves as a broad country portal that addresses the general public abroad (SWE Doc 06, SWE I 02). The Swedish Institute also maintains more specific information portals that for instance focus on the aspect of higher education ([studyinSweden.se](http://studyinSweden.se)) (SWE Doc 06, SWE I 02). To coordinate the design and the use of controlled online media tools in the context of the Brand Strategy, all organizations involved in the promotion of Sweden abroad have access to the platform [presentingsweden.si.se](http://presentingsweden.si.se) maintained by the Swedish Institute (SWE Doc 04).

Whereas only one document discloses information on the role and the use of interactive online media in Swedish public diplomacy tools, four interviewees highlight web 2.0 applications as a crucial part of their work. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs maintains a blog platform on which staff from both the ministry and embassies communicate on the Swedish Foreign Service and its activities (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b). Similarly, the Ministry of Culture blogs about its work (SWE I 07). However, this blog is written in Swedish and addresses mainly Swedish publics. Two interviewees from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stress that all embassies have Twitter and Facebook accounts. While they have technological pre-conditions to engage in social networking sites, embassies need to decide on the amount and the manner of social media use on the basis of the local context. (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b, see also SWE Doc 09) The Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU particularly highlights the role of Twitter. It was the first organization within the Swedish government to tweet and maintains one of the most active Twitter accounts with 7.000 to 8.000 followers (SWE I 03). One representative from the Ministry of Culture names the 'Curators of Sweden' project (see sub-chapter 4.2.4) as an example of Swedish public diplomacy tools. He perceives this project as an instrument to



communicate Swedish values as well as human rights in general. (SWE I 07) On a general level, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs lists the following objectives of social media tools: create relationships, promote dialogue, listen, and monitor the world around us. “[These goals] provide the grounds of both good communication and diplomacy” (SWE Doc 09, p. 5). These goals can only be attained if public diplomacy organizations commit to social media activities in the long run (SWE Doc 09). Despite the active use of web 2.0 applications by Swedish public diplomacy organizations, one interviewee from the Ministry of Culture concludes that bureaucratic institutions like ministries do not move as fast as the internet and have not fully understood the potential of social media (SWE I 07).

Swedish interviewees name exchange and scholarship programs (SWE I 02, SWE I 06), seminars (SWE I 02, see also SWE Doc 06), (touring) exhibitions, as well as (grants for) touring performances (SWE I 02, see also SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 06, SWE Doc 15) as public diplomacy tools that can be allocated to the category ‘events/group communication’. The Swedish Institute manages student exchange programs and allocates scholarships (SWE Doc 06) to students from non-EU countries that are selected on the basis of excellence as well as the networks they develop (SWE I 06). Thus, scholarship and exchange programs seek to target ‘connectors’ that have been identified as the most important Swedish strategic publics in sub-chapter 6.3.2. Swedish public diplomacy organizations like the Swedish Arts Council also allocate grants in the area of culture to support for bands playing in Sweden, or Swedish musicians touring abroad, or to provide financial assistance for authors, translators or playwrights (SWE I 06). Sweden also jointly funds cultural projects with other countries in the context of the Nordic Arts Fund (SWE Doc 06). Activities like the participation in international cultural festivals like the Venice Biennale (SWE Doc 06) do not only increase the international awareness of Swedish culture, but also contribute to the promotion of the image of Sweden as a whole (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 06). In a document issued in 2013, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs lists conferences as a tool to reach specific groups of strategic publics such as civil society organizations (SWE Doc 09). Conferences and meetings also constitute important instruments in multilateral development cooperation in order to make the work of international organizations like the OECD visible (SWE Doc 07). To strengthen relations with foreign journalists, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs organizes visits to Sweden in cooperation with Swedish representations (SWE Doc 09). Swedish language courses abroad are only mentioned as a tool of public diplomacy in one document. The document connects teaching Swedish language and Swedish literature also to fostering a more open and democratic society in a number of countries. (SWE Doc 06)

The Swedish Arts Council and the Swedish Institute support both the translation of Swedish youth and children’s books, and Swedish literature and plays. Whereas the translation of books for children and adolescents chiefly address young people living in Sweden that belong to a minority and speak a different mother tongue, translated plays and literature should reach an international audience. (SWE Doc 06) The Sweden Bookshop in Stockholm features both a selection of translated Swedish literature and publications produced by the Swedish Institute (SWE Doc 09). A single Swedish document addresses meetings with journalists as a tool of one-on-one communication (SWE Doc 15).

The analysis of Swedish documents does not reveal a prioritization of single tools or groups of tools. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs only stresses a combination of different communication channels (SWE Doc 09). Similarly, one interviewee from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs argues that the issue determines the communication channels applied (SWE I 05). In contrast to that, many interviewees state to focus more and more on digital media and social media (SWE I 02, SWE I 03, SWE I 04, SWE I 06, SWE I 07). The interviewee from the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU considers direct relations with journalists as most important in her own work, followed by the application of social networking sites like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, or LinkedIn. She also

accentuates the growing relevance of digital communication channels, as less and less journalists are physically present in Brussels. (SWE I 03)

The Swedish Institute is responsible for developing methods for monitoring the goal attainment and the impact of the Brand Strategy (SWE Doc 04). To improve its own approach to public diplomacy evaluation, the Swedish Institute has conducted a meta-study summarizing previous academic research on this subject (SWE I 02). The Ministry for Foreign Affairs stresses the importance of developing tools to monitor Sweden's global development policy and to assess its impact. Monitoring tools should be designed to identify and address new points and intersections between Sweden's global development policy and other policy areas, as well as to follow up on international developments that are relevant to Sweden's global development policy. (SWE Doc 03)

#### **6.4.3 Comparison: Public diplomacy practice on the regional and national level**

EC Representations in EU member states, as well as EU Delegations in third countries adapt strategies centrally defined in Brussels to the local contexts they are operating in. They cooperate with a network of local partner organizations and integrate third party endorsement in national and regional public diplomacy activities. Similarly, French and Swedish foreign representations adapt national public diplomacy strategies to the local context and develop their own networks in their host countries. Swedish foreign representations also adapt the country's brand strategy to the context they operate in. EU and member state public diplomacy practitioners alike stress the importance of not only adapting public diplomacy strategies and activities to specific national and local contexts, but to specific types of strategic publics as well.

EU public diplomacy practitioners highlight one key message that is communicated to strategic publics within and outside of the EU: The depiction of EU achievements such as peace, security, or prosperity. This broad key message is linked to communicating the added value of the EU for its citizens in the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. Moreover, EU documents and interviewees seek to convey the message of the inclusive nature of the EU to strategic publics within the EU. Towards strategic publics in third countries and multilateral organizations, EU public diplomacy organizations focus on highlighting the EU's role in the world, for instance as an advocate for human rights or as partner in democratic transition. While the aforementioned key messages concentrate on the EU only, the message 'support for multilateralism', that is mentioned in both documents and interviews, also includes other multilateral organizations such as regional bodies or international fora. Whereas EU member states are strategic publics within the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy, they are encouraged to take on the role of multipliers of EU key messages in third states. One French document emphasizes the uniqueness of France as a key message. In addition to this clearly competitive key message, French public diplomacy organizations seek to promote and defend the French language internationally. This key message may imply a national focus, but can also include other Francophone countries. Moreover, one document contains the key message of France as a leader in European integration. France's contribution to the EU is also communicated by the Permanent Representation to the EU. However, the Permanent Representation highlights the support for the work of EU institutions as well.

Swedish organizations define key messages predominantly in the context of the country's brand strategy. Both the notion of 'Sweden as a free and open society', as well as Sweden as the 'Innovation', disclose a primarily national focus. Nonetheless, both key messages provide links to other countries and multilateral cooperation: The key message of 'Sweden as a free and open society' also includes other Nordic countries that share Swedish values. Moreover, the Swedish Institute argues

that innovation constitutes an important skill to address transnational challenges. A third key message focuses on Sweden's long-term commitment to cooperation on sustainable development. It does not address collaboration with the EU specifically, but work with multilateral organizations in a more general sense. The comparative analysis of key messages shows that the selected member states primarily place their own actions and achievements in the focus of a key message, irrespective of if the key message is set in a national or transnational context. Whereas Sweden only refers to multilateral organizations on the whole, French public diplomacy organizations make explicit references to the EU in their key messages.

EU public diplomacy practitioners and their national counterparts in France and Sweden underline the growing relevance of online communication tools. Online communication tools allow for a digital, low-cost distribution of controlled media, but also encompass a wide variety of web 2.0 applications. Moreover, French and Swedish organizations highlight the advantage of combining online communication with other public diplomacy tools like events. Controlled media tools, ranging from (digital) publications, press releases, and websites to speeches, serve the purpose of increasing visibility, as well as informing both broader groups of publics like citizens, and more specific strategic publics like journalists or businesses. Only EU interviewees mention ads as controlled media tools. Moreover, only EU interviewees assign the function of engaging citizens to controlled (online) media tools. Social networking sites, particularly Twitter, are the most named interactive media tools by member state organizations. While EU public diplomacy practitioners also communicate on social networking platforms, they stress interactive features on websites, discussion platforms, as well as interactive events calendars as interactive online instruments. Blogs play a pivotal role in Swedish public diplomacy, too. French public diplomacy organizations highlight e-learning platforms and interactive online language classes as important means of promoting the French language. Despite the technological pre-conditions of establishing a dialogue, many public diplomacy organizations connect objectives like informing, showcasing own work, as well as diffusing messages to interactive online media. French public diplomacy organizations only name persuasive objectives of their interactive online media tools. In contrast to that, EU public diplomacy organizations seek to engage EU citizens through online discussion platforms. Similarly, Sweden does not solely consider web 2.0 applications as outreach tools but, at the same time, instruments to promote dialogue, build relationships, and monitor the international environment. As the initiative 'Curators of Sweden' illustrates, the communication channel Twitter can embody a message itself, and serves as a basis for communicating Swedish values as well as Sweden's commitment to human rights.

In contrast to France and Sweden, the EU particularly highlights visits of senior officials to EU member states and third countries as a priority within the group 'events/group communication'. The strength of visits lies within the opportunity of combining them with other instruments like conferences, seminars, or civil society dialogues. Visiting senior officials assume the role of the speaker. In many other settings, including exchange programs, international awards, and exhibitions, EU and member state public diplomacy organizations take the role of the architect that does not communicate itself, but designs the communicative spaces in which others interact (see sub-chapter 3.3). Events and group communication tools by the EU and its selected member states address a variety of strategic publics, ranging from decision-makers, businesses, and civil society organizations to media organizations, artists, and young people. Interestingly, EU documents emphasize engaging and networking as primary objectives of events and group communication tools. These findings contrast with EU interview statements that mention informing, reaching out, and raising awareness as primary tools. Both France and Sweden perceive exchange and scholarship programs in the core area 'education/research' as opportunities of attracting high potentials and 'connectors' respectively. However, the two countries differ with regard to their conception of language courses and cultural

events. To French public diplomacy organizations, language courses and cultural events contribute to promoting the French language and the French culture. In contrast to that, the Swedish Institute regards language courses as a tool to foster democratization in a number of countries. Furthermore, the Swedish Arts Council as main governmental agency in the field of culture, understand activities like allocating scholarships or hosting events as a means of facilitating cultural exchange and diversity.

EU and member state organizations just briefly touch upon tools of one-on-one communication. EU documents and interviews highlight Europe Direct (Call) Centres as tools for informing and listening to EU citizens. The French and Swedish Permanent Representations draw on off-the-record conversations with journalists, for example. The role of international broadcasters is only discussed in greater detail by French public diplomacy organizations. French international broadcasting channels promote the French language, propose a French take on international issues and, by that, also contribute to increasing France's international influence. DG Communication depicts Euronews as the only pan-European news channel, but emphasizes the need of cooperating with broadcasters from member states to reach EU citizens. Sverige Radio International considers itself a public radio station, but not an international broadcaster. Similar to Euronews, it contributes to the internal or domestic dimension of public diplomacy.

## **6.5 Interorganizational Cooperation**

This sub-chapter presents the empirical findings on interorganizational cooperation in public diplomacy. The term 'interorganizational cooperation' encompasses dyadic relationships and networks on the regional (within the EU as an international actor), national (within EU member states), and transnational level. It analyzes motivational, structural, and operational characteristics of cooperation on a general level, and with regard to specific goals, programs, and tools.

### **6.5.1 Public diplomacy organizations of the European Union**

This section explores the interorganizational cooperation of EU public diplomacy organization within the EU as a body, with member state and international organizations, as well as organizations based in third countries – both on a bilateral level and within networks. It fathoms how the EU public diplomacy organizations under study perceive the cooperations they engage in, and analyzes the factors that enable and/or constrain these cooperation efforts.

#### *Interorganizational cooperation within the EU*

As a service Directorate-General (DG), DG Communication is tasked with coordinating the communication approach of the EC as a whole (EU I 03, EU I 05). Both Policy DGs and EC Representations coordinate their public diplomacy goals with DG Communication (EU I 07). DG Communication does not usually develop its own communication campaigns<sup>217</sup>, but assists and oversees the communication strategies and campaigns of EC Policy DGs. Weekly meetings of Communication Advisers and representatives from the Information and Communication Units from

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<sup>217</sup> The campaign 'EU Working for You' constitutes an exception. The campaign seeks to show how EU actions and EU funding affects EU citizens in a positive way on the basis of about 80 real projects. It is developed by DG Communication as well as coordinated with all Policy DGs that were involved in running the projects featured in the campaign. (EU I 09)

each Policy DG, as well as responsible press officers of the Spokesperson Service facilitate the coordination process. (EU Doc 18) Policy DGs with a focus on external relations and external policy, including DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, DG Trade, or for instance DG NEAR, also meet within the External Communication Network. This network started in 2002 and was relaunched with the issue of an ‘Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe by the Commission’ (EU Doc 01) in 2005. It brings the Heads of the single Policy DGs together to exchange best practices as well as to prepare and implement communication plans (European Commission, 2015c). Within Policy DGs, the respective spokesperson of the Commissioner and his or her team develop a public diplomacy strategy that is coordinated by the Director General of the Policy DG and the Cabinet (EU I 02).

According to one interviewee from DG Communication, the amount of cooperation with Policy DGs varies significantly: Policy DGs that either have a fairly big communications unit themselves or hardly communicate publicly need little help from DG Communication. Moreover, Policy DGs that work in policy areas in which the EU holds exclusive decision-making competences enjoy a greater degree of independence than Policy DGs working in issue areas in which the EU only has shared or supporting competences. (EU I 09) One representative from DG ECHO adds that Policy DGs working on issues that do not constitute a communication priority operate fairly independently (EU I 11). The analysis of EU interviews shows that a number of Policy DGs remain hesitant and reserved to cooperation with DG Communication, which presents an obstacle to the overall consistency of EC communication (EU I 09).

One interviewee from the EC Representation in Paris positively assesses the cooperation with the EC headquarters in Brussels. She particularly highlights the regular briefings by DG Communication as a helpful instrument. Cooperation at local level particularly occurs between the EP Information Office in Paris, the EC Regional Representation in Paris, as well as the 54 Europe Direct Centers, 46 European Documentation Centers, and 49 Team Europe Members the EC Representation manages. Additionally, the interviewee from the EC Representation in Paris values the exchange with counterparts in EC Representations that work in similar environments, for example in Belgium, London, or Berlin. (EU I 12)

The cooperation between the EC and other EU institutions draws on both formal and informal channels: On a formal level, an inter-institutional agreement outlines the cooperation among EC, the Council, and EP, as well as between EU institutions and its strategic publics. The agreement aims at identifying main communication priorities as well as developing an annual work plan around these priorities. Not least, it is designed to encourage cooperation between EU institutions and member states. (EU Doc 05) Moreover, the Inter-Institutional Group on Information (EU Doc 04, EU Doc 05, EU Doc 07) brings representatives of the EC, the EP, and the Council together<sup>218</sup> to coordinate EU communication efforts (primarily directed at strategic publics within the EU) (EU Doc 04), and to select common communication priorities of EU institutions and member states (EU Doc 05). One document issued by the EC in 2007, argues that the political status and legitimacy of this group should be strengthened to elevate its role in the EU (EU Doc 05). In addition, EU institutions also hold informal meetings on EU external action (EU Doc 10). The ‘White Paper on a European Communication Policy’, published by the EC in 2006, documents the EC’s commitment to a stronger cooperation with other EU bodies, including the Council, the EP, the Committee of the Regions, as well as the European Economic and Social Committee with regard to communication within the EU (EU Doc 04). Moreover, one interviewee from DG NEAR plans to inform Council Working Groups more regularly about activities of his DG (EU I 08). In a document issued in 2006, the EC underlines

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<sup>218</sup> Additionally, the Committee of the Regions as well as the European Economic and Social Committee hold observer status in the Inter-Institutional Group on Information.

the need for improving cooperation between all EU institutions and member states with regard to setting strategic objectives and external policy priorities and implementing EU external action. The document also suggests a regular exchange of staff between the Council Secretariat, member state representations, and EU Delegations, for example. The staff exchange is one way to improve the information exchange between European public diplomacy organizations in third countries. (EU Doc 10).

One interviewee from DG Communication states to only cooperate with other EU institutions occasionally and on selected issues. DG Communication has, for example, assisted the EP in preparing and implementing campaigns on EP elections. On a general level, however, single EU institutions communicate fairly independently and the interviewee does not feel a need for closer collaboration. (EU I 09) One representative from the EC Representation in Stockholm argues that the Representation cooperates with DG Communication and draws on the expertise of EC Policy DGs in some policy areas. Moreover, it jointly conducts public diplomacy activities, including debates and seminars in the member state. In contrast to that, the Representation only engages in selective cooperation initiatives with other EU bodies. The EC Representation in Sweden is the only public diplomacy organization in this study to suggest a closer collaboration with the European Investment Bank in the future. (EU I 07) A number of EU documents focusing on the external dimension of EU public diplomacy address the cooperation between the EEAS and the EC (EU Doc 11, EU Doc 12, EU Doc 17). EU documents that concentrate on the external dimension of EU public diplomacy stress the necessity to speak with one voice (EU Doc 18), and to ensure consistency between all EU programs, EU external action, and related policy fields (EU Doc 14, EU Doc 15). This consistency needs to be reflected in the external representation of the EU as well: One interviewee from DG Communication stresses the importance of only communicating under the name and logo of the EU, not single institutions like the EC or the EP, in third countries as well as in multilateral fora, “[b]ecause there's no point in communicating institutions outside, because frankly nobody really cares” (EU I 09, paragraph 54). The cooperation includes jointly preparing responses to EP questions, coordinating responses to crises, as well as jointly submitting legislative proposals, for example in the area of development cooperation or European Neighbourhood Policy (EU Doc 11, EU Doc 12). The EEAS Strategic Communications Unit chairs the ‘External Relations Information Committee’<sup>219</sup> that brings the heads of communications units from external Policy DGs, DG Communication, the Council, as well as the EP together to inform about and coordinate ongoing and future communication activities in third countries (EU Doc 13, EU I 09). The ‘EEAS Review’, issued by former HR/VP Catherine Ashton in 2013, describes the cooperation between EEAS and EC as close. However, the document suggests that a tighter cooperation between EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, as well as more frequent meetings of the External Relations Group of Commissioners are needed (EU Doc 12).

Interviewees from EC Policy DGs with a focus on external relations state that they cooperate with the EEAS (EU I 08, EU I 11, see also EU I 09). DG Communication, on the contrary, is rarely involved in public diplomacy activities by the EEAS and may only assist by conducting Special Eurobarometer surveys (EU I 09). One representative from DG NEAR stresses that the EEAS as well as EU Delegations constitute the most important cooperation partners within the EU. He plans to further intensify the cooperation with the EEAS and seeks to introduce mechanisms for a more regular and structured collaboration.

Even though the interviewee from DG NEAR expresses a relatively high level of satisfaction with the cooperation between the two organizations, he also emphasizes that his DG and the EEAS pursue

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<sup>219</sup> The External Relations Information Committee was introduced in 2011 as a successor to the Relex Information Committee.

slightly different goals and approaches in third countries: Whereas DG NEAR focuses on projects in neighboring countries, the EEAS adopts a more politically strategic focus and covers a greater number of target countries that also include nations that may not share EU values. The interviewee also points to a lack of resources, as well as a lack of experience as possible constraints to the cooperation between the two EU organizations. (EU I 08)

#### *Interorganizational cooperation with other multilateral organizations*

Whereas DG Education and Culture rarely observes communication activities of member states, it dedicates more attention to observing international organizations to better understand “how they tick” (EU I 03, paragraph 78). International organizations are regarded as important cooperation partners. DG Education and Culture for instance follows up on the work of the OECD as it is “very, very strong on communication and that’s what gives them a lot of their overall recognition and visibility” (EU I 03, paragraph 78).

Coordination of public diplomacy efforts with international organizations are mostly discussed with regard to development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in third countries. DG ECHO, for example, conducts joint public diplomacy campaigns with international organizations like UNESCO, but also with internationally operating NGOs. As DG Trade, DG ECHO perceives these organizations as third party endorsers that often have a better public perception than the EU in third countries. While DG ECHO usually coordinates with international organizations and NGOs to implement public diplomacy strategies and campaigns, the initiative ‘EUsaveLIVES – You save lives’<sup>220</sup> provides an example for a campaign that was jointly developed by DG ECHO and Oxfam International. (EU I 11)

The analysis of EU documents and interviews reveals that both EU Delegations and EC Policy DGs, with a focus on EU external action primarily engage in cooperations with international organizations (EU Doc 13, EU I 08, EU I 09, EU I 10). One interviewee from DG NEAR states that his DG cooperates with international financing organizations like UNESCO or the World Bank on a project-basis (EU I 03, EU I 08). Moreover, DG Education and Culture develops and produces joint publications with the OECD or the International Labour Organization (EU I 03). In addition to that, one interviewee from the EC Representation in Stockholm argues that many of his Swedish cooperation partners are national branches of transnational or international organizations (EU I 07).

International organizations contribute to the EU’s visibility at a local level and can strengthen the EU’s presence in a specific country (EU Doc 13, see also EU I 03). The EU adopts different approaches to organize cooperation with single international organizations on joint projects, and to ensure the EU’s visibility in multi-donor projects (EU Doc 13). In 2003, the EU established a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement to regulate the funding relationship between the EU and the UN in jointly financed projects. Based on this agreement, the UN is legally obliged to develop a communication and visibility plan for joint activities and to make the EU’s project contribution visible in all its communication. In addition to project-based cooperations, the EC encourages UN agencies to identify areas for a broader, more strategic communication with the EU. (EU Doc 16) In contrast to the cooperation with the UN, communication and visibility-related activities are less strictly regulated in joint projects with the World Bank. The World Bank is not legally bound to ensuring the EU’s visibility in joint projects in third countries. However, the EU and the World Bank have committed to ‘Joint Visibility Guidelines’ since 2009. (EU Doc 16)

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<sup>220</sup> ‘EUsaveLIVES – You save lives’ is an awareness campaign that draws attention to the situation of refugees and displaced people (DG ECHO, 2015).

### *Interorganizational cooperation with EU member states*

As the EU documents included in this study did not contain any information showing to what extent and how EU public diplomacy organizations observe the work of member states, third countries and international organizations, this section only draws on interview statements. One representative from DG Communication accentuates the unique nature of the EU, that it does not really compare to any other organization, also in terms of communication (EU I 09). Nonetheless, a number of EC public diplomacy practitioners take the opportunity of informing themselves about EU member states activities (EU I 02, EU I 07), and learning from member states with regard to tools, or for instance the development and implementation of campaigns (EU I 09). One interviewee from DG Communication highlights the quality of communication by the UK, but also the amount of resources allocated to British public diplomacy and communication efforts that may exceed the communication budget of all EU institutions put together (EU I 09). Both interviewees from DG Communication and DG Trade point to the non-systematic, informal approach EU public diplomacy practitioners pursue to inform themselves about the activities of member states (EU I 02, EU I 04). The Club of Venice for example constitutes an informal framework for the exchange of ideas and knowledge on public diplomacy tools, less on messages or strategic publics (EU I 04).

One interviewee from DG Communication stresses that a good communication strategy demands “cooperation between institutions AND member states” (EU I 05, paragraph 46). This applies to the internal (EU I 05) and external dimension (EU Doc 10) of EU public diplomacy. In a document issued in 2006, the EC emphasizes the necessity of communicating EU decisions publicly by all actors involved in these decisions. The EC suggests to reinforce the coordination between EU institutions and member states in Brussels, as well as of EU Delegations and member state representations in order to communicate coordinated messages to strategic publics in third countries. (EU Doc 10)

Within the EU, the EC aims at adopting a partnership approach with national and sub-national authorities, other political bodies, and civil society organizations in member states (EU Doc 04). In this context, the EC adopts the role of a facilitator, coordinator, and financial provider (EU Doc 02, EU Doc 03) of both pan-European projects and national as well as sub-national initiatives (EU Doc 07). As outlined by one interview from DG Education and Culture, member states are generally not involved in developing a communication strategy (EU I 03). Instead, EU public diplomacy organizations in Brussels, as well as EC Representations primarily cooperate with member state organizations on the basis of single initiatives or activities (EU I 07, EU I 08). The EC cooperates for instance with think tanks and universities to realize activities in the program ‘Debate Europe’ (EU Doc 07), or implements activities to raise the awareness of EP elections together with European political foundations and political parties (EU Doc 07). Moreover, DG Trade cooperates with representatives from state and non-state organizations on the level of communicating key messages. In the context of the TTIP, national, and sub-national organizations in favor of the agreement assume the role of third party endorsers that communicate on behalf of the EU in national and sub-national contexts. (EU I 02)

The document ‘Communicating Europe in Partnership’, issued by the EC in 2007, states that EU public diplomacy is the task of everyone that is involved in EU decision-making. This includes member state governments that set the course of EU policy in the Council and, thus, have a responsibility of communicating their mandates and policies to their citizens (EU Doc 05). National governments play a crucial role in the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy, and assume the role of multipliers that can either reinforce or constrain key messages developed by the EU (EU I 04, EU I 05). Moreover, interviewees from DG Communication highlight NGOs and sub-national organizations



in member states as important cooperation partners with regard to the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy.

Both the analysis of EU documents and EU interviews disclose three types of partnerships between the EU and member states: Management partnerships, strategic partnerships, and ad-hoc partnerships (EU Doc 05, EU I 05). Both management and strategic partnerships present more formal, structured types of cooperation, whereas ad-hoc partnerships focus on selective cooperation on single issues. Management partnerships were funded by the EC. Member states only provided staff and facilities for implementing the partnership activities (EU Doc 05, EU I 05). However, the EC decided to cancel the management partnership program due to budget constraints. Strategic partnerships build on a commonly agreed communication plan, and are jointly financed by the EC and member states. (EU I 05) One interviewee from DG Communication stresses that the type of partnership depends on the political willingness of the member states and cannot be imposed (EU I 05).

The EU interview analysis discloses that there are meetings of EC Director Generals with national communication directors in member states from time to time (EU I 09). Similarly, the Spokesperson Service maintains informal contacts with spokespeople of national governments (EU I 10). The interviews do, however, not contain any information on formal, regular meetings with national communication directors from each member state that were proposed in the document 'Communicating Europe Through Partnership'. The purpose of these regular meetings would lie in identifying communication priorities, exchanging information, and monitoring communication activities. (EU Doc 05)

Both the Spokesperson Service and DG ECHO as one EC Policy DG argue that there is still room for improvement in the cooperation between the EC and member states. The representative from the Spokesperson Service states that the cooperation between the Spokesperson Service and member state organizations should be extended and structured in a better way. He highlights job shadowing as one possibility on encouraging the exchange of information and best practices. (EU I 10) According to one interviewee from DG ECHO, there should be more joint communication of EC DGs and member states on joint humanitarian aid projects. Until now though, member state organizations have communicated these joint efforts from a primarily national angle to EU citizens. (EU I 11) In contrast to that, one interviewee from the EC Representation in Stockholm perceives the cooperation between EC Representation, and both national and sub-national organizations in Sweden as very good. Due to resource constraints, the EC Representation focuses on national organizations that allocate EU funding to sub-national organizations, or represent regions within Sweden and are based in Stockholm or Brussels. (EU I 07) To further enhance cooperation between the EU and Sweden, he suggests to establish networks between EC Representations and member state organizations within particular policy fields (EU I 07). Similarly, the EC Representation in Paris points to a close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development as well as the French Prime Minister's Office. This cooperation also involves the development of joint communication campaigns, for instance to increase the voter turnout in the EP elections (EU I 12). On a general note, one interviewee from DG Education and Culture finds that EU public diplomacy practitioners need to increase their expertise on single EU member states (EU I 03).

The 'White Paper on a European Communication Policy', issued by the EC in 2006, identifies political parties in member states as well as transnational think tanks and civil society organizations the EC should cooperate more with. Moreover, the document proposes a closer collaboration with the media to promote and hold debates on European policies. The document discloses that the EC does not only seek a close cooperation with member state organizations with regard to the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy, but particularly in the area of EU external relations. (EU Doc 04) The

commitment to cooperation with member state organizations varies between single EC organizations: Whereas one representative from the Spokesperson Service finds that the level of cooperation with national governments depends on the topic, one interview from DG Communication (Directorate 'Citizens') shows a general openness towards the nature and type of cooperation and cooperation partner: "So yes, we work with [...] anybody who is interested to communicate about Europe" (EU I 04, paragraph 29). DG Education and Culture does not only pursue to cooperate with organizations from member states, but also aims at connecting different types of multipliers (within member states), such as civil society organizations and educational providers (EU I 03).

The respondent from the EC Representation in Stockholm that accentuated the very good cooperation between EC Representation in Stockholm and Swedish organizations, recognizes Europe Direct Information Offices as a facilitator of cooperative relations, as they provide a good infrastructure for collaborations with local and regional organizations (EU I 07). According to one interviewee from the Spokesperson Service, controversies as well as divergent political views on national and European level, on the other hand, constrain EU public diplomacy, particularly if they are voiced publicly (EU I 10).

EU decision-making power in a specific policy area, as well as the political willingness of member states can either enable or constrain the success of EU public diplomacy – both with regard to the internal and external dimension. For example, DG Education and Culture operates in policy areas in which the EU only has supporting competencies. As a consequence, cooperation between the EC and member state organizations may be less binding than in a field like monetary policy, in which the EU maintains exclusive decision-making competencies. (EU I 03) Moreover, the political willingness of member state governments and other member state organizations to work together with the EU determine the level and the nature of cooperation (EU I 04, EU I 05) - "[a]nd with some member states that works better than with others and unfortunately, I mean, it works the least well in those of the countries where it would be needed the most" (EU I 04, paragraph 27).

With regard to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy, the EEAS and its network of EU Delegations complement national initiatives by EU member states in third countries (EU Doc 12, EU Doc 14). One interviewee from the EEAS identifies culture as the most common area of cooperation between EU Delegations and member state representations in third countries (EU I 06c). To facilitate the cooperation in third countries, the 'Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations', issued in 2012, encourages EU Delegations to share their communication strategies with member state representations to explore opportunities of joint action. The document highlights cooperation efforts in Brazil and Mexico as positive examples. (EU Doc 13) The 'EEAS Review', published in 2013, concludes that regular meetings between Heads of EU Delegations and Heads of member state representations in third countries have been well-established and contribute to the information exchange between EU and member state organizations (EU Doc 12, see also EU Doc 17, EU I 06c). To further enhance the cooperation between these organizations, the EEAS supports and promotes the principle of collocation of EU Delegations and member state representations (EU Doc 12). One document issued by the EC prior to the inception of the Lisbon Treaty stresses the need for improving cooperation between all EU institutions and member state organizations with regard to the implementation of EU external action (EU Doc 10). While acknowledging the progress made in the cooperation between EU Delegations and member state representations, the 'EEAS Review' from 2013 still points to the importance of deepening the dialogue between these organizations in third countries due to scarce resources that demand more joint activities (EU Doc 12), but also to speak with one EU voice in third countries (EU I 08). One representative from the EEAS assesses the situation in third countries as very complex, as both EU public diplomacy activities, as well as activities of member states embassies run parallel (EU I 06c).

He argues that the quality of the cooperation between EU Delegations and member state representations varies from country to country (EU I 06c).

Nonetheless, one representative from the Spokesperson Service argues that the EU maintains very close formal and informal contacts with member countries that also influence cooperations in the field of public diplomacy (EU I 10). In addition to that, one interviewee from DG Communication briefly touches upon the Club of Venice as a network that brings governmental communication experts from the EU and its member states together to engage in an informal exchange (EU I 04).

The document 'Communicating Europe through audiovisual media', published in 2008, provides information on the European Radio Network as a transnational network in the sub-dimension 'society/culture'. The network comprises the EC, as well as radio broadcasters from different EU member states and was launched in April 2008. It serves the purpose of increasing radio coverage on EU-related issues across all EU institutions. Roles and responsibilities within this network are regulated on the basis of multi-annual contracts: The EC provides financial assistance to broadcasters that engage in the network. The radio broadcasters, on the other hand, inform EU citizens in their languages, but include broader European perspectives as well as view points from other EU member states into the national media coverage. The multi-annual contracts guarantee complete editorial freedom. (EU Doc 08) The network responds to calls for increasing audiovisual coverage on EU issues, as well as establishing networks with broadcasters at national and pan-European levels as voiced in EU documents from 2005 to 2007 (EU Doc 01, EU Doc 05).

The interview analysis shows that the EC also establishes networks within single EU member states. The EC Representation assumes the leading / coordinating role in a network that is labeled 'EC-Sweden' in this study. The network gathers individuals who work with the EU or EU-related issues on a regular basis. This includes representatives from the Swedish parliament, the Swedish government, regional authorities, or organizations that administer EU funds. The network combines two purposes: Providing information on EU / EC priorities to strategic publics within Sweden, and obtaining feedback on the work of the EU in general as well as the EC in particular. Members of the network meet annually. Apart from logistic challenges and resource constraints that may affect the organization of the annual meetings, the interviewee does not detect any factors that constrain the network. (EU I 07)

The G7/G8<sup>221</sup> as well as the G20 are identified as important networks for the EU in both one document (EU Doc 11) and one interview (EU I 11). They constitute governmental political fora that do not focus on public diplomacy or communication.

### *Interorganizational cooperation with third countries*

EU organizations do not only engage in cooperation with member state organizations to conduct public diplomacy activities in third countries, but also directly collaborate with organizations from third countries. Documents issued by the EEAS as well as DG DEVCO in 2011 and 2012 identify civil society organizations as important cooperation partners in third countries (EU Doc 13, EU Doc 14). In industrialized and other high income countries, EU public diplomacy organizations seek to stimulate an information exchange with civil society organizations, as well as to contribute to the creation and reinforcement of civil society networks. Collaboration with civil society organizations can also

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<sup>221</sup> The document, issued in 2011, refers to the network as the G8. The interview with the representative of the Spokesperson Service was conducted after Russia had been suspended from the G8 forum. The interviewee thus refers to the network as 'G7'.

complement formal policy dialogue at government level. (EU Doc 14) Moreover, civil society organizations constitute partners for change in specific developing or emerging countries (EU Doc 13). The document analysis discloses the need to increase and formalize cooperation with industrialized countries and other high income countries through agreements or for example declarations. In addition to these broader frameworks of cooperation, there are many small-scale cooperation projects between the EU and organizations in third countries, including joint workshops or conferences. (EU Doc 14) According to the EEAS, future cooperation with industrialized countries and other high income countries should focus more on national parliaments (EU Doc 14).

Only one interviewee from DG Trade claims to observe the public diplomacy activities of organizations in third countries: Following up on the public diplomacy of efforts of third countries serves the purpose of benchmarking with cooperation partners, for instance in the context of TTIP. (EU I 02) The EEAS is the sole public diplomacy organization that has launched a study that focuses on the public perception and public diplomacy approaches of member states as well as third countries, and to consult academic research on public diplomacy (EU I 06c).

The ‘Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions’ (EU Doc 16), issued in 2010 and developed by DG EuropeAid (now DG DEVCO), regulates the coordination of visibility of EU funded projects in third countries. Contractors, implementing partners, and international organizations are encouraged to develop a communication and visibility plan for joint projects with the EU, as well as to consult EU Delegations in the respective partner countries prior implementing a communication activity on a project. In addition to that, they also contribute to assist in the preparation of EU public diplomacy materials by providing technical information on joint projects. (EU Doc 16) Cooperation partners have a contractual obligation to make the EU visible in joint projects, but can only be encouraged to communicate on these joint activities. However, one interviewee working in the area of humanitarian assistance in third countries stresses that communication on joint projects by partner organizations is much more relevant than ensuring visibility of EU funding or EU assistance (EU I 11).

### **6.5.2 French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations**

This section explores the inter-organizational cooperation of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations within the country, with the EU, other multilateral organization as well as other countries – both on a bilateral level and within networks. It fathoms how French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations perceive the cooperations they engage in, and analyzes the factors that enable and/or constrain these cooperation efforts.

#### *Interorganizational cooperation within EU member states*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development is at the heart of the French public diplomacy architecture. Nonetheless, it does not have a monopoly on external action and public diplomacy, as almost all policies have a European and/or international dimension (FRA Doc 05). Thus, inter-ministerial cooperation is crucial to conducting French public diplomacy (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 09). Three French documents, issued from 2005 to 2010, stress the need for inter-ministerial cooperation within the French government (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 09). Two inter-ministerial bodies facilitate the cooperation within the French government: Comité Interministériel des

Réseaux Internationaux de l'État (CORINTE)<sup>222</sup>, tasked with the allocation of financial resources for external action, and the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement – CICID), that coordinates international cooperation and development cooperation on an inter-ministerial level (FRA Doc 05).

Two documents issued in 2005 and 2008 reflect on the creation of a Council on French External Action ('Conseil de l'Action Extérieure de la France') under the authority of the President that discusses and coordinates strategic orientations in the areas economy, culture, and education (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05). The idea of establishing a Council on French External Action is, however, not taken up again in documents issued after 2008, or interviews with French public diplomacy practitioners. Furthermore, the report by Frank Melloul in 2010 suggests the introduction of a 'Special Representative for Public Diplomacy'. This Special Representation would assume the tasks of developing a strategic approach to public diplomacy and coordinating the different core areas of French public diplomacy. (FRA Doc 09) The suggestion of Melloul to introduce a Special Representative for Public Diplomacy was not adopted by the French government. The document 'La France et l'Europe dans le monde', issued by the French government in 2008 also highlights the role of the French Parliament in French public diplomacy, and suggests stronger involvement of and coordination with the parliament (FRA Doc 05).

The analysis of the relational satisfaction with cooperation among foreign representations, as well as between foreign representations and other organizations reveals two points of criticism. Documents issued in 2005 and 2008 point to shortcomings in the internal communication among French representations, as well as between embassies and the French government in Paris (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05). Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development critically address the organization of annual meetings of Heads of Representations in a document published in 2013. According to the document, the agenda of these annual meetings is too crowded and does not leave enough room for reflecting on joint strategies as well as entering in a dialogue with government agencies and other partner organizations (FRA Doc 03).

In order to formalize and strengthen the cooperation between different French representations, two documents issued in 2005 and 2008 suggest establishing regular regional conferences that should include ambassadors, consuls, cultural attachés, or for instance government agencies like Alliance Française (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05). More recently, in a document issued in 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development proposed to set up a 'Conseil d'Influence', in which French Representations as well as government agencies that they cooperate with coordinate public diplomacy activities in the areas culture, education, and the promotion of France. However, the ministry also stresses that French Representations should not only strengthen efforts in the area of culture and 'diplomatie d'influence', but also engage in closer collaborations within organizations in the public diplomacy core area 'economy'. (FRA Doc 02).

The French government draws on a number of government agencies ('opérateurs') that are tasked with implementing French public diplomacy (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06). The document analysis discloses a development in the relationship between French ministries and government agencies. Whereas documents issued in 2005 and 2008 emphasizes the need to strengthen the central steering of operators, as well as to formalized the modes of cooperation (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05), the report

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<sup>222</sup> The document FRA Doc 05 refers to the inter-ministerial body Comité Interministériel des Moyens de l'État à l'Étranger (CIMEE). However, CIMEE was replaced by the inter-ministerial body CORINTE.

by Frank Melloul, published in 2010, indicates that the French government has reformed its network of government agencies to strengthen the coherence of French public diplomacy (FRA Doc 09, see also FRA Doc 10). One interviewee from the Institut Français claims that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development does not only exercise considerable influence on the strategy development of the organization, but also on its operational work: For example press releases drafted by the Institut Français have to be checked with the ministry before they can be issued. (FRA I 01) Both the Institut Français, and France Médias Monde maintain that they do not only cooperate with the French government, but also with other government agencies in order to carry out projects (FRA I 02, FRA I 04). France Médias Monde has also completed cooperation agreements with French schools abroad, as well as the MuCEM, the Museum for Europe and the Mediterranean, in Marseille. While the cooperation with French schools addresses pupils as potential multipliers, joint projects with MuCEM like live-broadcasts from the museum aim at strengthening the visibility of the cooperation partners involved. (FRA I 02)

The French documents included in this analysis only briefly touch upon cooperation between public and private organizations. The report by Frank Melloul issued in 2010 values the role of government agencies, international marketing experts, and NGOs as consultants in the development of a French public diplomacy strategy (FRA Doc 09). Moreover, the document analysis shows that French governmental organizations cooperate with private organizations to realize and/or co-fund public diplomacy activities in the core area ‘society/culture’ (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 06), as well as ‘economy’ (FRA Doc 10). One interviewee from the Institut Français states that the organization is more and more looking for cooperation with businesses, as they possess a lot of financial resources (FRA I 01).

Public diplomacy activities in the area of development coordination are subject to inter-governmental coordination between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Economy, Industry and the Digital Sector, and the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research, as well as coordination between the French government and government agencies like Agence Française de Développement (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 08). Moreover, sub-national organizations play a crucial role in French development cooperation. Sub-national and national organizations already conduct a number of joint activities like awareness campaigns in French schools to sensitize pupils for the international activities of regional authorities in the area of development cooperation (FRA Doc 08). However, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs argues that already existing projects of sub-national organizations need to be taken better into account at the national level. In addition to that, the Ministry stresses that the coordination between sub-national organizations has to be strengthened. These coordination efforts should also include French and foreign non-state organizations at regional and local level, such as associations, research institutes, or think tanks. (FRA Doc 03)

Currently, there are three national organizations that coordinate the international activities of sub-national authorities. Both the Centre national de la fonction publique territoriale<sup>223</sup> (CNFPT) and the National Commission for Decentralized Cooperation (Commission nationale de la coopération décentralisée, CNCD), play a central role in coordinating public diplomacy efforts of sub-national authorities (FRA Doc 03). The National Commission for Decentralized Cooperation is for example responsible for developing a common strategy for the international activities of sub-national authorities, and monitoring the strategy’s implementation. In a document issued in 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development does not only suggest more regular meetings of the

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<sup>223</sup> There is no official English translation for the Centre national de la fonction publique territoriale. It is a national civil service organization that handles a number of administrative tasks at local level, including the recruitment, education, and counseling of local civil servants.

National Commission for Decentralized Cooperation, but also the creation of an economic committee within the commission, which is open to social and business organizations that may engage in joint external activities with sub-national authorities. (FRA Doc 03) Moreover, the 'Directorate General for Globalization, Development and Partnership' within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development encompasses a 'Delegation for the External Action of Collectivités Territoriales' (Délégation pour l'action extérieure des collectivités territoriales – DAECT) that acts as the head of the network of French sub-national authorities and assists the international activities of sub-national organizations by providing information, guidance, analysis and financial support. A high level of consensus on the role of sub-national authorities in the French government and the French parliament facilitates these coordination efforts. (FRA Doc 03)

Moreover, one document addresses the financial resources of sub-national authorities: It recommends increasing the budget allocated to public diplomacy activities of sub-national authorities in single areas such as development cooperation and, more generally, to make procedures of co-financing international activities of sub-national authorities more transparent and understandable. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development suggests to intensify the cooperation between the Institut Français and sub-national authorities in the area of culture and language, and to foster cooperation between sub-national organizations in the core area 'education/research'. (FRA Doc 03) Not least, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development points out that inter-ministerial cooperation is essential on both national and sub-national level in order to foster the coherence and the information exchange between organizations from different public diplomacy core areas (FRA Doc 03).

Drawing on the analysis of French documents, there are four public diplomacy networks that only include French organizations (culture, higher education and research, trade and tourism, development cooperation) as well as two networks that comprise mainly French, but also a small number of foreign or international organizations (education, international broadcasting). This section introduces these exclusively or mainly national networks, traces the development of these networks within the time frame of analysis, and identifies links and overlaps between these single networks.

The French public diplomacy network 'Culture' encompasses the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the Ministry of Culture and Communication as two governmental organizations, government agencies as well as organization like France Édition or UniFrance Films that promote French cultural industries abroad (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06). The network 'Culture' constitutes an issue that is discussed in documents issued from 2004 (FRA Doc 06) to 2013 (FRA Doc 02). The diachronic document analysis points to a process of consolidation with regard to government agencies: By 2005, the network still comprised l'Association française d'action artistique (AFAA) as well as l'Association pour la diffusion de la pensée française (ADPF) (FRA Doc 04), before the two government organizations were merged into CulturesFrance in 2006. CulturesFrance, in turn, became IF in January 2011. Today the network includes the IF as main government agency in the area of culture as well as AF (FRA Doc 02). It operates both on a central level in Paris, as well as on the level of French representations and local cultural organizations abroad (FRA Doc 10). In addition to these permanent members, the network also cooperates with artists and other cultural institutions on a project basis (FRA Doc 09).

One document issued in 2005 places the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development at the center of the network 'Culture'. At the same time it raises the question if the management of the network should be transferred to an external agency. (FRA Doc 05) The idea to assign the management of the network to an external organization has not gained ground. One document issued in 2014 points to the need of improving the allocation of resources to organizations within the

network, as well as developing better tools for monitoring and evaluating international activities in the area of culture. The document reveals that the French government has assigned a budget of 400.000 Euro for restructuring and modernizing the French cultural network. (FRA Doc 10)

There are two French networks in the public diplomacy core area 'education/research': 'Education', and 'Higher Education and Research'. The network 'Education' has two overarching goals: 1) the promotion of the French language and 2) the promotion of the French education system through establishing French schools abroad as well as initiating joint programs with schools and other educational institutions abroad (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06). At the central level in Paris, the network 'Education' covers the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research as well as the government agencies AEFÉ and AF as well as the non-profit organization Mission laïque française that promotes the French language and culture by setting up schools in other countries (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 06). Government agencies like AEFÉ coordinate a heterogeneous network of local educational facilities that vary significantly with regard to funding, management, and organization. This constitutes a challenge for the stability and coherence of the network. Thus, one document points to the need for a head of the network 'Education'. (FRA Doc 06) Building on that, another document issued by the French government in 2008 asks whether the management of this network should be transferred to an external organization (FRA Doc 05). The document analysis does not include any references to the adoption of this idea. Besides these French organizations, the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) as international organization is also mentioned as a member in one document, however, without specifying its role within the network (FRA Doc 06). Moreover, the French government proposes to rationalize the network of French educational facilities in Europe and focus on other regions of the world (FRA Doc 05). As in the area of culture, the need for enhancing resource allocation as well as monitoring and evaluating tools also applies to this network.

The promotion of the French language also constitutes one main goal of the network 'Higher Education and Research'. Organizations that are part of this network include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research, as well as the governmental agency Campus France<sup>224</sup> that is tasked with promoting French higher education abroad, allocating scholarships and internships, or welcoming foreign students in France (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 10). One document issued in 2005 points to role of the National Council for the Development of International Student Mobility (Conseil national pour le développement de la mobilité internationale des étudiants) in conceptualizing a strategy for the promotion of French higher education abroad (FRA Doc 04). It features representatives from national and sub-national authorities, as well as the heads of French higher education institutions like universities and Grandes Écoles, but is not mentioned again in any of the documents published after 2005. There are two organizations concentrating on the area of research, the group of French Research Institutes Abroad (Instituts français de recherche à l'étranger, IFRE), as well as the French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development (CIRAD) that is also part of the network 'Development Cooperation' (see below). IFRE engages in research cooperation with other countries in the fields of human and social science as well as archeology. It considers itself a science diplomacy organization. (IFRE, n.d.)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development also plays a pivotal role in the network labeled 'International Broadcasting' (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06). Additionally, the Ministry of Culture and Communication also engages in defining goals and strategic orientations of the network

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<sup>224</sup> The three organizations Egide, CROUS and EduFrance have been merged into a single implementing agency named Campus France.



(FRA Doc 06). The network also comprises the French international broadcasting organizations Radio France International (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 06), France 24 and the Arab language radio station Monte Carlo Doualiya as well as the pan-European TV channel Euronews, and the international television network TV5 Monde (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 06). Euronews is regarded as a partner with regard to the European dimension of the French international TV channel France 24<sup>225</sup>. French public diplomacy organizations seek to utilize its expertise in producing multilateral content. (FRA Doc 06) To better coordinate the activities of these different organizations and to enhance the visibility of French international broadcasting programs, the holding society Audiovisuel Extérieur de la France was created in 2008 (FRA Doc 09). Audiovisuel Extérieur de la France became France Médias Monde in 2013. It performs the same tasks and owns 100% of Radio France International, France 24 and Monte Carlo Doualiya, as well as 49% of TV5 Monde. While the French government defines the overarching goals and priorities of French international broadcasting, the France Médias Monde coordinates French international broadcasting on an operational level.

In addition to these core members of the network, two documents highlight the international role of France TV, and recommend closer cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and this public television broadcaster (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06) to make better use of existing resources and expertise (FRA Doc 06). Two documents issued in 2005 (FRA Doc 04) and 2014 (FRA Doc 10) identify Canal France International as a member of the network 'International Broadcasting'. Canal France International implements French development policy with regard to media (Canal France International, n.d.). It serves as a link between the networks 'International Broadcasting' and 'Development Cooperation'.

The network 'Development Cooperation' involves the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 08) and the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and the Digital Sector (FRA Doc 08) as two organizations from the French government. The two ministries supervise Agence Française de Développement as the principal government agency in French development cooperation (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 08) as well as Expertise France as agency for public technical expertise on an international level (cf. Expertise France, 2015). Additionally, one document issued in 2005 also identifies research organizations like the French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development (CIRAD), as well as the French Research Institute for Development (IRD) as members of the network. Both operate under the joint authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research. (FRA Doc 04)

The work of French public diplomacy organizations in this network builds on the strategic orientations in the area of development policy and international solidarity that are developed and regularly updated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development in consultation with the National Council for Development and International Solidarity (Conseil National pour le Développement et la Solidarité Internationale - CND SI), permanent commissions of the Parliament, as well as the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID). The CICID is a national council created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development that coordinates the goals, the strategic orientations, and tools in French development policy and ensures the coherence between the different organizations within the network 'Development Cooperation'. Moreover, the French government has appointed an inter-ministerial delegate of international technical cooperation to coordinate and oversee technical cooperation on a strategic and operational level. In addition to these steering mechanisms of the network, one document published in 2014 suggests to

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<sup>225</sup> By the time document FRA Doc 06 was issued (2004), France 24 had not been launched yet. Therefore, the document refers to a planned French international TV channel.

commission one independent organization to evaluate activities in the field of development cooperation. (FRA Doc 08)

The CNCD also constitutes a part of the network ‘Development Cooperation’, as it coordinates development cooperation activities of sub-national authorities, and serves as a link between the French government and sub-national authorities (FRA Doc 08). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development also maintain relations with civil society organizations and businesses as organizations at the periphery of the network. While civil society organizations hold important knowledge on the local conditions within partner countries, businesses work with partner organizations in emerging countries. Not least, the CND SI has established a forum for dialogue with NGOs, private organizations, higher education and research institutions, employer organizations, and sub-national organizations that provides the opportunity for exchange between organizations at the center and the periphery of the network. (FRA Doc 08)

The document analysis discloses one network in the public diplomacy core area ‘economy’ that is labeled ‘Trade and Tourism’ (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 10). The network pursues two main goals: 1) increase French economic gains and 2) enhance France’s image abroad (FRA Doc 05). The network comprises the national tourism organization Atout France and Business France (previously the export promotion organization UBIFRANCE and the investment promotion organization Agence Française pour les Investissements Internationaux (AFII)<sup>226</sup> as main government agencies in the core area ‘economy’ (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 10). Moreover, the network encompasses the French Chambers of Commerce and Industry, sub-national authorities, professional associations, as well as French representations abroad (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs defines the overarching priority issues and key messages of Swedish public diplomacy in cooperation with other ministries. A consultation group involving the communications department, the ‘Department for the EU Internal Market and the Promotion of Sweden and Swedish Trade’ (UD-FIM), as well as representatives from geographical and functional departments, if necessary, coordinates public diplomacy efforts within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. While UD-FIM is more active in the promotion of Sweden, the communications department directs public diplomacy efforts in crisis situations. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not only assume main responsibility for the content, strategy, and implementation of public diplomacy, but also supports other ministries and embassies in their public diplomacy practice by providing tools, advice and training. (SWE Doc 09) One interviewee from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs argues that Swedish Representations abroad seek more guidance and information exchange on public diplomacy (SWE I 01a). Therefore, the Ministry has initiated a pilot project in about 12 to 13 Representations to improve their public diplomacy efforts. In the context of this pilot project, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs coaches and guides the network of Swedish embassies and encourages them to provide feedback on the implementation of Swedish public diplomacy strategy (SWE I 01b). Swedish Representations assess the pilot project on public diplomacy positively and report to work with public diplomacy in a more integrated way (SWE I 01a).

The Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU takes a special position within the network of Swedish embassies. It is invited to the monthly meetings of the heads of communication of all Swedish ministries, as the Permanent Representation is “such an important window” for the entire Swedish government in Brussels (SWE I 03, paragraph 86). Moreover, it coordinates Twitter activities with the Swedish government, for instance by matching hash tags (SWE I 03). The interviewee from

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<sup>226</sup> The documents still list UBIFRANCE and AFII as two separate organizations. However, they were merged into the single export and investment promotion agency Business France in January 2015.

the Permanent Representation to the EU assesses its working relationship with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as positive, because it receives a lot of support from the Ministry, particularly with regard to digital diplomacy. While the Permanent Representation is part of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it works for all Swedish ministries in practice. This makes it difficult for the interviewee to always identify the right counterpart in Stockholm. Not least, the interviewee from the Permanent Representation to the EU points to the need to continuously monitor the Swedish ministries' EU work, and the press releases of the Swedish government to inform herself about the agreed language on a specific issue. She underlines that this is particularly important when working for a coalition government. (SWE I 03)

Swedish public diplomacy representatives from the government as well as from government agencies state that they observe other public diplomacy organizations and compare their own public diplomacy efforts with the activities of others (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b, SWE I 02, SWE I 03), but only seldomly integrate these observed aspects into their own work (SWE I 02, SWE I 03). Rather, Swedish public diplomacy organizations concentrate on cooperation at the tactical level. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs cooperates with both Swedish, foreign, and international organizations to implement its public diplomacy strategy (SWE I 01b). The Swedish Institute does not only constitute the second key organization of Swedish public diplomacy. It is also the organization the Ministry cooperates the most with. The Swedish Institute is for example invited to the meetings of the Ministry's internal working group on public diplomacy<sup>227</sup>. (SWE I 01a) One representative from the Swedish Institute describes the relationship between the governmental agency and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as "working at arm's length" (SWE I 06, paragraph 20): "This means that we get [...] an instruction [...] and we get a yearly directive, together with our budget, but this is more on what the government expects us to achieve and we are then responsible for the 'how'" (SWE I 06, paragraph 20).

The Swedish Institute also develops its own public diplomacy strategy. One interviewee from the Swedish Institute states that the organization consults with external stakeholders in the process of strategy development (SWE I 06). As outlined in sub-chapter 6.1.2, the Swedish Institute spans across different public diplomacy core areas and is active in cultural cooperation, Sweden promotion, or for instance development cooperation. One interviewee from the organization considers it very important to understand the goals and the strategies of other organizations in public diplomacy in order to complement them as well as "to be relevant and continue [to be] relevant" in all fields (SWE I 06, paragraph 65) The Swedish Institute does not only conduct its own public diplomacy activities, but also produces public diplomacy tools for Swedish representations abroad (SWE Doc 09). It does not only create materials and tools for them, but also consults them on how to create own, well-targeted public diplomacy activities. (SWE I 06) The Swedish Institute also cooperates with representations on the Swedish Brand Strategy by developing web-based support tools and workshops to facilitate the implementation of the Brand Strategy in foreign missions (SWE I 02).

Besides the Swedish Institute, there are more government agencies that carry out public diplomacy, including Business Sweden and the Swedish Arts Council. The Swedish Arts Council and the Swedish Institute often work in similar domains and have to coordinate their public diplomacy efforts (SWE I 06). One interviewee from the Ministry of Culture explains that the Swedish Institute starts from a foreign policy point of view, whereas the Swedish Arts Council operates from a cultural policy point of view, even though foreign and cultural policy are, of course, intertwined (SWE I 07, SWE I 08a). The Swedish Arts Council seeks to cooperate with the Swedish Institute whenever these two perspectives can be combined. Cooperation between the Swedish Institute and the Swedish Arts

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<sup>227</sup> When touristic topics are addressed, Visit Sweden is also invited to the meetings of the internal working group (SWE I 01a).

Council is based on joint projects as well as regular meetings to exchange information and coordinate activities. One representative from the Swedish Arts Council asserts that there are no constraints to the cooperation of the two governmental organizations. Nonetheless, she underlines that it is important to clarify everyone's mission, particularly with regard to funding schemes in the area of culture. (SWE I 08a) The Swedish Arts Council also assigns small grants to Swedish representations abroad that enable them to conduct additional cultural activities (SWE I 08a). Moreover, the government agency works with Swedish sub-national organizations on cultural exchanges and cooperations. It seeks to ensure that the international dimension is a priority in the sub-national organizations' cultural activities. (SWE I 08b)

One interviewee from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' communications department explains that the Ministry cooperates with all types of organizations on specific issues, ranging from NGOs to multilateral organizations (SWE I 05). Moreover, the Swedish Institute cooperates with the sub-national organizations as well as businesses on the implementation of the Swedish brand strategy. Companies mostly assume the role of financiers of single projects in target countries. (SWE I 02) Not least, the Swedish Institute has a lot of experience in working with organizations from the cultural and creative industries sector, especially in the areas of cultural diplomacy, branding, and the promotion of human rights. Despite the long-term experience in cooperating with private partners, one document issued in 2013 stresses that professional organizations, companies, and practitioners feel that implemented activities lack synchronization and monitoring. (SWE Doc 15)

Four Swedish documents, issued from 2006 to 2015, broach the issue of cooperation within Sweden in the area of development cooperation. In contrast to public diplomacy and branding, the Swedish government, government agencies as well as representations abroad jointly define the Swedish approach to development cooperation. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs encourages a broad civil society participation in Sweden's global development policy. (SWE Doc 03) Swedish efforts in the area of development cooperation are embedded in a common international agenda and also involve cooperation with international civil society organizations (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 17). Moreover, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs encourages consultations and joint planning of a multilateral development cooperation strategy (SWE Doc 02).

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) is the most important government agency in the area of development cooperation. Traditionally, SIDA has focused on bilateral aid, whereas the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been primarily responsible for multilateral development cooperation initiatives. One document issued in 2007 discloses that these lines of division have loosened, and addresses the need for clarifying the roles between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Affairs on the basis of activity-specific objectives and clear outcome indicators (SWE Doc 02). In a number of cases, SIDA's field offices are integrated with Swedish representations abroad. Two documents released in 2007 and 2008 find that the exchange of information and knowledge between the Swedish government, SIDA headquarters in Stockholm as well as SIDA field offices should be strengthened (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 03). Moreover, one document identifies a lack of coherence of Stockholm-based organizations, the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, and multilateral organizations in the area of development cooperation (SWE Doc 02). Neither the documents nor the interviews contain information on the current perception of the relationship of SIDA, the Swedish government, and multilateral organizations. Several documents stress the role of businesses and NGOs in multilateral development cooperation (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 03).

The analysis of public diplomacy key issues has already pointed to overlaps between the areas of development cooperation and culture. SIDA engages in both long-term cultural and media

cooperations with Swedish cultural organizations as well as organizations in partner countries (SWE Doc 06). SIDA has for example cooperated with the Swedish Arts Council on funding programs for cultural cooperation between Swedish organizations and organizations from South Africa, Botswana, India, Indonesia, and China. By the time the interviews with the Swedish Arts Council were conducted (September/October, 2015), the two government agencies were talking about launching a new funding program on cultural cooperation. (SWE I 08a, SWE I 08b)

The Council for the Promotion of Sweden is the most important national public diplomacy network. By the time of its foundation in 1995, the Council for the Promotion of Sweden encompassed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Institute, the Swedish Trade Council, the Invest in Sweden Agency and the Swedish Tourism Board (SWE I 06). The Swedish Trade Council as well as the Invest in Sweden Agency were merged into Business Sweden in January 2013 (SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 11). Today, the Council for the Promotion of Sweden also comprises the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation and, as of October 2013, also the Ministry of Culture (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 10, SWE Doc 11, SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b). The interviewee from the Ministry of Culture interprets the addition of his ministry as a sign that there is a growing understanding of the role of culture in external relations (SWE I 07). The network pursues the goal to ensure an effective and coherent long-term promotion of Sweden abroad. To attain this goal, it seeks to develop a strategy for communicating the country's image and to coordinate the work with this image strategy. (SWE Doc 05, SWE Doc 06). The network also provides support for the public diplomacy activities of its members and fosters cooperation among them (SWE Doc 06). Moreover, one interviewee from the Swedish Institute comprehends the Council for the Promotion of Sweden as an opportunity for observing the work of other members and exchanging information (SWE I 02).

Furthermore, the document analysis discloses two national networks in the public diplomacy core areas 'economy' and 'society/culture'. The network labeled 'Trade and Tourism' comprises an inter-ministerial working group for trade promotion, Swedish representations as organizations of trade and investment promotion at national and sub-national level in foreign countries. In addition to that, the network comprises the government agencies Business Sweden, and the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (Tillväxtverket) in the field of trade and investment, as well as Visit Sweden and Swedavia AB in the field of tourism. In 2011, Visit Sweden and Swedavia AB established the Svensk Destinationsutveckling AB as an organization for developing national tourism strategies and training tourist destinations to be internationally competitive. Svensk Destinationsutveckling AB<sup>228</sup> has also been part of the network 'Trade and Tourism'. (SWE Doc 05) In a document issued in 2011, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs identifies similarities between tourism, export, and investment promotion as well as the promotion of Sweden's image as factors that enable this network. Coordination between all organizations involved is perceived as inevitable to the success of the network in order to avoid duplications and confusion among foreign companies and consumers. Moreover, the document issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs recommends integrating the Swedish Trade Council and Invest in Sweden into one organization to create a greater network of contacts, and enhance the visibility of Swedish trade and investment promotion among foreign partners and strategic publics. (SWE Doc 05) This suggestion was taken up in 2013 by the creation of Business Sweden. In contrast to that, the idea to also include Visit Sweden in this new organization, also voiced in the same document (SWE Doc 05), was not put into practice. The Ministry of Culture points to the establishment of a network in the area of culture, including the Ministry of Culture, the Swedish Arts Council (Kulturrådet), Swedish Arts Grants Committee (Konstärnsnämnden), the Swedish Film Institute (Stiftelsen Svenska Filminstitutet), Stiftelsen Svenska Rikskonserter<sup>229</sup>, as well as a number of libraries and archives, in a

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<sup>228</sup> Svensk Destinationsutveckling AB was taken over by STUA Utvecklar Besöksnäringen in 2014.

<sup>229</sup> Stiftelsen Svenska Rikskonserter ceased to exist in 2010.

document issued in 2007. The document does, however, not provide any further information on the network's purpose, structure, or mode of communication.

#### *Interorganizational cooperation with the EU*

France considers itself a powerful actor in multilateral organizations (FRA Doc 03). At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development emphasizes multilateral organizations like the EU as important frameworks to promote the French 'diplomatie d'influence' (FRA Doc 02). In 2008, one document called for allocating more budget to EU projects, particularly in the area of higher education exchange (FRA Doc 05). More recently issued documents, however, do not include suggestions to allocate more money to EU initiatives. Rather, one document issued in 2014 highlights France's role as the second largest contributor to the European Development Fund (FRA Doc 08). The French government encourages the EU to strengthen exchange and (economic) cooperation with other regional organizations (FRA Doc 05).

The coordination of public diplomacy activities with EU organizations is only mentioned in one document, stating that the French government co-funds a number of foreign cultural activities together with the EU (FRA Doc 02). The EU finances cultural projects with money provided by member states. As one representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development highlights, this process of re-financing cultural projects does not always work out for member states. He regards the funding of cultural cooperation projects as a major challenge of French government agencies. (FRA I 05) The Institut Français has set up its own unit dedicated to cooperation with EU institutions ('Pôle Europe') that did, however, only comprise one full staff member and one intern by the time the interviews with the Institut Français were conducted (February, 2015) (FRA I 04). Government agencies like the Institut Français also meet, exchange, and initiate joint initiatives with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development in a task force on acquiring European funds (FRA I 04).

One representative from the Institut Français, and one interviewee from the French Permanent Representation to the EU regularly engage with colleagues from EU institutions (FRA I 03, FRA I 04). The interviewee from the Institut Français highlights the importance of face-to-face communication with partners in Brussels (FRA I 04). The respondent from the Permanent Representation describes communication with EU colleagues as primarily informal (FRA I 03). He traces the primarily informal communication processes back to time constraints that do not allow for establishing systematic, formal coordination procedures. (FRA I 03) French public diplomacy practitioners positively assess their cooperation with EU institutions (FRA I 03), for example on EU programs like ERASMUS+ (FRA I 05). While one representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development supports the cooperation with the EU in the area of culture, he strongly opposes the development of an overarching European culture, emphasizing that each member states draws on its cultural history (FRA I 05). France Médias Monde cooperates with EU institutions on the basis of single projects. Single programs of French international broadcasters like France 24 or Radio France International have for instance been co-funded by the EU. At this point in time, France Médias Monde does not work towards a closer collaboration with EU institutions. (FRA I 02)

The coordination of international activities by sub-national authorities also constitutes an issue on regional and transnational level. Representatives of French sub-national authorities are for instance part of the Committee of the Regions, as well as the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities within the EU. Furthermore, strategies in single areas of international activity like development cooperation should consider collaboration on regional, national, and sub-national level. This involves

a closer collaboration among the Permanent Representation of France in Brussels, French sub-national representations in Brussels, the Committee of the Regions as well as single European networks like EUNIDA<sup>230</sup>. To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, cooperation of sub-national organizations within the EU can serve as a model for other regional organizations. (FRA Doc 03) It also proposes to use French presidencies in the Council of the EU or the G20 to place this issue on the agenda of multilateral organizations. (FRA Doc 03)

The document analysis identifies two factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation between France and the EU. Cooperation with the EU can only be successful if it can be build on coherent national and European policies (FRA Doc 08), and if a significant amount of resources are dedicated to joint projects (FRA Doc 05). The European Consensus on Development<sup>231</sup> facilitates cooperation in development cooperation, as it strengthens coherence across policy fields on a regional and national level (FRA Doc 08). The decision to decrease EU funding for development cooperation of sub-national organizations in the time frame 2014 to 2020, on the contrary, impedes cooperation in this area. Moreover, one interviewee from the Institut Français regularly engages in the cooperation with both French and EU partners, and identifies a lack of knowledge as a constraint to joint activities:

*“I am quite surprised, every time, how little the people I work with, French partners, know about European institutions, how they work. For sure, it is complex, but at the same time, it is truly important”.* (FRA I 04, paragraph 76, translated by author<sup>232</sup>)

While the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs argues that the formation of the EEAS has created momentum for rethinking Swedish foreign policy (SWE Doc 01), it does not observe EU public diplomacy (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b). Two interviewees from the Ministry even ask if the EU engages in public diplomacy at all, and question the visibility of EU public diplomacy activities (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b). The Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU focuses on observing EU institutions and EU member states, but also follows up on the work of third countries and international organizations with regard to specific issues (SWE I 03)<sup>233</sup>.

The Swedish government perceives Sweden’s membership in the EU as a starting point for international cooperation (SWE Doc 01), and an important stepping stone for advancing cultural cooperation and exchange (SWE Doc 06). The document analysis reveals that Swedish public diplomacy organizations identify two core areas in its EU involvement: Sweden considers itself as an advocate for free trade and the free internal market within the EU (SWE Doc 01). Moreover, it is of particular importance for Sweden to increase its influence on development cooperation and humanitarian aid within the EU (SWE Doc 02). The Ministry for Foreign Affairs stresses the country’s commitment to encourage more effective, coherent, and stronger development cooperation by the EU,

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<sup>230</sup> EUNIDA is a pan- European network of member state implementing agencies that operate in the area of sustainable development and realize pan-European projects on behalf of the EU (EUNIDA, n.d.).

<sup>231</sup> The EC, the EP and the Council adopted the ‘European Consensus on Development’ in 2006. It is a joint policy statement that identifies shared goals and commitments in development policy.

<sup>232</sup> “Enfin moi je suis assez surprise à chaque fois à quel point finalement les personnes avec qui je travaille, les partenaires français connaissent finalement assez peu les institutions européennes, leurs fonctionnements. Alors certes c’est complexe mais bon c’est quand même vraiment important.” (FRA I 04, Paragraph 76)

<sup>233</sup> Examples include for instance the observation of the USA in the context of TTIP as well as NATO with regard to Russia (SWE I 03).

as well as to strengthen the EU's role as a global actor for peace, freedom, and poverty reduction (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 03).

One interviewee from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs accentuates that, "public diplomacy is a rather national matter, because it's how you as a country try to work with your issues, with your priorities towards civil society in other countries" (SWE I 01b). Hence, the Ministry does not seek to coordinate its public diplomacy strategy with the EU, but welcomes a cooperation in selected fields in countries outside of the EU (SWE I 01a). In contrast to that, the relationship between Sweden and the EU with regard to culture seems ambivalent: On the one hand, Sweden engages in EU cultural initiatives: The Swedish Arts Council and the Swedish Film Institute contact points of the Creative Europe Program for example (SWE Doc 06, SWE I 07, SWE I 08a, SWE I 08b). Sweden also contributes to fostering intercultural dialogue in the context of the Euro Mediterranean Cooperation (SWE Doc 06). On the other hand, Sweden opposes a harmonization of cultural policy within the EU and stresses that cultural policy needs to stay the exclusive competence of member states. Not least, because culture constitutes an important channel for promoting national interests. (SWE Doc 06) Similarly, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs encourages a clear role division between the member state representations and EU Delegations in countries outside of the EU: While EU Delegations may generally promote and inform on EU member states, economic promotion should remain the national business of member states. (SWE Doc 01) Adding to that, one interviewee from the Swedish Institute states that the government agency undertakes deliberate efforts to position Sweden away from the EU in single regions. He takes the example of the Middle East, in which a number of EU member states including Sweden have a positive image, whereas the EU as an organization is perceived rather negatively. (SWE I 02)

Whereas the Swedish Institute opposes EU cooperation with regard to the promotion of Sweden, it is quite active in the Baltic Sea region, and aims at realizing EU goals in the context of the Baltic Sea Program. In general, however, the Swedish Institute cooperates only little with EU institutions. One representative from the governmental agency stresses that this is not intentional: The Swedish Institute sees great potential in working with EU institutions, but has not made it a priority yet. (SWE I 02) The Swedish Arts Council does not only host the national 'Creative Europe Desk Culture', but has also participated in 'Open Method of Cooperation' groups (SWE I 08a, SWE I 08b). 'Open Method of Cooperation' is a cooperation framework and form of policy making in areas in which the EU only possesses supporting competences. Representatives of EU member states jointly develop objectives and measuring tools, as well as benchmarking in specific policy areas (cf. EUR-Lex, n.d.). The Swedish Arts Council participated in two groups on 1) cultural diversity as well as 2) internationalization and export of European creative and cultural industries. Sweden has used the results of the 'Open Method of Cooperation' meetings on the internationalization of creative and cultural industries as a starting point for further discussion on this subject with representatives on foreign, cultural, and trade policy within the country. One interviewee from the Swedish Arts Council regards her involvement in the 'Open Method of Cooperation' meetings as a valuable, interesting exchange with representatives from different member states that face similar problems, as well as a chance for mutual learning. Nonetheless, she also states that the cooperation within the groups depends on the degree of activity of the single participants and the time they dedicate to the respective groups. (SWE I 08a) The Swedish Arts Council also cooperates with the EU in the context of the Creative Europe Program. One interviewee points to the synergies between national and European funding systems as a factor that enables cooperation with the EU. Moreover, the EC organizes Creative Europe Desk Meetings twice a year that enable the Swedish Arts Council to provide feedback to the EC, as well as to network with other Creative Europe Desks in EU member states. (EU I 08a) The document analysis identifies only one constraining factor with regard to EU cooperation. In a report issued in 2010, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs criticizes a lack of focus and precision with



regard to defining priorities of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. To the ministry, this hampers a more efficient cooperation with like-minded EU member states. (SWE Doc 01)

#### *Interorganizational cooperation with multilateral organizations*

French documents deal with the cooperation with single international organizations, including NATO (FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 09), the UN (FRA Doc 05, see also FRA I 02), UNESCO (FRA Doc 04, see also FRA I 02), Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (FRA Doc 02, FRA Doc 06, see also FRA I 02), the WTO (FRA Doc 05) as well as regional organizations like ASEAN and MERCOSUR (FRA Doc 04). The document analysis discloses that French public diplomacy organizations engage with international organizations for different purposes: Whereas NATO presents a forum for consultations on collective defense actions (FRA Doc 05), France engages in the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie to promote cultural diversity and multilingualism (FRA Doc 02). In addition to the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, French public diplomacy practitioners participate in single-issue organizations of French-speaking countries, like the business-focused 'Forum Francophone des Affaires' (FRA Doc 06). While France has participated in all military operations of NATO (FRA Doc 05), one document issued in 2008 argues that France should be more committed to multilateral missions of the UN (FRA Doc 05). In particular, the document critically addresses France's weak voluntary contribution to the UN. The document states that France needs to raise its voluntary financial contributions to the UN in order to remain credible as an actor in the multilateral environment (FRA Doc 05).

Two documents also discuss France's involvement in the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 06). The international organization aims at making the French-speaking world more visible, and promoting its interests in an international political context. The organization involves heads of government agencies (FRA Doc 06). France Médias Monde engages in intense cooperation with the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie. One interviewee from France Médias Monde highlights common values of member organizations as a factor that facilitates cooperation. (FRA I 02) Possible constraints of cooperating within this organization include its unclear structure (FRA Doc 06), as well as its heterogeneity that may embody the danger of duplications (FRA Doc 04).

One document issued in 2005 raises the question of how regional organizations like MERCOSUR or ASEAN should be integrated in France's public diplomacy and more, generally, its external action. The document stresses the role of French Representations abroad, and suggests to systematize the cooperations between French Representations in regions and sub-regions. Moreover, it proposes to install consultants on regional cooperation in cities in which headquarters of regional organizations are based. (FRA Doc 04, see also section 'Interorganizational cooperation within EU member states: France and Sweden' above) Another document, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development in 2013 recommends strengthening the role of French sub-national organizations in the UN as well as well regional organizations.

Five out of 18 Swedish documents discuss the cooperation between Swedish public diplomacy organizations and international or multilateral organizations (SWE Doc 02, SWE Doc 03, SWE Doc 06, SWE Doc 07, SWE Doc 08). One document, issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2004, provides a detailed analysis of the cooperation with the OECD. The OECD has traditionally focused on economic policy, but widened its focus throughout its existence and now also includes policy fields such as education, research, and sustainability. It constitutes a forum for negotiations between industrialized countries and transatlantic cooperation. (SWE Doc 07) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs regards the OECD as an important channel to promote Swedish policy interests, particularly in the

areas of sustainable global development and economic growth. Moreover, the OECD takes the role of a think tank that conducts analysis and, by that, facilitates Swedish domestic policy and complements the work of other multilateral organizations, such as the EU. (SWE Doc 07) The Ministry considers Sweden as an active member of the OECD and values the mode of communication within the OECD, which it describes as open and informal. Sweden engages in cooperation with like-minded countries like the Nordic states to make the voice of smaller countries heard. While it appreciates EU cooperation within the OECD, it opposes even closer collaboration and stresses that each EU member state should be able to voice opinions that run counter to the EU position. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs expresses a long-term commitment to the OECD and to reforming the organization in order to make its work more visible and flexible, as well as to clarify the organization's priorities. (SWE Doc 07) Despite the importance attributed to the OECD by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden's role in the OECD is not taken up again in other documents.

Two documents issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2007 and 2008 focus on multilateral cooperation in the area of development. The documents highlight Sweden's long-time involvement in the UN as well as international financing institutions. It aims at fostering a holistic approach to global development policy that is coherent across all policy areas. (SWE Doc 03) To strengthen their influence in multilateral organizations, Swedish public diplomacy organizations apply both formal communication channels such as meetings of decision-making bodies and informal communication channels, including dialogue with Swedish representations on their experiences with development cooperation on the ground, as well as alliance-building prior to meetings. Moreover, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs also suggests to increase Swedish influence by deploying more staff in multilateral organizations. (SWE Doc 02) One document issued by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2007, identifies advantages of scale, lower transaction costs, higher effectiveness, shared goals, and increased volumes of aid as factors that enable cooperation with multilateral organizations in the field of development cooperation. The document also accentuates that multilateral cooperation on development aid can only be successful if member states are not in competition with one another. (SWE Doc 02)

In addition to development cooperation, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs also discusses cooperation with international organizations in the field of humanitarian aid in a document issued in 2008. It particularly stresses the central role of the UN, the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent Movement in this area. (SWE Doc 08) The Ministry of Culture also broaches the issue of cultural cooperation with international organizations in a document published in 2006. Sweden contributes to developing normative instruments of cultural policy such as conventions and declarations in order to strengthen cultural diversity and acknowledge that cultural products and services do not only have an economic dimension. The Ministry of Culture particularly stresses Sweden's engagement in UNESCO, and encourages more Asia-Euro Meetings (ASEM) to foster cultural cooperation between Europe and Asia. Despite Sweden's commitment to intercultural cooperation in the field of culture, the Ministry of Culture seeks to avoid international developments that run counter to its national cultural policy. (SWE Doc 06)

#### *Interorganizational cooperation with other countries*

Two documents issued in 2004 and 2005 reveal that French public diplomacy organizations observe the activities of the USA, Germany, the UK, Morocco, Italy, Spain, and Canada (FRA Doc 04). The more recently published report, 'Développement de l'influence de la France sur la scène internationale. Une diplomatie publique à la française' by Frank Melloul (FRA Doc 09), suggests to also observe multilateral organizations such as NATO with regard to the application of soft power (FRA Doc 09).

The document analysis reveals that the French government dedicates particular attention to the activities of the Foreign Commonwealth Office and the structure of the British Foreign Service, the British Council, as well as the BBC World Service (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05, FRA Doc 06, FRA Doc 09), but also to the Goethe-Institute as one of the main German public diplomacy organizations. Both the UK and Germany decided to delegate their public diplomacy efforts in the areas of culture and education to single, external organizations, namely the British Council and the Goethe-Institute. (FRA Doc 06). While France does not seek to entrust its foreign cultural activities to a single operator (FRA Doc 06), the document analysis points to the need of strengthening the visual identity of French cultural organizations and activities (FRA Doc 05). Frank Melloul voices the idea of establishing a label that is similar to the Goethe-Institute or the British Council to enhance the coherence and international visibility of French public diplomacy activities in the area of culture (FRA Doc 09). This idea has been taken up: The Institut Français developed a common brand identity that is applied to all local Institut Français organizations, and inspired by the British Council (FRA I 01).

The Institut Français observes both the British Council and the Goethe-Institute. Cooperation agreements with both organizations allow for an open dialogue on public diplomacy strategies and tools. (FRA I 01, FRA I 04) Representatives from the Institut Français emphasize the visibility, the clear, coherent strategies and the coordination mechanisms as strengths of the two partner organizations (FRA I 01, FRA I 04). Even though the British Council and the Goethe-Institute face similar problems to the Institut Français on a day-to-day basis, both interviewees from the Institut Français question the comparability of the three organizations: In contrast to the Institut Français, the British Council and the Goethe-Institute define their own geographical priorities and have direct control over their networks of local organizations (FRA I 04). Comparatively, the Institut Français neither commands the financial, nor the human resources of its two partner organizations (FRA I 01).

One representative from the French Permanent Representation to the EU states to observe his colleagues from other member state representations in Brussels with regard to their use of social media as communication tools, as well as the organization of press briefings. The Permanent Representations of member states to the EU inform each other when they hold on- and off-the-record briefings. (FRA I 03) In contrast to France, Germany and the UK each have a single organization that is responsible for international broadcasting. In Germany, the UK, but also in China, Turkey, or Russia international broadcasting is understood as a strategic tool of governmental public diplomacy. The report issued by Frank Melloul in 2010 suggests to adopt this understanding of the role of international broadcasting in French public diplomacy as well. (FRA Doc 09)

French documents issued in 2005 (FRA Doc 04) and 2008 (FRA Doc 05) stress the importance of cooperating with other member states to influence EU decisions, but also to conduct joint activities within and outside of the EU context (FRA Doc 04). The document analysis identifies the UK (FRA Doc 05, see also FRA Doc 09) as well as Germany (FRA Doc 05) as priority partners within the EU. One French document issued in 2005 points to the necessity of organizing cooperation with EU member states in a more systematic way. This includes for example the co-localization of representations or cultural facilities abroad with other EU member states such as Germany. (FRA Doc 04, FRA Doc 05) Moreover, one document promotes closer collaboration among member states to advance European integration and foster the European community spirit. Not least, the French government encourages a stronger cooperation with EU member states in the area of trade in order to prevent economic block building, and advocates for an open global economy. (FRA Doc 05) Two documents address the cooperation with organizations from developing countries: They stress that French public diplomacy organizations should pursue a partnership approach that should be based on equal footing and adjusted to the needs and capacities of partner countries. (FRA Doc 03, FRA Doc 08)

The Institut Français closely collaborates with the British Council and the Goethe-Institute on the basis of partnership agreements (FRA I 01, FRA I 04). These agreements encompass both exchanges on a strategic level, as well as joint activities like the ‘Tandem Paris-London’ promoting French cultural seasons in London and vice versa. It draws on both formal communication in the context of annual meetings as well as informal communication channels. The Institut Français positively assesses the cooperation with both the British Council and the Goethe-Institute. Nonetheless, it points to different missions and geographical foci that may impede its work with these two partner organizations. (FRA I 04) The Permanent Representation of France to the EU stresses German organization as closest partners on the levels of policy and communication. On a general level, the Representation focuses on informal, issue-based cooperation with organizations from other EU member states. If organizations share the same interests, the Representation seeks to harmonize communication on a specific issue and build alliances. (FRA I 03) France Médias Monde cooperates with audiovisual media groups from other countries such as Télé Liban. These partnerships comprise many different forms of collaboration, including the exchange of content, and the provision of technical assistance. (FRA I 02)

One document issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development in 2013 discloses that there are already a number of cooperation projects between French sub-national authorities and sub-national organizations from other European countries. France and Germany have for instance adopted about 120 town twinning programs after the two countries had signed the Elysée Treaty in 1963. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development recommends to further encourage joint public diplomacy initiatives between French sub-national authorities and other European countries. It places particular emphasis on Germany as a partner country. (FRA Doc 03) Furthermore, French sub-national organizations also engage in cooperations with developing and emerging countries. In developing countries, they seek to strengthen the competences of sub-national organizations like local governments to contribute to the attainment of the UN development goals. (FRA Doc 03, FRA Doc 08) Foci of cooperation in emerging countries include innovation, sustainable development, climate, trade, research, and higher education (FRA Doc 03).

The document analysis reveals that cooperation at the sub-national level is often open-ended. Even though they build on a single, individual initiative in many cases, they are characterized as generally stable. (FRA Doc 03) Nonetheless, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development states that French sub-national authorities should receive more legal guidance in areas of international cooperation that are not legally regulated yet. The document also accentuates that France needs to give new momentum to the exchange of information and best practices between authorities, civil society organizations, and businesses at sub-national level. It outlines that there is still a lot of room for improving the cooperation of sub-national organizations in the public diplomacy core area ‘economy’. Constraining factors include that businesses often underestimate the role of sub-national authorities in economic cooperation, and French representations do not regularly integrate sub-national authorities in cooperation projects. (FRA Doc 03)

The Institut Français participates in a number of transnational networks, ranging from large, established networks like EUNIC to relatively new, small initiatives like More Europe. In contrast to Germany and the UK that are represented by a single organization per country, there are three French EUNIC members: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, the Institut Français, and Alliance Française. This constrains the visibility of the single French organizations within EUNIC as well as the coherence of French contributions to the network. For example, only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development is part of EUNIC Global in Brussels. The Institut Français, on the other hand, can only facilitate and support work in single clusters. This may not include the clusters local Institut Français operate in. (FRA I 04) The small network ‘More Europe’ was founded in 2011 with the purpose of strengthening the role of cultural relations and civil

society in European foreign policy (FRA I 04). It includes both public and private organizations, such as cultural institutes and foundations (cf. More Europe, n.d.). Similarly, the network 'Culture Action Europe' seeks to elevate the role of culture within European policy (FRA I 04). The organization refers to itself as, "the biggest umbrella organisation representing the cultural sector at the European level" (Culture Action Europe, n.d.). The Institut Français engages in a number of (bilateral) cooperations with members of the network (FRA I 04). It also works with more specific networks like IETM, bringing professionals in the area of contemporary performing arts together. One interviewee from the Institut Français hopes to continue the organization's engagement within this network, as it allows her to exchange experiences with people the Institut Français seldom cooperates with. (FRA I 04)

One interviewee from France Médias Monde points to a transnational network within the area of international broadcasting. The presidents of big Western international broadcasters meet once or twice per year to exchange information and discuss issues affecting all broadcasters, such as the security of journalists in the wake of terrorism. (FRA I 02) Moreover, the G8/G7 and the G20 are recognized as important networks for coordinating development cooperation initiatives, particularly with regard to capacity building (FRA Doc 08).

Swedish interviewees hardly look at the public diplomacy efforts of multilateral organizations, but primarily observe the public diplomacy of other countries. The Swedish Institute informs itself about the strategies and activities of Norway, France, Denmark, the UK, and Switzerland (SWE I 02), but also engages in information exchanges and mutual learning exercises within the Nordic Council of Ministers, as well as EUNIC. Furthermore, the Swedish Institute regards the British Council as an example with regard to public diplomacy evaluation (SWE I 02). In a document issued in 2011, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs indicates to follow up on the public diplomacy activities of the UK, Germany, Denmark, and Switzerland in the area of trade and investment promotion, as well as Norway in the area of tourism promotion (SWE Doc 05). One interviewee from the Swedish Institute claims to not only observe public diplomacy efforts by governments and government agencies, but to also draw on think tanks and academic research as sources of information (SWE I 06). The Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU maintains regular, informal working contacts with other Permanent Representations, particularly from Denmark and Finland, to learn from each other. Moreover, the interviewee from the Swedish Permanent Representation shows particular interest in the work of her British counterparts, whose work she considers very good. (SWE I 03)

In many cases, cooperation between Sweden and other countries occurs on a local level. Thus, Swedish representations abroad play a pivotal role in developing and maintaining these partnerships. Swedish representations engage in cooperation with local state organizations, civil society organizations, and journalists, as well as Swedish correspondents working in the respective country (SWE Doc 09). In addition to cooperation with local organizations, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs encourages the Representations to create networks with Representations of other countries in the same region and/or language area to exchange experiences on conducting public diplomacy (SWE Doc 09). In a number of cases, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs also initiates joint projects with EU member states in target countries outside of the EU (SWE I 05).

One representative from the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU states to cooperate with other Permanent Representations in Brussels on an ad-hoc basis - the selection of the partners is dependent on the issue or subject of cooperation (SWE I 03). The 'Working Party on Information' represents the formal channel for exchange between press councilors of the different Permanent Representations to the EU. The interviewee from the Swedish Permanent Representations expresses the wish to have more networking possibilities with press councilors from other EU member states in

order to learn from one another. In this context, she stresses the importance of going out and proactively seeking contacts to Permanent Representations from other EU member states. (SWE I 03) The Swedish Arts Council regularly cooperates with government agencies from other countries (SWE I 08a). Both interviewees from the Swedish Institute state there is very little cooperation with other countries (SWE I 02, SWE I 06), and that it is often limited to the local level (SWE I 02). However, one interviewee from the Swedish Institute perceives Sweden's membership in the network EUNIC (see below) as an opportunity of increasing transnational cooperation in the future (SWE I 06).

The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs argues that cooperation with other countries is mostly project-based (SWE I 01a). The cooperation with Nordic countries constitutes an exception. In addition to cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, cooperation with other Nordic countries is regarded as a priority by Swedish public diplomacy organizations. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs even states that Nordic cooperation "[...] is in a class of its own" (SWE Doc 01, p. 67, translation by author)<sup>234</sup>. It aims at presenting the North as a strong international actor (SWE Doc 01). Nordic cooperation is particularly strong between foreign representations. In 2010, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs voiced the idea of creating joint representations abroad (SWE Doc 01). This idea has for example been realized in Berlin, where the 'Felleshus', the Pan Nordic building, hosts the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish, and Icelandic embassies<sup>235</sup>. Moreover, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs suggests to increase information exchanges, coordinate meetings and visits from the respective capitals, host joint seminars, and engage in joint reporting to further enhance cooperation between Nordic countries in third states. Cooperation should not be limited to the level of Representations, but should also involve the joint development of guidelines for Representations at central level. (SWE Doc 01) One representative from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs even points to the idea of launching a common Nordic branding strategy (SWE I 01b). The Swedish Institute does not maintain cooperation projects with Nordic countries itself, but contributes to joint activities of Nordic Representations.

Nordic cooperation occurs both in specific issue areas such as culture<sup>236</sup>, as well as in the context of multilateral organizations, including the Council of the Baltic Sea States (Östersjöstaternas råd, CBSS), the Euro-Arctic Council (Barentsrådet, BEAC), and the Arctic Council (SWE Doc 06). Even though not all Nordic countries are members of multilateral organizations like NATO or the EU, there is a close cooperation between Nordic countries with regard to foreign and security policy that facilitates common public diplomacy activities (SWE Doc 01).

In addition to geographical foci, the document and interview analysis also discloses specific areas of cooperation that are highlighted by Swedish public diplomacy organizations. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs receives for example many requests from other countries to learn more about the Swedish approach to digital diplomacy (SWE I 01b). Moreover, the Ministry of Culture underlines that Swedish archives, libraries, and museums have a strong international dimension in their work and engage in transnational networks to exchange for instance expertise on the digitalization of cultural goods (SWE Doc 06). One interviewee from the radio broadcaster Radio Sverige International, highlights project-based cooperation with Radio Canada International on 'Eye on the Arctic'<sup>237</sup>. Swedish organizations in the field development cooperation also aim at building alliances with like-

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<sup>234</sup> „Nordiskt samarbete står här i en klass för sig“. (SWE Doc 01, p. 67)

<sup>235</sup> More information on the concept of 'Felleshus' can be found on the joint website of the Nordic Embassies in Berlin: <http://www.nordicembassies.org/>.

<sup>236</sup> Cooperations in the area of culture include the Nordic Film and TV Fund that also funds film in minority languages spoken in more than one Nordic country, as well as funds for bilateral collaboration projects (SWE Doc 06).

<sup>237</sup> Print, broadcast, and online journalists jointly from circumpolar countries to work on 'Eye on the Arctic' to, "better tell the stories of communities and people directly affected by climate change" (Eye on the Arctic, n.d.).

minded partner countries (SWE Doc 02). In this regard, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs encourages SIDA to collaborate with 'new' civil society organizations such as diaspora groups, sports associations, or environmental movements in partner countries (SWE Doc 17).

On a transnational level, the Nordic Council of Ministers as well as EUNIC constitute the most important networks for Swedish public diplomacy. Cooperation within the Nordic Council of Ministers aims at strengthening the competitiveness of Nordic countries and jointly tackling global challenges. Moreover, both the Nordic Council of Ministers as well as the Council for the Promotion of Sweden are involved in the creation of the Nordic brand strategy 'Nordic Cool' (SWE I 06). According to the Ministry of Culture, Nordic cooperation draws on a historical language and cultural community. Therefore, cultural cooperation is an important element of the work of the Nordic Council of Ministers (SWE Doc 06), but also in more specific networks such as the Nordic Arts Fund (SWE I 08a). In 2006, it accounted for almost one fifth of the Nordic Council of Ministers' budget (SWE Doc 06). Not least, Nordic cooperation complements cooperation within the EU on crisis management and civil protection (SWE Doc 01).

The network of European National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) focuses on cultural cooperation. The Swedish Institute is a member of EUNIC and engages in the network to learn from, openly compare and discuss with other cultural organizations based in European countries. Cooperation within EUNIC occurs in the context of EU institutionalized programs and on a bilateral level, between cultural organizations in EU member states with regard to projects and activities in third countries. (SWE I 06) To one interviewee from the Swedish Institute that also assumes a management position within EUNIC, the network becomes denser and more strategic. She points to the growing understanding of the mandate and the scope of action of the single members within the network. (SWE I 06) EUNIC comprises both organizations with a long history and experience with multilateral organizations, and very small organizations. While this may limit the speed with which the network moves, it can also be a factor that facilitates cooperation, when the different strengths of small and big organizations complement one another. The interviewee from the Swedish Institute regards the members of EUNIC as competitors, but even more so as partners:

*"But I think that EUNIC has opened a possibility for us to - in a quite easy way - actually learn from others and we can openly compare and discuss, and this, I believe, is important. That organizations like ours and others feel that yes, we might be in some respect competitors when it comes to, sort of, building relations or promoting our individual governments' interests, but moreover we are colleagues in a world where we continually and constantly need to establish dialogue."* (SWE I 06, paragraph 38)

In contrast to this complex, well-established network of European culture cooperation, the Club of Venice constitutes a rather informal forum for communication departments of EU member states. In 2012, members of the Club of Venice conducted a public diplomacy workshop. Two representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stress that they regard the Club of Venice primarily as a channel to maintain contacts with individual member states, and less as an EU network. (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b)

In January 2014, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs launched the Stockholm Initiative on Digital Diplomacy with a two-day conference, bringing state and non-state organizations, as well as individuals from different countries together (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b). According to one representative from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Stockholm Initiative on Digital Diplomacy does not constitute a traditional network, but a forum to "gather individuals and organizations that were on the forefront of digital diplomacy" (SWE I 05, paragraph 60), and learn from each other on how to use digital media in a governmental context (SWE I 01a, SWE I 01b, SWE I 05). Members of

this loose network meet face-to-face and virtually. One representative from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that the Ministry remains completely open to the network's future development. To him, the low level of formalization constitutes an important success criterion of cooperation within the network: Members of the Stockholm Initiative on Digital Diplomacy are not obligated to define common goals or messages and do not sign agreements, but only cooperate on specific issues of common interest, for example through the coordination of hash tags. (SWE I 05)

One document issued by the Ministry of Culture in 2007 mentions the International Network for Cultural Policy as an informal network for Ministers of Culture from about 60 member countries. Its goals include maintaining and fostering cultural diversity. The network was established during a UNESCO conference held in Stockholm in 1998. The document positions Sweden as an active member since the network's foundation. The network's secretariat is, however, managed by Canada. (SWE Doc 06) The Swedish Arts Council participates in the international network of arts councils. Moreover, organizations that are funded by the Swedish Arts Council engage in a number of international networks, including IETM, as well as the European Museum Organization. (SWE I 08a) Additionally, Radio Sverige International engages in the international broadcasting network G6, which also includes broadcasters like Swiss Info and Radio Australia International. The network enables its members to exchange information and working routines. (SWE I 04)

### **6.5.3 Comparison: Interorganizational cooperation on the regional, national and transnational level**

EU public diplomacy comprises an internal and an external dimension that differ with regard to goals, strategic publics, approaches, messages, and tools, but also the main public diplomacy organizations. Within the EU, DG Communication coordinates and oversees communication by both EC policy DGs and EC Representations. While the EC Representations in Stockholm and Paris point to a close cooperation with DG Communication, the relationships between DG Communication and single EC Policy DGs may vary significantly, depending on the policy area, the size of the Policy DG, as well as the willingness to accept the coordinating role of DG Communication. 'Relex DGs', EC Policy DGs that deal with EU external relations, also collaborate with the EEAS as the main coordinating body of the external dimension of EU public diplomacy. The EEAS is an autonomous organization that works closely with the EC's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, and maintains a network of EU Delegations in third countries and to multilateral organizations. An Inter-Institutional Agreement between the EC, the Council as well as the EP defines common communication priorities. Furthermore, the Inter-Institutional Group on Information discusses communication priorities with regard to the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. In addition to that, the heads of communication of Relex DGs, DG Communication, as well as the Council meet within the External Relations Information Committee. Apart from these formal channels of cooperation, EU institutions cooperate fairly little on a day-to-day basis. This also holds true for the external dimension of public diplomacy, even though documents and interviewees alike stress the importance of communicating with one EU voice.

Other multilateral organizations like the UN, the OECD, or the World Bank constitute important partners the EU conducts and co-funds projects with. With regard to the external dimension of EU public diplomacy, they assume the role of third party endorsers and strengthen the visibility of the EU and its actions. A joint development of public diplomacy initiatives could only be detected in the area of humanitarian aid. The lion's share of cooperation between multilateral organizations occurs at the



tactical level. In addition, one French document suggests a closer collaboration between the EU and other regional organizations.

Member states, particularly national governments, belong to the most important, but at the same time the most challenging cooperation partners with regard to the internal and external dimension of EU public diplomacy. They should foster the legitimacy of, and the support for the regional organization within the EU and strengthen the EU as a global actor in third countries. EU public diplomacy practitioners observe how member state governments implement tools and campaigns in an informal, non-systematic way. One interviewee from DG Communication recognizes that single member states like the UK may have a bigger public diplomacy budget than the EU as a whole.

In cooperation with EU member states, the EC may assume the role of the facilitator, the coordinator, or the financial provider. Cooperation between the EC and EU member states ranges from jointly agreed communication plans to ad-hoc partnerships. Even though EU public diplomacy organizations stress that EU communication should be the task of everyone involved in EU decision-making, they argue that the success of joint activities is largely dependent on the political will of member states and the EU competence in a specific policy field. In contrast to EU public diplomacy practitioners based in Brussels, interviewees from EC Representations in member states perceive the cooperation between the EU and member state organizations as very good and point to the pivotal role of EU Direct Centers in facilitating cooperation with think tanks, political parties, and sub-national authorities. Whereas the analysis of EU documents discloses that relations between EU Delegations and member state representations in third countries are already well-established, one interview with the EEAS reveals that the degree of cooperation between these national and regional organizations varies significantly from country to country.

EU documents only point to the ‘European Radio Network’ as a transnational network involving the EC as well as radio broadcasters from member states. The Club of Venice is only named as a transnational network by one EU interviewee. It is an informal network that brings communication practitioners from EU institutions and EU member states together to exchange information and experiences. However, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs primarily considers the Club of Venice as a forum for networking and exchanging with other EU member states, less with EU institutions. One interviewee from the Swedish Arts Council mentions the ‘Creative Europe Desk Network’ as an example of EC-induced networks on specific regional programs. Additionally, one representative from the EC Representation in Stockholm shows that networks may also be established between EU institutions and national organizations in single member states.

The EEAS observes the public diplomacy practice of countries within and outside of the EU. Additionally, it takes academic public diplomacy literature into consideration. External Relations DGs within the EC only study the public diplomacy efforts of third countries with regard to specific issues like TTIP. The EEAS stresses civil society organizations as important partners in third countries, as they complement formal policy dialogue and may act as agents of change in emerging and developing countries. Cooperation with other multilateral organizations and partner organizations in third countries draws on a ‘Communication and Visibility Manual’ that formalizes communication on joint initiatives.

The Foreign Ministry plays a central and coordinating role in French and Swedish public diplomacy. However, it does not have a monopoly on public diplomacy in either of the countries, and draws on inter-ministerial cooperation with ministries in the economic and cultural domain. French documents additionally highlight the role of the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research in the country’s public diplomacy. There are several bodies within France that coordinate inter-ministerial cooperation on external action. French documents criticize the fact that French

Representations abroad have insufficient opportunities and time resources for discussing and developing joint, regional strategies.

Both the French and the Swedish government command a number of government agencies that plan and implement the public diplomacy strategy primarily defined by the government. The Swedish Institute as a government agency engages in all three public diplomacy core areas, and plays a special role in Swedish public diplomacy. It has been mainly responsible for developing the country's public diplomacy strategy until the re-conceptualization of the Swedish public diplomacy structure in 2013. The analysis of interviews and documents shows that Swedish government agencies operate more independently than their French counterparts. The same applies to public media that broadcast to international audiences. Government agencies regularly exchange information and cooperate on a project-basis in France and Sweden.

French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations alike seek to extend public-private partnerships in the areas of culture, and for instance promotion. While Swedish documents and interviewees only briefly touch upon the role of sub-national organizations, they play an important role in French public diplomacy and, more generally, French external action. Several national bodies centrally coordinate the activities of sub-national organizations. Moreover, the 'Directorate General for Globalization, Development and Partnership' within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development comprises a unit that heads the network of French sub-national authorities. Several French documents suggest increasing the competences and the resources of sub-national authorities with regard to public diplomacy.

Both French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations cooperate in the context of national networks. In France, national interorganizational networks are only established within specific public diplomacy core areas. Whereas four of these networks are entirely national, the networks 'education' as well as 'international broadcasting' are primarily national, but also contain single international members that do, however, not assume a central position within the network. The French public diplomacy structure comprises more interorganizational networks than public diplomacy in Sweden. A number of French public diplomacy networks like 'culture', 'development cooperation', and 'higher education' overlap, as they address similar key issues such as cultural diversity, or work towards similar purposes like promoting the French language abroad. Moreover, single public diplomacy organizations like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, but also Canal France International, engage in several networks and act as bridge builders.

Swedish public diplomacy organizations also engage in networks within single core areas (for example 'Trade and Tourism'). The most important Swedish public diplomacy network, the Council for the Promotion of Sweden, however, spans across several public diplomacy core areas. It was established in 1995 to coordinate the promotion of Sweden abroad. Swedish public diplomacy networks do not encompass any foreign or international members. The government as well as government agencies constitute the core members of French and Swedish public diplomacy networks. In both countries, civil society organizations, private organizations, and sub-national authorities participate in single networks, but are usually placed at the periphery of the respective network.

France and Sweden consider the EU as a framework for advancing their public diplomacy efforts and fostering international cooperation respectively. Sweden identifies free trade as well as development cooperation and humanitarian aid as two priority areas of cooperation with the EU. Neither French nor Swedish documents advise dedicating more resources to EU cooperation. In contrast, members of government agencies in the field of culture, as well as the Permanent Representations to the EU from both countries, who work with EU institutions on a day-to-day basis, advocate a closer collaboration. While both the French and the Swedish government welcome EU cultural initiatives, they strongly

oppose the establishment of a European culture and the harmonization of cultural policy. Swedish documents highlight culture as a channel for promoting national interests. Moreover, Swedish documents argue for a clear role division between EU Delegations and Swedish representations in third countries, stating that economic promotion should remain a national matter. French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations highlight the coherence of European policies as well as the provision of significant resources as preconditions for successful cooperation between member states and the EU in third countries. French public diplomacy practitioners point to time as a constraint of cooperation between EU and member state organizations.

The cooperation of French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations with other multilateral organizations is primarily addressed in documents. One document issued by the French government in 2008 calls for a greater voluntary contribution to the UN. Moreover, France Médias Monde seeks to continue and further extend its cooperation with Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, the international organization for French-speaking countries. Swedish documents address cooperation with other multilateral organizations mainly with regard to the country's commitment to development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The documents stress Sweden's commitment to multilateral organizations operating in this field and voice the idea of deploying more Swedish staff in multilateral organizations. One document issued in 2004 details Sweden's engagement in the OECD and highlights the open, informal mode of communication within the organization.

With regard to cooperation with other countries, French documents and interviewees focus almost exclusively on joint efforts with other EU member states. French public diplomacy organizations highlight Germany and the UK as priority partners. One French document perceives closer collaboration between EU member states as a way of fostering European integration and the European community spirit. Swedish public diplomacy practitioners engage in projects with other EU member states in third countries. On a general level, Swedish public diplomacy practitioners state to cooperate relatively little with other countries. Collaboration between countries mostly takes place on a local level. Swedish documents accentuate the role of Swedish representations in establishing and maintaining cooperation, and encourage them to build local networks with foreign representations from other countries. The French Permanent Representation to the EU identifies Germany as its most important partner. Its Swedish counterpart, on the contrary, does not mention single priority countries, but shows a preference for issue-specific cooperations. Whereas cooperation with other countries mainly happens on a project-basis and at local level, the collaboration between the Nordic countries constitutes an exception. Nordic countries aim at presenting the North as a strong international actor. To achieve this goal, Nordic countries cooperate closely on foreign and security policy, build alliances within multilateral organizations, and manage joint foreign representations, for example. Solely French documents address the role of sub-national organizations in cooperation with other countries. French sub-national organizations engage in cooperation projects with sub-national bodies from the EU, but also in emerging and developing countries. Even though many cooperation projects at the sub-national level are based on individual initiatives and open-ended, they are generally characterized as stable. Nonetheless, sub-national organizations face legal constraints and have not been widely accepted as partners by business organizations.

French public diplomacy organizations only engage in transnational networks in the area of culture, including EUNIC, 'Culture Action Europe', and 'More Europe'. The network 'More Europe' does not only include public and private organizations from EU member states, but also EU representatives. Swedish public diplomacy organizations also engage in transnational networks in the area of culture, including EUNIC. Swedish interviewees and documents highlight the Nordic Council of Ministers as a network to strengthen the competitiveness of Nordic countries and address global challenges at the same time. One Swedish interviewee points to the common language and cultural history of Nordic

countries which facilitates cooperation within the network, and serves as a basis for cultural cooperation. Not least, the Stockholm Initiative on Digital Diplomacy constitutes a transnational network that brings public and private organizations, as well as individuals together to advance the use of digital and social media in governance.

This summary outlines that French public diplomacy organizations primarily engage in national networks. Transnational networks that promote culture and/or the French language serve as a complement. National networks play an important role for Swedish organization, too. However, Swedish public diplomacy practitioners highlight the role of transnational cooperation in the Nordic region, as well as on areas of perceived strength such as digital diplomacy. The EU has set up both an Inter-Institutional Group on Information, as well as an External Relations Information Committee to foster coordination between EU institutions. Networks between the EU and other multilateral organizations are neither addressed in EU documents nor by EU interviewees. French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations mainly perceive transnational networks as an opportunity to exchange and cooperate with organizations from other countries, less with EU organizations.

## **6.6 Discussion**

The previous sub-chapters have described public diplomacy from the perspective of EU and member state organizations and identified similarities and differences between these perspectives. Building on the presentation of the findings, this sub-chapter tackles the question, how these findings can be interpreted against the background of the state of research on (European) public diplomacy. It proceeds by discussing the most relevant results on the internal and external environment of public diplomacy organizations, their public diplomacy understanding, and practice, as well as interorganizational cooperation in the light of the theoretical approaches introduced in chapter two, as well as previous studies on (European) public diplomacy.

### **6.6.1 Public diplomacy organizations**

The empirical analysis of EU public diplomacy has concentrated on the EC and the EEAS. While the EEAS as well as the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments solely address publics outside of the EU, Directorate-General (DG) Communication directs public diplomacy efforts predominantly at strategic publics within the EU. A number of EC Policy DGs contribute to both the internal and external dimension of EU public diplomacy. This differentiated communication architecture within the EU is contrasted by rather centralized public diplomacy structures in France and Sweden. The foreign ministries of the two countries assume a coordinating role, as well as fund and oversee the activities of government agencies. Nonetheless, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and its Swedish counterpart are not the only governmental public diplomacy organizations. Rather, other ministries in policy areas such as culture, trade, or education and research also engage in the public diplomacy practice of the two countries. These observations reflect a process of transnationalization of both politics and policy fields (cf. Busch-Janser & Florian, 2007, p. 217), which leads to a growing entanglement of foreign and domestic policies (cf. Gonesh & Melissen, 2005).

Unlike Norwegian or Finnish public diplomacy organizations (cf. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, n.d; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007), none of the organizations analyzed in this

study has incorporated a unit or division whose designation includes the term ‘public diplomacy’<sup>238</sup>. The majority of EU and member state public diplomacy practitioners interviewed operate below management level. While EU public diplomacy practitioners primarily work in communications department, there is a relatively even split between member state interviewees that are integrated in communications and functional department. On the one hand, these findings are in line with the empirical analysis of public diplomacy in Germany by Löffelholz et al. (2011a, 2015): Löffelholz et al. (2015) argue that public diplomacy, in contrast to public relations, “has not been institutionalized as an organizational function” (p. 448). On the other hand, the results of the empirical analysis also suggest that public diplomacy may be regarded as the task of the entire organization, which cannot be assigned to a single department. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for example, understands public diplomacy as a complement to all diplomatic activities of a foreign representation. Therefore, it encourages foreign representations to integrate public diplomacy into their overall strategy and in everybody’s work, instead of drafting a separate public diplomacy strategy for a single department.

The analysis of documents and interview transcripts has provided little information on the budget public diplomacy organizations command. Only a number of EU interviewees point to budget cuts and staff reduction in the area of communications in the Juncker Commission. These individual statements do not allow for drawing reliable conclusions on the development of public diplomacy resources within the EU. Nonetheless, they call into question whether EU communication policy, as well as public diplomacy have become and remain an “institutional priority” (Valentini & Nesti, 2010, p. 2)<sup>239</sup>.

EU documents and interviewees discuss external influencing factors primarily with regard to the political and the cultural environment within the EU. They focus on the relationship with member states as well as the role of citizens within the EU. As outlined in chapters 3.3 and 3.6, the political will of member states to support EU public diplomacy is a crucial factor in the development of a European public sphere. A European public sphere in which single public sphere segments are interconnected serves as a precondition for the emergence of a European identity, as well as the political participation of EU citizens. Participation and dialogue between EU institutions and EU citizens, in turn, contributes to the democratic legitimacy of the EU as a regional actor (cf. Telò, 2006, p. 79).

French and Swedish interviews and documents concentrate on the influence of the political environment, as well as new ICT as both an opportunity and a challenge for public diplomacy practitioners. Globalization, a global power shift to the east, and, closely connected to that, the rise of emerging countries constitute the most important aspects of the political environment for the two countries. Interestingly, French public diplomacy organizations analyze the political environment primarily in terms of identifying potential threats to the French international influence. In contrast, Sweden perceives changes in the international political environment such as the EU enlargement as an opportunity of enhancing its international visibility and influence. These differences in the interpretation of the political environment mirror the differentiation between big, and small and

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<sup>238</sup> In fact, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments initially featured an ‘Election Observation and Public Diplomacy’ department that handled parts of the EU’s public diplomacy budget. This initial structure has, however been revised. Public diplomacy now constitutes one aspect of the ‘Partnership Instrument’ of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. Moreover, the Strategic Communications Division within the EEAS cooperates closely with colleagues from the Partnership Instrument on EU public diplomacy. Duke (2013) provides a critical analysis of structures of the external dimension of EU public diplomacy.

<sup>239</sup> To reform and strengthen communication as a “policy in its own right” (CEC 2005a, p. 2), the first Barroso Commission introduced the portfolio of the European Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy. However, the portfolio was dropped again in 2009, when the second Barroso Commission took office.

medium-sized states proposed by Bátor (2005). According to Bátor (2005), big countries such as France understand public diplomacy as an instrument for explaining positions, uphold international influence, and maintain or alter an already established image. In contrast, small-and medium sized states such as Sweden strive for international recognition, and center their public diplomacy efforts on increasing international visibility (see also sub-chapter 6.6.3). The discussion of the public diplomacy understanding of France and Sweden, as well as the EU is deepened in the following sub-chapter 6.6.2.

### **6.6.2 The Public diplomacy understanding**

Chapter 6.2 has revealed that the EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments are the only EU organizations included in this study to use the term ‘public diplomacy’ to refer to their activities. Pagovski (2015) traces the reluctant application of the term ‘public diplomacy’ back to the constant struggle between being a “supra-nationalist [organization] and inter-governmentalist forces” (p. 34). In contrast to the EU, NATO utilizes ‘public diplomacy’ more consistently and regards public diplomacy as an instrument to counter its perceived lack of soft power (cf. Pagovski, 2015). ASEAN rather refers to its public diplomacy activities as ‘the people’s diplomacy’ (cf. Chachavalpongpan, 2011). Pagovski (2015) traces this selection of terminology back to the principles of respect for sovereignty as well as non-interference of member states that ASEAN is based on.

Both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as well as the Swedish Institute as the two main organizations in Swedish public diplomacy work with the term ‘public diplomacy’. In contrast to that, the term ‘public diplomacy’ appears only once in French documents and is used by none of the French interviewees. Based on a comparative analysis of British, German, and French public diplomacy, Pamment (2013a) concludes that these three West-European countries hardly employ the term today, as they seek to delineate themselves from the “more politicized American approach” to public diplomacy and “short-term foreign policy objectives” pursued by the USA (Melissen, 2013, p. 206).

When asked to define public diplomacy, both French and Swedish organizations described the concept mainly as government communication, assisted by government agencies, and a complement to traditional diplomacy. The scholarly acknowledgment of non-state actors as public diplomacy organizations in their own right (see for instance Cull, 2008c; Gregory, 2011; La Porte, 2011; Kelley, 2010; see sub-chapter 2.1) is only reflected by two EU organizations: the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments and the EEAS. These findings show that organizations within the selected member states have a more traditional conception of public diplomacy than organizations of the EU (see sub-chapter 2.1). The broader conceptualization of public diplomacy actors by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, as well as the EEAS may also root in the multi-level consultation, negotiation, and decision-making processes within the EU that involve a wide range of organizations (see sub-chapter 3.3). In contrast, the domestic or internal dimension of public diplomacy is not included in any of the practitioner definitions (see for instance Huijgh, 2013; Melissen, 2013).

The EU comprehends public diplomacy as a tool to influence foreign attitudes, more specifically to strengthen the image and the visibility of the EU, communicating the EU position on specific issues, and exporting the EU model to other regional organizations. The idea of public diplomacy as an instrument to evoke understanding for EU policies and actions, as well as to build relationships and encourage joint action is only present in documents. Public diplomacy definitions deduced in the empirical data, as well as EU documents discussed in chapter 3.1 disclose that public diplomacy is primarily understood by the EU as a tool to persuade and to influence public opinion. Azpiroz (2015) argues that the public diplomacy definitions provided by EU practitioners only comprise a small share

of the EU's actual public diplomacy activities. Both France and Sweden comprehend public diplomacy as a tool that facilitates the attainment of national (foreign) political goals, and that contributes to generating a favorable international environment for national governments to act in. Similar to the EU, Sweden only addresses relationship and trust building as public diplomacy goals in documents, but not interviews. The public diplomacy definitions provided by the majority of Swedish public diplomacy practitioners confirm the focus on self-presentation and promotion identified by Pamment (2011a, 2013b). The EU only applies the term 'public diplomacy' to communication with audiences in third countries and multilateral organizations. These findings are in line with previous EU communications and speeches documented in sub-chapters 3.1 and 3.4 (see for instance Ferrero-Waldner, 2006; Wallström, 2008). Among foreign publics, citizens constitute a priority for EU as well as French and Swedish public diplomacy. EU documents and interviews also consider decision-makers as strategic publics, whereas Swedish public diplomacy practitioners additionally highlight civil society organizations.

While not many of the organizations analyzed use the term 'public diplomacy', they apply the concept in practice. EU public diplomacy practitioners primarily refer to their public diplomacy-related activities towards strategic publics in the EU as communication. 'Communication' or 'communication policy' was introduced to the EU vocabulary in the 1980s. Prior to that, EU organizations had mainly worked with the more one-directional concept of 'information policy' (see sub-chapter 3.1). French organizations primarily draw on the term 'diplomatie d'influence'. 'Diplomatie d'influence' aims at managing foreign opinions and increasing France's international influence – not only through prestige and persuasion, but also through the development of norms and models that should be adopted universally (Melloul, 2010). Pamment (2013a) argues that France pursues international influence in a subtle way that does not focus on political advocacy, but shaping common frameworks in and through multilateral organizations (see also Duchêne & Lamouroux, 2011).

As the Swedish public diplomacy understanding is closely connected to the country's self-representation, Swedish organizations often work with the terms 'branding' and 'promotion of Sweden' to describe their activities. Sub-chapter 6.2.2 has shown that a number of Swedish interviewees regard the promotion of Sweden as an overarching concept that encompasses aspects of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. This view on the relationship between promotion, branding, and public diplomacy reflect Simon Anholt's early delineation of nation branding as a representation of the "nation as a whole", opposed to public diplomacy concentrating "exclusively on the presentation and representation of government policy to other publics [...]" (Anholt, 2006, p. 271). Anholt's approach was, however, revised by the author himself in favor of a co-existence of the two concepts. The empirical findings confirm Pamment's assessment of the close connection between public diplomacy, and branding (Pamment, 2011, 2013b).

Auer and Srugies (see also Auer et al., 2010; Löffelholz et al., 2011a) maintain that an organization's public diplomacy understanding is shaped by the social sub-systems and the core areas that public diplomacy organizations operate in. The analysis of Swedish public diplomacy organizations partly confirms this assumption: The Swedish Arts Council (core area 'society/culture') applies the terms cultural exchange and cultural cooperation to refer to their activities, whereas the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute rather work with the terms 'public diplomacy' and 'promotion'. In contrast to that, representatives from the Institut Français (core area 'society/culture') use the term cultural diplomacy, but also emphasize 'diplomatie d'influence' as a more encompassing term (see sub-chapter 6.2.2).

### 6.6.3 Public diplomacy practice

Both EU and member state organizations stress the importance of two-way communication in their public diplomacy approach. Communication as a two-sided process constitutes the basis of the relational communication framework to public diplomacy, suggested by Zaharna (2013). The stated focus on the relational communication framework is mirrored by the following goals of internal EU public diplomacy: Engaging citizens, promoting mutual understanding and cooperation, as well as fostering a European public sphere and a European identity. These goals reflect Bui's (2011) observation that regional "political organizations (e.g. the EU, ASEAN, etc.) [...] have been trying to promote better understanding and lasting relationships between them and their audiences" (p. 9). At the same time, goals of the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy also include informing about, as well as promoting the EU, its values, and policies. Public diplomacy goals addressing strategic publics outside of the EU focus on strengthening the image of the EU, increasing the visibility and the awareness of the EU and its actions, as well as informing about the EU. These goals are more persuasive and can be allocated to the information framework introduced by Zaharna (2013). Subchapter 2.5.1 has located public diplomacy goals on a continuum from political information to cultural communication. EU public diplomacy within member states concentrates on goals placed at the 'cultural communication' pole of the continuum, rather than EU public diplomacy towards third countries and other multilateral organizations. This finding suggests that the EU does not only seek to legitimize itself and its (external) policies and actions in member states, but that it also regards internal strategic publics as partners as well as potential multipliers of external EU public diplomacy (see for instance Huijgh, 2013; Potter, 2009). Moreover, public diplomacy goals such as developing a European public sphere, as well as a European identity go along with the aim of fostering solidarity and cohesion among citizens from different EU member states. This observation hints at similarities to the public diplomacy approach of Asian countries such as Indonesia or South Korea, who understand public diplomacy as a tool for achieving national cohesion (cf. Melissen, 2011b).

Both French and Swedish organizations primarily, but not exclusively pursue goals that correspond to the information framework of public diplomacy and are rather positioned at the 'political information' pole of the goal continuum. Both countries seek to promote their interests, policies, and values. In addition to that, France places more emphasis on gaining international influence, whereas Sweden seeks to increase knowledge on the country. These findings confirm Pamment's (2013a) observation that France seeks to gain international influence through language and culture. He points to strong links between culture, language, and influence. French language and culture should also contribute to enriching cultural diversity (Gazeau-Secret, 2010), and present an alternative to a perceived Anglophone dominance in the world (Pamment, 2013a). Previous studies have also already highlighted creating awareness of Sweden, its policies, and actions as important goals of Swedish public diplomacy (Pamment, 2013b, 2014). Sweden strives for attaining similar goals to its Nordic neighbors, as well as Central and East European countries. They all constitute small to medium-sized states that strive for "recognition by the rest of the world" (Bátora, 2005, p. 6), and thus focus on enhancing the international visibility of their own interests and actions.

Even though both French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations mainly pursue national interests, they also point to transnational goals. Like German public diplomacy practitioners, French organizations consider fostering European integration as a public diplomacy goal (see for instance Auer & Srugies, 2013; Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015; Pamment, 2013a; Plumridge, 2005). Transnational goals do not automatically go along with a more cooperative public diplomacy approach, but may embody a strong competitive dimension. France, for example, seeks to maximize national interests through the EU and position itself as a normative power multilaterally (Pamment, 2013a). Galtung (1989) identifies "coercive, remunerative, and normative power" (p. 15) as three



types of power. Coercive power corresponds to physical force, remunerative power refers to material incentives, and normative power encompasses normative justifications (cf. Boulding, 1989; Manners & Whitman, 2013; Weber, 1991). Normative justification involves persuasion as well as argumentation (cf. Manners & Whitman, 2013) and is a form of social power where ‘power to’ is more crucial than ‘power over’ (see sub-chapter 2.7.2). International actors attain normative power by diffusing norms through transferring material and immaterial assets such as humanitarian aid and technical assistance or participating in negotiations on transnational problems such as climate change (cf. Manners & Whitman, 2013)<sup>240</sup>.

As a EU founding member and large state with a considerable influence on settings norms and rules of cooperation within the regional organization, France directly links its transnational public diplomacy goals to the EU. Swedish public diplomacy practitioners, on the contrary, do not explicitly refer to the EU, but seek to engage in multilateral organizations in general. These findings suggest that Sweden, as a country with comparably little public diplomacy resources, includes a transnational, but not necessarily European dimension in its public diplomacy approach. They mirror Swedish foreign policy (see sub-chapter 4.2.2), which places a lot of emphasis on work in multilateral organizations like the UN and the WTO, but pursues a wait-and-see approach with regard to further European integration.

While Swedish and French public diplomacy organization attune their goals to national political priorities, EU public diplomacy is guided by the political priorities defined by EU member states. In the area of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, international conventions and multilateral policy priorities also influence the definition of public diplomacy goals. By that, both EU and member state public diplomacy, is “the second-order set of consequences that follow from initial [policy] choice[s]” (Brown, 2013, p. 47). The empirical analysis shows that both EU and member state organizations apply public diplomacy as a tool to reach ‘milieu goals’ (Nye, 2004). The term ‘milieu goals’ refers to influencing the international environment in a way that facilitates the attainment of policy goals.

Like NATO, the EU addresses strategic publics within and outside of member states (cf. Melissen, 2011a). Opposed to that, ASEAN focuses on the internal dimension of its ‘people’s diplomacy’ (cf. Chachavalpongpun, 2011, p. 111). The analysis of strategic publics has revealed that the EU regards citizens as important publics of its internal public diplomacy. As outlined in sub-chapter 3.1, the Maastricht Treaty marked a turning point in EU communication policy by placing more emphasis on European citizens. Citizens as strategic publics of EU public diplomacy have been further valorized during the “period of reflection”, following two failed referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands. In addition to citizens, internal publics of EU public diplomacy also include journalists, as well as political bodies and civil society organizations. While both representatives from EC Policy DGs and the EC Representation in Paris state to address both national-based journalists (EU I 08, EU I 11, EU I 12) and sub-national media (EU I 08, EU I 11), the interviewee from the EC Spokesperson Service highlights Brussels-based journalists as strategic publics. Previous studies have already pointed to the Spokesperson Service’s focus on Brussels-based journalists (see for instance Balčytienė et al., 2007; Spanier 2010, 2012). This constitutes a challenge to the success of EU public diplomacy: Brussels-based journalists cover the EU more positively and are more likely to use official EU sources than their national-based counterparts (cf. Price, 2010, see also EU I 12). In contrast to that, national-based journalists draw on sources from national governments and often do not engage in direct contact with EU officials (cf. Price, 2010). However, these journalists account for the lion’s share of EU coverage in member states. According to one interviewee from the Swedish Permanent

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<sup>240</sup> Manners and Whitman (2013) provide a detailed discussion of mechanisms of norm diffusion using the example of the EU.

Representation to the EU, the portion of EU coverage by national-based journalists is going to increase in the future, as less and less journalists are physically present in Brussels (SWE I 03). While EU public diplomacy organizations identify print and audiovisual media as strategic publics, neither EU documents nor interviewees discuss the role of online journalists for EU public diplomacy. By that, EU public diplomacy organizations do not adequately acknowledge the relevance of online media becoming an important source of information on EU-related issues (cf. Eurobarometer 82, 2014).

Whereas the majority of EU citizens belongs to the public domain sphere, journalists and representatives from transnational, national, or sub-national political bodies and civil society organizations are part of the EU expert sphere and/or strong public sphere (cf. Eriksen, 2005; Spanier, 2012; see sub-chapter 3.3). Members of the EU expert sphere or strong public sphere serve as intermediaries between the EU and European citizens, multipliers that communicate on EU-related issues and link different segments of the public sphere. EU citizens can also become multipliers themselves when communicating on the EU as well as European issues in third countries, for example in the context of an exchange program. The external dimension of EU public diplomacy concentrates on journalists, civil society organizations, as well as political bodies, including multilateral organizations. Citizens in third countries are only addressed through multipliers or via web-based tools. These findings are tied to Melissen's (2013) observation that EU public diplomacy organizations command more resources for communicating with internal publics than with external audiences.

Analogous to the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy, French public diplomacy concentrates on foreign citizens. Pamment (2013a) argues that France and other West-European countries like Germany and the UK compete over similar strategic publics such as the middle class or young people. Moreover, French public diplomacy organizations highlight the importance of addressing diaspora communities abroad. Members of diaspora communities may act as multipliers and facilitate relationship building between home and host countries (cf. Rana, 2013, pp. 79-83). In addition to France, Central and East European countries also focus on diaspora communities in their public diplomacy efforts (cf. Ociepka, 2013; Szondi, 2009). As a smaller country, Sweden commands fewer public diplomacy resources and, thus, places more emphasis on multipliers as strategic publics: Swedish public diplomacy organizations widely agree on 'connectors', well-connected organizations and individuals who assume the role of multipliers and decision-makers (cf. Pamment, 2013b), as most important strategic publics. Both French and Swedish organizations acknowledge the role of domestic citizens and groups in public diplomacy.

These findings reflect the growing relevance of public diplomacy's domestic dimension in research (see for instance Batora, 2005; Cull, 2008a; Gonesh & Melissen, 2005; Hocking, 2008; Huijgh, 2011, 2013; Riordan, 2005), as well as public diplomacy practice in Europe, North America and Asia (Andrlic, Tarte & Sopta, 2012; d'Hooghe, 2011; Huijgh, 2013; Huijgh & Byrne, 2012; Potter, 2009; Wang, 2009). Domestic public diplomacy does not only serve the purpose of legitimizing and gaining support for a country's external actions. Radio Sverige International as well as France Médias Monde also fulfil the function of integrating immigrants from different cultural backgrounds. Moreover, Radio Sverige International highlights preserving minority languages and culture as an important aspect of domestic public diplomacy. Not least, French and Swedish government agencies working in the core area 'society/culture' promote cultural diversity among domestic citizens.

Big states like France and Germany operate more or less worldwide (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013). They apply a global strategy of geographical targeting (cf. Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008). In contrast to that, Sweden combines two strategies of geographical targeting identified by Fisher and Bröckerhoff (2008): On the one hand, Swedish public diplomacy organizations address strategic publics in emerging countries where Sweden is less known and understood ('focus outside of the region'). On

the other hand, they stress the relevance of public diplomacy efforts in the Baltic Region ('local region'). Geographical priorities of EU as well as French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations overlap with regard to emerging countries as well as EU neighboring countries in the east and in the south.

The EU does not develop an overarching strategy that encompasses both the internal and external dimension, but addresses public diplomacy towards strategic publics within and outside of the EU in separate documents. Moreover, the internal and the external dimension of EU public diplomacy builds on different organizations: Whereas DG Communication and the network of EC Representations play a leading role in public diplomacy within the EU, the EEAS, its network of EU Delegations, and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments almost exclusively conceptualize and implement public diplomacy towards external publics. EC Policy DGs may contribute to the internal and/or external dimension of EU public diplomacy. Representatives of the EEAS and Service for Foreign Policy Instruments have pointed to a lack of strategy and coordination regarding the EU's external public diplomacy activities. The two organizations are currently in the process of developing a joint approach to external EU public diplomacy that also takes EU Delegations and EC Policy DGs with an external focus into consideration. This strategy is going to take up regional key issues such as the political, economic, and social situation of neighboring countries as well as global challenges such as health pandemics.

Pagovski (2015) describes EU public diplomacy as a "diffused, decentralized, and multilayered framework of departments, policies, and programs" (p. 17), but also acknowledges the gradual development of an EU public diplomacy apparatus. According to Pagovski (2015), the EU cannot conduct public diplomacy in a centralized, coherent manner, as there is a lack of political consensus on the EU's overall mission as well as positions in single policy fields (see also Michalski, 2005; Rasmussen, 2014). Opposed to multilateral organizations such as NATO that focus on single issues like security and the collective defense of its members, the EU is a multi-issue organization (cf. Pagovski, 2015, p. 35). It combines features of a supranational and an intergovernmental organization and holds exclusive decision-making power in some policy areas like common monetary policy, but only supporting competences in other policy areas like culture and education (see sub-chapter 3.3).

The empirical analysis has delivered insights into the building blocks of the EU's internal public diplomacy approach. The critical assessment of EU communication in the wake of the Maastricht crisis and the failed referenda on the EU Constitution (see sub-chapter 3.1) has led to the identification of dialogue, citizen-centered communication, as well as a going-local approach as important pillars of internal EU public diplomacy. Dialogue can refer to communication among EU citizens from different member states and communication between EU citizens and organizations. Whereas exchanges among EU citizens pursues dialogue as an end in itself (cf. Taylor & Kent, 2002), two-way communication between EU organizations and citizens involves elements of both a genuine and a technical dialogue. On the one hand, a dialogue with EU citizens incorporates listening as a process by which EU organizations take up citizens' ideas, and concerns and include them in policy formulation as well as the conceptualization and implementation of EU public diplomacy (cf. Srugies, 2015, p. 22). This notion of listening corresponds to Fisher and Bröckerhoff's (2008) understanding of listening as a "genuine interest in the perspective of the other" (p. 28). On the other hand, dialogue with EU citizens draws on pre-defined values and aims at promoting EU achievements and benefits (cf. EU Doc 02, EU Doc 09, Srugies, 2015, pp. 22-23). These findings suggest that the EU applies two-way communication as a strategic tool and means to reach its own interests (cf. Brüggemann, 2008; Taylor & Kent, 2002). Furthermore, they correspond to Gregory's proposition that all public diplomacy activities embody an instrumental dimension:

*“Discourse reasoning often drives tone, style, doctrines, perceptions, budgets, time horizons, and organizational structures. But discourse reasoning in public diplomacy is subsumed within an instrumental context. It is not only that public diplomacy presupposes activities with resource or symbolic ties to governments and non-state political entities. It is because public diplomacy is carried out for interest and value based reasons”.* (Gregory, 2005, p. 15)

Drawing on the ‘Theory of Communicative Action’ by German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas, Srugies (2015) argues that EC public diplomacy organizations mainly engage in weak communicative action that can be considered as an *“intermediary [stage] between strategic [action] and stronger forms of communicative action”* (Bjola, 2009, p. 71, italics in original).

The analysis of the external environment EU public diplomacy practitioners operate in has shown that EU citizens have moderate trust in the EU. Six out of ten citizens identify with the EU (as a second affiliation). However, Weigl (2007) argues that national identity is often a matter of the heart, whereas the EU is primarily regarded as ‘commercium’, a community of purposes (see sub-chapter 3.3). The communication of pre-defined values in dialogues with EU citizens as well as a perceived Western bias of these values (cf. Weigl, 2007) hampers the development of a European identity (cf. Kantner, 2006; Mokre, 2006).

Beside the instrumental nature of two-way communication with EU citizens, Brüggemann (2008) argues that scarce financial and human resources present profound obstacles to realizing a more citizen- and dialogue-oriented public diplomacy (see sub-chapter 6.6.1). The findings of this study reveal that resource constraints continue to be a problem: Interviewees from DG Communication, the Spokesperson Service, as well as DG Trade point to financial cuts as future challenges of EU public diplomacy (EU I 02, EU I 04, EU I 05, EU I 10, cf. Srugies, 2015). Pagovski (2015, p. 31) argues that the EU, NATO as well as ASEAN command a comparable amount of public diplomacy resources to the UK. This means that the EU is tasked with communicating on behalf of 28 countries to heterogeneous publics within and outside of the EU on the basis of resources that equal the public diplomacy budget of one of its biggest member states. Even though EU public diplomacy practitioners stress the diversity of strategic publics within the EU, Löffelholz and Arao (2011) argue that “most European countries share quite similar cultural patterns” (pp. 72-73) compared to member states of ASEAN. The challenge of communicating to heterogeneous publics is thus more pronounced in other regional organizations.

The EU’s ‘going local’-approach implies the decentralized implementation of centrally developed communication priorities in cooperation with other EU institutions, national, regional and local authorities, as well as other public and private cooperation partners (cf. Srugies, 2015). It goes along with a loss of control over initiatives and messages of EU public diplomacy (cf. Michalski, 2005, pp. 128-129). Whereas both EU documents and interviewees stress the ‘going local’-approach as an important pillar of internal EU public diplomacy, Valentini (2008a) questions to what extent EU public diplomacy organizations really put it into practice. Drawing on an analysis of EU communication strategies towards Finland and Italy, she argues that, “in practice, the centralized and traditional EU method of dealing with communication towards citizens was the preferred choice in the majority of situations” (Valentini, 2008a, p. 112). The findings of Valentini (2008a) cannot be confirmed in this study, as interviewees from EC Representations in both Stockholm and Paris point out that they are free to adapt communication priorities and develop a localized public diplomacy approach (EU I 07, EU I 12).

Both France and Sweden adopt a rather centralized public diplomacy strategy. Swedish public diplomacy is based on a public diplomacy strategy defined by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as well as a Brand Strategy coordinated by the Swedish Institute. Consistency and centralization as characteristics of Swedish public diplomacy (cf. Pamment, 2013b) reflect the consensus-oriented decision-making style as an important feature of the Swedish political system. (see sub-chapter 4.2.2) Moreover, it enables the small country to pool its public diplomacy resources. The French approach to public diplomacy mirrors the country's centralized political system. Scholars have primarily looked at sub-national public diplomacy through actors like Scotland or Catalonia that strive for a high degree of autonomy and who develop their own public diplomacy strategies (cf. Alexander, 2015; Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015). In the case of France, sub-national authorities are part of the overarching 'diplomatie d'influence' strategy, defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development. Opposed to that, sub-national regions in Sweden operate much more independently and develop their own international cooperation activities in the field of culture, for example. The international state of research on the practice of public diplomacy shows that both big states like the US and the UK, as well as small countries in Central and East Europe pursue centralized public diplomacy strategies (cf. Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015; Ociepka, 2013; Szondi, 2009). In contrast to that, different public diplomacy organizations and strategies co-exist in a rather disconnected way in Australia (cf. Byrne, 2009). Only German public diplomacy practitioners deliberately decide for a decentralized public diplomacy approach in order to depict Germany as a pluralistic country, and distance themselves from the centralized communication structures that coined the Third Reich (cf. Auer & Srugies, 2013; Löffelholz et al., 2011a, b; Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015).

The two member states pursue a rather competitive public diplomacy approach that centers on facilitating the assertion of national interests. National sovereignty plays a crucial role in France. As pointed out in sub-chapter 4.2.2, the nation plays a social integrative role for French citizens as a source of unity and identity. French public diplomacy focuses on the core areas 'society/culture', as well as 'education/research' (cf. Pamment, 2013a; Melloul, 2010; Haize, 2013; Lane, 2013) and has a strong record in international broadcasting (cf. Plumridge, 2005). In comparison to Germany or the UK, who draw on one main organization in international broadcasting (Deutsche Welle, BBC World Service), there are a number of French organizations like Monte Carlo Doualiya, Radio France International, and France 24 that engage in international broadcasting. Culture, norms, and language constitute channels of increasing France's international influence (cf. Pamment, 2013a). Pamment (2013b) notes that culture and image are means of Swedish public diplomacy to reach competitive, often economically driven goals. The focus on image and promotion as tools of increasing economic growth and wealth also characterizes the public diplomacy and nation branding approach that the UK has adopted with the launch of the campaign 'GREAT Britain' (cf. Pamment, 2015; Rivera, 2015). As Denmark, Sweden places a lot of emphasis on the economic core area (cf. Meiner-Jensen, 2012; Pamment, 2011). However, its public diplomacy efforts also concentrate on the core area 'society/culture, which is reflected by Sweden's engagement in bilateral and multilateral development cooperation, as well as global sustainability.

Both the Swedish public diplomacy strategy and brand strategy concentrate on a small number of key issues. The brand strategy defines open, innovative, authentic, and caring as Swedish core values, and society, innovation, creativity, and sustainability as profile areas. Both core values and profile areas occupy a gatekeeping function and guide the selection of activities and issues Swedish public diplomacy organizations focus on (cf. Pamment, 2013b). Like other small and medium-sized states such as Norway (Arthur, 2005, Henrikson, 2005, Plumridge, 2005), or the Czech Republic (see for instance Szondi, 2009), Sweden carves its own public diplomacy niche. The profile areas of the Brand Strategy constitute areas of perceived strength. Swedish and French public diplomacy practitioners

point to the new ICT as a key issue, and seek to position themselves at the forefront of digital diplomacy. Initiatives like the Second House of Sweden, the establishment of an embassy in Second Life (cf. Bengtsson, 2011), as well as Curators of Sweden (cf. Christensen, 2013; Hoffmann, 2013) nurture the image of Sweden as a digital pioneer (see also sub-chapters 4.2.4 and 6.4.2).

According to the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey, Swedish citizens have more trust in their national institutions and a higher level of political participation than French citizens (see sub-chapter 4.2.2). The analysis of the Swedish public diplomacy practice confirms the assumption that Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to integrate domestic citizens in public diplomacy initiatives (see sub-chapter 4.3 and 5.1). The findings disclose more Swedish than French public diplomacy tools and programs that actively involve domestic citizens. The initiative 'Curators of Sweden' enables Swedish citizens to communicate on behalf of Sweden on the government's official Twitter account. In this context, Swedish public diplomacy organizations assume the role of architects rather than speakers. 'Curators of Sweden' draws on the social media platform Twitter and the technical pre-conditions it provides for engaging Swedish and foreign citizens in a dialogue. Nonetheless, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Council for the Promotion of Sweden perceive the initiative as an element of the country's brand strategy that is linked to the core values 'caring' and 'open' (cf. Christensen, 2013; Hoffmann, 2013; Ricknert, 2013). Even though 'Curators of Sweden' has achieved a lot of international success and has been adapted by, for example, British and Mexican public diplomacy practitioners<sup>241</sup>, several scholars criticize the instrumental nature of the initiative: The 'Curators of Sweden' do not represent a cross-section of the Swedish population, but feature carefully selected participants (cf. Christensen, 2013; Hoffmann, 2013) who are employed to communicate pre-defined values to international publics (cf. Pamment, 2013b). This criticism does not only apply to 'Curators of Sweden', but the Swedish Brand Strategy as a whole: Both Pamment (2013b,c) and Christensen (2013) remark that not all Swedish citizens identify with Brand Sweden. The brand strategy does not allow for countercultures and thus runs thus contrary to its own core value 'open'. Instead of relying on pre-defined values, Pamment (2013b) suggests that Swedish public diplomacy organizations should place more emphasis on communicating its activities in the area of development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

The analysis of public diplomacy tools (see sub-chapter 6.4) has pointed out that both EU and member state organizations acknowledge the growing relevance of controlled online media and even more so interactive online media as stand-alone tools or complements to other activities such as events. Auer et al. (2012) identify information management, identity management, as well as relationship management as key functions of interactive online media such as social networking sites or blogs. Whereas French public diplomacy organizations only name information and identity management as purposes of interactive online media, EU and Swedish public diplomacy practitioners also identify relationship management with the purpose of applying interactive online media. Especially findings relating to France confirm previous studies on the role of interactive online media in public diplomacy. Analyses of the public diplomacy practice of German, Dutch, and U.S. organizations suggest that interactive online media are primarily used for identity and information management (cf. Auer, Srugies & Löffelholz, 2012; Lee, 2007; Seo, 2009; van Noort, 2011). Political leaders of ASEAN member states as well as the ASEAN Secretariat also apply social media tools to reach out to young people (cf. Chachavalpongpan, 2011). Similarly, events and tools of group communication can serve promotional purposes and/or foster relationship building and mutual exchange. Whereas EU documents emphasize relationship building goals such as engaging citizens, EU interviewees comprehend events and group communication primarily as tools to inform and reach out to strategic publics, as well as to raise


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<sup>241</sup> Christensen lists @WeAreAustralia, @CuratorsMexico, and @PeopleOfTheUK as Twitter channels inspired by the 'Curators of Sweden' project.

awareness about EU policies and issues. Swedish and French public diplomacy organizations apply tools such as exchange programs and language courses to promote their country and its assets (see also Pamment, 2013a). Moreover, the Swedish Institute perceives language courses as a tool to attain transnational purposes like democracy promotion. The comparative analysis of the French and Swedish media environment has shown that media operate freely in both countries, even though Swedish journalists enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than their French colleagues (see sub-chapter 4.2.2). French and Swedish journalists stress their editorial freedom from the government. Nonetheless, French international broadcasters such as Radio France International and France 24 acknowledge their role in contributing to promoting France's international influence. In contrast to that, Sverige Radio International does not consider itself as an international broadcaster, but a public media organization that only cooperates with the Swedish government and parliament on the integration of immigrants, as well as the preservation of minority cultures within Sweden.

The question of how EU and member state organizations frame their public diplomacy message involves three sub-aspects: 1) The context or scope fathoms if key messages rather concentrate on national or sub-national issues, or also take transnational phenomena into consideration. 2) The focus of a message serves as an indicator if public diplomacy organizations concentrate on communicating their own national or regional interests and achievements (exclusive focus), or rather include interests, policies, and activities of other international actors (inclusive focus). 3) Not least, a key message may solely encompass information on the communicator or also contain references to other international actors. This study has analyzed to what extent organizations refer to other international actors and how they depict these other actors (see sub-chapter 2.6.1).

**Illustration 24: Key messages communicated by EU public diplomacy (EU1-EU4), French public diplomacy (FR1-FR4), and Swedish public diplomacy organizations (SW1-SW3)**



The analysis of EU documents and interviews has disclosed that EU organizations communicate one key message with a rather exclusive focus, and one key message that includes other multilateral organizations. Furthermore, two messages contain both exclusive and inclusive elements. Both within and outside of the EU, the regional organization seeks to communicate EU achievements such as peace, security, and prosperity (key message EU1). This broad key message is closely connected to highlighting the added value of the EU for its citizens (key message EU2). The external dimension of EU public diplomacy emphasizes the EU's role in the world. While this message centers on the EU's international significance (exclusive focus), it also embraces an inclusive dimension: The EU comprehends its role as advocate for human rights, or for example as partner in democratic transition. Fostering and ensuring respect for human rights is a transnational concern that is shared by both EU member states, third countries, as well as other multilateral organizations. The inclusive nature of the EU is an important key message in the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy (key message EU3). While this key message emphasizes inclusiveness as a positive feature of the regional organization (exclusive focus), it welcomes and encourages the diversity of its member states as well (inclusive focus). The key message 'support for multilateralism' is mentioned in EU documents and interviews (key message EU4). It includes the goals and concerns of other multilateral organizations and values their work.

Whereas EU member states are strategic publics within the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy, they are encouraged to take on the role of multipliers of EU key messages in third states and other multilateral organizations. As outlined in sub-chapter 3.6, EU public diplomacy can only be successful, if member states include European issues in their public diplomacy, conduct joint activities with the EU, and actively communicate them in their public diplomacy strategy. In contrast to that, member states constrain EU public diplomacy if they primarily communicate key messages from a national point of view and depict the EU as a scapegoat rather than a collaboration partner.

French public diplomacy practitioners emphasize the promotion and the defense of the French language as a key message. Even though Pamment (2013a) points to language as an important channel of promoting national interests, French public diplomacy organizations underline the transnational, inclusive dimension of this key message: The promotion and defense of the French language is communicated as a common concern of all Francophone countries in the world (key message FR1). In contrast to that, one document suggests adopting 'the uniqueness of France' as a nationally focused, exclusive key message (key message FR2). This message is, however, not taken up by any interviewees. The French Permanent Representation to the EU proposes two key messages that are set in a European context. The message of 'France as a leader in European integration' focuses primarily on France's role within the EU (key message FR3). The depiction of France as a central member of the EU goes along with providing advice and instructions to EU institutions. One interviewee from the French Permanent Representation to the EU stresses that, "European institutions need to focus on the preoccupations... the actual preoccupations of the Europeans" (FRA I 03, paragraph 22). At the same time, he stresses France's support for the work of EU institutions (key message FR4). In contrast to the communication of France as a leader in European integration, this key message implies a more inclusive focus.

Swedish public diplomacy organizations seek to communicate 'Sweden as a free and open society'. This key message is set in a national context and is linked to the country's brand strategy. The notion of 'Sweden as a free and open society' draws on the pivotal role of the Swedish model, which combines a strong state, emancipated citizens, and an egalitarian social order, for the Swedish national



identity (see sub-chapter 4.2.2). To Swedish politicians, the Swedish model constitutes an alternative concept to continental European ideas of federalism and subsidiarity (see for instance Glover, 2011; Marklund, 2009, p. 264; Trägårdh, 2002, p. 132, 150). It implies Nordic values that are considered superior to European values<sup>242</sup>.

The key message ‘Sweden as a free and open society’ (key message SW1) is characterized by a primarily exclusive, national focus, but also includes references to values Nordic countries share. A second key message depicts Sweden as the ‘Innovation’ (key message SW2). It was also developed in the context of the country’s brand strategy. Even though the term ‘Innovation’ may hint at an exclusively national focus and context, the Swedish Institute highlights the transnational dimension of this key message, stating that innovation is an important skill in order to be able to tackle global challenges. A third key message centers on Sweden’s long-term commitment to international cooperation on sustainable development (key message SW3). It is inclusive and set in a transnational context. It emphasizes the importance of engaging in multilateral organizations in a general sense, but does not specifically address cooperation with the EU.

Melissen (2011a) claims that public diplomacy narratives of national governments do not only center on national aspects, but increasingly emphasize common interests and immaterial public goods. To Pagovski (2015), “[t]his provides a solid basis for collaborative beyond-the-state public diplomacy and creates different public diplomacy forms - one of which is public diplomacy collaboration in multilateral organizations” (p. 8). This empirical analysis shows that that France and Sweden mainly place their own actions and achievements in the focus of a key message, irrespectively if the key message is set in a national or transnational context. Despite these exclusive foci, the messages ‘FR 3’ and ‘SW 3’ in Illustration 24 above implicitly contribute to EU public diplomacy. Whereas Sweden only refers to multilateral organizations on the whole, French public diplomacy organizations make explicit references to the EU as a partner in their key messages. None of the national public diplomacy organizations depict the EU negatively.

Both national and regional organizations centrally define public diplomacy messages that are adapted at local level. Several national public diplomacy organizations were involved in developing the key messages incorporated in the Swedish brand strategy. Public diplomacy organizations do not coordinate key messages on a transnational level. However, both the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as well as the Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU state to apply hash tags to coordinate the issues they communicate on with other public diplomacy organizations, and thus jointly influence the international thematic agenda.

#### **6.6.4 Interorganizational cooperation**

The literature review has detected a lack of empirical research on interorganizational cooperation in public diplomacy. Therefore, this section primarily discusses the empirical findings against the background of theoretical reflections presented in sub-chapter 2.7. Biermann (2008) identifies three types of interorganizational cooperation: Information sharing is the most basic type of cooperation, and aims at ensuring transparency of an organization’s actions as well as avoiding unintended

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<sup>242</sup> The analysis of the Swedish EU coverage discloses that Swedish journalists embrace the idea “that people can have more than one cultural identity at the same time” (Tjernström, 2008, p. 352). In the news coverage of EU-related issues, journalists depict Sweden as a “moral global villager” and “slightly superior” (Riegert, 2008, p. 29) to the EU as well as other EU member states. Common values as a basis for cooperation are rather stressed in the context of Nordic cooperation than in the European context (Government Offices of Sweden, 2014c, p. 15; see sub-chapter 6.6.4).

conflicts. Information sharing between EU member states is stressed by interviewees from the Permanent Representations of both France and Sweden to the EU. Moreover, government agencies like the Swedish Institute underline the pivotal role of information exchange with other national government agencies to complement activities and use resources efficiently. On a transnational level, government agencies share information and knowledge on EU programs like 'Creative Europe' with organizations from other EU member states. Both EU public diplomacy practitioners and government officials from member states welcome the 'Club of Venice' as an important forum for exchanging experiences.

'Coordination', as the cooperation on the implementation of strategies and single activities is the most mentioned type of cooperation on the national, regional and transnational level. DG Communication, EC Policy DGs as well as EC Representations and EC Direct Centres in member states coordinate the implementation of the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. In the same way, the EEAS as well as the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments coordinate the implementation of public diplomacy initiatives with EC Policy DGs with an external focus, and EU Delegations in third countries and to multilateral organizations.

In addition to sharing information, government agencies within France and Sweden also realize single projects together in similar or overlapping domains. Both EU and member state organizations coordinate activities with non-state organizations such as civil society organizations or businesses in EU member states and third countries. Cooperation between EU organizations and member state governments ranges on a continuum of ad-hoc coordination of single projects to commonly agreed communication plans. These communication plans are part of joint decision-making, the third and most advanced type of cooperation. Joint decision-making involves joint goal and strategy development, and often goes along with the establishment of formal and informal rules of behavior as well as informal and formal channels of cooperation. (cf. Biermann, 2008) Cooperation between the EU and its member states on a local level usually refers to the implementation and adaptation of centrally defined public diplomacy strategies. However, one interviewee from the EC Representation in Paris reports to also develop public diplomacy campaigns with the French government, for example to increase the participation in the EP election. Within the EU, an Inter-Institutional Agreement between the EC, the Council, as well as the EP defines common communication priorities. Joint goals and priorities of EU internal public diplomacy are discussed within the Inter-Institutional Group on Information. Similarly, the External Relations Information Committee debates common priorities of public diplomacy outside of the EU. In spite of these formal channels of joint decision-making, there is fairly little inter-institutional cooperation on a day-to-day basis, and a lack of coordination of the internal and external dimension of EU public diplomacy. The examples of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and the Institut Français, as well as the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute show that government agencies do not only implement government-defined strategies, but are also consulted on the development of public diplomacy goals and priorities.

Both France and Sweden define priority partners with regard to transnational cooperation: French public diplomacy organizations particularly stress German and British organizations as close cooperation partners, but also welcome cooperation with other EU member states. These cooperation foci reflect France's endorsement of a 'Europe of Projects' and 'Europe à la carte' approach that advocates an intensified cooperation with single member states to make the EU capable of acting more strongly and visibly (see sub-chapter 4.2.2). The empirical analysis confirms previous research that Swedish organizations emphasize the relevance of cooperation with other Nordic countries (cf. Plumridge, 2005). These countries do not only cooperate with each other on the implementation of public diplomacy activities, but also build coalitions in multilateral organizations and coordinate

approaches on issues of common interest. This pragmatic approach to cooperation with organizations from other countries is particularly stressed by interviewees from the French and Swedish Permanent Representations to the EU.

Public diplomacy organizations from the EU as well as France and Sweden work with multilateral organizations like the UN to implement joint projects. Joint decision-making only occurs in the cooperation between the EU and other multilateral organizations: The EU and the UN for example commit to a 'Communication and Visibility Manual' that regulates cooperation on joint projects in third countries, and establishes formal rules of cooperation. In the area of humanitarian aid, the EC Policy DG ECHO has conceptualized a communication strategy as well as key messages of the awareness campaign 'EUsaveLIVES-You save lives'.

Sub-chapter 2.7.2 has identified factors that enable and/or constrain interorganizational cooperation. Factors that facilitate cooperation include the mutual recognition of a common (urgent) problem, common or complimentary perspectives on this problem, mutual trust, as well as the physical and conceptual proximity of the interacting organizations. On the other hand, additional resources like time and transaction costs may constitute barriers to cooperation. Furthermore, rivalry and a struggle for power among organizations may also impede cooperation.

Interviewees from EC Representations in Paris and Stockholm, as well as from the French and Swedish Permanent Representations to the EU assess the cooperation between EU and member state organizations as positive. They only identify time constraints as factors that hamper a closer, more systematic cooperation. In contrast to that, EU public diplomacy practitioners from DG Communication and the EEAS argue that cooperation with member states in and outside of the EU varies significantly. To EU interviewees, the extent and success of cooperation largely depends on the political will of member state governments. The analysis of Swedish public diplomacy shows that the country concentrates its EU engagement on specific issues like free trade and development cooperation. Swedish public diplomacy organizations highlight the coherence of European policies, as well as the provision of significant resources as preconditions for successful cooperation between member states and the EU in third countries. Moreover, one interviewee from the Swedish Arts Council points out that cooperation among single EU member states, and between member state and EU organizations is bound to the motivation and time single representatives dedicate to cooperation (SWE I 08a). The willingness of organizational representatives to take time for cooperation, learning, and changing is part of an organization's culture (cf. Comfort, 1999; Wukich, 2011). Both the French and Swedish government representatives oppose a closer collaboration with the EU. Especially in the area of culture, where the EU only has supporting competences, they value coordination on single initiatives, but reject the development of joint goals and strategies. In contrast to that, government agencies in the field of culture, as well as the Permanent Representations to the EU from both countries that work with EU institutions on a day-to-day basis, advocate a closer collaboration. Swedish public diplomacy practitioners highlight close cooperation with other Nordic countries. As one Swedish interviewee argues, geographical and conceptual proximity, reflected for instance by linguistic similarities, a common cultural history and common values, facilitate Nordic cooperation. Moreover, the co-localization of Nordic public diplomacy organizations abroad, for example at 'Felleshus', the Pan Nordic building of Nordic embassies in Berlin, also strengthens Nordic cooperation in public diplomacy.

Zaharna (2013) identifies increasing awareness about a specific issue, informing about a specific issue, exercising influence, attaining shared goals, as well as sharing knowledge as possible motivations of organizations to engage in a network (see sub-chapter 2.7.2). The analysis of interorganizational cooperation within networks reveals that member state organizations primarily engage in networks to

influence policies on a multilateral level, and to cultivate shared norms (see for example More Europe, Cultural Action Europe as well as the Nordic Council of Ministers), as well as to collaborate on joint projects and to achieve joint goals (see for example EUNIC, the Council for the Promotion of Sweden, the Nordic Council of Ministers, national networks within single public diplomacy core areas). EU public diplomacy organizations also establish and engage in networks like the European Radio Network to collaborate on shared goals such as developing a European public sphere. Although transnational media like Euronews broadcasts to an increasing number of recipients, they are mainly used by elites and not really the public at large in EU member states (see sub-chapter 3.3). To overcome this problem, DG Communication seeks to establish cooperations with broadcasters within EU member states. The Club of Venice and the Stockholm Initiative on Digital Diplomacy constitute two examples of transnational networks that public diplomacy organizations engage in to exchange experiences, share knowledge, and develop innovative solutions to common problems. Raising awareness about and informing on specific issues are not named as reasons for engaging in public diplomacy networks. The majority of networks on a national, regional and transnational level either focus on a single public diplomacy core area like 'society/culture', or one a single issue such as digital diplomacy or promotion.

National networks within France and Sweden are smaller than transnational networks involving EU and member state organizations. Governments and government agencies are often located at the core of national networks on culture, education, or trade. They are the main carriers of rules and norms within the network (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). Relationships between these public diplomacy organizations are characterized by strong ties. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, as well as single government agencies like Canal France International are members of several national networks. Moreover, members at the core of national networks additionally engage in dyadic relationships. Strong ties are particularly beneficial if member organizations jointly develop public diplomacy goals and strategies (cf. Biermann, 2008; Zaharna, 2013). The most important Swedish network Council for the Promotion of Sweden serves as an example of a network that engages in joint decision-making and is composed of member organizations that have established strong ties. In addition to governments and government agencies at the core of a network, many national networks also comprise non-state actors that are situated at the periphery and only cooperate with core members on single activities.

In contrast to that, transnational networks like EUNIC or the Stockholm Initiative on Digital Diplomacy are not only bigger in size, but often more heterogeneous. According to Page (2008) and Zaharna (2013), homogeneous networks may be more stable and easier to coordinate, but the strengths of heterogeneous networks lies within their capacity to foster new ways of thinking. EUNIC is one of the most advanced transnational public diplomacy networks. At the core, it includes 34 cultural organizations from 28 European countries. In addition to its global office, EUNIC comprises almost 100 geographical clusters in which member organizations coordinate activities with local partners at the periphery of the network. (EUNIC, n.d.) One interviewee from the Swedish Institute who occupies a central position within EUNIC highlights the network's heterogeneity as an opportunity of mutual learning and leveling out weak points of single member organizations (SWE I 06). Even though some member organizations may be competitors in single regions, she argues that rivalry has not impeded cooperation within the network. In contrast, one interviewee from the Institut Français state that several member organizations from one country in a transnational network constrains the visibility of the country's contributions (FRA I 04). In an empirical analysis of three EUNIC clusters, Schühle (2014) shows that EUNIC is primarily a forum for cooperation between nation states that does not provide a European added value to cultural relations. These findings correspond to the reluctant

attitude of French and Swedish governments to cooperate more closely with EU organization in the area of culture.

Opposed to EUNIC as well as the majority of national networks, the Stockholm Initiative on Digital Diplomacy is less structured and only loosely coordinated by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Its heterogeneous pool of members contributes to developing new ways of thinking about digital diplomacy. All networks discussed in sub-chapter 6.5 are open-ended.

## **7. Conclusion and outlook: Between competitive identity and differentiated cooperation<sup>243</sup>**

The overarching purpose of this study was to comparatively analyze the public diplomacy approaches of the EU as well as France and Sweden as selected EU member states. The study analyzed public diplomacy from an organizational perspective. It integrated concepts of public diplomacy research, communication science, international relations theory, sociology, as well as social network research to theoretically describe the internal and external environment of public diplomacy organizations, goals, strategic publics, messages, and tools as components of a public diplomacy strategy, as well as interorganizational cooperation among public diplomacy organizations. Based on an interdisciplinary research model, this study examined how EU, as well as French and Swedish organizations conduct public diplomacy, and to what extent the public diplomacy of EU as well as member state organizations complement or contradict each other.

The study combined a qualitative analysis of strategy documents with guided expert interviews. This triangulation of research methods allows for examining both planned and actual public diplomacy conduct, as well as formal and informal communication processes. This chapter summarizes the most important empirical findings presented and interpreted in chapter six (sub-chapter 7.1). Moreover, it answers the research questions, and discusses the assumptions laid out in sub-chapter 5.1. The summary of findings serves as a starting point for exploring future avenues of theory development and empirical research, as well as fathoming the contribution of this study to advancing public diplomacy practice (sub-chapter 7.2).

### **7.1 Summary of the study**

The public diplomacy definitions brought forward by EU and member state organizations point at a similar understanding of the concept. However, only the EEAS and the Service for the Foreign Policy Instruments within the EU, as well as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute within Sweden apply the term ‘public diplomacy’. The empirical findings confirm the assumptions that EU public organizations primarily apply the term ‘public diplomacy’ to refer to communication with strategic publics outside of the EU (assumption 1), and primarily perceive public diplomacy as a tool of advocacy (assumption 2). Both French and Swedish organizations work with alternate terms to describe their public diplomacy activities. The preference of the terms ‘diplomatie d’influence’ in France, as well as promotion and branding in Sweden already provide cues for the country’s public diplomacy goals and key issues.

EU public diplomacy encompasses an internal dimension addressing publics within the EU, and an external dimension directed at publics in third countries and multilateral fora. The regional organization develops separate strategies for these two dimensions, and tasks different organizations with the communication towards internal and external publics. EC Policy DGs like NEAR or ECHO are among the few organizations that address strategic publics within and outside of the EU. These findings confirm the assumption that the complex structure of the EU is reflected in a differentiated approach to public diplomacy, in which different public diplomacy strategies coexist (assumption 5).

Internal EU public diplomacy seeks to legitimize the EU as a polity as well as its policies actions and to strengthen the cohesion among EU member states. It serves as a precondition for conducting

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<sup>243</sup> This heading draws on Fisher (2010, p. 1) stating that public diplomacy organizations are confronted with a strategic challenge between “competitive identity” and “multilateral cooperation (see sub-chapter 1.1).

external EU public diplomacy. As suggested in sub-chapter 5.1, public diplomacy goals of the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy accentuate cultural communication, whereas goals of external EU public diplomacy place more emphasis on persuasion and political information (assumption 3). As the EU allocates much more resources to the internal than the external dimension of public diplomacy, EU organizations directly address citizens within the EU and focus on targeting multipliers in third countries (assumption 4). With a network of 139 Delegations in third countries and to multilateral organizations, EU public diplomacy organizations operate worldwide. However, EU representatives identify emerging countries as well as EU neighboring countries as geographical priorities.

EU practitioners emphasize the importance of two-way communication in public diplomacy. The EU for example defines dialogue, an orientation towards citizens, as well as a ‘going local’-approach as pillars of internal public diplomacy. Nonetheless, the analysis of EU and member state tools reveals that instruments that enable a dialogue with strategic publics are often used for promotional purposes, and to communicate pre-defined values and messages (assumption 6). Internal EU public diplomacy concentrates on communicating on depicting achievements of the regional organization as well as its inclusive nature. Key messages of external EU public diplomacy include the EU’s role in the world as well as its general support for multilateralism. Table 16 below summarizes the discussion on the research assumptions related to the first research question on the public diplomacy understanding and practice of the EU:

**Table 16: Tested research assumptions (first research question) (confirmed assumptions are highlighted in green, assumptions that could not be confirmed are highlighted in red)**

Public diplomacy understanding	
Assumption 1:	EU public diplomacy organizations primarily apply the term public diplomacy to refer to communication with strategic publics outside of the EU.
Assumption 2:	EU public diplomacy organizations primarily perceive public diplomacy as a tool of advocacy.
Public diplomacy practice on the strategic level	
Assumption 3:	EU public diplomacy organizations put a stronger emphasis on goals of cultural communication in the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. Goals of political information/persuasion are more pronounced in the external dimension of EU public diplomacy.
Assumption 4:	EU public diplomacy organizations emphasize citizens as strategic publics within the internal dimension of EU public diplomacy. In contrast to that, EU public diplomacy organizations focus on decision-makers and multipliers in third countries and multilateral fora.
Assumption 5:	The complex structure of the EU is reflected in a differentiated approach to public diplomacy, in which different public diplomacy strategies coexist.
Assumption 6:	EU public diplomacy organizations primarily apply two-way communication to reach persuasive goals.

(source: own depiction)

In contrast to the EU, France and Sweden pursue a rather centralized public diplomacy strategy. The French government even integrates the activities of sub-national authorities in its overall public diplomacy strategy. Swedish public diplomacy, as well as the country's brand strategy are characterized by a high degree of consistency and coherence. These findings substantiate the assumption that the consensus-driven decision-making style inherent in the Swedish political system encourages a coherent public diplomacy approach (assumption 7).

The two member states show a preference for persuasive public diplomacy goals that facilitate the assertion of national interests. Whereas both countries seek to promote national policies and actions, Swedish organizations place more emphasis on increasing knowledge and awareness about the country (assumption 9). French public diplomacy practitioners, in turn, highlight increasing France's international influence as a crucial public diplomacy goal (assumption 8). Both countries also define transnational public diplomacy goals. Swedish public diplomacy organizations stress their commitment to work in multilateral organizations, but make no explicit references to the EU.

France and Sweden set different priorities regarding their strategic publics: French organizations highlight the role of citizens and diaspora communities as foci, whereas Sweden as a smaller country concentrates its public diplomacy efforts on 'connectors' that have a multiplying function in foreign countries and multilateral fora. Swedish and French organizations, particularly operating in the core area 'society/culture', also direct public diplomacy efforts at domestic publics in order to gain support for (external) policies and actions, integrate migrants, preserve minority cultures, and foster the awareness of cultural diversity among domestic citizens. The two countries differ with regard to geographical priorities of public diplomacy: France pursues a global strategy of geographical targeting, but pays special attention to Francophone African countries. Sweden combines a focus on emerging countries with targeting Baltic states in its neighborhood (assumption 10).

'Society/culture' as well as 'education/research' constitute core areas of French public diplomacy. In contrast to Swedish media, French international broadcasters like Radio France International, Monte Carlo Doualiya, or France 24 are integrated in the country's public diplomacy strategy. This observation suggests that Swedish public media operate more independently than their French counterparts. Swedish public diplomacy practitioners preferentially engage in the core areas 'economy', as well as 'society/culture'. As a smaller country, Sweden identifies society, innovation, creativity, and sustainability as four areas of perceived strength that present the public diplomacy niches Sweden focuses on. New ICT constitute foci of French and Swedish public diplomacy. Organizations from both countries point to the growing relevance of controlled and interactive online media as stand-alone tools and complements to other instruments such as events. Thus, the assumption that Swedish public diplomacy organizations rely more heavily on online media, including web 2.0-applications, as public diplomacy tools than French organizations cannot be confirmed (assumption 11). Sub-chapter 4.2.2 has disclosed that Swedish citizens have a higher level of trust in national political organizations than French citizens. Building on that, this study has assumed that Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to integrate domestic citizens in public diplomacy initiatives (assumption 12). The empirical results support this assumption. Swedish public diplomacy initiatives like 'Curators of Sweden' combine the application of new ICT and the integration of domestic citizens in the country's public diplomacy efforts. In addition to online media, public diplomacy practitioners from both member states highlight the importance of events as well as tools of group communication. Interactive online media, events, and tools of group communication all provide the opportunity of establishing a dialogue and fostering relationship building. Nonetheless, French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations, much like their EU colleagues, mostly use these tools for information and identity management purposes.



The selected member states communicate messages that are set in national as well as transnational contexts. Messages that address transnational issues may imply an exclusive, competitive focus, concentrating on the respective member state or include the perspectives and actions of other international actors. The French Permanent Representation to the EU defines the support for the work of EU institutions as a key message with an inclusive focus. By communicating its commitment to work in multilateral organizations, Swedish public diplomacy organizations also define an inclusive key message set in a transnational context that does, however, not make any explicit references to the EU.

Interorganizational cooperation on a national, regional, and transnational level ranges on a continuum from information sharing as the most basic form of cooperation to joint decision-making. EU and member state organizations cooperate most often on the implementation of public diplomacy strategies and activities. Interestingly, organizations from different EU institutions cooperate on overarching communication priorities and goals, but do not coordinate activities to attain these goals. Similarly, there is hardly any cooperation on the implementation of public diplomacy strategies between organizations focusing on the internal and the external dimension of EU public diplomacy.

Depending on the political will of single member states, cooperation between EU and member state organizations may stretch from ad-hoc cooperation on single issues and activities to the development of joint communication plans. Interviewees from EC Representations in Paris and Stockholm assess cooperation with member state organizations more positively than their colleagues in Brussels. Whereas EU representatives suggest a closer collaboration with member states, interviewees from the French and Swedish governments do not share this opinion, and show a preference for cooperation in the context of single EU programs and single issues. French public diplomacy organizations consider other EU member states, particularly Germany and the UK, as important cooperation partners they also develop strategies with. Sweden, on the contrary, engages in close cooperation with other Nordic countries. Their geographical and conceptual proximity facilitates interorganizational cooperation with these countries.

National networks within member states are smaller and more homogeneous than transnational networks. Governments and government agencies constitute the core of the majority of national networks, whereas non-state organizations such as professional associations or trade unions are located at the periphery. The assumption that Swedish non-state organizations are more active and influential in Sweden than in France, and are therefore more inclined to engage in public-private partnerships could not be confirmed on the basis of the empirical data (assumption 13). Networks at national and transnational level are either composed of organizations from single public diplomacy core areas, or gather organizations from different core areas that work together on single issues such as digital diplomacy or promotion. Public diplomacy organizations primarily engage in national networks to gain international influence or achieve shared outcomes. In addition to that, transnational networks also foster mutual learning, innovation, as well as experience and information exchange. Swedish and French public diplomacy organizations comprehend transnational networks rather as an opportunity of cooperation with other member states than with EU organizations – even if these networks have been established by the EU itself. French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations build coalitions with other member state organizations to strengthen their position on a multilateral level, and engage on issue-specific cooperations. The analysis of interorganizational cooperation discloses that French and Swedish public diplomacy practitioners rather pursue pragmatic cooperation that resonates with the ideas of a ‘Europe of Projects’ and ‘Europe à la Carte’, than endorsing strategic cooperation on an overarching EU public diplomacy strategy. These findings suggest the validation of the assumption that French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to engage in selected, project-based cooperations with EU organizations than in long-term cooperation efforts (assumption

14). The results support the idea of a differentiated integration as most likely scenario of the future of the EU. Boening, Kremer and van Loon (2013) point to processes of “re-nationalization [...] which limit the ability of the EU to develop common policies” (viii-ix). Boening et al. (2015) argue that “a Union shaped according to accommodation of diverse member state perspectives may be needed”. This “entail member states, or coalitions of them, driving EU foreign policy on selected priority issues, depending on respective national agendas” (ix). All assumptions on public diplomacy by French and Swedish organizations are summarized below in table 17.

**Table 17: Tested research assumptions (second research question) (confirmed assumptions are highlighted in green, assumptions that could not be confirmed are highlighted in red)**

Public diplomacy practice on the strategic level	
Assumption 7:	The more consensus-driven decision-making style in Sweden goes along with a coherent public diplomacy approach in which all organizations involved agree on a single public diplomacy strategy instead of juxtaposing different public diplomacy strategies.
Assumption 8:	French public diplomacy organizations consider the goal of gaining international influence most important. They place particular emphasis on increasing and maintaining international influence of the French language and culture.
Assumption 9:	Swedish public diplomacy organizations focus on the public diplomacy goals of promoting the image of Sweden and creating awareness of Sweden, its policies, values, and activities.
Assumption 10:	France and Sweden differ with regard to their geographical priorities. While France pays particular attention to former African colonies, Sweden highlights strategic publics in the Baltic Sea region.
Public diplomacy practice on the tactical level	
Assumption 11:	The importance of online media for Swedish journalists and citizens suggests that Swedish public diplomacy organizations rely more heavily on online media, including web 2.0-applications, as public diplomacy tools than French organizations.
Assumption 12:	The level of political participation and trust in national political institutions among Swedish citizens in contrast to French citizens suggest that Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to integrate domestic citizens in public diplomacy initiatives.
Interorganizational cooperation	
Assumption 13:	Non-state organizations like trade unions and associations play a more vital part in the Swedish than in French public diplomacy.
Assumption 14:	Both French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations are more likely to engage in selected, project-based cooperations with EU organizations than in long-term, strategic cooperation efforts.

(Source: own depiction)

The EU is a multi-issue organization. EU competences as well as political consensus among EU member states varies significantly between the different policy areas, which constrains a more coherent EU public diplomacy approach. Policy priorities of member state governments do not only affect the coherence of EU policies, but also the definition of public diplomacy goals of the EU as well as the member states. The focus of both French and Swedish public diplomacy organizations on national, competitive goals impedes EU public diplomacy. While the two member states also include transnational public diplomacy goals, only France explicitly refers to the EU and European integration. In contrast to that, one Swedish interviewee explained that Sweden makes a deliberate attempt to position itself away from the EU in countries where the regional organization is perceived negatively.

Rather than supporting entire EU public diplomacy strategies, member states add selectively to EU public diplomacy. Sweden, for example, considers the Baltic Sea Program as a public diplomacy priority, but strongly opposes cooperation with the EU on trade promotion in third countries. None of the key messages defined by member state organizations depicts the EU in a negative way. However, only the French Permanent Representation to the EU includes European integration as well as the work of EU institutions in its key messages. Whereas the EU key message on its achievements is rather exclusive, all other EU public diplomacy messages can be complemented with member state narratives. The comparative analysis of French and Swedish public diplomacy has revealed that France as a founding member that has adopted the Euro currency, and a comparably high degree of influence on EU decision-making, pursues a slightly more cooperative strategy with regard to EU public diplomacy (assumptions 15 to 17). Sweden, as a smaller and less influential EU member state also includes cooperative elements in its public diplomacy strategy to attain goals it would not be able to reach on its own. Cooperation does, however, not focus on the EU specifically, but refers to multilateral organizations in general (assumption 18). Table 18 below summarizes the discussion of the assumptions regarding the complementarity of national and regional public diplomacy (research question three):

**Table 18: Tested research assumptions based (third research question) (confirmed assumptions are highlighted in green, assumptions that could not be confirmed are highlighted in red)**

Assumption 15:	France as a founding member of the EU pursues a more cooperative public diplomacy approach, working together with the EU, than Sweden.
Assumption 16:	France as a EU member state that has adopted the Euro currency pursues a more cooperative public diplomacy approach, working together with the EU, than Sweden.
Assumption 17:	France as a EU member state with a comparably high degree of influence on EU decisions and comparably large amount of financial contributions to the EU pursues a more cooperative public diplomacy approach, working together with the EU, than Sweden.
Assumption 18:	Sweden as a less influential EU member state and less public diplomacy resources than France adopts a cooperative strategy to attain public diplomacy goals it would not be able to reach on its own. Cooperation does not necessarily refer to the EU.

(Source: own depiction)

This thesis could only present the main findings of the empirical analysis. It would have gone beyond the scope of this study to present similarities and differences of all (sub-) groups of interviews and documents (see sub-chapter 5.2.6) in detail. In addition to that, not all analytical dimensions have been analyzed exhaustively.

Sub-chapter 2.7 has provided the basis for analyzing interorganizational cooperation on a national, regional and transnational level. It deductively developed a large set of sub-dimensions to fathom public diplomacy networks on the organizational level, as well as the whole network level. Data on interorganizational cooperation was primarily gathered from guided expert interviews. A time frame of 45 to 60 minutes or sometimes less (see sub-chapter 2.5.2) did not allow for covering all sub-aspects of interorganizational cooperation in detail. The empirical analysis yielded only little information on the organization-public relationship dimensions ‘trust’ and ‘control mutuality’ (see sub-chapter 2.7). Moreover, there is a lack of data on the network level of interorganizational cooperation. The researcher can only analyze network purpose, network structure and network governance (see sub-chapter 2.7) in a meaningful way if statements from several network members are available. This is only the case for a number of networks, such as EUNIC or the Council for the Promotion of Sweden. Although the set of analytical sub-dimensions to examine interorganizational cooperation among public diplomacy organizations has proven to be too extensive for this study, it may serve as a theoretical guideline for future studies concentrating on dyadic relationships between organizations and/or networks (see sub-chapter 7.2 below).

## **7.2 Avenues for future research and practice**

The findings of this study reveal a number of important implications for EU and member state practitioners. The EU pursues a rather decentralized public diplomacy approach based on relatively separate communication structures and strategies for the internal and external dimension of EU public diplomacy. Both the theoretical treatise and the presentation of findings have pointed to an increasing interconnection of the domestic/internal and foreign/external dimension of public diplomacy. To acknowledge these developments, EU public diplomacy organizations communicating to internal and external publics should not only agree on overarching communication priorities, but exchange more regularly on the strategic planning and implementation of public diplomacy efforts. This refers particularly to DG Communication, the EEAS, and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.

The empirical analysis has shown that the Spokesperson Service still focuses primarily on Brussels-based journalists. The finding points to a persisting problem in EU communication: The Spokesperson Service prioritizes Brussels-based correspondents with a more positive view and more knowledge on the EU over national-based journalists that do not only cover the EU more negatively, but also account for a much bigger share of EU coverage (see sub-chapter 3.3). This dilemma will become more pronounced in the future, as several interviewees have stated that less and less journalists are physically present in Brussels. This thesis therefore suggests placing more emphasis on national-based journalists within the Spokesperson Service.

Moreover, the empirical findings have shown that EU, as well as French and Swedish public diplomacy practitioners underline the importance of two-way communication in public diplomacy, but primarily use interactive tools for promotional purposes and to communicate pre-defined values and messages (technical dialogue). This thesis strongly encourages European public diplomacy organizations to not only adopt a rhetoric of dialogue, but to integrate genuine dialogue in its public diplomacy activities. Genuine dialogue in domestic, but also foreign public diplomacy has the potential to strengthen national cohesion within EU member states. This includes the recognition of

countercultures and an on-going (re-) negotiation of a country's identity and its values. A genuinely dialogic approach may conflict with a country's pre-defined brand values and messages, but has an important integrative function. To Booms (2015), integration is a crucial security-political dimension. In an analysis of the recent terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015, he argues that every society needs to continually and (self-) critically reflect the sustainability of its own values in order to avoid the emergence of parallel societies. If citizens cannot identify with the values public diplomacy organizations communicate within a country or on behalf of a country to foreign publics, they may search for alternative, perhaps more extreme conceptions of society.

To Rasmussen (2012), "EU-level public diplomacy has traditionally focused on uncontroversial issues where the Member States are largely in agreement" (Rasmussen, 2012, p. 39). Strengthening the role of genuine dialogue may contribute to a more pluralistic, diverse EU public diplomacy approach. The EU is a multi-issue organization, in which political consensus among EU member states varies significantly between the different policy areas. The findings of this study have shown that France and Sweden engage in EU public diplomacy selectively, focusing on policy areas in which EU and national positions correspond to each other, or in which member states can exercise considerable influence. The communication of EU values that are not static, but also take into consideration the positions of member states that have joined the EU over the course of the past twelve years will increase the engagement of these 'new' member states in EU public diplomacy. In an empirical study on German public diplomacy, Löffelholz et al. (2011b, see also Auer & Srugies, 2013) have shown that German organizations successfully communicate a pluralistic picture of the country abroad. Applying these findings to the EU, a public diplomacy approach that integrates diverging positions on single issues does not necessarily constrain the success of EU public diplomacy, but contributes to the credibility of promoting the inclusive, multifaceted nature of the EU.

The findings of this study do not only disclose practical implications, but also contribute to empirically grounded theory building in public diplomacy research. This sub-chapter offers a number of suggestions on how to further develop existing public diplomacy models, and also fathoms the potential of advancing public diplomacy theory from a public relations perspective.

Chapter two has introduced a differentiation between competitive approaches, understanding public diplomacy mainly as a zero-sum game, and cooperative approaches, comprehending public diplomacy as a concept that does not only serve the interest of a single political entity, but also addresses common interests of several international actors. Both Leonard et al. (2002) and Hocking (2008) point to the more cooperative nature of public diplomacy activities in the context of multilateral organizations or transnational networks. The findings of this study imply that the engagement of EU member states in transnational public diplomacy efforts may also be motivated by national, competitively oriented goals. France, for example, seeks to enhance its normative power, and by that, its international influence, within and through the EU. Similarly, Sweden does not only foster the development of transnational networks on digital diplomacy to support a mutual learning process and advance common solutions to new digital challenges. It also aims at promoting itself as a pioneer in digital diplomacy and communicating the core value 'innovative' as part of the country's brand strategy. While national public diplomacy may be more competitive, transnational public diplomacy efforts can serve both competitively and cooperatively oriented goals.

The theoretical reflection on the role of domestic/internal publics in sub-chapter 2.5.2 has disclosed the following functions of the domestic/internal dimension of public diplomacy:


- Legitimizing external actions (see for instance Huijgh, 2013; Potter, 2009),

- gaining support for external actions (see for instance Bátorá, 2005; Huijgh, 2013; Potter, 2009),
- engaging domestic publics (see for instance Bátorá, 2005; Cull 2008a),
- strengthening national/ regional cohesion (see for instance d’Hooghe, 2011; Wang, 2008), and
- identity and community building (on a regional level) (see for instance Chachavalpongpun, 2011; Huijgh, 2011; Smith, 2014).

Based on the empirical findings of this study, the researcher suggests to extend this typology by further differentiating the function ‘strengthening national/regional cohesion’, as well as adding the goal ‘stimulating cultural awareness’. In both France and Sweden, strengthening national cohesion incorporates the integration of migrants. Whereas France Médias Monde emphasizes the communication of cultural values, Radio Sverige International seeks to foster the social participation of immigrants who have not picked up the Swedish language yet by broadcasting information on Sweden in Kurdish, Persian or for instance Somali. Moreover, Radio Sverige International contributes to strengthening national cohesion by preserving and fostering minority languages and cultures. The government agency Swedish Arts Council promotes exchange and cooperation within the field of culture. The notion of exchange is connected to the goal of raising awareness of culture from other parts of the world among strategic publics within Sweden (SWE I 08b). Drawing on the practical commendations developed above, domestic public diplomacy can only contribute to strengthening national cohesion in a broader sense and integrating migrants in a more narrow sense, if public diplomacy organizations pursue a genuine dialogue and not force pre-defined values on domestic publics.

Sub-chapter 2.6.2 has proposed a systematization of public diplomacy tools in five groups: controlled (online) media, public media, interactive online media, events/group communication, as well as one-on-one communication. However, a number of tools and programs mentioned by interviewees and in documents, including awarding grants to artists and cultural institutes, as well as providing technical expertise and allocating micro-credits to (groups of) people in developing countries, cannot be assigned to any of these groups. Therefore, this study suggests to add ‘facilitating tools’ as a sixth group to the systematization of public diplomacy tools (see illustration Illustration 25 below). Drawing on the definition of facilitation by Fisher & Bröckerhoff (2008), facilitation tools provide strategic publics “with the means of achieving their goals” (p. 2008, p. 26). Facilitation corresponds to the idea of ‘power for’, the empowerment of less powerful individuals or organizations (see for instance Barnett & Duval, 2005; Hayden, 2012; Huxham & Beech, 2008). Even though facilitating tools actively involve strategic publics and draw on two-way communication, their purpose may be rather competitive. Public diplomacy organizations applying facilitating tools aim at gaining international influence and/or “chang[ing] the way the target audience acts” (Fisher & Bröckerhoff, 2008, p. 26, see also FRA Doc 08).

### Illustration 25: Revised systematization of public diplomacy tools and communication channels



This study has explored the potential of applying strategic framing to analyzing messages as a component of public diplomacy strategies (see sub-chapter 2.6.1). It focused on the content of messages and examined the thematic issues addressed in public diplomacy messages, as well as the aspects of issues that are either highlighted or neglected by the organizations analyzed. To understand public diplomacy messages in greater detail, future research should also fathom how public diplomacy organizations communicate messages to their strategic publics. Due to conceptual and practical convergences of public diplomacy and public relations (see for instance Fitzpatrick, Kendrick & Fullerton, 2013), public relations concepts and approaches have substantial potential to advance public diplomacy theory. Werder's (2015) typology of public relations messaging strategies serve as a starting point for understanding and analyzing how public diplomacy messages are communicated. Werder (2015) builds on the public relations process model introduced by Hazleton and Long in 1988, and identifies six different strategies: informative strategies, persuasive strategies, facilitative strategies, power strategies, bargaining strategies, and cooperative problem-solving strategies. The first four strategies are based on the concepts for planned change identified by Zaltman & Duncan (1977). Bargaining and cooperative problem-solving strategies, on the contrary, are taken from the four models of public relations suggested by Grunig and Hunt (1984). The following table Table 19 provides an overview of the different types of messaging strategies.

**Table 19: Messaging strategies**

Messaging strategy	Characteristics	Assumptions about strategic publics	(Suggested) application
informative	unbiased presentation of facts, neutral language, focus on cognitive information processing	rational, motivated, draws appropriate conclusions from facts presented	used to create awareness of an issue or problem, most likely to be effective in long-term oriented public diplomacy strategies
persuasive	purposefully selected information on an issue or problem, appeal to the emotions and	low problem recognition, low involvement, low motivation or even resistance towards public	more likely to be adopted in short-term public diplomacy

	values of strategic publics	diplomacy goals	strategies
facilitative	allocation of tangible and intangible resources to support strategic publics to act in a particular way	lack of resources to attain a particular goal	most effective if strategic publics lack the resources to attain a goal that is supported or encouraged by public diplomacy organizations
coercive	exercise of power (promises, rewards, threats, punishment) to gain compliance	anticipated resistance towards a public diplomacy goal	most effective if behavioral change is sought and in the case of anticipated resistance by strategic publics
bargaining	purposeful deception or withholding of information, exclusive rhetoric	strategic publics do not pursue compatible goals	more likely if goals of public diplomacy organizations are less compatible
cooperative problem-solving	open exchange of information, joint problem and goal definition, joint issue positions, inclusive rhetoric	strategic publics pursue compatible goals	more likely if there is a high degree of interdependence and public diplomacy organizations have compatible goals

(Source: own depiction, based on Werder, 2015)

A number of scholars (see for instance Förster & Werder, 2011; Gallo, 2009; Guilfoil, 2010) have empirically validated this typology of messaging strategies. The selection of a messaging strategy embodies “strategic choices [that] reflect assumptions about motivational, cognitive, and behavioral characteristics of audiences” (Hazleton, 1993, p. 91), as well as the role attributed to strategic publics. It also provides important cues for determining the public diplomacy approach pursued by organizations. While informative, persuasive, and facilitative messaging strategies may be adopted in both competitive and cooperative approaches to public diplomacy, coercive messaging and bargaining strategies hint at a competitive approach to public diplomacy. On the contrary, cooperative problem-solving strategies are indicative of a cooperative approach to public diplomacy. Furthermore, White and Radic (2014) conducted a first empirical study on public diplomacy messaging strategies of ‘new’ EU member states and candidate countries, and investigated how messaging strategies correlate with infrastructure factors as well as the foreign perception of these countries.

In the time frame of analysis of this study, the EU and its member states had to face a number of transnational crises, including the European financial crisis, the Ukraine crisis, as well as the terrorist attacks in France, and the ongoing refugee crisis. Transnational crises demand quick and effective communication with both geographically and culturally distant strategic publics. Public diplomacy constitutes a valuable tool to manage and mitigate transboundary crises (cf. Olsson, 2013). Auer (2013) and Olsson (2013) are among the first to explore the potential of crisis communication and crisis management literature for theorizing public diplomacy research. Whereas Auer (2013) examines



the crisis management of political actors, Olsson (2013) points to sense making, networking, and messaging as three core functions of public diplomacy in crises.

Public diplomacy can contribute to preventing crises. Moreover, listening as a core element of public diplomacy plays an important part in detecting crises at an early stage. Further research should address the extent to which public diplomacy organizations include aspects of crisis communication in their public diplomacy strategies, and to what extent they have specific communication structures to address crises, and how they adapt their strategies in a post-crisis and learning phase. The 'Integrative Model of Organizational Crisis Communication' (Schwarz, Rothenberger, Schleicher & Srugies, 2014), for example, provides a good basis for elaborating the role of public diplomacy in crises. It analyzes all phases of the crisis communication process (crisis prevention, crisis preparation, acute crisis communication, post-crisis communication and learning) from an institutional, a technical-instrumental and a symbolic-relational perspective (cf. Schwarz et al., 2014, p. 6).

The brief discussion of limitations in sub-chapter 7.1 has pointed out that this study could not empirically investigate all sub-categories within the analytical dimension 'Interorganizational cooperation' (see sub-chapter 2.7). While the set of sub-categories proved to be too extensive for a broad public diplomacy study such as this one, it provides a theoretical guideline for future studies that concentrate on the aspect of interorganizational cooperation. (Comparative) case studies on public diplomacy networks at national, regional, and transnational networks enrich the "understanding of the underlying dynamics of relationship building and [...] practical knowledge about how to transform relationships into more elaborate and effective network structures" (Zaharna, Fisher & Arsenault, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, they contribute to the development of taxonomies of public diplomacy networks that depicts similarities and differences of national, regional, and transnational networks.

These analyses should include guided interviews with all network members or, if this is not feasible, with a careful selection of members at the center and the periphery to, 1) examine why, how and to what extent single organizations engage in networks, and building on an aggregation of the interview data, 2) make tentative statements about the purpose, the structure, and the governance of whole networks. By fathoming interorganizational cooperation both on the organizational and the whole network level, scholars can explore "how organizational phenomena at one level affect organizational phenomena at other (higher or lower) levels" (Moliterno & Mahony, 2011, p. 447). Furthermore, an observation of network meetings can provide additional insights into communication structures and processes, as well as relations between network members.

Besides deepening the understanding of single dimensions of analysis addressed in this study, further research should also turn its eyes on broadening the knowledge on European public diplomacy by including further EU organizations and more EU member states in empirical analyses. Dolea and Ingenhoff (2016) point to different positions of 'old' and 'new' EU member states<sup>244</sup> in the current refugee crisis and, subsequently, different actions and discourses on migration policy (see also Dolea, 2016). It would be very interesting to examine the extent to which the public diplomacy understanding and practice of 'old' and 'new' member states resemble each other or differ, and to what extent their public diplomacy approaches complement or contradict EU public diplomacy. A possible follow-up study could draw on a combination of document analysis and guided interviews to investigate the public diplomacy understanding and practice of two relatively similar 'old' member states' and two relatively similar 'new' member states. This sampling strategy combines a most similar design within

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<sup>244</sup> The term 'new' member states refer to all EU member states that have joined the regional organization in the course or after the 2004 enlargement.

‘old’ and ‘new’ member states with a most different cases design between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states (cf. Hanitzsch & Esser, 2012, p. 512)<sup>245</sup>.

The state of public diplomacy research presented in sub-chapter 1.3 has disclosed a dominance of qualitative studies. Wang and Sun’s (2012) study of eight national pavilions at the world exposition in Shanghai in 2010 is among the few research projects that applies quantitative methods to the analysis of public diplomacy. Up to now, public diplomacy research heavily relied on qualitative approaches to data collection and analysis. Future research needs to give a more prominent role to quantitative approaches and integrate them in mixed method designs. One way to advance quantitative public diplomacy research is a follow-up study that comparatively analyzes the public diplomacy approach of all 28 EU member states, and EU public diplomacy practitioners on the basis of a more quantitative research design. This thesis may serve as a first qualitative pre-study for developing a quantitative survey that is sent to representatives of the most important public diplomacy organizations in each EU member state. This survey may be complemented with additional guided interviews in all or selected countries to deepen single dimensions of analysis, as well as an analysis of strategy documents.

While many researchers stress the importance of network-based approaches to public diplomacy (see for example Riordan, 2004; Zaharna, 2005; Zaharna, Arsenault & Fisher, 2013), the scholarly community itself is only loosely connected, and joint empirical research projects are still an exception. This thesis encourages more joint projects in public diplomacy research in order to realize large-scale comparative research projects such as an analysis of public diplomacy by the EU and all 28 member states. It suggests adopting Hanitzsch and Esser’s (2012) collaborative model of scientific cooperation to conduct large-scale comparative studies. Within this model international research teams jointly develop guiding concepts and instruments, and are also integrated in the analysis and interpretation of the empirical data, while one researcher or one research institution coordinates the project (cf. Hanitzsch, 2008, p. 262). This model was applied in Hanitzsch’s comprehensive study on journalism cultures in 18 countries, for example (see for instance Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011). Large-scale comparative studies do not only demand cooperation among scholars, but also substantial funding. A lack of financial means, as well as complex application procedures to attain funding has kept many scholars from realizing these studies (cf. Hanitzsch & Esser, 2012). In the case of examining the public diplomacy of the EU’s 28 member states, ‘Starting Grant’ or ‘Consolidator Grant’ allocated by the European Research Council may provide useful funding instruments. They allow European researchers to create and independently coordinate international research teams and each cover a period of five years (cf. European Research Council, n.d.a, n.d.b).

The study at hand analyzes public diplomacy of regional organizations on the basis of one single actor, the European Union. To gain a deeper understanding of public diplomacy by regional organization, future research needs to turn its eyes on trans-regional analyses that comparatively assess the public diplomacy practice of regional organizations. While ASEAN is “[w]idely perceived as the [Southeast Asian] region’s version of the European Union” (Löffelholz & Arao, 2011, p. 79), there are significant differences between the two regional bodies. Whereas the EU features a high level of regional integration with regard to “institutional structures, dominant principles and decision-making processes” (Löffelholz & Arao, 2011, p. 72), the “ASEAN Way” implies, “partnership known for minimal institutionalism, a low level of supranational elements and a preference for consensus-building” (ibid., 2011, p. 7). Pagovski (2015) refers to this differentiation as ‘hard’ and ‘soft institutionalism’. A comparative analysis of the EU and ASEAN could shed light on the question of

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<sup>245</sup> In a ‘most similar cases design’, cases are included that are similar in as many as possible. Scholars seek to manipulate intervening variables on the basis of the case selection. The ‘most different cases design’, in turn, aims at determining how robust a relationship among variables is under different conditions. (cf. Peters, 1998, pp. 36-41)

how the different institutional contexts of these two regional organizations influence their public diplomacy strategies.

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## Appendix A: Printed Appendix

### Appendix A.1: List of coded strategy documents

#### EU

- EU Doc 01      CEC (2005). *Communication to the Commission: Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe by the Commission*. SEC(2005) 985 final. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 02      CEC (2005). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions on The Commission's contribution to the period of reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate*. COM (2005) 494 final. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 03      CEC (2006). *Communication from the Commission to the European Council: The Period of reflection and Plan D*. COM (2006) 212 final. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 04      CEC (2006). *White Paper on a European Communication Policy*. COM (2006) 35 final. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 05      CEC (2007). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Communicating Europe in Partnership*. COM (2007) 568 final. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 06      CEC (2007). *Communication to the Commission: Communicating about Europe via the Internet. Engaging the citizens*. SEC (2007)1742. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 07      CEC (2008). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions: Debate Europe — building on the experience of Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate*. COM(2008) 158 final. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 08      CEC (2008). *Communication to the Commission: Communicating Europe through audiovisual media*. SEC(2008)506/2. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 09      European Commission - Secretariat General (2014). *Rules governing the composition of the Cabinets of the Members of the Commission and of the Spokesperson's Service*. C(2014) 9002. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 10      CEC (2006). *Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006. Europe in the World — Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility*. COM (2006) 278 final. Brussels: European Commission.

- EU Doc 11 European Commission - Secretariat General (2011). *Vademecum on Working Relations with the European External Action Service (EEAS)*. SEC (2011)1636. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 12 European External Action Service (2013). *EEAS Review* Brussels: European External Action Service.
- EU Doc 13 EEAS Strategic Communication Division & DEVCO Communication and Transparency Unit (2012). *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*. Brussels: EEAS Strategic Communication Division & DEVCO Communication and Transparency Unit.
- EU Doc 14 European External Action Service (2011). *Multi-annual programme for cooperation with industrialised countries and other high-income countries and territories (2011 - 2013)*. Brussels: European External Action Service.
- EU Doc 15 *COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1934/2006 of 21 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for cooperation with industrialised and other high-income countries and territories* (2006). L 405/41. Brussels: European Council.
- EU Doc 16 European Commission - EuropeAid Cooperation Office (2010). *Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions*. Brussels: European Commission - EuropeAid Cooperation Office.
- EU Doc 17 European Commission - Secretariat General (2014). *Communication from the President to the Commission: The Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019*. C (2014) 9004. Brussels: European Commission.
- EU Doc 18 The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton (2010). *Draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service*. Brussels: European Commission.
- FRANCE**
- FRA Doc 01 Gordon-Krief, D. (2014). *L'influence de la France sur la scène européenne et internationale par la promotion du droit continental*. NOR: CESL1100019X. Paris: Conseil économique, social et environnemental
- FRA Doc 02 Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international (2013). *Quelle Ambition pour une Diplomatie d'Influence de la France au XXIème Siècle? Stratégie pour l'Action Culturelle Extérieure*. Paris: Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international.

- FRA Doc 03 Laignel, A. (2013). *L'action extérieure des collectivités territoriales françaises : nouvelles approches... Nouvelles ambitions*. Paris: Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international.
- FRA Doc 04 Le Bris, R.-F. (2005). *Réflexion et propositions sur l'organisation et le fonctionnement des services de l'Etat à l'étranger*. Paris: Collection des rapports officiels. La Documentation Française.
- FRA Doc 05 Juppé, A. & Schweitzer, L. (2008). *La France et l'Europe dans le monde - Livre blanc sur la politique étrangère et européenne de la France 2008 – 2020*. Paris: Présidence de la République & Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes.
- FRA Doc 06 Duvernois, L. (2004). *Rapport d'information fait au nom de la Commission des affaires culturelles sur la stratégie d'action culturelle de la France à l'étranger*. Paris: Sénat - Commission des affaires culturelle.
- FRA Doc 07 *LOI n° 2010-873 du 27 juillet 2010 relative à l'action extérieure de l'Etat* (2010). NOR: MAEX0912977L.
- FRA Doc 08 *LOI no. 2014-773 du 7 juillet 2014 d'orientation et de programmation relative à la politique de développement et de solidarité internationale* (2014). NOR: MAEX1325199L.
- FRA Doc 09 Mélloul, F. (2010). *Développement de l'influence de la France sur la scène internationale: Une diplomatie publique à la française*. Rapport à M. Le Secrétaire Général de l'UMP.
- FRA Doc 10 Ministère des Finances et des Comptes Publics (2014). *PLF 2015 – Extrait du bleu budgétaire de la mission: Action extérieure de l'état*. Paris: Ministère des Finances et des Comptes Publics.

## **SWEDEN**

- SWE Doc 01 *Utrikesförvaltning i världsklass. En mer flexibel utrikesrepresentation* (2010). SOU 2010:32. Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden.
- SWE Doc 02 *Sweden's Strategy for Multilateral Development Cooperation* (2007). Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden.
- SWE Doc 03 *Global challenges - our responsibility, Communication on Sweden's policy for global development* (2008). Government Communication 2007/08:89. Stockholm: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- SWE Doc 04 Swedish Institute (2013). *Strategy for the Promotion of Sweden Abroad*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.

- SWE Doc 05 *Översyn av myndighetsstrukturen för Sverige-, handels- och investeringsfrämjande* (2011). Ds 2011:29. Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden.
- SWE Doc 06 *Kulturlivets internationalisering* (2006). Skr. 2005/06: 188. Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden.
- SWE Doc 07 *OECD Strategy for Sweden - Overall Priorities and Organisation* (2004). Ds 2004:17. Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden.
- SWE Doc 08 *The Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy* (2004). Communication 2004/05: 52. Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden.
- SWE Doc 09 *Public diplomacy: Guidelines and checklist* (2013). Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- SWE Doc 10 Swedish Institute (2014). *Strategi för Sverigebilden*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.
- SWE Doc 11 Swedish Institute (2013). *Riktlinjer för Tredje Parts användande av den visuella identiten för Sverigefrämjande*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.
- SWE Doc 12 Swedish Institute (2013). *Budskapsplattform – För hållbar utveckling*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.
- SWE Doc 13 Swedish Institute (2013). *Budskapsplattform – För området samhällsfrågor*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.
- SWE Doc 14 Swedish Institute (2013). *Budskapsplattform – För Sverige som innovationsland*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.
- SWE Doc 15 Swedish Institute (2013). *Budskapsplattform – För kulturella och kreativa näringar*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.
- SWE Doc 16 *Uppdrag att ta fram underlag för informations- och kommunikationsverksamheten inom internationellt utvecklingssamarbete* (2015). Bilaga till regeringsbeslut 2015-05-28 (UF2015/32103/DU/USTYR). Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- SWE Doc 17 *Uppdrag att ta fram underlag för stödet till civila samhället i utvecklingsländer* (2015). Bilaga till regeringsbeslut 2015-05-28 (UF2015/32103/DU/USTYR). Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- SWE Doc 18 *Strategy for research cooperation and research in development cooperation 2015 – 2021* (2014). Annex to Government decision 18 December 2014 (UF2014/80398/UD/USTYR). Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.



**Appendix A2 : Coding Frame Strategy Documents**

**COMPETITION OR COOPERATION? A  
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND  
SELECTED MEMBER STATES**

**Document Analysis of Strategy Documents by EU, French  
and Swedish public diplomacy organizations  
Coding Frame**

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# INTRODUCTION

## I Objective of the Document Analysis

This document analysis seeks to answer the question how the EU and selected EU member states conduct public diplomacy. It comparatively analyzes the public diplomacy goals, approaches, tools and key messages of both EU and member state organizations as well as the interorganizational cooperations they engage in to reach public diplomacy objectives. This codebook focuses on the analysis of strategy documents only.

### Definition of public diplomacy

Public diplomacy encompasses communication activities of international actors that aim at managing the international environment. Public diplomacy can be understood as an instrument of an international actor to improve its international relations and facilitate the assertion of its interests. Public diplomacy can be targeted at both foreign/internal and domestic/external audiences (cf. Auer, Srugies, Löffelholz, 2015, p. 40; Cull, 2009a, p. 12).

Drawing on the different approaches to defining public diplomacy, three roles of public diplomacy actors can be identified. These different roles are not mutually exclusive, but may overlap:

- Public diplomacy actors seek to influence the attitudes and decisions of primarily foreign publics and governments and manage perceptions (role of the persuader),
- Public diplomacy actors seek to evoke understanding for political programs, ideas, ideals and values (role of the generator of understanding), and
- Public diplomacy actors seek to establish and maintain relations and partnerships (role of the facilitator) (cf. Löffelholz, Auer & Srugies, 2015)

In this study, all information and communication activities are considered as public diplomacy that match the definition above. This includes strategies and activities that are not labeled as 'public diplomacy' by the organizations that are analyzed in this codebook.

### Public diplomacy organizations

The term public diplomacy organization comprises both governments as well as government agencies. Other types of organizations like businesses or NGOs that contribute to the public diplomacy of an international actor are only addressed in the analytical dimension 'Interorganizational Cooperation'.

## II Object of Investigation

Strategy documents issued by EU and member state organizations constitute the object of investigation. Strategy documents include all documents in the time frame of analysis that

- outline the public diplomacy goals and the means to attain these goals in a long-term or at least mid-term perspective, and
- include information on...

- goals and strategic publics of international actors and/or public diplomacy organizations,
- the approach pursued to attain these goals,
- the roles and responsibilities of single public diplomacy organizations, and
- relations between these different organizations.

In contrast to that, annual reports and annual communication plans, strategies for specific campaigns and tools as well as controlled media tools like brochures are excluded from the analysis.

To identify the relevant documents for the analysis, this study applies a keyword search in the databases as well as on the websites of the selected public diplomacy organizations. Moreover, documents were identified on the basis of references in guided expert interviews and/or other documents.

The search was carried out in the following databases:

- **EU:** Register of European Commission Documents (<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/index.cfm?language=en>)
- **France:** La Documentation Francaise (<http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr>), LegiFrance (<http://www.legifrance.fr>)
- **Sweden:** Register of Legal Documents (<http://www.government.se/legal-documents>)

The search is based on the following keywords:

English	French	Swedish
<b>Public diplomacy</b>	diplomatie publique diplomatie d'influence	Offentlig diplomati
<b>Strategic communication</b>	communication stratégique	strategisk kommunikation
<b>Information policy</b>	politique d'information	Informationspolitik
<b>Communication policy</b>	politique de communication	Kommunikationspolitik
<b>Information and communication policy</b>	la politique d'information et communication	Informations- och kommunikationspolitik
<b>External communication</b>	communication extérieure	extern kommunikation
<b>Communication strategy</b>	stratégie de communication	kommunikationsstrategi
<b>Promotion</b>	Promotion publicité	Främjande

If a document appears multiple times in databases and on organizations' websites, duplications are excluded. For each document that could be identified on the basis of the keywords listed above, the researcher manually checks if the document provides information on the public diplomacy approach of the respective international actor in at least one section. To carry out this manual check, the researcher reads the table of contents, the executive summary and the introduction of each document. If a document

does not provide information on the public diplomacy approach or only briefly mention public diplomacy are excluded from the analysis.

There are one sampling unit and two coding units that can be differentiated in this document analysis.

### *Sampling Unit*

The sampling unit refers to the single document that is analyzed.

### *Coding Unit*

The codebook at hand is divided into two basic parts.

- a) Coding of the document: On the one hand, the codebook comprises advice and variables for coding aspects of the respective document on document level. This includes all formal categories as well as the category 'Purpose of the Document'.
- b) Coding of single statements: The codebook also encompasses variables that capture single statements about the public diplomacy of the EU. The statement level focuses on specific content-related aspects. Based on the loose structure of qualitative document analyses, all statements that refer to a specific aspect are coded, regardless of where these statements are to be found in the document. Single statements are the coding unit for all content categories except for 'Purpose of the Document'.

The coding unit is defined for each category of the codebook.

All in all, the codebook differentiates between the following content aspects that mark the main dimensions of the analysis:

- A: General Information on the Document
- B: Understanding of Public Diplomacy
- C: Public Diplomacy Organizations
- D: Public Diplomacy Goals
- E: Strategic Publics of Public Diplomacy
- F: Public Diplomacy Approach
- G: Public Diplomacy Tools
- H: Public Diplomacy Key Messages,
- I: Interorganizational Cooperation
- J: Current and Future Challenges

### *Time Frame of Analysis*

The codebook analyzes strategy documents issued from November 22, 2004 to December 1, 2015.

### III General Coding Advice

The codebook **has to be read through entirely** prior to coding. The document does not have to be read entirely before starting to code. However, every document has to be paged through entirely prior to coding in order to grasp its overall structure.

**Please do only code what is really in the document** – neither personal thoughts of the coder nor external information that is known about a certain issue at the point of coding is part of the coding.

**Please code chronologically:** (1) The documents will be read and coded consecutively page by page, (2) one category will be coded after the other. This implies a great coding effort, but it is essential in order to fully embrace the complexity of the object of investigation as well as the category system.

Please effect the coding of the formal categories on the corresponding coding sheet (see Appendix A). The coding sheet will be filed after the coding is completed. Please code all content categories with the qualitative content analysis software MAXQDA.

**Coding with MAXQDA:** All content categories are coded with the software MAXQDA. The researcher makes sure that all coders are familiar with the basic functions of the program at the beginning of the coding process. MAXQDA enables the coder to extract entire text passages, tables and illustrations and file them under a specific category or subcategory. Please extract entire sentences only. Please do not code single keywords or parts of a sentence. Please make sure that the text passages you have extracted provide enough context for understanding a text passage without consulting the coded document.

This codebook serves as a manual for coding both EU and member state documents. If coding instructions for EU and member state documents differ, this is indicated in the coding advice of the respective category. Most categories contain examples. These may either be fictitious or quotations taken from strategy documents (in italics).

# 1. FORMAL CATEGORIES

1.1 Sequential Number	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	Please fill in the sequential number of the document. The sequential number of the document is coded <b>as a three-digit number (e.g. 105)</b> . The sequential number can be extracted from the file name of the document.
<b>Example:</b>	If the document file is labeled 'Doc103', please code '103' as sequential number.

1.2 Date of Issue	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	In this category, the date of issue of the document is coded. The date will be coded as an eight-digit number (YYYYMMDD). If there is no specific date of issue given, please code the year of issue as a four-digit number (YYYY).
<b>Example:</b>	If a document was issued on December 2, 2006, please code 20061202. If there is only the information given that the document was issued in 2008, please code 2008.

1.3 Title of the Document	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	Please note down the complete title of the document (e.g. "COM(2006) 35 final: White Paper on a European Communication Policy"). The title of the document can be found on the cover page of the document.

1.4 Issuer of Document	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures the issuer of the document. Synonyms of issuers of a document include editor and author. Issuers can be individual actors (e.g. David O'Sullivan), organizational units within an organization (e.g. Directorate-General for Communication) or the public diplomacy organization as a whole (e.g. European Commission). Please do not code individual actors, but always organizational units or entire organizations. If the organizational affiliation of an individual actor cannot be identified on the basis of the document, please look the individual issuer up.</p> <p>The issuer of a document is coded openly. The author and the source respectively can be named directly, marked by an acronym or cannot be specified at all. If the author is not specified, please code "issuer of document not apparent".</p>
<b>Example:</b>	Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

### 1.5 Number of Pages

**Coding instructions:**

This category captures the number of pages of the document. Please code the number of pages of the document as a **three-digit number (e.g. 012)**.

Please count the number of pages by applying the Microsoft Word tool “Page count...” or using the page display in Adobe Acrobat. This category refers to the entire document, including cover page and appendix.

**Example:**

If a document contains 12 pages, please code ‘012’.



## 2. CONTENT CATEGORIES

### DIMENSION A: 2.1 GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT

This dimension focuses on general information provided about the document, including its purpose as well as information on reference documents and feedback options. The coding unit is the entire document.

2.1.1 Purpose of the Document	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures the purpose of the document. Why was the document issued? What is its function? Information on this category can be found in the preface, the foreword or the introductory section of the respective document. The coding unit for this category is the entire document.</p> <p>Please only code the purpose of the specific document, not the purpose of a communication strategy or communication activity or the purpose of a specific EU or member state organization.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p><i>„But these initiatives by the European Commission will only succeed if many more forces are brought into play. A partnership approach is essential. Success will depend on the involvement of all the key players – the other EU institutions and bodies; the national, regional and local authorities in the Member States; European political parties; civil society. The main purpose of this White Paper is to propose a way forward and to invite all these players to contribute their ideas on how best we can work together to close the gap. The result will be a forward-looking agenda for better communication to enhance the public debate in Europe.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 04)<sup>1</sup></p>

2.1.2 Feedback on Document	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures all statements that refer to opportunities of providing feedback on the document. Please code all statements that include information on the existence of feedback channels: Who is invited to provide feedback? What are the communication channels the issuer of the document has included for obtaining feedback? How will the feedback be included in the document, future documents and/or future communication initiatives?</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p><i>“European citizens and stakeholders are invited to respond by logging on to a specially created multilingual website <a href="http://europa.eu.int/comm/communication_white_paper">http://europa.eu.int/comm/communication_white_paper</a> or at the postal address White Paper Consultation - European Commission – Directorate General Communication - B-1049 Brussels – Belgium”</i> (Source: EU Doc 04)</p>

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<sup>1</sup> This coding frame only includes examples of EU and Swedish documents that were available in English.

### 2.1.3 Information on Reference Documents

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures the documents that the document at hand is referring to. Please code all statements that provide information on reference documents, including their purpose, their impact as well as their influence on the document at hand. This category captures both information on reference documents issued in the past as well as on planned follow-up documents.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>"The present strategy is a follow-up to the Commission's recent Communication 'Communicating Europe in Partnership'". (Source: EU Doc 06)</i>

## DIMENSION B: 2.2 UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This dimension focuses on the understanding and conceptualization of public diplomacy by EU and member state public diplomacy organizations. It encompasses both communication activities that are explicitly referred to as public diplomacy and communication activities that are not labeled as public diplomacy, but contribute to public diplomacy as defined above. The coding unit is the single statement.

### 2.2.1 Terms and concepts used to describe communication activities

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category aims to define which terms and concepts EU and member state organizations use to describe their communication activities. The coder codes all passages that name terms and concepts to describe communication activities and provide information on how these terms and concepts are understood by the respective EU or member state organization.</p> <p>The single terms and concepts used by EU and member state organizations are developed as sub-categories in the coding process: The coder creates a new sub-code in the program MAXQDA for each new term that can be identified in a document. Does the coding tree in MAXQDA already contain a sub-code for this specific term, all statements regarding this term are coded using this sub-code.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>In the example, 'digital diplomacy' was identified as a term to describe public diplomacy-related activities. In this case, a new sub-code 'digital diplomacy' will be created. The following statement will then be coded under this new sub-code 'digital diplomacy':</p> <p><i>"Digital diplomacy is about using the internet and new technology to achieve the purposes of diplomacy. Digital diplomacy can target civil society, official representatives and decision-makers".</i></p> <p>(Source: SWE Doc 09)</p>

### 2.2.2 Conceptualization of public diplomacy

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements in documents that define public diplomacy and/or disclose information how an international actor as a whole or a specific organization understands public diplomacy. It is only coded if the term public diplomacy is explicitly named in the documents.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>„Public diplomacy encompasses a number of elements from advocacy and public persuasion, usually aimed at media and policy-makers, to the kind of basic information provision that is carried out via the internet, social media platforms, publications, or more explicitly in seminars and conferences, often involving informed audiences that include the private sector, academia, organized civil society and the general public, the citizens. The common denominator of all definitions of “public diplomacy” is its ultimate objective of enhancing the public perception/awareness of a world stage actor (i.e. country or organisation).”</i> (Source: EU Doc 13)

## DIMENSION C: 2.3 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ORGANIZATIONS

This dimension characterizes public diplomacy organizations in greater detail. It looks at internal and external factors that influence the understanding and practice of the concept. The coding unit is the single statement.

While internal factors may only refer to single public diplomacy organizations, external factors political environment, media coverage, public opinion and miscellaneous can either refer to an international actor as a whole or to specific public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of the respective international actor. Category 2.3.1 refers to the international actor as a whole, whereas all subsequent categories refer to single public diplomacy organizations.

### 2.3.1 The international actor in general

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that discuss the external environment of the international actor as a whole.
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#### 2.3.1.1 External environment 1: Political environment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category encompasses all statements that grasp the political and diplomatic environment the international actor operates in.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“EU issues are mainly seen through national lenses and rarely presented in a transnational context [by member state governments], despite the fact that many practical challenges faced by citizens can only be solved at European level”.</i> (Source: EU Doc 05)

2.3.1.2 External environment 2: Media coverage	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category encompasses all statements that refer to the media coverage on the international actor as a whole and how the media coverage influences the public diplomacy of the international actor as a whole. This category includes statements about the media coverage on a transnational, national and regional/local level inside and outside of the EU.</p> <p><b>PLEASE NOTE:</b> Statements that include information on the relationship between journalists and EU public diplomacy organizations are coded in 'Dimension E: Strategic Publics'.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p><i>"One of the factors currently constraining a citizens' debate on the European Union is the very limited coverage of EU information in the audiovisual media".</i> (Source: EU Doc 08)</p>

2.3.1.3 External environment 3: Public Opinion	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category encompasses all statements that refer to public opinion on an international actor and how public opinion influences the international actor's public diplomacy as a whole. Public opinion may be voiced by citizens or more specific publics within and outside of the EU.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p><i>"More than eight out of every ten Europeans feel that it is important to be informed about European issues. Seven out of ten Europeans want to know more about their rights as citizens. Close to two thirds of Europeans think that available information on the EU is useful and interesting, but almost as many find it insufficient".</i> (Source: EU Doc 05).</p>

2.3.1.4 External environment 4: Miscellaneous	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category encompasses all statements that refer to social, economic, technological, geographic and/or ecological factors and how these factors influence an international actor's public diplomacy as a whole.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p><i>"Countries such as China and India are growing fast, and there is increasing competition for access to raw materials, energy resources and markets. Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime remain as pressing as ever".</i> (Source: EU Doc 10)</p>

<b>2.3.1.5 Resources</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that refer to human, financial and other types of resources (e.g. technological infrastructure) on the level of the international actor.
<b>Example:</b>	One interviewee states that there are decisive budget cuts in EU public diplomacy that affects all organizations that conduct public diplomacy on behalf of the EU.

The single public diplomacy organizations as well as the internal and external factors that influence their public diplomacy understanding and practice are developed as sub-categories in the coding process: The coder creates a new sub-code in the program MAXQDA for each new public diplomacy organization that can be identified in a document (subcategory 2.3.2 refers to public diplomacy organization 1, subcategory 2.3.3 refers to public diplomacy organization 2 and so on). Does the coding tree in MAXQDA already contain a sub-code for a specific public diplomacy organization, all statements regarding this public diplomacy organization are coded using this sub-code.

<b>2.3.2 Public Diplomacy Organization 1</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category and its sub-categories 2.3.2.1 to 2.3.2.10 capture statements on the internal and external factors that influence the public diplomacy understanding and practice of organization 1.</p> <p>If statements regarding internal and external influence factors cannot be assigned to one of the sub-categories below , they are coded in this category.</p>

<b>2.3.2.1 Public Diplomacy Organization 1: Overarching goals and mission</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category seeks to grasp all statements that refer to the overarching goals and mission of the respective public diplomacy organization. The mission and overall goals of an organization set a framework in which public diplomacy objectives, strategic publics and approaches are defined. <sup>2</sup>
<b>Example:</b>	<p><i>“The EEAS provides information, advice and support to any of the Commissioners who request or need it, and EU Delegations not only offer support to Commissioners and their DGs when visiting a third country but also host their staff and implement their instructions”.</i></p> <p>(Source: EU Doc 12)</p>

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<sup>2</sup> cf. Löffelholz, Auer, & Schleicher, 2013, p. 181

### 2.3.2.2 Public diplomacy organization 1: Communication structures and procedures within the organization

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category collects all statements on communication structures and procedures within single organizational units or between single units.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“Good coordination between Cabinets and services is ensured by a weekly strategy meeting between the Head of Cabinet and the Director-General and/or their representatives”. (Source: EU Doc 17)</i>

### 2.3.2.3 Public diplomacy organization 1: Structural embeddedness of public diplomacy

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category covers the structural integration of public diplomacy within an organization. All statements that provide information on the single organizational units that fulfil public diplomacy-related tasks are coded here. This encompasses statements that characterize the organizational units in greater detail, including</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• its responsibilities (What tasks are the organizational units entrusted with? Does public diplomacy constitute the main focus? Are there several organizational units that share public diplomacy-related tasks?), and</li> <li>• its position within organization (Is the organizational unit integrated on management level or below management level?).</li> </ul> <p>Second, where the department(s) responsible for public diplomacy is/are located within the organization.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	The Communications Department within the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs is tasked with developing the Ministry’s public diplomacy strategy.

### 2.3.2.4 Public diplomacy organization 1: Resources

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures all statements that refer to resources that are available to an organization or that an organization needs to realize its public diplomacy goals. Resources encompass human, financial and other types of resources.</p> <p>Human resources refer to the persons employed by an organization and entrusted with public diplomacy-related tasks. Please code all statements in a document that refer to the personnel or staff, including statements regarding the number of people employed, their educational and professional background, qualifications employees need to possess to fulfill public diplomacy-related tasks as well as the training of staff members.</p> <p>Financial resources concentrate on the budget for public diplomacy activities. Other types of resources may for instance include specific</p>
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	technologies or software solutions to implement public diplomacy strategies. This category also captures all statements that refer to planned measures that concern resources as well as statements that point to a lack of resources.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“The HR/VP job’s extensive travel requirements affect her ability to participate in Commission meetings. HR/VP staff participate at every level of decision making and discussion on every aspect of Commission policy - from transport to single market issues. Greater use of modern technology such as enabling the HR/VP to contribute to Commission meetings by video link should be considered for the next Commission.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 12)

#### 2.3.2.5 Public diplomacy organization 1: Decision-making power of public diplomacy practitioners

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category refers to the power of influence that single organizational units or departments as well as single practitioners that are entrusted with public diplomacy-related tasks have on decisions on public diplomacy goals, the development and implementation of public diplomacy strategies as well as the allocation of resources to public diplomacy-related tasks. These statements can either refer to the organizational units or single employees within these departments. Furthermore, this category also captures all statements that concern the power of influence of the respective public diplomacy organization within the EU or the member state as a whole.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“The Head of Delegation shall have the power to represent the EU in the country where the delegation is located, in particular for the conclusion of contracts and being a party to legal proceedings”.</i> (Source: EU Doc 18)

#### 2.3.2.6 External environment of public diplomacy organization 1: Political environment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category encompasses all statements that grasp the political and diplomatic environment the public diplomacy organization operates in.
<b>Example:</b>	Processes of regionalization has led the Swedish Institute to redefine its public diplomacy understanding.

#### 2.3.2.7 External environment of public diplomacy organization 1: Public diplomacy core areas

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category encompasses all statements that refer to the core area(s) the public diplomacy organization operates in and how the this core area / these core areas influence the public diplomacy understanding and practice of the organization. There are four different public diplomacy core areas: politics/military, economy, society/culture and education/research <sup>3</sup> . Synonyms of core area include field of work, area of work.
<b>Example:</b>	As an actor in the field of culture, the Swedish Ministry of Culture places a lot of emphasis on mutual exchange and two-way communication as pillars of public diplomacy.

#### 2.3.2.8 External environment of public diplomacy organization 1: Media coverage

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category encompasses all statements that refer to the media coverage on the respective international actor or single public diplomacy organizations and how the media coverage influences the public diplomacy understanding and practice of organization 1. This category includes statements about the media coverage on a transnational, national and regional/local level inside and outside of the EU.</p> <p><b>PLEASE NOTE:</b> Statements that include information on the relationship between journalists and EU public diplomacy organizations are coded in 'Dimension E: Strategic Publics'.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	Media coverage on Sweden in the broadsheet press in emerging countries has led the Swedish Institute to rethink the communication of the Swedish image abroad.

#### 2.3.2.9 External environment of public diplomacy organization 1: Public Opinion

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category encompasses all statements that refer to public opinion on the respective international actor or single public diplomacy organizations and how public opinion influences the public diplomacy understanding and practice of organization 1. Public opinion may be voiced by citizens or more specific publics within and outside of the EU.
<b>Example:</b>	As public opinion polls in Asian countries show that respondents hold only little knowledge on French culture, the Institut Français plans to allocate more resources to cultural activities in Asian countries.

<sup>3</sup> see Leonard et al., 2002; Löffelholz, Auer, Krichbaum & Srugies, 2011



<b>2.3.2.10 External environment of public diplomacy organization 1: Miscellaneous</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category encompasses all statements that refer to social, economic, technological, geographic and/or ecological factors and how these factors influence the public diplomacy understanding and practice of organization 1.
<b>Example:</b>	New information and communication technologies provide individuals with new tools to voice their opinions. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs needs to adapt to these changing conditions and places greater emphasis on digital diplomacy.

## **DIMENSION D: 2.4 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GOALS**

This dimension examines the objectives that organizations seek to reach on the basis of their public diplomacy activities. It aims at capturing the types of public diplomacy objectives and the process of developing. The coding unit is the single statement.

<b>2.4.1 Prioritization of public diplomacy goals</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that disclose to what extent a public diplomacy organization prioritizes specific public diplomacy goals. Please also code statements that indicate that there is no prioritization of public diplomacy goals.
<b>Example:</b>	The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs defines increasing the country's international influence in the area of culture and development cooperation as most important public diplomacy goals.

<b>2.4.2 Coordination of public diplomacy goals</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category examines to what extent organizations coordinate and jointly develop public diplomacy goals. Coordination of goals can refer to coordination among single units within a public diplomacy organization (2.4.2.1), coordination between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of one international actor (2.4.2.2) or coordination between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors (2.4.2.3).

<b>2.4.2.1 Coordination of public diplomacy goals within organizations</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe coordination of public diplomacy goals among single units of one organization. Text passages that explicitly state that there is no coordination of public

	diplomacy goals among different units of one public diplomacy organization are also coded in this sub-category.
<b>Example:</b>	coordination of public diplomacy goals between the Department for the EU Internal Market and the Promotion of Sweden and Swedish Trade as well as the Communications Department within the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

#### **2.4.2.2 Coordination of public diplomacy goals between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of the same international actor**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe coordination of public diplomacy goals between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of one international actor. Text passages that explicitly state that there is no coordination of public diplomacy goals between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of one international actor are also coded in this sub-category.
<b>Example:</b>	coordination of public diplomacy goals between the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute

#### **2.4.2.3 Coordination of public diplomacy goals between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe coordination of public diplomacy goals between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors. Text passages that explicitly state that there is no coordination of public diplomacy goals between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors are also coded in this sub-category.
<b>Example:</b>	coordination of public diplomacy goals between the Swedish and the Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU

#### **2.4.3 Attunement of public diplomacy goals to political priorities**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category refers to statements that outline to what extent public diplomacy goals are attuned to overarching political priorities and guidelines of an international actor. It captures all text passages that describe these priorities and guidelines.
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<b>Example:</b>	Public diplomacy goals of DG Communication are attuned to the 10 EU Priorities defined by Jean-Claude Juncker.
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The single public diplomacy goals are developed inductively as sub-categories in the coding process: The coder creates a new sub-code in the program MAXQDA for each new public diplomacy goal that can be identified in a document (sub-categories 2.4.4 to 2.4.x). Does the coding tree in MAXQDA already contain a sub-code for a specific goal, all statements regarding this public diplomacy goal are coded using this sub-code.

<b>2.4.4 Public diplomacy goal 1</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that refer to the goals that public diplomacy organizations seek to achieve on the basis of their public diplomacy efforts. Keywords such as aim, focus or objective function as synonyms for the word goal and can also point to the statements regarding public diplomacy goal.
<b>Example:</b>	Increase the participation of EU citizens in debates on EU-related issues.

<b>2.4.4.1 Definition of intermediate communication objectives</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that break public diplomacy goals down into single intermediate communication objectives.
<b>Example:</b>	Raising awareness of existing participate fora of the EU as an intermediate communication objective that contributes to attaining the goal of increasing the participation of EU citizens in debates on EU-related issues.

<b>2.4.4.2 Reference to strategic publics – Public diplomacy goal 1</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that specify the strategic publics that the public diplomacy goal defined in category 2.4.4 is directed at. Strategic publics are individuals or groups of people (organizations, communities etc.) that public diplomacy organizations seek to reach, but that can also affect the realization of public diplomacy objectives <sup>4</sup> . Statements in strategy documents may also refer to strategic publics as stakeholders, target groups or target regions.
<b>Example:</b>	The public diplomacy goal increasing the participation of EU citizens in debates on EU-related issues refers to citizens in EU member states as strategic publics.

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<sup>4</sup> See Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 424

## DIMENSION E: 2.5 STRATEGIC PUBLICS

This dimension concentrates on strategic publics that public diplomacy organizations address on the basis of their public diplomacy activities. The following sub-categories identify strategic publics that public diplomacy organizations seek to reach on the basis of their public diplomacy activities. Strategic publics are individuals or groups of people (organizations, communities etc.) that public diplomacy organizations seek to reach, but that can also affect the realization of public diplomacy objectives<sup>5</sup>. Statements in strategy documents may also refer to strategic publics as stakeholders, target groups or target regions. The coding unit is the single statement.

**PLEASE NOTE:** Strategic publics refer to individuals, groups of people and organizations that EU public diplomacy efforts are directed at. While they can play an active role in dialogue- and collaboration-oriented public diplomacy initiatives and tools, they have to be differentiated from organizations that cooperate with public diplomacy organizations to define, develop, implement and evaluate public diplomacy goals, strategies and tools. Statements that refer to other organizations as cooperation partners are coded in ‘Dimension F: Public Diplomacy Approaches’, ‘Dimension G: Public Diplomacy Tools’ and ‘Dimension I: Interorganizational Cooperation’.

**FILTER:** Please proceed to section 2.5A when coding a EU document or to section 2.5B when coding a French or Swedish document.

### Section 2.5A: Strategic Publics of EU Public Diplomacy Organizations

2.5.1 Types of Strategic Publics within the EU	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>The following sub-categories capture all statements that refer to strategic publics within the EU. This includes supra- and transnational organizations within the area of the EU, individuals, groups and organizations within the 28 EU member states as well as within sub-national regions of these 28 member states.</p> <p>Please also code all statements that refer to the role and function of the strategic publics (for instance opinion leaders, decision-makers) as well as all statements that characterize the relationship between the respective public diplomacy organization and strategic publics. This includes statements referring to the level of knowledge, the degree of activism and/or the attitude towards the EU as a whole or single EU public diplomacy organizations.</p>

2.5.1.1 Political bodies	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to political bodies on transnational, member state level or sub-national level within member states. This may include multilateral organization, member state governments, local authorities or for example parliaments.
<b>Example:</b>	Danish Parliament

<sup>5</sup> See Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 424

2.5.1.2 Businesses	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to multinational corporations and/or business organizations that are based in and operate in one EU member state. The term multinational corporation refers to organizations that are owned in at least one more country other than its home country and/or operates in at least one more country other than its home country.
<b>Example:</b>	Siemens

2.5.1.3 Media	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures all statements that refer to transnational media, national media as well as sub-national media within the EU as strategic publics.</p> <p>Transnational media is a generic term that encompasses 1) national media with a transnational mission, 2) international media, 3) Pan-European media, and 4) global media<sup>6</sup>. National media with a transnational mission include media organizations that target audiences beyond a national territory and often pursues a political mission such as presenting a country's perspective on European or generally international issues, example: Deutsche Welle in earlier days). International media are based on cooperations between media organizations based in two or more countries (at least one of these countries needs to be part of the EU) in and that seek to reach audiences in all of these countries (example: Arte). Pan-European media such as Euronews are characterized by a European target audience as well as a European perspective from which news are presented. Finally, global media address audiences that are not limited to single world regions. This subcategory includes all global media with headquarters in a EU member country, for instance the BBC World Service. Global media organizations with headquarters in a country outside of the EU (example: CNN, Al-Jazeera) are coded in sub-category 2.5.2.3. If you are not sure if a transnational media organization is based in a EU member states, please add a comment to the coded segment. To add a comment, right click on the coded statement and select the option "Edit comment".</p> <p>National and sub-national media outlets are based in and operate in one EU member state and address a primarily national audience.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	Libération in France, Dagens Nyheter in Sweden

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<sup>6</sup> This typology is based on Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg (2009)

#### 2.5.1.4 Civil society organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to transnational, national or sub-national civil society organizations within the EU as strategic publics. Civil society organizations can be understood as an “organized expression of the values and interests of society” (Castells, 2008, p. 78). To the UN, civil society constitutes “the “third sector” of society, along with government and business” (United Nations, n.d. – Civil Society).
<b>Example:</b>	Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU)

#### 2.5.1.5 Public Figures

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that refer to public figures within the EU as strategic publics. This includes statements that refer to single individuals that act as public figures and pursue a political and/or social agenda.
<b>Example:</b>	Athletes in EU member states

#### 2.5.1.6 EU citizens

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that refer to EU citizens as strategic publics. This includes statements that address citizens of particular member states and sub-national regions, that do not provide a reference to a specific region or country or that explicitly point to all European citizens as strategic publics. This sub-category encompasses statements referring to citizens in general or specific types of citizens like young people, the middle class or old people.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“It is particularly important to involve young people, as they are clearly determined to play a bigger part in the development of the European Union and thus develop their active European citizenship.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 03)

#### 2.5.2 Types of Strategic Publics outside of the EU

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	The following sub-categories capture all statements that refer to strategic publics outside the EU. This includes international and transnational organizations, individuals, groups and organizations within third states as well as within regions of these third states. Countries outside of the EU also include candidate countries that intend to join the EU in the future (for instance Montenegro, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) as well as European countries that are not part of the EU (for instance Norway, Switzerland).
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	Please also code all statements that refer to the role and function of the strategic publics (for instance opinion leaders, decision-makers) as well as all statements that characterize the relationship between the respective public diplomacy organization and strategic publics. This includes statements referring to the level of knowledge, the degree of activism and/or the attitude towards the EU as a whole or single EU public diplomacy organizations.
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#### 2.5.2.1 Political bodies

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to political bodies on transnational, member state level or sub-national level outside of the EU. This may include multilateral organization as well as governments, local authorities or for example parliaments in third countries.
<b>Example:</b>	General Assembly of the United Nations

#### 2.5.2.2 Businesses

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to multinational corporations and/or business organizations that are based in and operate in one third state. The term multinational corporation refers to organizations that are owned in at least one more country other than its home country and/or operates in at least one more country other than its home country.
<b>Example:</b>	General Motors

#### 2.5.2.3 Media

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures all statements that refer to transnational media, national media as well as sub-national media outside the EU as strategic publics.</p> <p>Transnational media is a generic term that encompasses 1) national media with a transnational mission, 2) international media, 3) Pan-European media, and 4) global media<sup>7</sup>. National media with a transnational mission include media organizations that target audiences beyond a national territory and often pursues a political mission such as presenting a country's perspective on European or generally international issues, example: Voice of America)</p> <p>International media are based on cooperations between media organizations based in two or more countries (outside of the EU) and that seek to reach audiences in all of these countries (example: the former mass media corporation News Corporation based in the USA). Pan-</p>
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<sup>7</sup> This typology is based on Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg (2009)

	<p>regional media such as La Nueva Televisora del Sur are characterized by a regional target audience as well as a regional perspective from which news are presented. Finally, global media address audiences that are not limited to single world regions. This subcategory includes all global media with headquarters outside of the EU, for instance CNN or Al-Jazeera. Global media organizations with headquarters in a country within the EU (example: BBC World Service) are coded in subcategory 2.5.1.3. If you are not sure if a transnational media organization is based outside of the EU, please add a comment to the coded segment. To add a comment, right click on the coded statement and select the option “Edit comment”. National and sub-national media outlets are based in and operate in one EU third country and address a primarily national audience.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	La Nueva Televisora del Sur

#### 2.5.2.4 Civil society organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This sub-category captures all statements that refer to transnational, national or sub-national civil society organizations within the EU as strategic publics. Civil society organizations can be understood as an “organized expression of the values and interests of society” (Castells, 2008, p. 78). To the UN, civil society constitutes “the “third sector” of society, along with government and business” (United Nations, n.d. – Civil Society).</p>
<b>Example:</b>	Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo

#### 2.5.2.5 Public Figures

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures all statements that refer to public figures outside of the EU as strategic publics. This includes statements that refer to single individuals that act as public figures and pursue a political and/or social agenda.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Examples of public figures outside of the EU include celebrities like George Clooney and Angelina Jolie, or the Chinese contemporary artist and activist Ai Wei Wei.</p>

#### 2.5.2.6 Citizens in third countries

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures all statements that refer to citizens in third countries as strategic publics. This includes statements that address citizens of particular third states and sub-national regions, that do not provide a reference to a specific region or country or that explicitly point to all citizens outside of the EU as strategic publics. This sub-category encompasses statements referring to citizens in general or specific types of citizens like young people, the middle class or old people.</p>
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<b>Example:</b>	Citizens in emerging countries in Asia
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### 2.5.3 Prioritization of strategic publics of the EU

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that disclose to what extent a public diplomacy organization prioritizes specific types of strategic publics or regions and/or countries. Please also code statements that indicate that there is no prioritization of specific groups of strategic publics.
<b>Example:</b>	Journalists constitute the priority publics of EU Delegations in South America.

### Section 2.5B: Strategic Publics of Member State Public Diplomacy Organizations

The following sub-categories capture all statements that refer to strategic publics of EU member state organizations. This includes supra- and transnational organizations, individuals, groups and organizations in foreign countries as well as within sub-national regions of these foreign countries and domestic publics.

Please also code all statements that refer to the role and function of the strategic publics (for instance opinion leaders, decision-makers) as well as all statements that characterize the relationship between the respective public diplomacy organization and strategic publics. This includes statements referring to the level of knowledge, the degree of activism and/or the attitude towards the member state as a whole or single member state public diplomacy organizations.

#### 2.5.1 Political bodies

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to political bodies on transnational, national or sub-national level. This may include multilateral organization, national governments, local authorities or for example parliaments.
<b>Example:</b>	Government officials in developing countries

#### 2.5.2 Businesses

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to multinational corporations and/or business organizations that are based in and operate in one country. The term multinational corporation refers to organizations that are owned in at least one more country other than its home country and/or operates in at least one more country other than its home country.
<b>Example:</b>	Siemens

### 2.5.3 Media

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures all statements that refer to transnational media, national media as well as sub-national media as strategic publics.</p> <p>Transnational media is a generic term that encompasses 1) national media with a transnational mission, 2) international media, 3) Pan-European media, and 4) global media<sup>8</sup>. National media with a transnational mission include media organizations that target audiences beyond a national territory and often pursues a political mission such as presenting a country's perspective on European or generally international issues, example: Deutsche Welle in earlier days). International media are based on cooperations between media organizations based in two or more countries and that seek to reach audiences in all of these countries (example: Arte). Pan-European media such as Euronews are characterized by a European target audience as well as a European perspective from which news are presented. Finally, global media address audiences that are not limited to single world regions. If you are not sure if a transnational media organization is based in a EU member states, please add a comment to the coded segment. To add a comment, right click on the coded statement and select the option "Edit comment".</p> <p>National and sub-national media outlets are based in and operate in one country and address a primarily national audience.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	Süddeutsche Zeitung in Germany

### 2.5.4 Civil society organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This sub-category captures all statements that refer to transnational, national or sub-national civil society organizations as strategic publics. Civil society organizations can be understood as an "organized expression of the values and interests of society" (Castells, 2008, p. 78). To the UN, civil society constitutes "the "third sector" of society, along with government and business" (United Nations, n.d. – Civil Society).</p>
<b>Example:</b>	Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU)

### 2.5.5 Public Figures

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category captures all statements that refer to public figures as strategic publics. This includes statements that refer to single individuals that act as public figures and pursue a political and/or social agenda.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Examples of public figures include celebrities like Bob Geldorf, U2 singer Bono, George Clooney and Angelina Jolie, intellectuals like the philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Peter Sloterdijk or the Chinese contemporary artist and activist Ai Wei Wei.</p>

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<sup>8</sup> This typology is based on Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg (2009)

<b>2.5.6 Citizens</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that refer to citizens as strategic publics. This includes statements that address citizens of particular countries and sub-national regions and that do not provide a reference to a specific region or country. This sub-category encompasses statements referring to citizens in general or specific types of citizens like young people, the middle class or old people.
<b>Example:</b>	Middle class in emerging countries

<b>2.5.7 Diaspora</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that disclose to what extent public diplomacy organizations consider French or Swedish publics respectively that live abroad as strategic publics.
<b>Example:</b>	The growing French diaspora in Southeast Asia constitutes an important public diplomacy target group.

<b>2.5.8 Domestic publics</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that disclose to what extent a public diplomacy organization in EU member states consider publics within their own country as strategic publics. This may also include minority communities and immigrants.
<b>Example:</b>	Journalists constitute the priority publics of the French Permanent Representation to the EU.

<b>2.5.9 Prioritization of strategic publics</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that disclose to what extent a public diplomacy organization prioritizes specific types of strategic publics or regions and/or countries. Please also code statements that indicate that there is no prioritization of specific groups of strategic publics.
<b>Example:</b>	Journalists constitute the priority publics of the French Permanent Representation to the EU.

## **DIMENSION F: 2.6 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACHES**

This dimension seeks to identify the public diplomacy approaches the respective organizations apply to reach their public diplomacy goals. The coding unit is the single statement. It captures all statements that provide cues for the general communication approach public diplomacy organizations pursue. Statements can refer to the mode of communication and the role attributed to strategic publics.

### 2.6.1 Time frame of public diplomacy strategy

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that detail the period of time or the time frame that a public diplomacy strategy is designed for.
<b>Example:</b>	The public diplomacy strategy of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs is set out for a period of five years.

### 2.6.2 Key Issues

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that address the key issues and core areas that organizations concentrate on in their public diplomacy approach.
<b>Example:</b>	Enlargement as a key issue:  <i>"Enlargement. The EU started with six Member States and now has twenty-five. Through successive accession negotiations, the EU has extended peace and stability, economic prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law across Europe. Strict accession criteria combined with a credible EU perspective provide strong leverage to stabilisation and reform in candidate countries". (EU Doc 10)</i>

### 2.6.3 Observation of other public diplomacy organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that disclose to what extent public diplomacy organizations observe as well as evaluate public diplomacy activities by other organizations and to what extent the public diplomacy conceptualization and practice of other organizations influence their own public diplomacy approach.
<b>Example:</b>	The introduction of the EEAS has stimulated a process of rethinking Swedish public diplomacy.

### 2.6.4 Coordination of public diplomacy approach

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category examines to what extent organizations coordinate their public diplomacy approach with each other. Coordination of the public diplomacy approach can refer to coordination among single units within a public diplomacy organization (2.6.4.1), coordination between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of one international actor (2.6.4.2) or coordination between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors (2.6.4.3).
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#### **2.6.4.1 Coordination of public diplomacy approach within organizations**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe coordination of the public diplomacy approach among single units of one organization. Text passages that explicitly state that there is no coordination of the public diplomacy approach among different units of one public diplomacy organization are also coded in this sub-category.
<b>Example:</b>	Staff members of the Partnership Instrument and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace jointly develop a public diplomacy strategy for the Service of Foreign Policy Instruments within the EC.

#### **2.4.2.2 Coordination of public diplomacy approach between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of one international actor**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe coordination of the public diplomacy approach between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of one international actor. Text passages that explicitly state that there is no coordination of the public diplomacy approach between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of one international actor are also coded in this sub-category.
<b>Example:</b>	Coordination of the Swedish public diplomacy approach in the core area 'society/culture' between the Swedish Arts Council and the Swedish Arts Grants Committee.

#### **2.4.2.3 Coordination of public diplomacy goals between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe coordination of the public diplomacy approach between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors. Text passages that explicitly state that there is no coordination of the public diplomacy approach between public diplomacy organizations communicating on behalf of different international actors are also coded in this sub-category.
<b>Example:</b>	DG Education and Culture within the EC coordinates its public diplomacy approach with the UNESCO.

#### **2.6.5 Adaptation of public diplomacy approach to strategic publics**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category captures all statements that refer to the adaptation of a public diplomacy approach to specific strategic publics and/or target regions. The adaptation of a public diplomacy approach may refer to the key issues addressed, the mode of communication or for instance the cooperation partners a public diplomacy organization works with to realize its goals.
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<b>Example:</b>	<i>“The Representations, whilst benefiting from the various tools set up by headquarters, will adapt them to national needs and deliver the message in the local language”.</i> (Source: EU Doc 01)
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### 2.6.6 Public Diplomacy Evaluation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements on the general approach to evaluating public diplomacy, including statements on current and planned measures as well as the resources allocated to evaluation. All statements that refer to the evaluation of specific tools are coded in and ‘Dimension G: Public Diplomacy Tools’.
<b>Example:</b>	“Communication activities need to be evaluated before, during and after to check for effectiveness, cost-efficiency and relevance. A specific evaluation function linked to strategic planning will be created within DG Communication. It will define quality standards for evaluating the main communication”. (Source: EU Doc 01)

### 2.6.7 Challenges of public diplomacy approach

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that provide information on challenges organizations identify with regard to its overall public diplomacy approach. Challenges may refer to reaching strategic publics, cooperation with other organizations or public diplomacy resources. All statements that refer to the evaluation of specific tools are coded in ‘Dimension G: Public Diplomacy Tools’.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“First and foremost the European Union itself is a complex concept in its own right, requiring considerable communication efforts to explain what the EU is and – equally importantly – what it is not. Secondly, and in spite of considerable efforts already being deployed, the role of the EU with regard to addressing global issues or promoting human rights and peace is still not widely understood”.</i> (Source: EU Doc 13).

## DIMENSION G: 2.7 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOOLS

This dimension seeks to identify the tools and communication channels public diplomacy organizations apply to reach their public diplomacy objectives. It concentrates on the types of public diplomacy tools, the mode of communication applied, the role of strategic publics as well as the degree of control a public diplomacy organizations has over specific tools as well as the organizations that implement these tools. The coding unit is the single statement.

Please only code public diplomacy tools if they are characterized in at least one sentence. Tools that are simply named in an enumeration of communication tools are not included in the coding process.

2.7.1 Prioritization of public diplomacy tools	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that disclose to what extent a public diplomacy organization prioritizes specific public diplomacy tools. Please also code statements that indicate that there is no prioritization of public diplomacy tools.
<b>Example:</b>	The Swedish Arts Council identifies the allocation of grants as most effective instrument.

The single public diplomacy tools are developed as sub-categories in the coding process: The coder creates a new sub-code in the program MAXQDA for each new public diplomacy tool that can be identified in a document (subcategory 2.7.2 refers to public diplomacy tool 1, subcategory 2.7.3 refers to public diplomacy tool 2 and so on). Does the coding tree in MAXQDA already contain a sub-code for a specific tool, all statements regarding this public diplomacy tool are coded using this sub-code. Keywords such as instrument, methods, measures or activities can be synonyms for the word tool and can also point to the statements regarding public diplomacy tools and communication channels.

2.7.2 Public Diplomacy Tool 1	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category and the following sub-categories capture all statements that define and characterize the public diplomacy tools outlined in the documents. This includes tools and activities that have already been completed, that are implemented at the time the document was issued as well as tools that should be implemented in the future. The following sub-categories analyze the purpose, the strategic publics the tool is directed it, the mode of communication applied, the degree of interactivity, the degree of control as well as the public diplomacy organizations that implement tools. All statements that characterize public diplomacy tools in greater detail, but cannot be assigned to any of these sub-categories are coded in this category.</p> <p><b>PLEASE NOTE:</b> Please mark all statements on planned public diplomacy tools (that should be implemented in the future) with a comment (comment: 'FUTURE TOOL'). Please mark all statements referring to recommendations regarding future public diplomacy tools as well as improvements of already existing tools with a comment (comment: 'RECOMMENDATION'). To add a comment, right click on the coded statement and select the option "Edit comment".</p>

2.7.2.1 Purpose of Public Diplomacy Tool 1	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that provide insights into the function a public diplomacy tool is supposed to fulfill. All statements that address the question how a public diplomacy tool contributes to realizing the overall public diplomacy objectives of an organization are coded here. Please also code all statements that disclose that public diplomacy organizations are uncertain about the purpose of a public diplomacy tool.

<b>Example:</b>	<p>Purpose of web 2.0 tools:</p> <p><i>“Digital age communication tools and platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, YouTube and blogs allow us to engage a wider audience in the work of the EU’s foreign policies”. (Source: EU Doc 13)</i></p>
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#### 2.7.2.2 Strategic Publics of Public Diplomacy Tool 1

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This sub-category captures all statements that provide insights into the strategic publics that a public diplomacy tool is directed at. Please code all statements that identify specific strategic publics that should be reached through a public diplomacy tool as well as provide information on how public diplomacy tools are tailored to the respective strategic publics. Please also code statements that disclose that public diplomacy tools are not directed at specific strategic publics.</p> <p>Keywords like target group, public or target audience may be used synonymously to strategic publics.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Strategic publics of web 2.0 tools:</p> <p><i>“Citizens, opinion makers, global influencers, bloggers and journalists are active on social media and we need to ensure our presence”. (Source: EU Doc 13)</i></p>

#### 2.7.2.3 Mode of Communication of Public Diplomacy Tool 1

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This sub-category captures all statements that address the communication approach applied by the public diplomacy organization. It addresses the question whether a public diplomacy tool is primarily implemented on the basis of monologue-oriented, one-way communication, whether it combines elements of one-way and two-communication or whether its implementation is primarily based on dialogue and/or collaboration.</p> <p>It also takes all statements into consideration that refer to the role of strategic publics in public diplomacy activities as well as the feedback options that are provided by public diplomacy organizations. The degree of interactivity is low if strategic publics assume the role of passive receivers (example: reception of a press release), moderate if public diplomacy tools provide feedback channels (example: panel discussions that allow for questions and comments from the audience) or high if public diplomacy tools are based on exchange and collaboration (example: participation in an educational exchange program).</p> <p>This sub-category encompasses both statements that provide information on the possibilities of integrating strategic publics that a public diplomacy tool provides (potential of public diplomacy tool) as well as the actual engagement of strategic publics in these public diplomacy activities (use of the potential).</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Mode of communication of web 2.0 tools:</p> <p><i>„The renewed Debate Europe forum website that will be launched early 2008 will be the first to implement this principle: debates will focus more on</i></p>



	<i>the Commission's communication priorities, and genuine interactivity will be achieved with the regular involvement of Commissioners and senior commission official". (Source: EU Doc 06)</i>
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#### 2.7.2.4 Coordination of public diplomacy tool 1 with other organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to the coordination of public diplomacy tools with other organizations. This includes statements regarding the involvement of other public diplomacy organizations in the planning, implementation and evaluation of public diplomacy tools. Moreover, this category also captures statements that disclose that public diplomacy tools are not coordinated with other public diplomacy organizations, but are solely planned, implemented and evaluated by the respective public diplomacy organization. Please also code all statements that disclose if a joint planning, implementation and/or evaluation of public diplomacy tools is part of a more encompassing cooperation agreement between public diplomacy organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>"600 case studies are available online on the Delegations and DEVCO websites. They are widely disseminated through the media, stakeholders and during international fora. Each Delegation should produce at least three case studies every year. An online application gives the opportunity to project managers to build the story of his project". (Source: EU Doc 13)</i>

#### 2.7.2.5 Resources allocated to Public Diplomacy Tool 1

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory identifies all statements that refer to human, financial and/or other resources that are allocated to the planning and realization of public diplomacy tools. This may also include planned measures, including the extension of resources or budget cuts.
<b>Example:</b>	Resources of the tool Europe by Satellite: <i>"Demand for time on EbS has reached saturation point, with live coverage of events conflicting with the transmission of press conferences and raw footage news packages for professional journalists. The capacity needs to be extended". (Source: EU Doc 08)</i>

#### 2.7.2.6 Evaluation of Public Diplomacy Tool 1

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that detail to what extent and how public diplomacy tools are evaluated. This may also include statements regarding planned evaluation measures. It also captures statements on the results of evaluations.
<b>Example:</b>	Evaluation of tool Europe by Satellite:

	<i>“The Commission launched a monitoring/traceability operation in February 2008, which measures media usage of audiovisual content provided by the EU institutions, either by satellite or via the EbS website. Daily monitoring reports will be automatically generated and analysed by the Audiovisual Service of the Commission with the aim of enhancing operations”. (Source: EU Doc 08)</i>
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<b>2.7.2.7 Challenges of Public Diplomacy Tool 1</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that provide information on challenges the organization identifies with regard to the planning and the realization of public diplomacy tools. Challenges may refer to reaching strategic publics, cooperation with other organizations or public diplomacy resources.
<b>Example:</b>	Challenges of tool Europe by Satellite: <i>“Much content is available from the Directorates-General in charge of specific policies, but there is no editorial line or real overview of what is available and where. Although the library is the central repository, it receives material regularly from only about half of the Commission DGs (see the Supporting document on Inter-institutional and internal frameworks and working methods, Chapter 2.4). However, a central video library can be of value to TV channels and journalists only if all relevant pictures are available”. (Source: EU Doc 08)</i>

## **DIMENSION H: 2.8 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY KEY MESSAGES**

This dimension analyzes the key messages that public diplomacy organizations seek to communicate. The term ‘key message’ refers to “symbolic communication that contains unique physical, psychological and social properties”<sup>9</sup>. This category concentrates on the physical properties of a message that can be defined as “tangible stimuli that can be perceived”<sup>10</sup>. Key messages are implemented to reach public diplomacy objectives and they are directed at strategic publics. The dimension focuses on the central ideas and issues embodied in the key messages, the context and focus of these key messages as well as the way in which other public diplomacy organizations are depicted in these key messages. The coding unit is the single statement.

<b>2.8.1 Prioritization of public diplomacy key messages</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that disclose to what extent a public diplomacy organization prioritizes specific public diplomacy key messages. Please also code statements that indicate that there is no prioritization of public diplomacy key messages.
<b>Example:</b>	Business Sweden concentrates on communicating Sweden as ‘Innovation’.

<sup>9</sup> Werder, 2015, p. 270

<sup>10</sup> Hazleton & Long, 1988, p. 85

The single key messages are developed as sub-categories in the coding process: The coder creates a new sub-code in the program MAXQDA for each new public diplomacy key message that can be identified in a document (subcategory 2.8.2 refers to public diplomacy key message 1, subcategory 2.8.3 refers to public diplomacy key message 2 and so on). Does the coding tree in MAXQDA already contain a sub-code for a specific key message, all statements regarding this public diplomacy key message are coded using this sub-code.

2.8.2 Key Message 1	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category and the following sub-categories capture all statements that characterize the central ideas that this key message embodies and the issues that the key message addresses. Statements that refer to the context and/or the focus of a key message are coded in the sub-categories below.

2.8.2.1 Context of Key Message 1	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to the context in which a key message is embedded in. A key message can highlight international issues that address the several world regions, it can be set in a European or EU-context, concentrate on national or sub-national issues.
<b>Example:</b>	The key message Sweden as 'Innovation' embodies a transnational dimension. Swedish innovations contribute to solving global challenges.

2.8.2.2 Focus of Key Message 1	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that provide cues regarding the strategic alignment or orientation of the key message. Key messages can focus exclusively on the objectives, strategies, activities and/or achievement of single public diplomacy organizations or include the objectives, strategies, activities and/or achievements of other public diplomacy actors as well.
<b>Example:</b>	Key message: Inclusive nature of the EU <i>"The European Union is a common project shared by all levels of government, all types of organisations and people from all walks of life".</i> (Source: EU Doc 04)

2.8.2.3 Depiction of other public diplomacy organizations	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements in which other public diplomacy organizations are characterized. Please code all statements that provide information on the context in which other public diplomacy organizations have been named and the way how other public diplomacy are perceived by the organization that has issued the strategy document (example: perception as a partner, a scapegoat, a competitor, a public).

	<p>Please make sure that the public diplomacy organization the statements refer to can be identified. If other public diplomacy organizations are not named in the coded statements, add a comment to your coding in which you note down the name of the public diplomacy organization.</p> <p>Please note that all statements regarding the perception of other public diplomacy organizations within a public diplomacy network as well as the relationship between different public diplomacy networks within networks are coded in 'Dimension I: Public Diplomacy Networks'.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	The key message of Sweden as an advocate of multilateral cooperation on sustainable development encompasses an acknowledgement of the work of the UNESCO.

<b>2.8.2.4 Challenges of Communicating Key Message 1</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that disclose information on challenges public diplomacy organizations perceive with regard to key messages. Challenges can refer to the formulation of a key message, addressing strategic publics, but also the actions of other public diplomacy organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The communication of the EU's important role in the world is particularly difficult in countries in which citizens have very little knowledge about the EU.

## **DIMENSION I: 2.9 INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION**

This dimension analyzes interorganizational public diplomacy cooperation. Interorganizational public diplomacy cooperation can occur between two public diplomacy organizations that engage in dyadic relationships as well as a group of three or more public diplomacy organizations within a network.

**PLEASE NOTE:** Cooperation between public diplomacy organizations and their strategic publics are coded separately in 'Dimension F: Public Diplomacy Approaches' (statements regarding cooperation in general) and in 'Dimension G: Public Diplomacy Tools' (statements that disclose information on cooperation with regard to single public diplomacy tools).

**FILTER:** Please proceed to section 2.9A when coding a EU document or to section 2.9B when coding a French or Swedish document. This filter only refers to categories 2.9.1 to 2.9.4. Coding instructions for category 2.9.5 refer to both EU and member state documents.

### **Section 2.9A Interorganizational Cooperation of EU public diplomacy organizations**

Categories 2.9.1 to 2.9.4 explore dyadic relationships, defined as the social interaction between two public diplomacy organizations or the individual representatives acting on behalf of the organization.

## 2.9A.1 Cooperation with other EU organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category explores inter-institutional cooperation between single EU organizations like the European Commission, the European Parliament or the Council of the EU. It explores the nature, the degree of formalization, the degree of satisfaction of the interorganizational cooperation as well as the factors that either enable and/or constrain this cooperation in the sub-categories 2.9A.1.1 to 2.9A.1.7 below. All aspects of interorganizational cooperation with other EU organizations that are not covered by these sub-categories, are coded in this overarching category.
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### 2.9A.1.1 Roles and responsibilities of cooperation partners

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category includes all statements that refer to the roles cooperation partner assume in a situation of interorganizational cooperation as well as the responsibilities and tasks of the cooperation partners. It takes statements on the roles and responsibilities of the organization that has issued the document into consideration, but also includes statements on the roles and responsibilities attributed to the cooperating organization.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“As the HR/VP's service, the EEAS also assists the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Council as well as other Commissioners in the exercise of their functions in the area of external relations”.</i> (Source: EU Doc 11)

### 2.9A.1.2 Degree of formalization

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that describe the degree of formalization of an interorganizational cooperation. The degree of formalization can range from informal connections that are solely based on trust to formal connections that are regulated on the basis of agreements and contracts <sup>11</sup> .
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“In January 2012, the EEAS and the Commission agreed detailed working arrangements covering co-operation on instructions and management of work in EU delegations, specific arrangements for joint work on the programming and implementation of the EU external assistance programmes (building on Article 9 of the EEAS Decision), the division of responsibility for preparation of briefings for Summits and other high-level meetings or visits involving the President of the Commission, the High Representative or other Members of the Commission, as well as co-operation in the area of communication and</i>

<sup>11</sup> cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482

	<i>press work and specific arrangements covering the status of ECHO field offices in relation to EU delegations". (Source: EU Doc 12)</i>
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### 2.9A.1.3 Relational Satisfaction

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to interorganizational cooperation. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceeded and that 2) benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>"Despite progress with improving co-ordination, there is considerable scope to bring together different instruments and assets, whether within the Commission, between the Council and Commission, or between the EU institutions and the Member States". (Source: EU Doc 10)</i>

### 2.9A.1.4 Relational Commitment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to cooperation with other EU organizations. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to cooperation, the extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the cooperation as well as planned measures to support or cede the cooperation.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>"The Commission has undertaken to enter into a regular dialogue with the European Parliament on the content of the draft country, regional and thematic strategy papers and to take due account of the position of the European Parliament when implementing the strategies". (Source: EU Doc 10)</i>

### 2.9A.1.5 Factors that enable cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with other EU organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The continuing commitment of representatives from the European Commission and the European Parliament greatly enhances cooperation on common public diplomacy initiatives.

#### 2.9A.1.6 Factors that constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with other EU organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Time constraints work against a closer cooperation of representatives of the European Commission and the European Parliament.

#### 2.9A.1.7 Factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that can either enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with other EU organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The quality of cooperation between the European Commission and the European Parliament greatly varies between policy fields.

### 2.9A.2 Cooperation with other multilateral organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category explores cooperation with multilateral organizations like the OECD or the UN as well as single organizations within these international organizations like the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It explores the nature, the degree of formalization, the degree of satisfaction of the interorganizational cooperation as well as the factors that either enable and/or constrain this cooperation in the sub-categories 2.9.2.1 to 2.9.2.7 below. All aspects of interorganizational cooperation with other multilateral organizations that are not covered by these sub-categories, are coded in this overarching category.
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#### 2.9A.2.1 Roles and responsibilities of cooperation partners

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the roles cooperation partner assume in a situation of interorganizational cooperation as well as the responsibilities and tasks of the cooperation partners. It takes statements on the roles and responsibilities of the organization that has issued the document into consideration, but also includes statements on the roles and responsibilities attributed to the cooperating organization.
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<b>Example:</b>	<i>“Contractors, implementing partners and international organizations are encouraged, where the available budget and resources permit, to develop a communication and visibility plan that will highlight in a dynamic way the impact of the EU support”. (Source: EU Doc 16)</i>
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#### 2.9A.2.2 Degree of formalization

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe the degree of formalization of an interorganizational cooperation. The degree of formalization can range from informal connections that are solely based on trust to formal connections that are regulated on the basis of agreements and contracts (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482).
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“Special attention should be given to the visibility of EU funding in the case of multi-donor projects and EU funded projects implemented by international organisations. Agreements on joint visibility guidelines have been signed with the UN (2008), the World Bank (2009) and the Council of Europe (2011). “ (Source: EU Doc 13)</i>

#### 2.9A.2.3 Relational Satisfaction

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to interorganizational cooperation. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceeded and that 2) benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“The United Nations and the European Commission have developed a strong partnership in the pursuit of shared humanitarian and development goals”. (Source: EU Doc 16)</i>

#### 2.9A.2.4 Relational Commitment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to cooperation with multilateral organizations. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to cooperation, the extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the cooperation as well as planned measures to support or cede the cooperation.
<b>Example:</b>	The European Commission seeks to deepen its cooperation with the United Nations.



#### 2.9A.2.5 Factors that enable cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with multilateral organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Additional funding for joint projects in developing countries enhances facilitates cooperation between the European Commission and the United Nations.

#### 2.9A.2.6 Factors that constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with multilateral organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Different decision-making styles inhibits closer cooperation between the European Union and ASEAN.

#### 2.9A.2.7 Factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that can either enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with multilateral organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The relationship between individual representatives of the European Union and the World Trade Organization has a decisive impact on the quality of the cooperation between the two multilateral organizations.

#### 2.9A.3 Cooperation with EU member state organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category explores cooperation with public diplomacy organizations within EU member states. This includes member state public diplomacy organizations on a national and regional level. It explores the nature, the degree of formalization, the degree of satisfaction of the interorganizational cooperation as well as the factors that either enable and/or constrain this cooperation in the sub-categories 2.9A.3.1 to 2.9A.3.7 below. All aspects of interorganizational cooperation with organizations within EU member states that are not covered by these sub-categories, are coded in this overarching category.
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### 2.9A.3.1 Roles and responsibilities of cooperation partners

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the roles cooperation partner assume in a situation of interorganizational cooperation as well as the responsibilities and tasks of the cooperation partners. It takes statements on the roles and responsibilities of the organization that has issued the document into consideration, but also includes statements on the roles and responsibilities attributed to the cooperating organization.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, EU Delegations were put under the authority of the HR/VP (Article 221 TFEU) and took on the role of local Presidency assuming responsibilities of local co-ordination with the diplomatic missions of Member States and external representation of EU foreign policy with third countries and multilateral organizations.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 12)

### 2.9A.3.2 Degree of formalization

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that describe the degree of formalization of an interorganizational cooperation. The degree of formalization can range from informal connections that are solely based on trust to formal connections that are regulated on the basis of agreements and contracts (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482).
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“Co-operation with Member States is based on well-established procedures for regular (at least monthly) meetings at the level of Heads of Mission and numerous co-ordination meetings at other levels (deputy heads of mission, political officers, trade experts, development specialists etc).”</i> (Source: EU Doc 12)

### 2.9A.3.3 Relational Satisfaction

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to interorganizational cooperation. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceeded and that 2) benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“While the Commission acknowledges that a lively debate is already under way in some Member States, in others it has yet to start or, where under way, needs to be intensified and broadened”.</i> (Source: EU Doc 02)

### 2.9A.3.4 Relational Commitment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to cooperation with organizations within EU
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	member states. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to cooperation, the extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the cooperation as well as planned measures to support or cede the cooperation.
<b>Example:</b>	<p><i>“More generally, there is huge potential to deepen the debate on the interaction between EU Delegations and national embassies, including innovative approaches to burden sharing and resource allocation. For example, the successful placement of a Spanish diplomat in the EU delegation in Yemen has created savings of up to</i></p> <p><i>€500,000 for the national budget. The growing opportunities for pooling activities and sharing resources should be exploited to the full.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 12)</p>

#### 2.9A.3.5 Factors that enable cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations within EU member states. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Country-specific knowledge of public diplomacy practitioners within EC Representatives facilitates cooperations with civil society organizations within the respective member state.

#### 2.9A.3.6 Factors that constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations within EU member states. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“As in national administrations, even when there is sufficient political will, the EU’s impact falls short when there are unresolved tensions or a lack of coherence between different policies.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 12)

#### 2.9A.3.7 Factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that can either enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations within EU member states. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“The success of EU external action depends on three main factors: first and foremost, political agreement among Member States on the goals to be achieved through the EU. This requires a strong partnership between the EU institutions and a clear focus on a limited number of strategic priorities where Europe can make the difference, rather than dispersing efforts across the board ...]”. (Source: EU Doc 10)</i>

#### 2.9A.4 Cooperation with organizations in third states

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category explores cooperation with public diplomacy organizations in third states. This includes public diplomacy organizations on a national and regional level. It explores the nature, the degree of formalization, the degree of satisfaction of the interorganizational cooperation as well as the factors that either enable and/or constrain this cooperation in the sub-categories 2.9A.4.1 to 2.9A.4.7 below. All aspects of interorganizational cooperation with organizations in third states that are not covered by these sub-categories, are coded in this overarching category.
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#### 2.9A.4.1 Roles and responsibilities of cooperation partners

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the roles cooperation partner assume in a situation of interorganizational cooperation as well as the responsibilities and tasks of the cooperation partners. It takes statements on the roles and responsibilities of the organization that has issued the document into consideration, but also includes statements on the roles and responsibilities attributed to the cooperating organization.
<b>Example:</b>	National governments and regional authorities in third countries assist EU Delegations in the adaptation of public diplomacy initiatives.

#### 2.9A.4.2 Degree of formalization

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that describe the degree of formalization of an interorganizational cooperation. The degree of formalization can range from informal connections that are solely based on trust to formal connections that are regulated on the basis of agreements and contracts (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482).
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<b>Example:</b>	<i>“Small-scale cooperation projects are there to underpinning the broader cooperation activities between the EU and the partner countries. They could potentially cover a wide range of themes and sectors. In addition, evaluation and audit activities will ensure that the cooperation projects meet their objectives and that the corresponding budget is implemented in a regular and cost-effective way.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 14)
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#### 2.9A.4.3 Relational Satisfaction

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to interorganizational cooperation. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceeded and that 2) benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs.
<b>Example:</b>	DG Education and Culture highlights the quality of the long-standing cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea in the field of education.

#### 2.9A.4.4 Relational Commitment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to cooperation with organizations in third states. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to cooperation, the extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the cooperation as well as planned measures to support or cede the cooperation.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>“Over the past decade, the Union has consistently strengthened its bilateral relations with a broad range of industrialised and other high-income countries and territories across different regions of the world, primarily in North America, East Asia and Australasia, but also in South-East Asia and the Gulf region.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 14)

#### 2.9A.4.5 Factors that enable cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations in third states. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
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<b>Example:</b>	<i>“The ICI emphasises the Union’s interest in further deepening its relations with industrialised countries and territories, with which it often shares similar political, economic and institutional structures and values as well as common challenges and which are important bilateral political and trading partners as well as players in multilateral fora and in global governance.”</i> (Source: EU Doc 14)
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#### 2.9A.4.6 Factors that constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations in third states. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Lack of financial resources for EU Delegations often prevents a better coordination and exchange with civil society organizations in third countries.

#### 2.9A.4.7 Factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that can either enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations in third states. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The personality of the head of the respective EU Delegation has an important impact on the quality of cooperation with organizations based in third countries.

### Section 2.9B Interorganizational Cooperation of member state public diplomacy organizations

Categories 2.9.1 to 2.9.4 explore dyadic relationships, defined as the social interaction between two public diplomacy organizations or the individual representatives acting on behalf of the organization.

#### 2.9B.1 Cooperation with other national organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category explores cooperation with other national organizations. It explores the nature, the degree of formalization, the degree of satisfaction of the interorganizational cooperation as well as the factors that either enable and/or constrain this cooperation in the sub-categories 2.9B.1.1 to 2.9B.1.7 below. All aspects of interorganizational cooperation with other national organizations that are not covered by these sub-categories, are coded in this overarching category.
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<b>2.9B.1.1 Roles and responsibilities of cooperation partners</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category includes all statements that refer to the roles cooperation partner assume in a situation of interorganizational cooperation as well as the responsibilities and tasks of the cooperation partners. It takes statements on the roles and responsibilities of the organization that has issued the document into consideration, but also includes statements on the roles and responsibilities attributed to the cooperating organization.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.1.1 (cooperation with other EU organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

<b>2.9B.1.2 Degree of formalization</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that describe the degree of formalization of an interorganizational cooperation. The degree of formalization can range from informal connections that are solely based on trust to formal connections that are regulated on the basis of agreements and contracts (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482).
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.1.2 (cooperation with other EU organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

<b>2.9B.1.3 Relational Satisfaction</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to interorganizational cooperation. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceeded and that 2) benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.1.3 (cooperation with other EU organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

<b>2.9B.1.4 Relational Commitment</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to cooperation with other national organizations. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to cooperation, the

	extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the cooperation as well as planned measures to support or cede the cooperation.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.1.4 (cooperation with other EU organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

#### **2.9B.1.5 Factors that enable cooperation**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with other national organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.1.5 (cooperation with other EU organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

#### **2.9B.1.6 Factors that constrain cooperation**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with other national organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.1.6 (cooperation with other EU organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

#### **2.9B.1.7 Factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that can either enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with other national organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.1.7 (cooperation with other EU organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.



## 2.9B.2 Cooperation with EU organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category explores cooperation between member state organizations and EU organizations. It explores the nature, the degree of formalization, the degree of satisfaction of the interorganizational cooperation as well as the factors that either enable and/or constrain this cooperation in the sub-categories 2.9B.2.1 to 2.9B.2.7 below. All aspects of interorganizational cooperation with EU organizations that are not covered by these sub-categories, are coded in this overarching category.
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### 2.9B.2.1 Roles and responsibilities of cooperation partners

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the roles cooperation partner assume in a situation of interorganizational cooperation as well as the responsibilities and tasks of the cooperation partners. It takes statements on the roles and responsibilities of the organization that has issued the document into consideration, but also includes statements on the roles and responsibilities attributed to the cooperating organization.
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<b>Example:</b>	The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs supports public diplomacy efforts by the EEAS in the area of development cooperation and global sustainability.
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### 2.9B.2.2 Degree of formalization

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe the degree of formalization of an interorganizational cooperation. The degree of formalization can range from informal connections that are solely based on trust to formal connections that are regulated on the basis of agreements and contracts (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482).
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<b>Example:</b>	The French Permanent Representation to the EU engages in primarily informal cooperation with colleagues in the European Commission.
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### 2.9B.2.3 Relational Satisfaction

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to interorganizational cooperation. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceeded and that 2) benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs.
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<b>Example:</b>	The Swedish Arts Council assesses the cooperation with the European Commission on the Creative Europe Program as positive.
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#### 2.9B.2.4 Relational Commitment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to cooperation with multilateral organizations. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to cooperation, the extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the cooperation as well as planned measures to support or cede the cooperation.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>"The establishment of a common EU Foreign Service affords a vital opportunity to strengthen the Union as a coherent actor. Active Swedish efforts in the EU to promote policy coherence for development are essential if Sweden's global development policy is to have international impact".</i> (Source: SWE Doc 03)

#### 2.9B.2.5 Factors that enable cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with EU organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	<i>"The EU and the international financial institutions (IFIs) also share these central objectives. The coordination of aid resources within the EU, the IFIs and the UN leads to advantages of scale, lower transaction costs and higher effectiveness."</i> (Source: SWE Doc 02)

#### 2.9B.2.6 Factors that constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with EU organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Diverging positions of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the EU on cultural policy often inhibit cooperation on cultural initiatives.

### 2.9B.2.7 Factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that can either enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with multilateral organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Single Policy DGs within the European Commission differ with regard to their modes of communication and approaches to cooperating with member state organizations. To the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, these different modes of communication and cooperation influence the success of cooperation.

### 2.9B.3 Cooperation with other multilateral organizations

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category explores cooperation with other multilateral organizations like the OECD or the UN as well as single organizations within these international organizations like the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It explores the nature, the degree of formalization, the degree of satisfaction of the interorganizational cooperation as well as the factors that either enable and/or constrain this cooperation in the sub-categories 2.9B.3.1 to 2.9B.3.7 below. All aspects of interorganizational cooperation with international organizations that are not covered by these sub-categories, are coded in this overarching category.
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#### 2.9B.3.1 Roles and responsibilities of cooperation partners

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the roles cooperation partner assume in a situation of interorganizational cooperation as well as the responsibilities and tasks of the cooperation partners. It takes statements on the roles and responsibilities of the organization that has issued the document into consideration, but also includes statements on the roles and responsibilities attributed to the cooperating organization.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.2.1 (cooperation with other multilateral organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

#### 2.9B.3.2 Degree of formalization

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that describe the degree of formalization of an interorganizational cooperation. The degree of formalization can range from informal connections that are solely based on trust to formal connections that are regulated on the basis of agreements and contracts (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482).
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<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.2.2 (cooperation with other multilateral organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.
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### 2.9B.3.3 Relational Satisfaction

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to interorganizational cooperation. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceeded and that 2) benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9B.2.3 (cooperation with other multilateral organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

### 2.9B.3.4 Relational Commitment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to cooperation with multilateral organizations. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to cooperation, the extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the cooperation as well as planned measures to support or cede the cooperation.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.2.4 (cooperation with other multilateral organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

### 2.9B.3.5 Factors that enable cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with multilateral organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.2.5 (cooperation with other multilateral organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

### 2.9B.3.6 Factors that constrain cooperation

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with multilateral organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating
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	organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.2.6 (cooperation with other multilateral organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

#### **2.9B.3.7 Factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that can either enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with multilateral organizations. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.2.7 (cooperation with other multilateral organizations) can also be applied to this sub-category.

#### **2.9B.4 Cooperation with organizations in third states**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This category explores cooperation with public diplomacy organizations in other countries. This includes public diplomacy organizations on a national and regional level. It explores the nature, the degree of formalization, the degree of satisfaction of the interorganizational cooperation as well as the factors that either enable and/or constrain this cooperation in the sub-categories 2.9B.4.1 to 2.9B.4.7 below. All aspects of interorganizational cooperation with organizations in other countries that are not covered by these sub-categories, are coded in this overarching category.
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#### **2.9B.4.1 Roles and responsibilities of cooperation partners**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the roles cooperation partner assume in a situation of interorganizational cooperation as well as the responsibilities and tasks of the cooperation partners. It takes statements on the roles and responsibilities of the organization that has issued the document into consideration, but also includes statements on the roles and responsibilities attributed to the cooperating organization.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.4.1 (cooperation with organizations in third states) can also be applied to this sub-category.

<b>2.9B.4.2 Degree of formalization</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that describe the degree of formalization of an interorganizational cooperation. The degree of formalization can range from informal connections that are solely based on trust to formal connections that are regulated on the basis of agreements and contracts (cf. Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482).
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.4.2 (cooperation with organizations in third states) can also be applied to this sub-category.

<b>2.9B.4.3 Relational Satisfaction</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to interorganizational cooperation. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceeded and that 2) benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.4.3 (cooperation with organizations in third states) can also be applied to this sub-category.

<b>2.9B.4.4 Relational Commitment</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to cooperation with organizations in other countries. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to cooperation, the extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the cooperation as well as planned measures to support or cede the cooperation.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.4.4 (cooperation with organizations in third states) can also be applied to this sub-category.

<b>2.9B.4.5 Factors that enable cooperation</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations in other countries. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.

<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.4.5 (cooperation with organizations in third states) can also be applied to this sub-category.
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#### **2.9B.4.6 Factors that constrain cooperation**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations in other countries. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.4.6 (cooperation with organizations in third states) can also be applied to this sub-category.

#### **2.9B.4.7 Factors that can either enable or constrain cooperation**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that can either enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of interorganizational cooperation with organizations in other countries. These factors can be internal, referring to the cooperating organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the cooperating organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	The example provided in sub-category 2.9A.4.7 (cooperation with organizations in third states) can also be applied to this sub-category.

### **2.9.5 Public diplomacy networks**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	The following sub-categories capture all statements that characterize public diplomacy networks in greater detail. A public diplomacy network is a “group of three or more organizations connected in ways that facilitate achievement of a common goal” <sup>12</sup> . Keyword such as “partnerships, strategic alliances, interorganizational relationships, coalitions, cooperative arrangements, or collaborative agreements” <sup>13</sup> may be used synonymously to public diplomacy networks.
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#### **2.9.5.1 Prioritization of public diplomacy goals**

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that disclose to what extent a public diplomacy organization prioritizes specific public diplomacy networks. Please also code statements that indicate that there is no prioritization of public diplomacy networks.
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<sup>12</sup> Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007, p. 482

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 480

<b>Example:</b>	DG Communication regards the Club of Venice as most important network for exchanging information on public diplomacy practice of member state and EU organizations.
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The single public diplomacy networks in category 2.9.5 are developed as sub-categories in the coding process: The coder creates a new sub-code in the program MAXQDA for each new public diplomacy network that can be identified in a document (subcategory 2.9.5.2 refers to public diplomacy network 1, subcategory 2.9.5.3 refers to public diplomacy network 2 and so on). Does the coding tree in MAXQDA already contain a sub-code for a specific public diplomacy network, all statements regarding this public diplomacy network are coded using this sub-code.

<b>2.9.5.2 Public Diplomacy Network 1</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This category and the following sub-categories capture all statements that characterize public diplomacy networks. On an organizational level, the sub-categories below analyze the motivation, the role and position, the mode of communication as well as the perception of relationships within a network of the public diplomacy organization that has issued the respective document. On a whole network level, the sub-categories below examine the network purpose and scope, the network structure as well as the way a public diplomacy network is governed. Moreover, sub-categories also capture statements on factors that enable, constrain or can both enable or constrain cooperation within a public diplomacy network.</p> <p>Statements that refer to a public diplomacy networks, but cannot be assigned to any of these sub-categories are coded in the categories 2.9.5.2 to 2.9.5.x.</p>

<b>2.9.5.2.1 Motivation to engage in a Public Diplomacy Network</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This subcategory captures all statements that refer to the motivation of a public diplomacy organization to participate in a public diplomacy network. Please code all statements that disclose information on the reasons why the public diplomacy organization engages in the respective network.</p> <p>Please note that this category focuses on the individual motivations of the public diplomacy organization. This motivation may, but need not match the purpose of the whole network. Statements that concern the purpose of the whole network are coded in subcategory 2.9.5.2.8.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example European Radio Network: The European Commission provides financial assistance on the basis of multi-annual contracts while broadcasters</p>



	retain their editorial freedom (similar to public service mission contracts).
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<b>2.9.5.2.2 Role and Position within Public Diplomacy Network</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This subcategory captures all statements that refer to the position a public diplomacy organization occupies within a network. Positions within a public diplomacy network range from the core of a network to its periphery. The position within a public diplomacy network is closely associated with the role a public diplomacy organization plays within the respective network. Please also code statements providing information on the role of a public diplomacy organization within a network. Public diplomacy organizations assuming a central position exercise more influence on decisions, but also informal rules and norms of a public diplomacy network. Public diplomacy networks are dynamic. Please code all statements that refer to developments and changes regarding the position and the role of a public diplomacy within an organization. This includes both actual changes and planned or desired changes.</p> <p>Please note that this category only focuses on the position and the role of the public diplomacy organization that issued the document. Statements regarding the structure of the whole network are coded in the sub-categories 2.9.5.2.8 and 2.9.5.2.9.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example Council for the Promotion of Sweden: The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs plays a leading role in the network and chairs its meetings.</p>

<b>2.9.5.2.3 Mode of Communication within Public Diplomacy Network</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This sub-category captures all statements that refer to the way public diplomacy organizations communicate in a public diplomacy network and the communication channels that are employed to communicate with other organizations within a network.</p> <p>Please note that this category only focuses on the mode of communication and the communication channels employed by the public diplomacy organization that issued the document. Statements regarding the way the whole network is managed and governed are coded in the sub-category 2.9.5.2.11.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example Stockholm Initiative for Digital Diplomacy: In addition to face-to-face meetings, members of the networks regularly exchange information and experiences online.</p>

#### 2.9.5.2.4 OPR 1: Control Mutuality

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category captures all statements that refer to the degree to which the organization is satisfied and in accordance with the way the public diplomacy network is managed, steered and controlled. It includes statements that disclose to what extent public diplomacy organizations perceive the organization(s) that define(s) the norms, rules and regulations of a network as legitimate.
<b>Example:</b>	Example Open Method of Cooperation: The procedures of cooperation established by the European Commission are helpful and accepted by all member state organizations engaging in the network.

#### 2.9.5.2.5 OPR 2: Trust

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category includes all statements that refer to the level of trust and confidence in other public diplomacy organizations within a public diplomacy network. Please code all statements in which public diplomacy organizations make references to the level of trust they have in single members of a public diplomacy networks as well as in the network as a whole. Indicators of trust are “integrity, the belief that an organization is fair and just[,] [...] dependability, the belief that an organization will do what it says it will do[, and] [...]competence, the belief that an organization has the ability to do what it says it will do” <sup>14</sup> .
<b>Example:</b>	Example Council for the Promotion of Sweden: The long-standing cooperation of all members within the network has gradually nurtured the trust of all Swedish organizations involved.

#### 2.9.5.2.6 OPR 3: Relational Satisfaction

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This sub-category includes all statements that refer to the degree of satisfaction a public diplomacy organization feels with regard to its engagement in a public diplomacy network. Indicators of a high degree of satisfaction are that 1) positive expectations are either fulfilled or exceed and that 2) benefits of the engagement outweigh its costs. Statements regarding the degree of relational satisfaction can either refer to the participation and engagement within the network as a whole or to relationships between single public diplomacy organizations within a network.
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<sup>14</sup> Hon & Grunig, 1999, p. 19

<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example Club of Venice:</p> <p>To the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the participation in the Club of Venice constitutes a great way of exchanging best practice examples of EU member state public diplomacy. There is no need to change the current structure of the network.</p>
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#### 2.9.5.2.7 OPR 4: Relational Commitment

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This subcategory includes all statements that discuss a public diplomacy organization's commitment to a network. Please code all statements that disclose information on the relevance the public diplomacy organization attributes to the network, the extent to which a public diplomacy organization perceives it as rewarding to invest resources in the development and the maintenance of the network as well as planned measures to support the network or cede the network membership. These statements can either refer to the network as a whole or single relationships within a network.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example EUNIC:</p> <p>The Institut Français aims at increasing the resources dedicated to EUNIC.</p>

#### 2.10.5.1.9 Network Purpose

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This sub-category captures all statements that refer to the purpose of a public diplomacy network. This includes statements that outline the public diplomacy objectives that should be achieved on the basis of collaborations, the issues the network focuses on as well as the time frame for which the network is designed. A public diplomacy network can be designed for a short period of time to reach a specific public diplomacy objective or be open-ended and created with a long-term perspective in mind.</p> <p>Please note that this category focuses on the purpose of the whole network. The network purpose may, but need not match the motivations of the single participating public diplomacy organizations. Statements that concern the motivations of single public diplomacy organizations to engage in a network are coded in the subcategory 2.9.5.2.1.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example Council for the Promotion of Sweden:</p> <p>The network aims at developing a consistent, modern image of Sweden abroad.</p>

<b>2.9.5.2.9 Network Structure 1: Network Density</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	The density of a network describes the number and the quality of the connections between members of a network. Please code all statements that include information on the frequency, the mode and the quality of communication between the single members of a public diplomacy organizations. Please include both statements on the quality and quantity of connections between public diplomacy organizations and between representatives of the respective organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Example Nordic Council of Ministers: Due to close cooperations on a number of issues, there are close ties between all Nordic governments that are part of this network.

<b>2.9.5.2.10 Network Structure 2: Degree of Permeability</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	The degree of permeability describes a public diplomacy network's openness to influences from outside (for instance by external public diplomacy organizations or other public diplomacy networks). Please code all statements that either refer to external influences on a network or to interactions between a public diplomacy networks and external public diplomacy organizations and/or other public diplomacy networks. Also code statements that oppose interactions and cooperation with other public diplomacy networks or external public diplomacy organizations.
<b>Example:</b>	Example Stockholm Initiative for Digital Diplomacy: The open and loose structure of this network invites cooperation with other networks as well as organizations that have not been part of the network yet.

<b>2.9.5.2.11 Network Governance</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	This subcategory captures all statements that provide insights into how public diplomacy networks are steered and controlled. Furthermore, this subcategory also includes all statements that detail how processes of network creation, development and maintenance are organized. A public diplomacy network can be governed by one or a few lead organizations that assume a central position within the network. Public diplomacy networks can also be characterized by a low degree of centralization, in which all member organizations participate in the process of steering and controlling a network. Network governance processes and structures also disclose information on the distribution of power within a network. Please also code all statements that refer to the distribution of power among member organizations of public diplomacy networks.

<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example Stockholm Initiative for Digital Diplomacy:</p> <p>Even though the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has initiated the Stockholm Initiative for Digital Diplomacy, it is not the lead organizations to govern and lead the network. In contrast to that, all decisions are taken jointly with all network members that can all influence the future development of the network.</p>
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#### 2.9.5.2.12 Factors that enable public diplomacy networks

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or facilitate the creation, development and/or maintenance of public diplomacy networks. These factors can be internal, referring to the network and its member organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the public diplomacy network.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example Nordic Council of Ministers:</p> <p>The common cultural heritage of the network's member countries facilitates the cooperation.</p>

#### 2.9.5.2.13 Factors that constrain public diplomacy networks

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that constrain or interfere with the creation, development and/or maintenance of public diplomacy networks. These factors can be internal, referring to the network and its member organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the public diplomacy network.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example Open Method of Cooperation:</p> <p>Limited time serves as a constraint to closer cooperation within the network.</p>

#### 2.10.5.1.15 Factors that enable or constrain public diplomacy networks

<b>Coding instructions:</b>	<p>This subcategory covers all statements that refer to factors or conditions that enable or constrain the creation, development and/or maintenance of public diplomacy networks. These factors can be internal, referring to the network and its member organizations, or external, referring to the environment that surrounds the public diplomacy network.</p>
<b>Example:</b>	<p>Example EUNIC:</p> <p>Member organizations greatly differ with regard to the type and size of the organizations as well as the resources they command. This may limit the speed with which the network moves, but it can</p>

	also be an asset, as the different types of organizations complement each other.
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## **DIMENSION J: 2.10 CONCLUSION**

This dimension analyzes all statements that refer to future developments and challenges of EU public diplomacy and member state public diplomacy respectively. The coding unit is the single statement.

<b>2.10.1 Future challenges at the level of the organization</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	Please code all statements that discuss and specify future developments as well as challenges regarding the public diplomacy practice of the respective public diplomacy organization.
<b>Example:</b>	The increasing importance of digital technologies provides both opportunities and challenges for the organization's public diplomacy efforts in the future. The challenge is to better integrate digital media in our current public diplomacy strategy.

<b>2.10.2 Future Challenges at the level of the international actor</b>	
<b>Coding instructions:</b>	Please code all statements that discuss and specify future developments as well as challenges regarding the public diplomacy practice of EU public diplomacy as a whole.
<b>Example:</b>	With power shifts in the international environment, it is a crucial challenge for a small country like Sweden to remain visible. Future Swedish public diplomacy efforts need to ensure the international visibility of Swedish policy priorities and achievements.

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## Coding Frame Document Analysis- Appendix: Coding Sheet Formal Categories

[illegible]



### **Appendix 3: List of Guided Expert Interviews**

#### **EU**

- |          |  |
|----------|--|
| EU I 01  | European Commission - DG Communication (Directorate C), face-to-face interview on March 11, 2014   |
| EU I 02  | European Commission - DG Trade (Communication Unit), face-to-face interview on March 12, 2014  |
| EU I 03  | European Commission - DG Education and Culture (Management), face-to-face interview on March 13, 2014  |
| EU I 04  | European Commission - DG Communication (Directorate C), face-to-face interview on March 13, 2014   |
| EU I 05  | European Commission - DG Communication (Directorate B), face-to-face interview on March 14, 2014   |
| EU I 06a | European Commission – Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (Partnership Instrument), telephone interview on March 11, 2015                         |
| EU I 06b | European Commission - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (Instrument Contributing to Peace and Stability), telephone interview on March 11, 2015 |
| EU I 06c | European External Action Service (Strategic Communications Division), telephone interview on March 11, 2015  |
| EU I 07  | European Commission – EC Representation in Stockholm (Communication Unit), telephone interview on March 18, 2015                                     |
| EU I 08  | European Commission – DG NEAR (Communication Unit), telephone interview on March 19, 2015  |
| EU I 09  | European Commission - DG Communication (Directorate A), telephone interview on March 25, 2015  |
| EU I 10  | European Commission - DG Communication (Spokesperson Service), telephone interview on May 08, 2015   |
| EU I 11  | European Commission – DG ECHO (Communication Unit), telephone interview on September 8, 2015   |
| EU I 12  | European Commission - EC Representation in Stockholm (Communication Unit), telephone interview on December 1, 2015                                   |

#### **FRANCE**

- |          |  |
|----------|--|
| FRA I 01 | Institut Français (Communication Unit), face-to-face interview on February 9, 2015 |
| FRA I 02 | France Médias Monde (Functional Unit), face-to-face interview on February 11, 2015 |

- FRA I 03 Permanent Representation of France to the EU (Communication Unit), face-to-face interview on February 11, 2015
- FRA I 04 Institut Français (Functional Unit), face-to-face interview on February 12, 2015
- FRA I 05 Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international (Direction générale de la mondialisation, du développement et des partenariats), face-to-face interview on February 13, 2015

## **SWEDEN**

- SWE I 01a Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Functional Unit), face-to-face interview on March 5, 2014
- SWE I 01b Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Functional Unit), face-to-face interview on March 5, 2014
- SWE I 02 Swedish Institute (Management), face-to-face interview on March 5, 2014
- SWE I 03 Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU (Communication Unit), telephone interview on May 8, 2015
- SWE I 04 Radio Sverige International (Management), written interview on March 12, 2014
- SWE I 05 Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Communication Unit), telephone interview on May 20, 2015
- SWE I 06 Swedish Institute (Management), telephone interview on May 26, 2015
- SWE I 07 Ministry of Culture (Functional Unit), telephone interview on August 21, 2015
- SWE I 08a Swedish Arts Council (Functional Unit), telephone interview on September 29, 2015
- SWE I 08b Swedish Arts Council (Functional Unit), telephone interview on October 9, 2010

## **Appendix A4: Acquisition of Interviewees – Project Description**

### **Scientific and Practical Relevance of the Research Project**

The communication with citizens, decision-makers and multipliers abroad makes an important contribution to reaching foreign policy or economic goals, improving and maintaining a country's image abroad as well as establishing relationships with organizations from other countries or on a supranational level. Against the theoretical background of the concept public diplomacy<sup>15</sup>, scholars have looked at communication strategies and practices of single organizations, single communication campaigns as well as instruments like international broadcasting. Only few studies have carried out in-depth analyses of countries and the complex networks of actors within these countries that include actors in areas of foreign trade promotion or foreign cultural policy.

This study goes beyond these previous efforts by looking at the communication strategies and practices of countries from a cross-cultural perspective: It conducts a comparative analysis of Sweden and France as two member states of the European Union and the European Union. By that, this study can shed light on best practice examples that can advance the communication practice of the European Union and its member states as well as identify the factors that facilitate and hinder their communication practices.

### **Objectives of the Research Project**

This research project conducts a comparative analysis of the communication strategies of the European Union and selected member states on the basis of the concept of public diplomacy. It addresses both the communication strategies and activities of organizations within the selected member states and within the European Union directed at citizens, multipliers and decision-makers within and outside of the European Union.

Analytical foci of this study include

- the functions, structures and resources of the most important communication actors within the European Union and the selected member states,
- their goals and target groups,
- the communication strategies, channels and tools they apply,
- the factors that enable or constrain these communication strategies,
- the issues they focus on in their communication strategies, and
- the sub-national, national and transnational networks they engage in.

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<sup>15</sup> Public diplomacy is understood as a form of external organizational communication that is primarily, but not exclusively directed at foreign elites, media and citizens. Public diplomacy is carried out by both state and non-state actors. Unlike public relations practitioners, public diplomacy organizations do not communicate on behalf of a single organization, but on behalf of a political entity like a country, a region or a supranational body. Three basic functions of public diplomacy can be identified: 1) Public diplomacy seeks to influence the attitudes and decisions of primarily foreign publics and governments and manage perceptions, 2) public diplomacy seeks to evoke understanding for political programs, ideas, ideals and values, and 3) public diplomacy seeks to establish and maintain relations and partnerships with other actors.

## **Procedure**

This research project combines guided expert interviews with an analysis of publicly available documents by actors of the European Union and selected member states. In order to analyze the communication strategies of Sweden in detail, this study seeks to conduct interviews with organizations that play a vital role in communicating Sweden to citizens, multipliers and decision-makers abroad.

The guided expert interviews will be conducted in person or via telephone. The duration of each interview will be 45 to 60 minutes.

## **Confidentiality**

All data gathered in the guided interviews is kept confidential and will be anonymized upon request of the interviewee.

## **Findings of the Study**

The findings of this research project are expected by the end of 2015. An executive summary of these findings will be provided to all interviewees who are interested in the findings of the project.

## **Contact**

For further information on the research project, please contact Ms. Alice Srugies via e-mail ([alice.srugies@tu-ilmenau.de](mailto:alice.srugies@tu-ilmenau.de)) or telephone (+49 3677 694659 or +49 163 7113937).

## Appendix A5: Interview Guidelines

### Guided Expert Interviews – Interview Guideline EU

This study comparatively analyzes communication strategies of the EU and its member states on the basis of the concept public diplomacy. Analytical foci of this study include:

- the functions, structures and resources of the most important communication actors within the European Union and the selected member states,
- their goals and target groups,
- the communication strategies, channels and tools they apply,
- the factors that enable or constrain these communication strategies,
- the issues they focus on in their communication strategies, and
- the sub-national, national and transnational networks they engage in.

The duration of this interview will be 45 to 60 minutes. All data gathered in the guided interviews is kept confidential and will be anonymized upon request of the interviewee. I would like to ask you for your permission to record this interview.

Do you have any questions prior to the interview? If not, I will start the recording now.

<b>Introduction / Public Diplomacy Understanding</b>
<p>1. You are holding the position of [ADD] in [ORGANIZATION]. Can you briefly tell me which tasks this position entails? For how long have you already been working in this position?</p> <p>2. This study works with the concept of public diplomacy. Are you familiar with the concept of public diplomacy?</p> <p>a. If yes, do you apply this concept to describe your own communication activities?</p> <p>b. If yes, how do you define the concept?</p> <p><i>EXPLANATORY NOTE: This study draws on the concept of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy subsumes communication activities of international actors (including national governments, international organizations, regional or local authorities) that aim at building, maintaining and improving political, economic, social, cultural and scientific relationships with other international actors and influencing the public sphere. Public diplomacy can be understood as an instrument of an international actor to improve its international relations and facilitate the assertion of its interests. Public diplomacy addresses citizens, multipliers or decision-makers outside of the EU, but also target groups within the EU to legitimize and win public support for the EU's external actions.</i></p> <p>c. If no, what are the terms you use to describe your communication activities that are directed at (primarily) foreign governments, other decision-makers, media and citizens?</p>
<b>Public Diplomacy Goals</b>
<p>3. What are the main objectives you pursue with regard to your communication activities?</p> <p>a. Can you prioritize these objectives?</p> <p>b. Who defines these objectives?</p> <p>c. To what extent do you need to coordinate these goals with other organizational units / organizations on a transnational / national /sub-national level?</p> <p>d. To what extent are these goals attuned to the overall policy objectives and guidelines of the EU?</p>

### Strategic Publics of Public Diplomacy

4. Who do you want to reach with your public diplomacy activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]? Who are the most important target groups/stakeholders?
5. What are your most important target countries or target regions?
- Can you prioritize these target countries / regions?
  - How important is it for you to reach target groups within the EU compared to target groups outside of the EU?
6. To what extent do you also consider multilateral organizations as target groups of your public diplomacy activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]?

### Public Diplomacy Approach, Public Diplomacy Tools, Public Diplomacy Messages

7. Do you define a public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] ?
- If yes, is this strategy documented in written form?
  - If yes, what is the time frame of your strategy?
  - If no, why not? Do you plan on developing such a strategy in the future?
8. Who is responsible for developing a public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] within your organization?
- Do you also coordinate this strategy with other actors outside of [ORGANIZATION]? If yes, with whom?
  - Do you also coordinate this strategy with representatives of single EU member states? If yes, can you give examples?
9. What are the most important issues that you currently focus on in your public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]? Can you name these issues or give examples for these issues?
- Can you prioritize these issues?
  - To what extent do you also include issues of single member states?
10. You have defined [GOALS STATED IN THE INTERVIEW] as public diplomacy goals [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]. Can you tell me which instruments and tools you use to reach these goals?
- Do you use different tools to reach different target groups?
  - Do you use different tools to reach target groups within different countries?
11. There are different communication channels including direct, face-to-face communication at a workshop or a discussion, the mass media, the internet as well as web 2.0, but also brochures and flyers. Can you tell me which communication channels you use to reach your goals?
12. Do you also define key messages in your public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]?

### Interorganizational Cooperation

13. Do you observe and inform yourself about the public diplomacy strategies and activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] of other organizations?
- If yes, do you observe strategies and activities of other organizations within the EU?
  - If yes, do you observe strategies and activities of organizations from EU member states?
  - If yes, do you observe strategies and activities of organizations in third countries?
  - If yes, do you observe strategies and activities of other multilateral organizations?
14. Do you also include aspects of these strategies and activities in your own work?
15. To what extent do you collaborate with other organizations to develop a public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] and implement this strategy?
- Do you collaborate with other organizations within the EU/ from member states/ from third countries / from other multilateral organizations?
  - Can you describe this collaboration in greater detail (with regard to purpose of the cooperation, the role of the single organizations, the degree of formalization, the mode of communication)?
  - Would you suggest a closer collaboration with these organizations? If yes, why? If not, why not?
  - What are factors that enable/ constrain this collaboration?
16. Do you engage in public diplomacy networks [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] with other organizations (within the EU and/or transnational networks)?
- Can you describe this collaboration in these networks in greater detail?
  - Would you suggest a closer collaboration with these networks? If yes, why? If not, why not?
  - What are factors that enable/ constrain collaboration within these networks?

### Conclusion / Future Challenges

17. What are future challenges with regard to the public diplomacy strategy and activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] of your organization?
18. What are future challenges with regard to the public diplomacy strategy and activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] of the EU?
19. Thank you very much. Is there anything you would like to add that we have not covered in this interview?

## Guided Expert Interviews – Interview Guideline English – EU Member States

This study comparatively analyzes communication strategies of the EU and its member states on the basis of the concept public diplomacy. Analytical foci of this study include:

- the functions, structures and resources of the most important communication actors within the European Union and the selected member states,
- their goals and target groups,
- the communication strategies, channels and tools they apply,
- the factors that enable or constrain these communication strategies,
- the issues they focus on in their communication strategies, and
- the sub-national, national and transnational networks they engage in.

The duration of this interview will be 45 to 60 minutes. All data gathered in the guided interviews is kept confidential and will be anonymized upon request of the interviewee. I would like to ask you for your permission to record this interview.

Do you have any questions prior to the interview? If not, I will start the recording now.

<b>Introduction / Public Diplomacy Understanding</b>
<p>1. You are holding the position of [ADD] in [ORGANIZATION]. Can you briefly tell me which tasks this position entails? For how long have you already been working in this position?</p> <p>2. This study works with the concept of public diplomacy. Are you familiar with the concept of public diplomacy?</p> <p>a. If yes, do you apply this concept to describe your own communication activities?</p> <p>b. If yes, how do you define the concept?</p> <p><i>EXPLANATORY NOTE: This study draws on the concept of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy subsumes communication activities of international actors (including national governments, international organizations, regional or local authorities) that aim at building, maintaining and improving political, economic, social, cultural and scientific relationships with other international actors and influencing the public sphere. Public diplomacy can be understood as an instrument of an international actor to improve its international relations and facilitate the assertion of its interests. Public diplomacy addresses citizens, multipliers or decision-makers outside of the EU, but also target groups within the EU to legitimize and win public support for the EU's external actions.</i></p> <p>c. If no, what are the terms you use to describe your communication activities that are directed at (primarily) foreign governments, other decision-makers, media and citizens?</p>
<b>Public Diplomacy Goals</b>
<p>3. What are the main objectives you pursue with regard to your communication activities?</p> <p>a. Can you prioritize these objectives?</p> <p>b. Who defines these objectives?</p> <p>c. To what extent do you need to coordinate these goals with other organizational units / organizations on a transnational / national /sub-national level?</p> <p>d. To what extent are these goals attuned to the overall policy objectives and guidelines of [COUNTRY]?</p>



### Strategic Publics of Public Diplomacy

4. Who do you want to reach with your public diplomacy activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]? Who are the most important target groups/stakeholders?
5. What are your most important target countries or target regions?
  - a. Can you prioritize these target countries / regions?
  - b. How important is it for you to reach target groups within the EU compared to target groups outside of the EU?
6. To what extent do you also consider multilateral organizations as target groups of your public diplomacy activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]?

### Public Diplomacy Approach, Public Diplomacy Tools, Public Diplomacy Messages

7. Do you define a public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] ?
  - a. If yes, is this strategy documented in written form?
  - b. If yes, what is the time frame of your strategy?
  - c. If no, why not? Do you plan on developing such a strategy in the future?
8. Who is responsible for developing a public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] within your organization?
  - a. Do you also coordinate this strategy with other actors outside of [ORGANIZATION]? If yes, with whom?
  - b. Do you also coordinate this strategy with representatives of the EU? If yes, can you give examples?
9. What are the most important issues that you currently focus on in your public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]? Can you name these issues or give examples for these issues?
  - a. Can you prioritize these issues?
  - b. To what extent do you also include European issues?
10. You have defined [GOALS STATED IN THE INTERVIEW] as public diplomacy goals [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]. Can you tell me which instruments and tools you use to reach these goals?
  - a. Do you use different tools to reach different target groups?
  - b. Do you use different tools to reach target groups within different countries?
11. There are different communication channels including direct, face-to-face communication at a workshop or a discussion, the mass media, the internet as well as web 2.0, but also brochures and flyers. Can you tell me which communication channels you use to reach your goals?
12. Do you also define key messages in your public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*]? If yes, do you also include a European dimension in these messages?

### **Interorganizational Cooperation**

13. Do you observe and inform yourself about the public diplomacy strategies and activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] of other organizations?

- a. If yes, do you observe strategies and activities of other organizations within [COUNTRY]?
- b. If yes, do you observe strategies and activities of other organizations from other countries?
- c. If yes, do you observe strategies and activities of the EU?
- d. If yes, do you observe strategies and activities of other multilateral organizations?

14. Do you also include aspects of these strategies and activities in your own work?

15. To what extent do you collaborate with other organizations to develop a public diplomacy strategy [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] and implement this strategy?

- a. Do you collaborate with other organizations within [COUNTRY] / from other countries / from the EU / from other international or supranational organizations?
- b. Can you describe this collaboration in greater detail (with regard to purpose of the cooperation, the role of the single organizations, the degree of formalization, the mode of communication)?
- c. Would you suggest a closer collaboration with these organizations? If yes, why? If not, why not?
- d. What are factors that enable/ constrain this collaboration?

16. Do you engage in public diplomacy networks [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] with other organizations (in [COUNTRY] and/or transnational networks)?

- a. Can you describe this collaboration in these networks in greater detail?
- c. Would you suggest a closer collaboration with these networks? If yes, why? If not, why not?
- d. What are factors that enable/ constrain collaboration within these networks?

### **Conclusion / Future Challenges**

17. What are future challenges with regard to the public diplomacy strategy and activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] of your organization?

18. What are future challenges with regard to the public diplomacy strategy and activities [*respective term used to describe communication activities*] of [COUNTRY]?

19. Thank you very much. Is there anything you would like to add that we have not covered in this interview?

## Guided Expert Interviews – Interview Guideline French – EU Member States

Ce projet de recherche effectue une analyse comparative des stratégies de communication de l'Union Européenne et des États membres sélectionnés sur la base du concept de la diplomatie publique. L'analyse porte sur :

- Les fonctions, l'organisation et les ressources des principaux acteurs de la communication dans l'Union européenne et des États membres sélectionnés,
- Leurs buts et leurs publics cibles,
- Leurs stratégies de communication et leurs moyens de communication,
- Des thèmes prioritaires de leurs stratégies de communications,
- Des facteurs qui contribuent et qui font obstacle aux stratégies de communication
- Leurs réseaux de diplomatie publique sous-nationaux, nationaux et transnationaux.

L'entretien dure de 45 à 60 minutes. Je souhaiterais enregistrer la conversation. Toutes les données recueillies sont traitées confidentiellement et seront rendues anonymes sur demande. Pourrais-je enregistrer l'entretien?

Avez-vous des questions sur le projet de recherche ou l'entretien avant de commencer? Si non, je voudrais bien commencer l'entretien et l'enregistrement maintenant.

### Introduction / Compréhension du concept de la diplomatie publique

1. Vous occupez le poste de [AJOUTER] chez [ORGANISATION]. Pouvez-vous me dire brièvement quelles sont vos tâches à ce poste? Depuis combien de temps travaillez-vous à ce poste?

2. Cette étude porte sur le concept de diplomatie publique. Connaissez-vous le concept de diplomatie publique ?

- a. Si oui, appliquez-vous ce concept pour décrire vos propres activités de communication?
- b. Si oui, comment définissez-vous ce concept?

*NOTE EXPLICATIF: Le concept de la diplomatie publique décrit des activités de communication des acteurs internationaux (des gouvernements nationaux, des organisations internationales, des autorités régionales ou locales...) avec les citoyens, les décideurs et les multiplicateurs à l'étranger dans le but de soutenir la politique étrangère et intérieure, améliorer l'image d'un pays et à établir et préserver les relations avec d'autres acteurs de l'environnement international.*

- c. Si non, quels sont les termes que vous utilisez pour décrire vos activités de communication qui visent (principalement) les gouvernements étrangers, d'autres décideurs, les médias et les citoyens?

### Objectifs

3. Concernant vos activités de communication, quels sont vos objectifs principaux?

- a. Pouvez-vous classer ces objectifs par ordre de priorité?
- b. Qui définit ces objectifs?
- c. Dans quelle mesure devez-vous coordonner ces objectifs avec d'autres unités organisationnelles / organisations, au niveau supranational / national / sous-national?
- d. Dans quelle mesure ces objectifs sont-ils en accord avec les objectifs politiques et les directives globaux de l'UE?

## Groupes Cibles

4. Qui voulez-vous atteindre avec vos activités de communication? Quels sont les groupes cibles/intervenants les plus importants?
5. Quels sont les pays ciblés ou les régions ciblées les plus importants pour vous?
  - a. Pouvez-vous classer ces pays/régions par ordre de priorité?
  - b. À quel point est-ce important pour vous d'atteindre les groupes ciblés à l'intérieur de l'UE, comparé aux groupes ciblés à l'extérieur de l'UE?
6. Dans quelle mesure considérez-vous aussi les organisations supranationales ou internationales comme des groupes cibles pour vos activités de communication?

## Stratégie, Mise en œuvre, Messages-clés

7. Définissez-vous une stratégie de communication / une stratégie de diplomatie publique?
  - a. Si oui, cette stratégie est-elle mise à l'écrit?
  - b. Si oui, quelle est l'échéance de votre stratégie?
  - c. Si non, pourquoi? Prévoyez-vous de développer une stratégie de diplomatie publique à l'avenir?
8. Qui est responsable de développer une stratégie de communication / une stratégie de diplomatie publique dans votre organisation?
  - a. Coordonnez-vous aussi votre stratégie de diplomatie publique avec d'autres acteurs que le DG pour la Communication ? Si oui, avec qui?
  - b. Coordonnez-vous aussi votre stratégie de diplomatie publique avec des représentants de l'UE ? Si oui, pouvez-vous donner des exemples?
9. Quels sont les problèmes les plus importants sur lesquels vous vous concentrez en ce moment dans votre stratégie de communication? Pouvez-vous nommer ces problèmes ou donner des exemples pour ces problèmes / une stratégie de diplomatie publique?
  - a. Pouvez-vous classer ces problèmes par ordre de priorité?
  - b. Dans quelle mesure incluez-vous aussi les problèmes européens?
10. Vous avez défini [OBJECTIFS CITÉS DANS L'ENTREVUE] comme objectifs de vos activités de communication. Pouvez-vous me dire quels instruments et outils vous utilisez pour atteindre ces objectifs?
  - a. Utilisez-vous des outils différents pour atteindre différents groupes cibles?
  - b. Utilisez-vous des outils différents pour atteindre des groupes cibles de différents pays?
11. Différents canaux de communication existent, comme la communication directe en face à face lors d'un atelier ou d'un débat, les médias de masse, internet et le web 2.0, ainsi que les brochures et flyers. Pouvez-vous me dire quels canaux de communication vous utilisez pour atteindre vos objectifs?
  - a. Utilisez-vous des canaux de communication différents pour atteindre différents groupes cibles?
  - b. Utilisez-vous des canaux de communication différents pour atteindre des groupes cibles de différents pays?
12. Définissez-vous aussi des messages-clés dans votre diplomatie publique ? Si oui, incluez-vous aussi une dimension européenne dans ces messages ?

### **Coopération entre des organisations**

13. Observez-vous et vous renseignez-vous sur les activités et stratégies de communication / les activités et stratégies de diplomatie publique d'autres organisations?

- a. Si oui, observez-vous les activités et stratégies de diplomatie publique d'autres organisations en France? Si oui, pouvez-vous donner des exemples?
- b. Si oui, observez-vous les activités et stratégies de diplomatie publique d'autres organisations dans d'autres pays? Si oui, pouvez-vous donner des exemples?
- c. Si oui, observez-vous les activités et stratégies de l'UE? Si oui, pouvez-vous donner des exemples?
- d. Si oui, observez-vous les activités et stratégies de diplomatie publique d'autres organisations internationales et supranationales? Si oui, pouvez-vous donner des exemples?

14. Incluez-vous aussi certains aspects de ces activités et stratégies de diplomatie publique dans votre propre travail? Si oui, pouvez-vous donner des exemples?

15. Dans quelle mesure collaborez-vous avec d'autres acteurs pour développer une stratégie de diplomatie publique / stratégie de communication et mettre en œuvre cette stratégie?

- a. Collaborez-vous avec d'autres organisations en France / dans d'autres pays / de l'UE / d'autres organisations internationales ou supranationales?
- b. Pouvez-vous décrire cette collaboration plus en détail (concernant la raison de cette coopération, le rôle de chaque organisation, le degré de formalisation, le mode de communication)?
- c. Suggèreriez-vous une collaboration plus étroite avec ces organisations? Si oui, pourquoi? Si non, pourquoi pas?
- d. Quels sont les facteurs qui permettent/limitent cette collaboration?

SI L'UE EST NOMMÉE PARTENAIRE DE COLLABORATION :

- e. Dans quelle mesure ressentez-vous que les objectifs/problèmes importants pour vous se reflètent dans la stratégie de diplomatie publique de l'UE ? Si oui, pouvez-vous donner des exemples ?

16. Vous engagez-vous dans des réseaux de diplomatie publique / communication avec d'autres organisations (en France / dans d'autres pays / au niveau supranational / sous-national)?

- a. Pouvez-vous décrire plus précisément cette collaboration dans ces réseaux (quel est le rôle de votre organisation, quels sont les buts des réseaux etc.)?
- c. Suggèreriez-vous une collaboration plus étroite avec ces réseaux? Si oui, pourquoi? Si non, pourquoi pas?
- d. Quels sont les facteurs qui permettent/limitent la collaboration dans ces réseaux?

### **Conclusion /Futurs défis**

17. Quels sont les futurs défis concernant les activités et la stratégie de communication de votre organisation?

18. Quels sont les futurs défis concernant les activités et la stratégie de communication de la France?

19. Merci beaucoup. Est-ce qu'il y a quelque chose que vous voulez ajouter?